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Résumé 
 Ce travail s’intéresse à la professionnalisation et la commercialisation des fédérations 
sportives internationales (FIs) partant du constat de l’absence quasi-totale de réflexion académique sur 
la définition ainsi que les impacts de la professionnalisation et de la commercialisation dans ces 
dernières. Considérant le nombre croissant d’employés dans ces FIs, des revenus commerciaux parfois 
importants et des redistributions souvent opaques, l’absence d’études académiques est d’autant plus 
étonnante.  
Le quadruple objectif de cette thèse est de conceptualiser la professionnalisation et la 
commercialisation dans le contexte des FIs, de décrire l’état actuel de professionnalisation et de 
commercialisation basé sur l’analyse de 22 FIs olympiques, d’investiguer le lien entre la 
professionnalisation et la commercialisation, et d’identifier les impacts managériaux de ces deux 
concepts sur les FIs. Ceci est abordé au moyen de trois questions principales : 1) Qu’est-ce qui 
favorise et qu’est-ce qui empêche la professionnalisation des FIs ? 2) Quels facteurs influencent la 
commercialisation des FIs ? 3) Quels sont les impacts managériaux de la professionnalisation et de la 
commercialisation des FIs ? 
La théorie néo-institutionnelle et les études de cas se sont avérées particulièrement utiles pour 
répondre aux trois questions et ainsi mieux comprendre le fonctionnement actuel des FIs. 
Les résultats, obtenus par l’analyse qualitative de contenu et l’analyse quali-quantitative 
comparée de 34 interviews semi-structurés et de documents, montrent qu’une professionnalisation 
systémique dans les FIs est actuellement encore limitée à la dimension des individus. En termes de 
structures et procédures, le manquent fréquent de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle (interne et externe) 
a contribué à de multiples scandales de gouvernance. Par suite de ces scandales, l’augmentation des 
pressions institutionnelles et les appels à une régulation accrue des FIs sont à l’origine d’une tendance 
à la déprofessionnalisation. Une classification des FIs olympiques en quatre types idéaux est proposée: 
les dominants, les marginalisés, les innovateurs et les traditionalistes. Plusieurs implications 
managériales liées à la professionnalisation et la commercialisation des FIs sont ensuite discutées.  
 
 
Summary 
Academic reflections on the definitions and impacts of professionalisation and 
commercialisation in the context of international sport federations (IFs) are literally absent. 
Considering the growing number of employees in IFs, of commercial revenues and the often opaque 
redistribution of these revenues, the absence of academic research is all the more surprising. Based on 
this observation, this thesis focuses on the professionalisation and commercialisation of IFs.  
The thesis pursues four main objectives: conceptualise professionalisation and 
commercialisation in the context of IFs, describe the current state of IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation based on the analysis of 22 Olympic IFs, investigate the interrelationship between 
professionalisation and commercialisation, and identify the impact of these two concepts on IFs. The 
objective is addressed by means of three research questions: 1) What are the drivers for and barriers to 
IFs’ professionalisation? 2) Which conditions influence IFs’ commercialisation? 3) What are the 
managerial implications of IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation? 
To answer the three research questions and further the understanding of IFs’ current 
functioning, the application of the theory of new institutionalism and conducting multiple case studies 
have proved to be of significant value. 
Data from 34 semi-structured interviews and documents were analysed by means of 
qualitative content analysis and qualitative comparative analysis. Findings demonstrate that systemic 
professionalisation in IFs is presently still limited to the dimension of individuals. In terms of structure 
and procedures, the frequent lack of efficient control mechanisms (internal and external) has 
contributed to multiple governance scandals. As a consequence of these scandals, an increase of 
institutional pressure on IFs and calls for stricter regulations entail a trend of deprofessionalisation. A 
classification of IFs into four ideal types is suggested: the market dominators, the marginalised, the 
innovators, and the traditionalists. Several managerial implications related to IFs’ professionalisation 
and commercialisation are presented and discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research context, topics and challenges 
As a physical activity (e.g. school sport, leisure sport, high performance sport), a social 
phenomenon (e.g. team sports, sporting events) and an economic marketplace (e.g. broadcasting 
rights, branding, players’ transfers), sport plays an important part in contemporary society. Major sport 
events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, marathons and even e-sport sport 
tournaments bring together thousands of fans from all over the world, united in their passion for sport. 
Because of the growing sport entertainment industry and the increasing economic benefits related 
herewith (e.g. broadcasting and sponsorship rights), professional athletes have become celebrities, 
some receiving gigantic salaries, and professional clubs have transformed into commercial brands. In 
sport, the term “professional” is frequently related to an economic activity as “money changes hands 
in the production, distribution and consumption of the sport” (Downward & Dawson, 2000, p. 1). In 
the case of professional athletes, high performance sport often takes the form of a remunerated 
activity (Leonard & Reyman, 1988). Professional sports leagues are economic entities (or joint 
ventures) that oversee competition schedules for league teams that, together, generate the league 
product (Flynn & Gilbert, 2001; Mason, 1999)1. And professional sport teams are part of professional 
sport leagues and their economy. An important trend among professional sport teams is the focus on 
building brand equity (Gladden & Funk, 2001; Ross, 2006; Ross, James, & Vargas, 2006).  
One of the reasons for the professionalisation of athletes, sports leagues and sport teams is the 
massive commodification of sport (Mason, 1999). Commodification means here “the structure and 
practice of sport are increasingly shaped by a market rationality”, resulting in “a direct and 
undisguised primacy of the profit motive” (Sewart, 1987, p. 172). Professional athletes, teams and 
sport leagues thus have become lucrative products on a growing market: athletes receive salaries and 
their transfers contribute to clubs’ profits; teams have become brands and some of them are owned by 
rich business men (corporate ownership); and leagues “sell” the sport event to media companies 
(broadcasting rights), sponsors (sponsorship rights) and fans (gate revenues, merchandising). Over the 
last 30 years, scholars regarded the commodification of sport primarily as a negative evolution, 
entailing for instance corruption (Forster, 2006), a trend of dehumanisation (Sewart, 1987) and a loss 
of social values (Walsh & Giulianotti, 2001).  
As individuals (athletes, paid staff) and the organisation of sport (leagues, events, etc.) become 
more and more professional and business-oriented, evolutions in international sport federations 
(henceforth: IFs) indicate similar transformations. For one thing, IFs increasingly resemble corporate 
organisations. Having started out as purely voluntary organisations, IFs’ operations are today more 
and more in the hands of paid professionals. In the case of Olympic IFs, staff size is, however, very 
                                                        
1 Leagues’ revenues largely stem from broadcasting rights and are shared amongst teams following different 
sharing/cross-subsidization systems. 
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heterogeneous, ranging from <10 (e.g. ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation) to >450 (e.g. 
FIFA). The evolution from voluntary to paid work further requires increased coordination (Bayle & 
Robinson, 2007), resulting, for instance, in departmental structures, hierarchical levels and reporting 
lines. Depending on the staff size, the IF’s structure is more or less sophisticated. A look at World 
Archery (WA), with 15 staff members one of the smaller Olympic IFs, shows that the federation’s 
office is split into four departments: administration, events, development, communications and 
marketing2 . Compared to this, the international volleyball federation (FIVB) with about 65 staff 
members is divided into 14 departments/units. As many of these departments perform tasks that do not 
necessarily require a sport specific background (e.g. finances, legal, communication, marketing), more 
and more professionals from outside sport are being hired. These employees bring specific 
professional norms into the federations, an evolution that is generally referred to as normative 
isomorphism (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Toepler & Anheier, 2004). This evolution is 
particularly reflected in IFs’ management characteristics, which, nowadays, include practices such as 
strategic planning, external financial audits and staff evaluations. In addition, IFs are increasingly 
bound up with for-profits through strategic partnerships (e.g. sponsorship contracts) and adopt 
boundary-blurring activities (e.g. bargaining with commercial rights such as broadcasting, sponsorship 
and event hosting). In some cases, commercial activities allow IFs to gain gargantuan revenues (e.g. 
FIFA’s overall revenue in 2014 amounted to USD 2.1 billion, of which 90.5% stem from commercial 
revenues3). 
These few examples emphasise that both professionalisation and commercialisation strongly 
influence IFs’ current structure, functioning and behaviour. Before turning towards the research 
questions and objectives, a brief introduction of the concepts of professionalisation and 
commercialisation seems useful.  
 
1.1.1. Professionalisation 
While professionalisation of athletes, clubs and leagues is often analysed from an economic 
perspective (e.g. Andreff & Szymanski, 2006; Smith & Stewart, 2010), it is also a constraining social 
norm of our times (Boussard, Demazière, & Milburn, 2010). Beliefs and discourses on 
professionalisation pressure people and organisations to demonstrate specific competences that can 
enhance trust and legitimise self-regulation (Evetts, 2009). The evident transformation of sport and 
sport organisations is at the origin of numerous research studies, at least at the level of national sport 
federations and clubs. Transformation processes in sport organisations are sometimes referred to as 
rationalisation (e.g. Kikulis, 2000; Skinner, Stewart, & Edwards, 1999) or bureaucratisation (e.g. (e.g. 
Bayle, 2010; Slack, 1985; Slack & Hinings, 1994). The most commonly used term, however, appears 
                                                        
2 WA - World Archery. Staff. (2017). Retrieved from: https://worldarchery.org/Staff  
3 FIFA financial revenues 2014 
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to be professionalisation (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2002; Kikulis, 2000; Skinner et al., 1999). In the 
sociology of professions, the definitions and concepts of ‘profession’, ‘professionalism’ and 
‘professionalisation’ have received extensive attention (e.g. Abbott, 1988; Crompton, 1990; Evetts, 
2003, 2009, 2011, 2014; Freidson, 1994, 2001; Larson, 1977; Stichweh, 1997). 
 
Professions 
Etymologically, the term ‘profession’ derives from the Old French verb ‘profiteor’, which means ‘to 
profess’. It implies that a person possesses (or claims to possess) certain knowledge, as well as a 
commitment to specific values. One of the early approaches describes professions as activities that 
require formal qualification through specific educational training. Universities provided the specific 
training and faculties “controlled the right of admission to professional practice” (Stichweh, 1997, p. 
95). Medicine and law constitute two archetypal professional groups. For communities to be 
recognised as professions, Larson (1977) argues that occupations need cognitive justifications (i.e. a 
body of knowledge and techniques, training) and normative justifications (i.e. service orientation and 
distinctive ethics justifying the privilege of self-regulation). In today’s functionally differentiated 
society, specific educational training and controlled admission are, however, insufficient definition 
criteria:  
 
If you look to emergent function systems of 20th century society, e.g. tourism, mass 
communication, sports, there is no possible argument that would allow them to be 
described as professionalized function systems. Professionalization here means the 
existence of one occupational group defining the system in its identity and combining 
classical attributes of professions (Stichweh, 1997, p. 97). 
 
And indeed, a look at the profiles of IF-employees reveals a multitude of occupational groups: former 
athletes, graduated sport managers, lawyers, communication, marketing, business and financial 
experts, etc. In the concrete case of sport management as a profession, one might ask whether it is 
actually recognised as an employment category? Is there a market for the knowledge and services of 
sport managers? Before moving on to the term of professionalism, it is worth taking a brief look at the 
term ‘professional’. ‘Professional’ not only designates a person of a specific profession, but also a 
quality. ‘Being professional’ means that someone is recognised for his/her conduct, demeanour and 
quality of work. Boussard et al. (2010) also refer to the quality of work as being “dialogic as it 
supposes recognition by other actors with whom these workers interact in the accomplishment of their 
activities” (p. 17, free translation from French). A recent study of Ruoranen et al. (2016), in the course 
of which interviews were conducted in national sport federations (henceforth: NFs), provides a 
concrete example: “professionalisation is primarily perceived to be a matter of ‘professional’ attitude” 
(p. 55).  
  
 
11 
Professionalism 
The concept of professionalism cannot be fixed to a single meaning. As a sociological concept it has 
“demonstrated changes over time both in its interpretation and function” (Evetts, 2003, p. 411). 
Broadly speaking, professionalism can be classified into two strands of interpretation: a normative 
value system, including a reaction to normative pressures, and a controlling ideology, including 
organisational professionalism. Past perspectives of professionalism as a normative value system 
implied a relation of trust between the professional worker as the expert (e.g. plumber, doctor) and the 
client as the layperson. Through “shared and common educational backgrounds, professional training 
and vocational experiences, and by membership of professional associations” (Evetts, 2003, p. 401), 
common identities emerged and created an aura of trust. Today, the appeal of professionalism is, 
above all, grounded on the principles of accountability, performance, efficacy and profitability. As the 
accomplishment of these principles can only be recognised by external actors, normative pressures to 
professionalise from outside the organisation become more important (Boussard et al., 2010).  
The discourse of professionalism as a normative value system is further used as a tool to gain 
clients’ trust and to increase legitimacy in the eyes of public authorities to act autonomously. Contrary 
to the functionalist definition in the early years of the sociology on professions (e.g. Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson, 1933; Parsons, 1939; Wilensky, 1964), the idea of professionalism/professionalisation is 
today disseminated as a social norm, an ideology, a discourse that is positively related to increased 
performance, accountability, expertise and competency. In turn, “the measurements of and attempts to 
demonstrate professionalism actually increase the demand for explicit accounting of professional 
competences” (Evetts, 2009, p. 254). Professionalism as a normative value experienced strong 
criticism during the 1970s and 1980s, decrying professions as “powerful, privileged, self-interested 
monopolies” (Evetts, 2003, p. 401). The sceptical approach marked the beginning of the approach of 
professionalism as a controlling ideology. Control means in this case that an occupational group tries 
to dominate other occupational groups, “manifested by a discourse of control, used increasingly by 
managers” (Evetts, 2009, p. 248). What Boussard et al. (2010) term as “l’injonction au 
professionalism4” [imperative to professionalise] and Evetts (2011) as “new professionalism” is in fact 
a transformation in the way of defining, controlling and evaluating work. In organisational 
professionalism, control is exercised through hierarchical structures of responsibility and decision-
making, resulting in an increase of standardised procedures. Organisational professionalism strives for 
greater efficiency and effectiveness. Control techniques employed by managers include performance 
review, appraisal and target setting, introducing further the notion of competition between individuals.  
 
 
                                                        
4 By means of multiple case studies in different professional groups, the authors analyse professional dynamics 
(e.g. resistance, adaptation, mobilisation, inertia) as responses to change mechanisms (e.g. rationalisation) that 
seek to reduce workers’ autonomy (e.g. conditions of employment and status, standardisation and steering of 
tasks, definition of efficacy and performance, system of values). 
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Professionalisation  
Just as the concepts of profession and professionalism, professionalisation is used in a rather 
inconsistent manner. Based on the two brief interpretations of ‘professionalism’ provided above, 
‘professionalisation’ can be the process of occupations achieving recognition as professions through a 
normative value system (occupational professionalisation), the process of implementing managerial 
controls that put particular emphasis on the evaluation of work results and the definition of 
performance measures (organisational professionalisation) or a rhetoric to gain trust and autonomy 
(discourse of professionalism). For this thesis, organisational professionalisation and the discourse of 
professionalism are of importance. Do IFs currently experience a process of professionalisation that is 
triggered by normative pressures? And if so, how do IFs and sport managers react to these pressures? 
Is there a call for professionalism from within? Is the discourse of professionalism employed by IFs to 
gain trust and autonomy? One proof for such a discourse being used effectively by the International 
Olympic Committee (henceforth: IOC) is the support and recognition of the autonomy and 
independence of sport by the United Nations (UN)5. 
 
Professionalisation in sport management 
Professionalisation in the context of sport management, and more precisely the management of 
national sport organisations (henceforth: NSO) and sport governing bodies, has been analysed from 
various perspectives, including among others: the process of professionalisation in French NFs (Bayle, 
2001), the impact of professional staff (Thibault, Slack, & Hinings, 1991), voluntary and paid work in 
voluntary sport clubs (Seippel, 2002), organisational change from amateurism to professionalism 
(O'Brien & Slack, 2003; Skinner et al., 1999), professional logic/rationale (Koski & Heikkala, 1998; 
O'Brien & Slack, 2004), challenges of sport organisations professionalisation (Chantelat, 2001). And 
yet professionalisation still remains an ill-defined concept in sport management (Dowling, Edwards, & 
Washington, 2014). In their attempt to grasp the various meanings of professionalisation in sport 
management literature, Dowling et al. (2014) suggest three classifications. According to their findings, 
some few scholars relate professionalisation to the hiring of paid staff and the transformation of 
occupations into professions, hence following the logic of occupational professionalisation (e.g. 
Robinson, 2003). Most scholars link professionalisation to the implementation of new managerial 
practices as a direct impact of the arrival of trained professionals, who have specific expertise and 
experience in various economic domains, thus following the logic of organisational 
professionalisation (e.g. Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Shilbury, Ferkins, & Smythe, 2013; Thibault et al., 
1991). Regarding organisational professionalisation, studies particularly focus on sport governance, 
organisational structure and policy-making. Systemic professionalisation constitutes a final and 
                                                        
5 United Nations. (2014). UN General Assembly. Resolution 69/6: Sport as a means to promote education, 
health, development and peace. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/6 
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broader conceptualisation, considering professionalisation as the result of externally induced changes 
that concern multiple organisational domains (e.g. O'Brien & Slack, 2003; Skinner et al., 1999).  
More recent studies of Nagel et al. (2015) and Ruoranen et al. (2016) suggest conceptual 
frameworks to analyse the professionalisation of sport organisations with regard to organisational 
rationalisation and efficiency. While Nagel et al. draw conclusions from extant literature on NSOs to 
build a multi-level framework to analyse professionalisation, Ruoranen et al. explore the perception of 
practitioners from NFs regarding professionalisation. Compared to the relatively abundant 
research on national sport federations’ professionalisation, little, if not to say no, research 
currently exists on IFs in this regard. This is rather astonishing, especially as IFs employ more and 
more paid staff. Between 1999 and 2014, the staff size of UEFA has quadrupled from 96 to 450 staff 
members and FIFA employs today more than 450 staff members6. Furthermore, as administrative 
bodies of international sport, and contrary to NFs that strive for sporting success at international 
events in first place, IFs employ less technical experts (e.g. coaches). Instead, they rely on experts 
from various domains, including finances, communication and marketing. We can therefore assume 
that processes of both occupational and organisational professionalisation are shaping IFs current 
structure and functioning. 
 
1.1.2. Commercialisation in and of sport 
Another approach to the transformation of sport organisations is to look at the rapid 
commodification and commercialisation of sport since the 1970s (North America), 1980s (Western 
Europe) and 1990s (rest of the world) (Andreff & Szymanski, 2006). As ‘commercialisation’ includes 
the word ‘commerce’, it implies that two or more parties trade with each other. Today, sport is 
undeniably an integral part of the worldwide economy. The rapidly growing economic significance of 
sport is also at the origin of the emergence of sport economics as a research field. First studies in the 
1950s are closely related to the importance of uncertainty of outcome in professional sports leagues 
and professional sports in general in the North American context. In the introduction of the Handbook 
on the economics of sport, Andreff and Szymanski (2006) note in this regard: “while teams compete 
on the field, one team could not dominate its competition if the league is to be successful in terms of 
sales and profit. Unlike in most industries, the firms (clubs) in a sports league must collude to balance 
the competition” (p. 2). Other topics followed, including the demand for sport, for sporting goods, for 
sport broadcasting and sponsorship. The growing importance of sports economics as a discipline is 
further emphasised by the creation of the International Association of Sport Economists in 1999, the 
Journal of Sports Economics in 2000, and the admission of articles on sport in mainstream economic 
                                                        
6 24heures. (2015). Trois graphiques pour expliquer FIFA et UEFA. Retrieved from: 
https://www.24heures.ch/sports/trois-graphiques-expliquer-fifa-uefa/story/31154510  
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journals. Three of the most salient examples of the commercialisation of sport are the sports goods 
industry, professional sport teams and mega-sporting events. 
 
The sports goods industry 
Since the 1980, the sports goods industry has been a branch of growing complexities and ever 
increasing revenues (Lipsey, 2006). Over the last three decades, the sporting goods industry evolved 
into an exploding marketplace. Nike is a perfect example of the explosive growth. In 2017, Forbes 
estimated the brand value of Nike to mount to USD 29.6 billion, guaranteeing Nike the title of the 
most valuable sports business brand worldwide7. However, as Slack and Parent (2006) point out, 
“Nike has not always been a large multimillion-dollar organization” (p. 1). Blue Ribbon Sports, which 
later became Nike, was formed in 1964. In its first year, Blue Ribbon generated modest revenue of 
USD 8’000. The distribution of running shoes at local and regional track meetings had nothing in 
common with the Nike stores we know today. But with the increasing popularity of running in the late 
1960 and 1970s, revenues bounced up quickly to attend nearly USD 300’000 in 1969 and USD 3.2 
million in 1973. Simultaneously to its market volume, Nike’s company structure grew, and its 
organisational design changed from a loosely structured organisation with informal coordination to a 
formalized management system with standardized operating practices. Despite the sports goods 
industry facing “a high volatility of demand” (Andreff, 2006, p. 27), store sales in the United States 
have tripled from USD 15.58 billion in 1992 to USD 46.35 in 20158. Several factors are contributing 
to this increase, including online shopping and new technologies (e.g. fitness apps). Even though IFs 
are the governing bodies of international sport, they capitalise little on the sports goods industry 
(though some IFs have introduced licence fees to produce specific equipment that is in line with the 
federation’s regulations).  
 
Sport teams and athletes 
The second example of the commercialisation of sport concerns professional sport teams and athletes. 
Bill Gerrard (1999) started an article by saying: “Team sports have become big business. The revenue 
streams are growing exponentially” (p. 273). Thanks to gargantuan revenues from broadcasting rights, 
sponsorship and merchandising, clubs such as Manchester United have indeed become large 
companies. And the more media exposure they have, the more they attract big business partners: “We 
attract leading global companies such as adidas, Aon, and General Motors (Chevrolet) that want 
access and exposure to our community of followers and association with our brand” (Manchester 
                                                        
7 Statista. (2017). Brand value of sports businesses worldwide. Retrieved from: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/253349/brand-value-of-sports-businesses-worldwide/  
8 Statista. (2015). Annual sporting goods store sales in the US since 1992. Retrieved from: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/197704/annual-sporting-goods-store-sales-in-the-us-since-1992/  
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United)9. Social media is adding to the worldwide spread of club-relevant information and interaction 
between the club, fans and followers. On 30 June 2017, Manchester United counted more than 17.7 
million Twitter followers and close to 150 million social connections10. Its business model is built 
around three principal sectors: commercial, broadcasting and matchday. In the past, the largest part of 
income came from matchdays (2006: 43% or £71 million) followed by broadcasting (2006: 29%) and 
commercial (2006: 28%). Over the years, the business model shifted towards more income from 
commercial (2017: 48% or £276 million, this being a mean annual growth rate of 17.4%) followed by 
broadcasting (2017: 33%) and matchdays now occupying the last place (2017: 19%)11. While growing 
revenues from broadcast rights and sponsorship deals with businesses partners came as a blessing for 
some teams, it also increased disparities between teams. With an annual budget of £31 million in 
2016, Team Sky largely came top of the list of professional cycling teams. Compared to this, the 
annual budget of Cannondale-Drapac amounted to one-third of Team Sky’s budget12. Research into 
sports teams frequently encompasses business-related topics such as brand equity (e.g. Ross, 2006) 
and brand loyalty (e.g. Gladden & Funk, 2001).  
In the wake of a growing demand for spectator sport (Simmons, 2006), league revenues 
increased (notably through broadcasting rights) and were redistributed to players in form of salaries. 
And even athletes from individual sports could capitalise on the rise of TV spectator sport by 
becoming a living advertising space when signing sponsorship contracts. At the same time, Vamplew 
(1988) argues “that sport became commercialised a long time ago” (p. 4), notably starting with gate 
revenues in the late nineteenth century. As Vamplew further notes, soccer players of the Scottish club 
Celtics went on strike as early as 1890 to claim higher wages. From this perspective, professional 
athletes in the sense of paid athletes are indeed not a novelty. In comparison, the sometimes 
irrationally high salaries of some athletes are a relatively recent evolution. In the 2017 ranking of The 
World’s Highest-Paid Athletes established by Forbes13, the accumulated salary of the top-ten athletes 
amounted to USD 623.7 million. And the top-twenty athletes come from only six different sports: 
soccer, basketball, tennis, football, golf and auto racing. In football, a key event in the sharp increase 
of player’s salaries and transfer fees was the so-called “Bosman ruling”. In 1990, Bosman’s employer, 
the RFC Liege, not only refused to let him change clubs without a transfer fee despite his contract 
coming to an end; it also drastically cut his wage after the deal had collapsed. Bosman attacked his 
                                                        
9 Manchester United. (2018). About Manchester. Retrieved from: http://ir.manutd.com/company-
information/about-manchester-united.aspx  
10 Idem 
11 Manchester United. (2018). Business Model. Retrieved from: http://ir.manutd.com/company-
information/business-model.aspx  
12 Businessinsider. (2017). Americas ‘Moneyball’ Tour de France team just made a clever deal that should make 
it much more competitive against Chris Froome’s Sky juggernaut. Retrieved from: 
http://www.businessinsider.fr/us/oath-cannondale-drapac-digital-media-partner-tour-de-france-cycling-team-
2017-7/  
13 Forbes. (2017). The World’s Highest-Paid Athletes. Retrieved from: 
https://www.forbes.com/athletes/list/#tab:overall  
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club at the European Court of Justice. In 1995, the court decided in Bosman’s favour. Since then, 
football players in Europe can change clubs at the end of their contract without a transfer fee. The 
Bosman ruling is at the origin of football’s exploding player salaries and transfer fees, as well as the 
arrival of players’ agents. 
 
Sporting events 
The third and final example of how commercialisation has penetrated various aspects of sport relates 
to sporting events. Scholars have analysed mega-sporting events from a multitude of different 
perspectives, including their economic impact (e.g. Lee & Taylor, 2005, on the FIFA World Cup), 
their social impact (e.g. Malfas, Theodoraki, & Houlihan, 2004, on the Olympic Games) and 
sponsorship (e.g. Crompton, 2004, on sponsorship effectiveness). The evolution of the economic 
growth of sporting events is often analysed through the example of the Olympic Games, and in 
particular the value of Olympic broadcast rights: “The summer Olympics in Rome 1960 attracted $1.2 
million TV rights; 40 years later in Sydney, the broadcasting rights sold for $1332 million (this is 
equivalent to an annualised growth rate of 19 per cent)” (Andreff & Szymanski, 2006, p. 6). The 
Olympic Summer and Winter Games as the IOC’s “unique ‘property’ has permitted it to head a 
flourishing business enterprise since the 1980s, even if its legal status remains that of a non-profit 
association” (Chappelet, 2006, p. 241). Competition between major TV networks contributed to the 
growth of the IOC’s broadcast rights. The second most important source of income from mega-
sporting events is marketing/sponsorship rights. From 2012 to 2015, FIFA generated about USD 1.5 
billion through marketing rights, this being 25.7% of its overall income for the same period14. For 
those sports that are being staged in stadiums, ticketing may represent a third source of revenue. 
Through the 2014 FIFA World Cup, FIFA generated 23% of its 2014 revenue through ticketing15.  
 
International sport federations 
While the economic volume generated through the sports goods industry and sport teams is 
considerable, these revenues are, for the most part, out of the IF’s reach. The only exceptions are 
licence fees for internationally regulated sports equipment (e.g. balls, rackets) and teams’/athletes’ 
registration with the federation. Meanwhile, as the rights holders of the World Championships (and 
other international sporting events in most cases), IFs can generate important amounts of revenue 
through broadcast and sponsorship rights as well as organising fees. The commercialisation of 
sporting events constitutes in fact one of the most important sources of revenue for IFs, which, like the 
IOC, are non-profit associations. Hoehn (2006) comments this situation by saying: “Governing bodies 
fund themselves from membership fees, from competitions they run and increasingly from 
sponsorship and sale of TV rights” (p. 234). If sport has become big business, how comes then that 
                                                        
14 FIFA financial statements 2010-2015 
15 FIFA financial statement 2014 
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no studies exist on the commercialisation of IFs as sports’ governing bodies? Several scholars 
criticise IFs’ massive commercialisation. At the same time, no study has yet analysed some of the 
most evident questions: Which of the IFs’ activities are commercial activities? How do IFs 
commercialise? Which goals does the IF pursue with these activities? What is the impact of 
commercialisation on IFs’ social mission?  
 
A considerable amount of studies on the commercialisation of nonprofit organisations 
(henceforth: NPO) in general has been published over the last 20 years (e.g. Guo, 2004, 2006; 
Weisbrod, 1998; Young, 1998). A recurring issue in these studies is whether commercialisation of 
NPOs  “fosters profit-seeking at the expense of social good” (Child, 2010, p. 146). Though 
commercial ventures in the NPO sector are not new, especially in competitive markets (Tuckman, 
1998), Young (1998) queries their handling with regard to the regulation and taxation: “As nonprofit 
commercial income grows, how much of it should be taxed? If commercial activities can undermine 
the integrity of nonprofits or divert them from their social missions, what limits are required to 
maintain tax-exempt status?” (p. 279). Broad mission formulations allow NPOs in their tightrope walk 
between social mission and commercial activities. Some of the central questions that can be deduced 
from the general NPO literature on commercialisation are: do commercial activities and initiatives 
contribute to the NPO’s mission? How can appropriate oversight on the use of commercial funds be 
guaranteed? Does the use of for-profit business techniques favour greater organisational efficiency? 
Considering growing revenues from commercial rights (e.g. broadcast, sponsorship, organising fees), 
it is surprising that research on the commercialisation of IFs is literally non-existent.  
 
1.1.3. Challenges 
Both the professionalisation and commercialisation of IFs have received little attention in sport 
management literature. This lack of research is even more surprising as IFs constitute an integral part 
of the global sport ecosystem. As stipulated in their mission, IFs are responsible for setting up, 
supervising and sanctioning international sporting rules (e.g. rules on participation, player transfers, 
doping, etc.), for promoting and developing their sport (e.g. development projects), and for organising 
their sport (e.g. World Championships, World Cups). Through their role and the multiple connections 
that result from it, IFs are strongly intertwined with professional sport and the wider sport economy. 
Consequently, both professionalisation and commercialisation are expected to play a central role in 
their current functioning.  
Though no clear definition of IFs’ professionalisation exists to this day, changes to IFs’ 
structure and functioning as described above are indicative of some sort of change process that can be 
qualified as professionalisation or at least as professionalisation discourse or rhetoric. Simultaneously, 
increasing reliance on revenues from commercial rights, particularly from sporting events, suggest a 
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strong commercial focus. In summary, IFs have become both complex organisational structures and 
global economic actors. And while governance issues dominate the research agenda on international 
sport governing bodies (e.g. Chappelet, 2011; Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Chappelet & 
Mrkonjic, 2013; Forster, 2006, 2016; Geeraert, Mrkonjic, & Chappelet, 2015; Pielke, 2013, 2015), the 
underlying concepts of professionalisation and commercialisation have been widely ignored.  
 
1.2. Research questions and objectives 
Against the background of the above reflections emerges the question of how professionalisation 
and commercialisation have shaped and shape IFs’ structure and functioning. Considering 
professionalisation and commercialisation as central dynamics in IFs’ current transformation, an 
analysis of their meaning (i.e. definition), occurrence (e.g. drivers, barriers, conditions), 
interrelationship and implications is presently missing in the sport management literature. At the same 
time, the constant focus on IFs’ governance issues is somewhat misleading. Because of a few analysed 
IFs, which have in common to generate high revenues and to have been/be involved in governance 
scandals (e.g. IOC – International Olympic Committee, FIFA – International Association Football 
Federation, IAAF - International Association of Athletics Federation, FIVB – International Volleyball 
Federation, UCI – International Cycling Federation), extant research studies primarily produce a very 
negative picture of international sport organisations. The focus on governance issues creates in fact a 
biased picture of the more than 90 IFs as it fails to produce a more comprehensive understanding of 
their general structure and functioning.  
Though research on the professionalisation of NSOs and the commercialisation of NPOs in 
general is abundant, both concepts are ill-defined and poorly explored in the context of IFs. Despite 
professionalism being an important social norm today and despite the transformation of the IOC and 
some IFs into commercial giants, a critical reflection on the interrelationship between 
professionalisation and commercialisation in IFs is currently lacking. Considering repeated 
governance scandals that have discredited IFs and increasing pressure from media and public 
authorities on the one hand, and IFs’ strong reliance on the techniques and rhetoric of the corporate 
world on the other hand, this research gap is even more surprising. The objective of this thesis is 
therefore to explore the concepts of and interrelationship between IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation as central transformation processes in recent years. Both professionalisation and 
commercialisation may further contribute to the explanation of recurring governance issues in IFs. To 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation, this 
thesis seeks to collect data from a representative sample of IFs, which goes beyond the usual focus on 
prominent international sport organisations such as IOC, FIFA, FIVB, IAAF and UCI. 
To remedy some of the shortcomings mentioned in the research context, this thesis reviews 
extant literature on the concepts of professionalisation and commercialisation, analyses their 
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occurrence and discusses their interrelationship and managerial implications. Before reviewing extant 
literature, a couple of basic questions constitute a useful starting point: Why did IFs emerge in the first 
place? What were their initial role and characteristics? How are IFs perceived today? What are their 
current role and characteristics? If we want to understand IFs’ current functioning and rationale, we 
first must understand where they come from. Only if we know the basics of their founding idea and 
the form and functioning this founding idea produced, we can draw a picture of IFs’ current form and 
functioning. A growing divergence between the original and the actual form of IFs would be a strong 
indication for important transformations to have taken place. Though I will briefly broach the topic of 
IFs’ emergence as well as their characteristics and legal form as NPOs, the main goal of this thesis is 
clearly not to trace back the historical evolution of IFs, nor to explain their legal form from a juridical 
point of view. These questions and reflexions only pave the ground for the main focus of this thesis: 
the interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation in international sport 
federations. The following research questions will henceforth guide the research: 
 
1. What are drivers for and barriers to professionalisation in international sport federations? 
2. Which conditions particularly influence international sport federations’ commercialisation?  
3. What are the managerial implications of international sport federations’ professionalisation 
and commercialisation?  
 
The term “international sport federations” refers only to those sport organisations that govern 
their sport at the international level and are recognised by SportAccord, the umbrella organisation for 
all Olympic, IOC-recognised and non-Olympic international sport federations16. In what follows, I 
first outline IFs’ emergence and their structure and functioning in the past (2.1) and then give an 
overview of their current structure and functioning (2.2). In a second step, I look at differences and 
commonalities between past and present structures and ways of functioning (2.3). I then explain the 
two key concepts of professionalisation (3.1) and commercialisation (3.2) by referring to extant 
literature. Based on these concepts and uncovered research gaps (3.3), I develop a conceptual 
framework (3.4). As this thesis is composed of publications, each publication has its own 
methodology. However, some common methodological elements are presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 
then provides a summary of the constituting articles (2) and book chapters (2). The first two 
publications deal with the question of causes of professionalisation in IFs, while the third and fourth 
publications examine commercialisation as a specific form of professionalisation: 
 
  
                                                        
16 SportAccord also counts several multi-sports games’ organisers and sport-related associations, but these are 
beyond the focus of this study. 
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1. Drivers of and Barriers to Professionalization in International Sport Federations (Publication I): 
The first article (Clausen et al., 2017) analyses drivers of and barriers to professionalisation in IFs. 
Parting from the observation of a fast changing and increasingly complex environment, IFs have 
to face new and complex challenges resulting from internal as well as external factors. While 
research on NSO is abundant, the question of IFs’ organisational change has rarely been subject to 
comprehensive studies. The conceptual framework we developed is based on the concepts and 
dynamics of organisational change, the influence of isomorphic pressures and the 
operationalization of the multi-level framework of Nagel et al. (2015). Data from six case studies 
was processed and analysed using qualitative content analysis. Findings reveal eleven essential 
drivers of and five barriers to IFs’ professionalisation. Three findings are discussed in detail: (1) 
professionalisation as a dynamic process with phases of acceleration that vary depending on IFs’ 
size; (2) IFs becoming increasingly business-like; and (3) five causes of particular relevance to 
IFs’ professionalisation process. These are: external pressures, leadership, commercialisation, 
management practices and organisational culture. 
 
2. Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of sport (Publication II): The second 
publication (Clausen & Bayle, forthcoming 2018), a book chapter on Hein Verbruggen, the late 
UCI president (1991-2005), picks up on one specific aspect of the first article: it focuses on the 
impact of individual key actors and their leadership on IFs’ professionalisation process. The 
chapter provides detailed insights into the career of Hein Verbruggen. His career is significantly 
linked to the structural and operational professionalisation of the UCI, and the transformation of 
SportAccord (formerly GAISF for “General Association of International Sport Federations”; now 
again GAISF but abbreviated for “Global Association of International Sport Federations”) to 
become a self-sufficient service provider to all IFs as well as a multi-sport games organiser. The 
chapter focuses on Hein Verbruggen as a marketing expert and his entrance into the world of 
sports, his managerial vision as a businessman and its implementation at the UCI, and his reform 
of SportAccord to become a service provider to IFs and a multi-sports game organiser. Being a 
person that strongly divides opinions of contemporaries and media alike, a short overview of some 
allegations against Hein Verbruggen is given. The chapter concludes with a summary of his main 
achievements. Information is based on 10 interviews (three of which were held with Hein 
Verbruggen and seven with former collaborators and contemporary witnesses) and data analysis of 
documents from the IOC, UCI and SportAccord as well as newspaper articles. 
 
3. International sport federations’ commercialisation – a qualitative comparative analysis 
(Publication III): Changing from the question of causes of IFs’ professionalisation, the third 
publication (Clausen et al., 2018) addresses the issue of forms that arise from IFs’ 
professionalisation processes. The study on which the article is based constitutes a first attempt to 
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collect, analyse and compare data on IFs’ commercialisation through sporting events. To analyse 
IFs’ event commercialisation, the method of crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) is 
applied to 22 Olympic IFs. Four conditions of influence are deduced from literature, interviews 
and documents: strategic planning, specialisation, social media engagement and low 
accountability. Of the 35 Olympic IFs (including 28 summer and 7 winter Olympic IFs), 22 IFs 
provide sufficient information to analyse their event commercialisation. The findings reveal a 
variety of configurations, six of which result in high and five in low commercialisation. They 
further highlight the importance of specialisation and social media engagement to achieve high 
levels of commercialisation. At the same time, IFs’ increasingly business-like behaviour also 
brings new issues to the fore such as the risks of mission drift, goal vagueness and governance 
issues. 
 
4. Major sport events at the centre of international sport federations’ resource strategy (Publication 
IV): The final publication (Clausen & Bayle, 2017) presented in this thesis can be considered as a 
sub-aspect of the topic of commercialisation as it looks at IFs’ major sporting events as a strategic 
tool within their financing strategy. The book chapter starts with an overview of event types in 
international sport, followed by a general summary of IFs’ main sources of revenue. The analysis 
of major sport events as a central element of IFs’ resource strategy is approached in two steps: 
first, observed commonalities across several IFs are outlined; and second, four cases exemplifying 
four different models of revenue generation are presented. Findings of this chapter reveal that 
observed patterns are likely to be historically funded or emerged as the result of changing 
environmental circumstances and organisations’ internal response strategies to them. At least three 
aspects make international sport events and their role in IFs’ resource strategy an interesting study 
topic: the constantly growing number and globalisation of sport events, their continuous 
commercialisation and the lack of research on sport events from the perspective of IFs. 
 
The discussion section is divided into two parts: the discussion of findings related to the three 
research questions; and the discussion of managerial implications that are deduced from the four 
publications. The risk of sector bending and mission drift is being discussed more in detail because of 
its underestimated importance and the current lack of research in sport management literature. In the 
context of theoretical contributions, I discuss the interrelationship between the concepts of 
professionalisation and commercialisation, suggesting a continuation of the design archetypes of 
Kikulis et al. (1992). A second theoretical contribution is the application of the institutional 
perspective, and notably institutional isomorphism, to analyse the interrelationship between 
professionalisation and commercialisation in IFs. The conclusion presents additional reflections and 
thought-provoking questions.  
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2. General context of International Sport federations 
2.1. International sport federations in the past: regulatory bodies with volunteer structures  
If we want to understand IFs’ current functioning, we need to understand where they come 
from. Though the creation of IFs has generally evolved from the bottom-up (Ferkins & Van 
Bottenburg, 2013), the organisation of the first modern Olympic Games in 1896, its fast growing 
popularity and the rapid expansion of modern sport were certainly additional impulses. How big 
should a football pitch be? How many players should play in a rugby team? What size should a tennis 
ball have? These questions may seem ridiculous today. The international standardisation of rules 
became one of the main responsibilities of IFs. Before the modern Olympic Games, internationally 
standardised rules were lacking in most sports. As an anecdote: the first draft of football rules 
established by the British Football Association (formed in 1864) “allowed running with the ball and 
hacking – kicking the shins of – the player in procession” (Vamplew, 2006). Football is one of the first 
sports to have been thoroughly regulated. All in all, the advent of the Olympic Games and 
international sport competitions were a true game changer in terms of sport regulations. To make sport 
competitions between two or more countries possible (as is the case at the Olympic Games), 
international rules became indispensable. It is therefore little surprising that many of the Olympic 
federations were created around the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (Table 1). 
Upon their creation and for many decades after, people’s involvement in IFs’ mission has been 
first and foremost about passion for the sport and gratuitous participation in its dissemination. At the 
same time, passion and voluntary work as the cornerstones of IFs’ functioning never excluded the 
pursuit of individual and political interests. These characteristics are coherent with the general NPO 
literature (e.g. Weisbrod, 1998). Two aspects briefly exemplify why IFs were created as NPOs: one is 
their structure and the other their mission/role. With regard to the first, IFs started out as pure amateur 
structures (Inglis, 1997a) with the goal of setting up international sporting rules. In short: some 
devoted and passionate people sacrificed their time to set up international rules. In their role as 
regulatory body whose functioning was guaranteed by volunteers, IFs did not seek financial profits in 
the first place. Hence, in their original form, the effectiveness of IFs as NPOs depended largely on 
volunteers and the time, skills and experience they put at the IF’s disposal (Cornforth, 2001). As a first 
observation, the structural characteristic of volunteer organisations justifies IFs’ creation as NPOs. 
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Table 1. Examples of IFs' creation 
IF Year Creation decided in Headquarters today 
FIFA 1904 Paris (France)17 Zurich (Switzerland) 
FINA 1908 London (England)18 Lausanne (Switzerland) 
FISA 1892 Turin (Italy)19 Lausanne (Switzerland) 
ISAF 1907 Paris (France)20 London (England) 
ISSF 1907 Zurich (Switzerland)21 Munich (Germany) 
ITF 1913 Paris (France)22 London (England) 
IWF 1905 Duisburg (Germany)23 Budapest (Hungary) 
UCI 1900 Paris (France)24 Aigle (Switzerland) 
UWW 1912 Stockholm (Sweden)25 Corsier-sur-Vevey (Switzerland) 
WR 1886 Dublin (Ireland)26 Dublin (Ireland) 
FIFA: International Football Federation; FINA: International Swimming Federation, FISA: International 
Rowing Federation, ISAF: International Sailing Federation, ISSF: International Shooting Sport Federation, 
ITF: International Tennis Federation, IWF: International Wrestling Federation, UCI: International Cycling 
Federation, UWW: United World Wrestling, WR: World Rugby 
 
From a mission perspective, IFs’ initial assignment was to regulate members’ recognition, 
establish and sanction international rules of the game and organise international competitions. Before 
the supervision of the rules of the game was conferred to an international governing body, rules 
initially emerged from the bottom. Indeed, initiatives to establish general regulations for the game and 
to have an organisation that supervises and sanctions these rules existed well before at national level. 
Referring to events as far back as 1750, Allison and Tomlison (2017) describe for instance the 
moulding of English football into a more formalised game, though for very practical reasons: “Rugby 
School27 purchased an enclosed field (‘the Close’), partly to stop its pupils playing games in local 
graveyards” (p. 11). About a century later, in 1845, three young schoolboys from Rugby wrote down 
the first rules of what could be described as folk football (as opposed to traditional games restrained to 
                                                        
17 FIFA. (2018). About FIFA. Retrieved from: http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/history/index.html  
18 FINA. (2018). FINA & Aquatics, a bit of history. Retrieved from: http://www.fina.org/content/fina-aquatics-
bit-history  
19 FISA Rule book (2017), p. 10 
20 ISAF. (2018). A short history of World Sailing. Retrieved from: 
http://www.sailing.org/worldsailing/about/history.php  
21 ISSF. (2018). The ISSF history. Retrieved from: http://www.issf-sports.org/theissf/history.ashx  
22 ITF. (2018). History. Retrieved from: http://www.itftennis.com/about/organisation/history.aspx  
23 IWF. (2018). Weightlifting history. Retrieved from: http://www.iwf.net/weightlifting_/history/  
24 UCI. (2018). History. Retrieved from: http://www.uci.ch/inside-uci/about/history/  
25 UWW. (2018). History of United World Wrestling. Retrieved from: 
https://unitedworldwrestling.org/organisation/united-world-wrestling  
26 IOC. (2018). Sports. Retrieved from: https://www.olympic.org/world-rugby  
27 An ancient school founded in 1567 in the English village of Rugby. 
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the English society). As a remnant of traditional games of English society, William Arnold, son of the 
late headmaster of Rugby and member of the rule-making committee, asked the three boys to anchor 
the norm of “gentlemanly conduct” as a form of modern chivalry in the rules. Hence, sportsmanship 
and ethical components have been integral parts of the game since the first establishment of rules. 
Allison (2012) cites a quote of De Coubertin from the year 1887, in which the latter referred to 
Arnold’s notion of Christian gentlemen: “my goal is to teach children to govern themselves which is 
far better than governing them myself” (p. 24). The idea of self-governance, self-organisation and 
autonomy were thus among the guiding principles in the creation of IFs. It is therefore little surprising 
that the first statutes of IFs contained only the very basic rules that were necessary for the organisation 
of international matches. For instance, the first FIFA statutes, established in its year of creation (1904), 
determined the following:  
 
[...] the reciprocal and exclusive recognition of the national associations 
represented and attending; clubs and players were forbidden to play simultaneously 
for different national associations; recognition by the other associations of a 
player's suspension announced by an association; and the playing of matches 
according to the Laws of the Game of the Football Association Ltd. (FIFA – 
History of FIFA28) 
 
Over time, and beyond their initial role as regulatory bodies, IFs seem to have developed a 
mission of increasingly social/societal scope. Zintz and Camy (2005) therefore also classify sport 
federations as “missionary organisations” (p. 31, free translation from French), which justify their 
existence through their social mission. However, unless someone dusts off IFs’ early statutes (and 
provided that these still exist and access to them is granted), it is difficult to establish at which point in 
time IFs developed this social anchorage as an additional reason for their existence. At this point in 
time, no studies exist that have analysed the evolution of IFs’ mission statements and actions related 
or, on the opposite, actions diverging from it. In the meantime, I can only assume that IFs with 
headquarters in Switzerland have aligned their mission in direct relation to the development of modern 
NPOs in Switzerland. In fact, since 1912 the Swiss Law legally defines the three types of “modern” 
nonprofits, which are foundations, associations and co-operations (von Schnurbein & Bethmann, 
2015). As stipulated in the Swiss Civil Code, a foundation (Swiss Civil Code, Art. 80-89bis) is a legal 
entity with segregated funds. The purpose of the funds needs to be specified. Contrary to associations 
and co-operations, a foundation has no members. The nonprofit form of associations (Swiss Civil 
Code, Art. 60-79bis) in Switzerland is similar to the Anglo-American voluntary organisation. Being a 
corporately organised group of persons, a minimum of two persons is necessary to found an 
                                                        
28 FIFA. (2017). History of FIFA - Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/history/index.html  
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association. Associations are not subject to state supervision. The goals of associations have to be non-
economic. A co-operation or cooperative (Swiss Code of Obligations, Art. 828) can consist of an 
unlimited number of persons or commercial enterprises. Their main goal is to collectively promote or 
safeguard the economic interests defined by its members. Contrary to the association the cooperative 
has to pursue economic purposes. Von Schnurbein and Bethmann further point towards the rise of 
distinct organisations in sport, music and education in the aftermath of this new codification. In 
general, NPOs in Switzerland are assigned the role of public service organisations that fall under the 
principle of subsidiarity. The Swiss conception of subsidiarity grants NPOs extensive regulatory 
freedom.  
Directly referring to IFs, Pieth (2014) notes: “The laws of Switzerland are such that sports 
governing bodies, as well as other non-profit organizations, are relatively free from governmental 
rules and regulations” (p. 3). In addition to this, the Swiss tax system allows for high tax deductions 
and even exemptions in the case of NPOs. According to Von Schnurbein and Bethmann’s (2015) 
findings, Switzerland counts today about 100’000 NPOs. The IOC was one of the first (if not the first) 
international sport organisations to choose Lausanne (Switzerland) as the base for its headquarters in 
1915. Some additional information on Lausanne and its role in the Olympic Movement is worth 
mentioning at this point. In 1994, Juan Antonio Samaranch (president of the IOC from 1980 to 2001) 
designates Lausanne as the Olympic Capital. Since the 1980s and under the impulse of Samaranch, the 
city of Lausanne and the Canton of Vaud have elaborated favourable conditions (e.g. legal and 
financial aspects) in close collaboration with the Swiss federal authorities to attract international sport 
federations. Today, Switzerland is home to more than 60 international sport organisations, of which 
about 45 are IFs, all of them enjoying the fiscal advantages and a legal frame that is characterised by 
great liberalism. After having been awarded the symbolic title of “Olympic Capital”, Lausanne thus 
also became the actual administrative capital of world sport (Pinson, 2016). Despite Lausanne’s 
undeniably central role in Olympic and international sport, the city has never hosted any Olympic 
Games (even though it was five times a candidate). With the 2020 Youth Olympic Games, this will 
finally come true. In recent years, and seeking a new catalyst for investment and promotion through 
international sport, the city of Lausanne had to rethink what Pinson (2016) defines as a sports events 
hosting strategy (SEHS). However, according to the author, Lausanne’s SEHS currently still lacks 
clear objectives and a systematic approach. 
 
One can retain that NPOs based in Switzerland enjoy extensive legal freedom, tax reductions 
and have been assigned the role of public services. The role of public service providers is further 
supposed to guide their mission. Minkoff and Powell (2006) argue that NPOs’ mission “provides a 
sense of purpose that energizes and justifies organisational existence” (p. 591), entails inducement and 
sets guidelines. Inducement means here a calling out to supporters and a means to convince them to 
invest time, energy, expertise and/or resources into the organisation. The feature of providing 
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guidelines relates to NPOs’ formal characteristics. These include for example the non-distribution 
constraint (Anheier, 2000; Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Dees & Anderson, 2003), institutional separation 
from the government, self-governance and voluntary nature (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). Hansmann 
(1987) suggests three theoretical approaches to describe the role of NPOs: public goods theory, 
contract failure theory and subsidy theories.  
 
1. With regard to the public goods theory and referring to Weisbrod (1977), Hansmann notes that 
NPOs provide “public goods in amounts supplemental to those provided by the government” (p. 
29).  
2. NPOs also emerge as a result of contract failure. Contract failure describes a situation in which 
consumers cannot easily evaluate the quantity and quality of produced services, hence resulting 
in information asymmetry. In cases such as day-care, parents might therefore turn to a nonprofit 
organisation under nondistribution constraint rather than to a for-profit by fear the latter could 
provide “inferior services to increase the firm’s profit” (p. 29).  
3. And finally, subsidy theories support the assumption that “subsidies (i.e. tax exemption) are in 
large part responsible for the proliferation of nonprofit firms” (p. 33).  
 
IFs are to be located in the first theory. By promoting, developing and organising their sport, IFs 
accommodate a specific demand and fill a gap “that neither the state nor the for-profit organizations 
are willing to fulfil” (Hall, 1987, p. 3)29. 
Meanwhile, and even though the mission of an NPO should function as a compass for its 
actions, Minkoff and Powell (2006) emphasise that organisations need to adapt to environmental 
changes and pressures, which may, over time, lead to contingent mission shifts. To return to the topic 
on IFs’ evolving structures and functioning as NPOs, I refer to Minkoff and Powell’s call to further 
investigate NPOs’ mission as both a charter (social contract) and a constraint. A staff member from 
the FIH (International Hockey Federation) aptly points out the current mission dilemma that IFs are in: 
“What is their [IFs’] role? We have changed their role dramatically. Should it be the same now for the 
future as it was 20 years ago? What is the purpose of them in a digital driven, fragmented, global 
world?” (FIH, B2). 
 
                                                        
29 Two other purposes noted by Hall are: “to perform public tasks that have been delegated to them by the state” 
and “to influence the direction of policy in the state, the for-profit, or the nonprofit organizations”.  
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2.2. International Sport Federations today: between social mission and economic rationale30 
The citation of the FIH staff member suggests that IFs’ current functioning differs 
considerably from the past, even though their mission statement and the definition of their role as 
public service providers have remained fairly unchanged. In a more general context, and referring to 
Salomon et al. (1999), Anheier (2000) observes that “NPOs have become a major economic force” 
and that “in this process, many non-profit organisations have come to embrace the language, the 
management practices, even the culture of the business world” (p. 2). This raises several questions. 
For instance: Have IFs become more business-like? And if so, why and how? How do they manage 
the “delicate and contradictory interplay of mission focus and commercial imperatives” (Jäger & 
Beyes, 2010)? And how does the bending towards an increasingly economic rationale impact their 
structure, their functioning and their mission fulfilment? As I broach the historical evolution of IFs 
only very superficially, I acknowledge that intermediate steps are less discussed in detail. Particular 
attention is given instead to the comparison of IFs’ initial and current form and functioning. 
Congruent with IFs’ mission to autonomously regulate international sport, a mission that has 
been entrusted to them by their members (i.e. NFs), and the social mission that IFs have developed 
over time, several universal institutions (e.g. United Nations) and regional intergovernmental 
organisations (e.g. European Union) have recently recognised the “independence and autonomy” of 
sport. As the following examples demonstrate, these institutions emphasise the role of sport as a 
vehicle for social action, a carrier of social values and a fundamental human right. Numerous 
examples exist, some of which are given below: 
 
1) United Nations (UN): 
Some UN resolutions since the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/5 entitled “Sport as a means to 
promote education, health, development and peace”31: 
• Resolution 69/6 (A/RES/69/6)32 from 2014:  the UN recognises and “supports the independence 
and autonomy of sport as well as the mission of the International Olympic Committee in leading 
the Olympic movement” (p. 5). 
• Resolution 70/4 (A/RES/70/4)33 from 2015: “Building a peaceful and better world through sport 
and the Olympic ideal”. 
 
                                                        
30 Adopted from Jäger and Beyes’(2010): Strategizing in NPOs: A case study on the practice of organizational 
change between social mission and economic rationale. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and 
Nonprofit Organizations, 21(1), 82-100. 
31 United Nations. (2003). UN General Assembly Resolution 58/5: Sport as a means to promote education, 
health, development and peace. Retrieved from https://www.sportanddev.org/fr/document/un-reports-un-
resolutions/un-general-assembly-resolution-585-sport-means-promote-health  
32 United Nations. (2014). UN General Assembly. Resolution 69/6: Sport as a means to promote education, 
health, development and peace. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/6 
33 United Nations. (2015). UN General Assembly, Resolution 70/4: Building a peaceful an better world through 
sport and the Olympic ideal. Retrieved from http://undocs.org/A/RES/70/4  
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2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration34: 
• Sport as a vehicle to “promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic 
ideal” (p. 4). 
 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development35 
• Sport as an important enabler of sustainable development, recognising “the growing contribution 
of sport to the realization of development and peace” (p. 10). 
 
UNESCO International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (from 1978)36 
• Advocates that access to physical activity and sport is a fundamental human right and should be 
assured and guaranteed for all human beings.  
• Places the development of physical activity and sport at the service of human progress and 
promotes their development. 
 
 
2) European Union (EU) 
European Commission “Sport” 
• “The European Union believes that Sport plays a vital role, not only in individual health and 
fitness, but in shaping our wider European society37” 
 
Lisbon Treaty (2012)38, Article 16539 
• “The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account 
of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and 
educational function” (p. 120). 
• At the same time, the Lisbon treaty recognises the principle of subsidiarity. 
o “[T]he main responsibility remains with the Member States and sport federations”40.  
o “Article 165 explicitly excludes the adoption of European Sport legislation41”. 
                                                        
34 United Nations. (2000). UN General Assembly. Resolution 55/2: United Nations Millennium Declaration. 
Retrieved from https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/en/documents/die-deza/Millenniums-Erklaerung-Vereinte-
Nationen-2000_EN.pdf  
35 United Nations. (2015). UN General Assembly. Resolution 70/1: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E  
36 UNESCO. (1978). International Charter for Physical Education, Physical Activity and Sport. Retrieved from 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/physical-education-and-sport/sport-charter  
37 European Commission. (2017). Sport. Societal Role. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/sport/policy/societal_role_en  
38 Official title: Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) 
39 European Union. (2009). Lisbon Treaty. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E/TXT  
40 EOC EU Office (2011). Guide to EU Sport Policy, p. 10 
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Report on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity 
(European Parliament resolution of 2nd February 2017)42 
• Acknowledgment of the specific nature of sport based on voluntary structures. 
• Acknowledgements of the educational and societal functions of sport. 
• Support for the European sport model including the principle of one federation per sport. 
 
 
In summary, the main aspects to retain from these examples are:  
• the recognition of the autonomy of sport, notably by applying the principle of subsidiarity;  
• the social and societal role of sport in promoting education, health, development and peace.  
 
Subsidiarity refers here to both horizontal and vertical decision-making. In the Encyclopedia of 
International Sport Studies (2010), Ian Henry defines subsidiarity in sport as follows: “decisions about 
sport provisions should be largely local, and where possible be made by voluntary or commercial 
sector bodies. Government intervention would thus be limited” (p. 1335). The recognition of the 
independence and autonomy of sport by the UN has been celebrated by the IOC as an important 
concession and trumpeted as a “historic milestone43” by Thomas Bach, the IOC president. Besides the 
usual arguments of sport fostering peace and development, the UN does not explain what is exactly 
meant by “independence” and “autonomy”. Bach reasons this autonomy with the universality of 
sporting rules and calls for responsible autonomy. While he particularly emphasises the role of sport in 
“education, health, urban planning, cohesion of society and peace-building44”, it remains, again, 
unclear what is meant by “responsible autonomy”. As the following extracts attest, in their 
statutes/constitution IFs strongly emphasise their social mission and activities in the public sphere, as 
well as the non-distribution constraint. Through such formulations, IFs can justify their nonprofit 
status and position themselves as a public good through collective action (for public good theories see 
e.g. Kingma, 1997; Olson, 2009). Three examples are given below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 EOC EU Office (2011). Guide to EU Sport Policy, p. 10 
42 European Olympic Committees. (2017). Integrated approach to sport policy. Retrieved from 
http://www.euoffice.eurolympic.org/blog/european-parliament-adopts-report-%E2%80%9C-integrated-
approach-sport-policy%E2%80%9D  
43 International Olympic Committee. United Nations recognises autonomy of sport. Retrieved from 
https://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nations-recognises-autonomy-of-sport  
44 Idem 
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UCI – International Cycling Union 
UCI Constitution (2016) 
Among the purposes of the UCI are the goal: 
• to promote cycling in all countries of the world and at all levels (Art. 2b); 
• to encourage friendship between all members of the cycling world (Art. 2d); 
• to promote sportsmanship and fairplay (Art. 2e). 
 
The UCI will carry out its activities in compliance with the principles of the non-profit-making 
purpose:  
• The financial resources shall be used only to pursue the purposes set forth in this Constitution (Art. 
3d). 
 
FIFA – Internationale Association Football Federation 
FIFA Statutes (2016) 
Among the objectives of FIFA are: 
• to improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, 
educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly through youth and development 
programmes (Art. 2a); 
• to use its efforts to ensure that the game of football is available to and resourced for all who wish 
to participate, regardless of gender or age (Art. 2e); 
• to promote the development of women’s football and the full participation of women at all levels 
of football governance (Art. 2f); 
• to promote integrity, ethics and fair play [...] (Art. 2g). 
 
FIH – International Hockey Federation 
FIH Statutes (2016) 
Among the fundamental purposes of the FIH are: 
• to promote and develop Hockey at all levels throughout the world, in accordance with the rights 
and freedoms of the Olympic Charter, and without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, 
gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status (Art. 1.4a). 
 
Meanwhile, and despite many positive affirmations of intergovernmental organisations with 
regard to IFs’ autonomy and social mission, IFs are no longer being considered as operating solely in 
the public sphere. They have in fact become an important part of the economy. The EU recognises for 
instance that “Sport is an ever growing sector of the economy that contributes to growth and jobs. 
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However, there is a need for comparable data to form the basis of evidence-based policy-making and 
for sustaining the financing of sport, in particular its non-profit structures45”. Already in the 1980s, 
Hansmann (1987) examines the income-generating behaviour of some NPOs, eventually leading to an 
overlapping of nonprofit and for-profit notions (Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner, 2014). Dees (2003), 
for his part, refers to the increase of NPOs’ boundary-blurring activities as sector-bending, stating that 
“traditional sector boundaries are increasingly breaking down” (p. 16).  
Other than certain NPOs such as hospitals, nursing homes and day cares, IFs do not face the 
risk of competition with for-profit organisations that offer similar services as both the IOC and the 
European Parliament 46  recognise only one federation per sport. This ultimately raises additional 
questions: Why do IFs increasingly focus on income-generation? How does this focus impact their 
structure and functioning? And how do IFs manage conflicting rationalities (social mission vs. 
economic rationale)? Several elements (and which will be discussed later in more detail) have entailed 
profound changes in sport in general and IFs’ behaviour in particular. One major evolution is 
undeniably the massive and rapid commodification of sport, involving a growing demand for sport 
spectating (Robinson, 2003) inclusive of broadcasting, sponsorship and event hosting rights, and an 
increasingly thriving sporting goods industry: 
 
• Between 2012 and 2015, FIFA generated about USD 2.57 billion through the selling of 
broadcasting rights47.  
• In 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) estimated the worldwide revenue from sports 
sponsorship at USD 26.75 billion48.  
• By 2015, the worldwide revenue from sports sponsorship had reached an incredible USD 45.28 
billion49.  
 
A quick glance at the sporting goods industry reveals that, in 2016, Forbes calculated the value of 
Nike, the leading sports business brand, as amounting to USD 27 billion50. The question of how the 
commodification of sport has impacted IFs’ structure, functioning and vision remains, for the moment, 
fairly unanswered. I believe that this research gap and, related herewith, a lack of comprehensive 
                                                        
45 European Union. (2011). European dimension in sport. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:ef0025  
46 European Olympic Committees. (2017). Integrated approach to sport policy. Retrieved from 
http://www.euoffice.eurolympic.org/blog/european-parliament-adopts-report-%E2%80%9C-integrated-
approach-sport-policy%E2%80%9D  
47 FIFA financial statements 2012-2015 
48  Statista. (2015). Sport sponsorship: total revenue worldwide from 2006 to 2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/269783/total-worldwide-revenue-from-sports-sponsorship/ 
49 Idem 
50  Statista. (2017). Most valuable sports business brands worldwide in 2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/253349/brand-value-of-sports-businesses-worldwide/ 
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understanding is at the origin of unclear positions that public authorities (at the national and 
international level) often take with regard to IFs’ excessive commercialisation.  
In light of an increasing interconnection of IFs’ nonprofit nature and their economic activities, 
Parrish (2003), who bases his findings on the analysis of the sports law and policy in the European 
Union,  defends the position that “[a]s a significant economic activity, sports rules should comply with 
EU law” (p. 2). A couple of years before, in 1995, the Bosman ruling constituted somewhat of a 
landmark decision in international sport as it revealed two important evolutions. First, it emphasised 
the growing involvement of policy and economy in sport. And second, the Bosman ruling strongly 
“undermined efforts to have sport classified as a social and not commercial pursuit” (Parrish, 2003, p. 
3). The efforts have paid off: despite recurring corruption, doping and mismanagement scandals and 
questions about IFs’ capacity to perform responsible autonomy and self-regulation, the UN has 
recognised the independence and autonomy of sport at its 69th regular session in 2014. Likewise, since 
February 2017, the European Parliament considers “the specific nature of sport 51 ” as voluntary 
structures, and “the autonomy of sport’s governing structures52”. It further stresses that:  
 
Sport is not only a growing economic reality, but also a social phenomenon which 
makes an important contribution to the European Union’s strategic objectives, and 
to social values such as tolerance, solidarity, prosperity, peace, respect for human 
rights and understanding among nations and cultures. (European Parliament 
resolution, 2nd February 2017) 
 
Though the European Parliament recognises the economic nature of sport, it is interesting that, 
in an earlier draft from September 2016, this passage put a much stronger focus on the commercial 
impact of sport, resulting in the proposal of a cross-sectorial approach in future policy-making:  
 
Sport is not only a social phenomenon. The economic contribution of sports to 
society is huge and the trend is growing. Sport is an economic driver behind 
tourism, welfare, the goods industry and increasingly in digital services. More than 
7 million Europeans work in the sport sector and the business of sport represents 
almost 300 billion euros. That is why sport deservers cross-sectorial thinking in 
policy-making. (Draft Report, 16th September 2016)53 
 
                                                        
51 European Parliament. (2017). An integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and 
integrity. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2016-
0381&language=EN#top  
52 Idem 
53 European Parliament. (2016). Draft report on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, 
accessibility and integrity. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2016-0381&language=EN#top 
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In the Swiss law (Art. 69b of the Civil Code), NPOs are, since 1st January 2008, obliged to 
carry out external financial audits as soon as one of the following criteria is met: headcount of more 
than 50 staff members, turnover of more than CHF 10 million, or balance sheet total of more than 
CHF 20 million. However, and as the following example shows, this law actually does not result in 
valuable transparency on opaque commercial activities of some IFs:  
 
FIFA has operated for many years as an unaccountable, opaque and notoriously 
corrupt organisation; whereas the recent arrests confirm that the fraud and 
corruption in FIFA are systemic, widespread and persistent rather than involving 
isolated cases of misconduct, as claimed by former FIFA President Joseph Blatter. 
(Official Journal of the European Union, 8th December 2015, p. 82)54. 
 
These brief examples of policy formulation emphasise the apparent difficulties of capturing the 
complex nature of IFs in their current form and functioning. Bayle and Robinson (2007) therefore 
speak aptly of a trend towards hybrid organisations.  
 
2.3. Stagnations and transformations: conclusions from the comparison of international 
sport federations in the past and today 
To understand IFs’ current structure and functioning, researchers need to understand their 
transformation from mainly volunteer-run associations (end of 19th/beginning of 20th century – 1980s) 
to more and more complex organisations in the hands of paid staff (1990s onwards). A comparison of 
several aspects across time therefore forms a useful step in the knowledge building of IFs’ change and 
adaptation processes. For this purpose, I compare two periods: IFs’ appearance until the 1980s, and 
1980s until today. These are obviously only rough periods and my goal is not to provide a detailed 
analysis of IFs’ evolution over a period of about 100 years. Several aspects that exemplify both 
stagnations and transformations in IFs emerge from readings and interviews: legal frame/form, 
mission statement, actors, structure, (main) activities and challenges. With regard to the legal frame, 
the focus is on Switzerland, home to the IOC since 1915 and to about 65 international sport 
organisations, of which about 45 are international sport federations. Some of these federations moved 
their headquarters to Lausanne in the 1980s and 1990s (FIVB: 1984, 55UCI: 199256; FISA: 199657), 
and many more followed with the creation of the Maison du Sport International (international sport 
house) in 2006 (home to 29 federations/associations58). 
                                                        
54 European Union. (2015). Official Journal of the European Union, C407. Retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AC%3A2015%3A407%3ATOC  
55 FIVB. (2018). The Federation. Retrieved from: http://www.fivb.org/EN/FIVB/FIVB_Structure.asp  
56 UCI. (2018). History. Retrieved from: http://www.uci.ch/inside-uci/about/history/  
57 Circular No. 1 of 1996 
58 Maison du Sport International: www.msi-lausanne.ch   
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Table 2. IFs’ legal form and frame in the past and today in the Swiss context 
IFs in the past IFs today  
Legal form 
• Nonprofit associations under the laws of the 
Swiss Civil Code. 
• Service organisations that step in to satisfy the 
demand for public goods that is not met by the 
government.  
Legal frame 
• Applicable laws: Articles 60 to 79 of the Swiss 
Civil Code. 
• Characteristics:  
o Extensive legal freedom and flexibility. 
o Little constraints in terms of requests 
for transparency or accountability. 
o Fiscal advantages. 
Legal form 
• Unchanged. 
Legal frame 
• Tightened legal frame due to repeated scandals. 
Several legal modifications were introduced: 
• Article 69b of the Swiss Civil Code59: since 1st 
January 2008, NPOs have to carry out an 
external financial audit as soon as one of the 
following criteria is met:  
o Staff headcount: ≥50 staff 
o Turnover (CHF): ≥10 million 
o Balance sheet total (CHF): ≥20 million  
• Swiss Criminal Code and the law dubbed “Lex 
FIFA” (RO 2016 128760) to fight bribes paid to 
private individuals. A revised legislation, 
enacted in July 2016, allows Swiss prosecutors 
to “investigate suspected bribes without having 
to wait a criminal complaint, and even if 
payoffs do not skew competition”61. 
Previously, investigations concerning private 
corruption offenses could only be launched if 
an organisation, an individual or a group 
belonging to the organisation in question 
lodged a complaint62. Under the revised law, 
leaders and top officials of sport organisations 
based in Switzerland are considered as 
“Politically Exposed Persons”. However, the 
law was not effective at the time of this study. 
 
                                                        
59 Droit de la société à responsabilité limitée; adaptation des droits de la société anonyme, de la société 
coopérative, du registre du commerce et des raisons de commerce 
60 Swiss Parliament. (2016). Disposition pénale incriminant la corruption. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20140035  
61 Reuters. (2016). Swiss crack down on bribery as ‘Lex FIFA’ set to take force. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-corruption-idUSKCN0XH1GE  
62 Swissinfo. (2015). La ‘lex FIFA’ fait l’unanimité, ou presque. Retrieved from 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/lutte-anti-corruption_la--lex-fifa--fait-l-unanimit%C3%A9--ou-presque/41661780  
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Tables 2 (above) and 3 (below) reveal several interesting changes as well as stagnations since 
the appearance of IFs. The comparison of IFs’ legal form as nonprofit associations and their mission 
statement in the past and today reveals certain stagnation. Transformations that become evident from 
the comparison are: a tightened legal frame, the arrival of new actors, a shift towards new main 
activities, an increasingly complex organisational structure, and new challenges. 
 
Table 3. IFs’ mission statement in the past and today 
IFs in the past IFs today  
• Govern (set up, supervise and sanction 
international rules of the sport), promote 
(worldwide development and promotion of the 
sport, ex. through grassroots, sport facilities 
and development programs), organise (major 
sport events). 
• Unchanged. 
Note: Based on a comparison of mission statements at FIFA, FIH, FISA, FIVB, UCI and UWW 
 
The link between legal form and mission statement: 
The legal form of nonprofit associations confers multiple advantages to IFs and other 
international sport organisations, including extensive legal freedom and fiscal advantages (Mrkonjic, 
2014). If one excludes the top earners among the IFs, this being for example FIFA, UEFA, IOC (all 
three around annual revenues of CHF 1 billion and more) and perhaps FIA (according to Forbes63, 
Formula 1 has generated more revenues than FIFA between 1999 and 2015)64 at the very top, but also 
IFs of the size of the UCI and FIS (annual revenues around CHF 30 million), IFs’ legal form as 
nonprofit organisations seems reasonable. In fact, any change to IFs’ current legal form, for example 
due the commercialisation and profits of some very big IFs and sport organisations, would penalise 
numerous smaller IFs. The legal flexibility and fiscal advantages are crucial to their functioning as 
many of them largely depend on volunteers and have small revenues that mainly come from member 
fees. To be in line with Swiss requirements in terms of nonprofit associations, and despite the growing 
economic rationale of several IFs, the mission statements of several IFs analysed (i.e. FIFA, FIH, 
FISA, FIVB, UCI, UWW) are nearly identical and have remained pretty much unchanged. In some 
prominent cases (e.g. FIFA), this raises the question of whether the legal form still primarily aims at 
fulfilling the organisation’s social mission or whether it is rather for reasons of convenience (e.g. legal 
                                                        
63 Forbes. (2015). F1 revenue accelerates past FIFA’s to $16.2 billion. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/csylt/2015/05/31/f1-revenue-accelerates-past-fifas-to-16-2-billion/#60dbde6b6d03  
64 As financial statements are not publicly available, it remains unclear how much of this revenue is actually 
designated to the FIA as the governing body.  
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loopholes). Analysing NPOs in general, Dees (1998) demonstrates the mission-activity dilemma that 
might be true for some IFs as well:  
 
The drive to become more businesslike, however, holds many dangers for 
nonprofits. In the best of circumstances, nonprofits face organisational and cultural 
challenges in the pursuit of commercial funding. In the worst, commercial 
operations can undercut an organisation’s social mission (p. 56). 
 
 
Tightened legal frame: 
The two examples given in Table 2, and which demonstrate a tightened legal frame, are recent 
modifications (Art. 69b: decision in 2005 and coming into effect in 2008; Lex FIFA: decision in 2016, 
has not come into effect yet). The first example, which constitutes a modification of the Swiss Civil 
Code with regard to NPOs, takes account of a general trend towards increasing commercial activities, 
a trend that has been put forward by numerous researchers (e.g. Dart, 2004; Dees, 1998; Dees & 
Anderson, 2003; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Maier et al., 2014). The second example has been 
established in direct relation to repeated bribery and corruption scandals in sport65. The legislative 
draft was fuelled by the latest FIFA scandal, which led to the arrest of 14 high FIFA officials in May 
2015. These modifications (or supplements) to the Swiss law demonstrate a gaping legal vacuum in 
terms of commercialisation and marketization of NPOs’ services and NPOs’ increasing business-
orientation and structure.  
 
Table 4. Individuals in IFs in the past and today 
IFs in the past IFs today  
• Volunteers with a passion for the sport and 
who put their time and knowledge at its 
disposal. 
• At the strategic level: elected volunteers (though 
some IF-presidents receive salaries today). 
• At the operational level: paid staff with 
technical skills and experiences. 
• Referees/judges: volunteers (only very big 
sports such as football have full-time employed 
referees). 
 
 
 
                                                        
65 See for example the motion “Sport. Accusations de corruption et matchs truqués”. Retrieved from: 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20103919 
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The arrival of new actors 
The second transformation that emerges from the comparison is the arrival of new actors (Table 
4). For many decades, IFs were run by volunteers who had a particular passion for the sport and were 
able and willing to devote their time to the organisation. Today, all Olympic IFs have a professional 
administration ranging from <10 to >450 paid staff. The hiring of paid experts started at the end of the 
1980s and accelerated during the 1990s. For instance, FISA made the position of the Secretary 
General a paid position in 1989, the UCI hired a General Director in 1992, and IAAF in 1995. A FIS 
(International Ski Federation) staff member even traces the first paid position back into the 1970s: “I 
think the first professional Secretary General was probably in the 70s. And even one before that was 
probably remunerated. I don’t think that there was formal remuneration before that” (FIS, I1). Though 
most IF-presidents probably still receive only allowances, some few receive proper salaries now (e.g. 
UCI, ITF – International Tennis Federation). This means that even though the position of the president 
is still subject to an election procedure, it is no longer a volunteer position in the strict sense in all IFs. 
Another interesting observation is that, perhaps with the exception of the president, the paid 
professionals do not necessarily come from sport. They are hired for the specific expertise they can 
bring into an IF due to a formation and/or experience in various domains such as legal, accounting, 
marketing, communication etc. The arrival of paid experts has a direct influence on IFs’ structure, 
activities and behaviour. 
 
Table 5. IFs’ activities in the past and today66 
IFs in the past IFs today  
• Initially: setting up and supervising 
international rules of the sport and managing 
questions of member adherence. 
• Over time: organisation of major sport events 
such as World Championships. 
• Organisation of major sport events (e.g. bidding 
process, defining and allocating rights) 
• Development projects 
• Fight against corruption, doping, betting etc. 
 
Shift towards new main activities: 
In the years of their creation and after, IFs’ main activities were (1) the establishment, 
supervision and sanctioning of the international rules of the game, and (2) defining and evaluating 
criteria of member adherence. Over time, IFs developed a third important pillar of activities: that of 
organising major sport events, generally beginning with the organisation of World Championships. 
Table 6 provides some examples in terms of the timely occurrence of World Championships. Today, 
IFs’ role is still that of a regulatory body. However, after more than 100 years of existence in the case 
                                                        
66 Information is based on interviews with Hein Verbruggen and an ARISF council member (both conducted in 
November 2014). 
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of many IFs, and though new and/or modified rules and regulations are and will always be necessary 
(e.g. anti-doping, fight against match fixing), the establishment of comprehensive rules and 
regulations (i.e. sporting rules, statutes/constitution, code of ethics) was perhaps the IF’s main activity 
in the past, but it is no longer their main activity today. Events, on the other hand, have taken a central 
place in IFs’ activities and strategy. In the beginning, World Championships (or World Cups as some 
IFs name them) pursued the sole purpose of determining the best athletes. Several IFs used the context 
of the Olympic Games to this end (e.g. IAAF, IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation). During 
the 1980s and 1990s, IFs began to realise that some of their services, and especially their events, had a 
commercial value. In a first step, IFs defined what rights had a commercial value. In a second step, 
they established ownership on those rights. In the following, the rights had to be managed and 
marketed, which brings us back to the arrival of new actors such as marketing experts. 
Complexification of activities and networks are more difficult to manage on a volunteer basis.  
 
Table 6. Examples of IFs’ first World Championships 
IF Year Town (country) Source 
FIH 1971 Barcelona (Spain) FIH website67 
FIFA 1930 Uruguay  FIFA website68 
FINA 1973 Belgrade (Yugoslavia) FINA website69 
FIS 
192470 Chamonix (France) 
FIS website71 
193172 Oberhof (Germany) 
FISA 1962 Lucerne (Switzerland) FISA website73 
FIVB 1949 Prague (Czech Republic) FIVB website74 
IAAF 198375 Helsinki (Finland) IAAF website76 
IIHF 192077 Antwerp (Belgium) Hockey Canada78 
UCI 1921 Copenhagen (Denmark) UCI website79 
                                                        
67 FIH – Internationale Hockey Federation. Hockey World Cup. Retrieved from http://www.fih.ch/events/world-
cup/#  
68 FIFA – International Association Football Federation. World Cup. Archive. Retrieved from 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/uruguay1930/index.html  
69 FINA – International Swimming Federation. (2017). Archives. Retrieved from 
http://archives.fina.org/H2O/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2205&Itemid=182  
70 FIS Nordic World Championships (i.e. cross-country and jumping) 
71 FIS – International Ski Federation. (2017). World Ski Championships. Retrieved from https://data.fis-
ski.com/global-links/statistics/event-overview.html?catcode=WSC&sectorcode=JP  
72 FIS Alpine World Championships (i.e. downhill and slalom) 
73 FISA – World Rowing. (2017). World Rowing Championships. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldrowing.com/events/1962-world-championships/schedule-results  
74 FIVB – International Volleyball Federation. (2017). World Championships. Retrieved from 
https://www.fivb.org/TheGame/TheGame_WorldChampionships.htm  
75 From 1913-1983, the IAAF World Championships were organised in the context of the Olympic Games. 
76 IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federation. (2017). IAAF World Championships. Retrieved 
from https://www.iaaf.org/competitions/iaaf-world-championships/1st-iaaf-world-championships-in-athletics-3  
77 Between 1920-1968, all Olympic Ice Hockey Tournaments also counted as World Championships. 
78 Hockey Canada. (2017). World Championship. Retrieved from https://www.hockeycanada.ca/en-ca/team-
canada/men/world-championship  
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The establishment of rights and the arrival of new actors further entailed new strategic foci. 
With the explosion of broadcasting rights, some IFs sought for instance to capitalise on the growing 
success of their main sporting events by increasing their frequency. The IAAF is a good example for 
this strategy: an official of the European Athletics Association80 explains that, since 1991, the IAAF 
organises its World Championships every two years (instead of the previous four-year interval). The 
central idea behind this change was to double television and sponsor incomes. He further adds that the 
1997 World Championships in Athens not only marked the end of IAAF’s financial support to the 
organisers of IAAF World Championships, but that since then organisers have to pay for the 
acquisition of IAAF World Championship organising rights.  
One can distinguish at least two additional activities into which IFs began to invest more 
human and financial resources: development and fight against doping, match fixing and the like. 
Different logics can be observed here:  
 
• Events serve the main goal of generating revenues for the IF (business logic).  
• The fight against corruption, doping, match fixing, and the like seeks to maintain or re-establish 
the IF’s legitimacy and credibility (legitimacy logic).  
• IFs’ development activities seem to pursue two objectives: one is to fulfil the mission that has 
been assigned to them by their members (mission logic), the other is to grow their sport and hence 
also the federation’s revenues (business logic). This raises the question of means and ends. Is the 
organisation of events and the revenue generated through them a means to develop the sport? Or is 
the development of the sport a means for some interest groups to make more money? 
 
 
Increasingly complex organisational structure: 
With the arrival of paid experts, IFs’ structure has become increasingly complex. While, for many 
decades, the concept of management seemed to be at odds with nonprofit organisations “whose 
essence is more associated with voluntarism, philanthropy, compassion and a concern for the public 
good” (Anheier, 2000), it became an essential element when IFs started to grow. Nowadays, many IFs 
are divided into distinct departments81 (e.g. sport and/or events, communication, marketing, legal, 
financial and human resource department), have organisation charts, and adopt certain techniques 
from the corporate human resource management (e.g. staff evaluation, job descriptions). Before, 
elected volunteers carried out all political/strategic and operational tasks (except perhaps refereeing). 
The structure one can see today in many IFs is three-fold:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
79 UCI – International Cycling Union. (2017). History. Retrieved from http://fr.uci.ch/inside-uci/about/histoire-
165083/  
80 Discussion on 9 December 2015 at the EAA headquarters. 
81 As an example: FIVB counts today ten departments, FIFA nine, FIS eight and UCI seven. 
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• At the strategic summit, we find the elected volunteers (i.e. president, board and commission 
members). 
• Through the hiring of paid experts, an administrative/operational level emerged, and whose 
size depends on the IF’s financial capacities and the evolution (e.g. growth) of the sport. 
• At the third level, we find what we could call the true volunteers and who officiate as 
judges/referees/commissaires.  
 
Table 7. IFs’ structure in the past and today 
IFs in the past IFs today  
• Mainly political structure:  
o General Assembly (Swiss law: 
“supreme body”). 
o Board (Swiss law: “direction”). 
o Commissions. 
• Very small or no operational/administrative 
structure (because no or few paid staff). 
• Operational/administrative structure of 
increasing complexity in addition to political 
structure. 
• Progressive implementation of corporate 
structures (e.g. several distinct departments, 
organisation chart) 
• Human resource management. 
 
The structures I am most interested in, and which appear to have evolved considerably, are the 
political/strategic level and the administrative/operational level. At these levels, fundamental changes 
occurred as IFs grew and as they had to face new challenges (e.g. tension between volunteers and 
professional staff in terms of decision-making power and information asymmetry) and opportunities 
(e.g. new technologies, general commodification of sport). Table 8 summarises these transformations. 
 
New challenges: 
In the early years of their existence and until the 1980s, IFs main challenges were (1) the attraction 
and retention of volunteers that were able and willing to invest their time, and (2) dealing with 
constraints in terms of financial resources and individuals’ capacities, meaning: specific expertise that 
is necessary to run organisational operations and adapt to the external environment (e.g. legal, 
business or sporting expertise)82. Both aspects were particularly crucial for the maintenance of the 
federations’ activities (i.e. setting up, supervising, sanctioning rules of the sport, organising World 
Championships) and their future development. The success of an IF in this period was, above all, a 
question of devoted people who put their time and technical and/or management skills at the disposal 
of the organisation (Cornforth, 2001). Today, the challenges that IFs have to face appear to be 
manifold due to an increasingly complex environment. Nagel et al. (2015) see the variety of 
challenges at the origin of profound organisational change processes in sport federations. According to 
                                                        
82 Information based on an interview with Hein Verbruggen in November 2014. 
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the authors, challenges include competition between top-level sports, increasing demand for 
diversified sport activities (e.g. sport for all), limits of voluntarism in meeting growing service 
demands, and the emergence of new task areas. They further assume that the transformation of actors, 
structures and processes as well as activities constitutes a process of professionalisation. Referring to 
Chantelat (2001), Nagel et al. define professionalisation as a process of increased organisational 
rationalisation, project management and strategic thinking with the goal to increase the federation’s 
efficiency.  
 
Table 8. IFs’ challenges in the past and today 
IFs in the past IFs today  
• Attracting and retaining volunteers, members, 
athletes, donors etc. and hence assuring the 
IF’s future. 
• Constraints in terms of financial resources and 
individuals’ capacities (e.g. expertise). 
• Competition  
o Growing competition between top-level 
sports (e.g. for scarce financial 
resources, visibility, athletes, fans). 
• Commercialisation 
o Need to commercialise to satisfy 
stakeholders on which the IF depends. 
o Desire to commercialise to generate 
more revenue. 
• Mission  
o Mission drift and/or sector bending, 
potentially entailing a loss of (social) 
values and traditions. 
o Limits of responsible autonomy in light 
of commercialisation: the question of 
means and ends. 
• Management of individuals and processes:  
o Growing complexity of activities and 
hence operations. 
o Management of individuals from 
different backgrounds and expertise 
(e.g. relation professional staff and 
elected board, autonomy, information 
asymmetry) 
 
  
 
42 
Based on general NPO literature and specific literature on sport organisations, I assume that IFs 
have to face three major challenges: commercialisation and competition for financial resources (Dees, 
1998; Enjolras, 2002; O'Brien & Slack, 2004; Tuckman, 1998), the question of mission fulfilment and 
mission drift (Dees & Anderson, 2003; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Minkoff & Powell, 2006), 
and the management of individuals and processes (Alexander, 2000; Doherty, 1998; Doherty & 
Chelladurai, 1999) at the headquarters. The comparison of IFs’ various characteristics in the past and 
today clearly suggests that profound organisational changes have occurred and emphasises a dire need 
to further scholars’ and practitioner’s understanding of these change processes and dynamics. For this 
purpose, the following section takes a closer look at two theoretical concepts that are essential for this 
study: professionalisation and commercialisation. 
 
3. Literature review of key concepts, research gaps and conceptual framework 
 
As the title implies, the concepts of professionalisation and commercialisation as well as their 
application in sport management literature are central to this thesis. The above comparison between 
IFs´ structure and functioning in the past and today clearly reveals that IFs have undergone profound 
transformations. Some scholars classify these transformations under the concept of 
professionalisation. The concept of professionalisation only made its entrance into sport management 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dowling et al., 2014). And despite a rapidly growing number of 
studies on professionalisation in sport management (e.g. Kikulis et al., 1992; Shilbury & Ferkins, 
2011; Thibault et al., 1991), Dowling et al. note that there is a blatant lack in terms of both the 
definition and the conceptualisation of professionalisation (and thus also of the operationalization) in 
sport management. The authors argue that, for the advancement of research on professionalisation in 
sport management, it is essential for scholars to work with clear definitions and concepts of what is 
actually meant by professionalisation. In an attempt to classify extant literature (general and sport-
specific), Dowling et al. suggest three broad categorisations: occupational professionalisation, 
organisational professionalisation and systemic professionalisation. They conclude that most studies 
tend to develop definitions and concepts for the category of organisational professionalisation, hence 
neglecting systemic and occupational professionalisation. Ideally, a broader conceptualisation of 
professionalisation including all three categories would be preferable. Based on Dowling et al.’s call 
for a broader conceptualisation, I will first look at each category separately (i.e. occupational, 
organisational and systemic professionalisation) before providing my own definition of 
professionalisation in the context of IFs. 
Commercialisation, the second concept I will focus on, is a widely discussed topic in general 
NPO-literature. Overall, the environment for NPOs has become increasingly competitive, complex 
  
 
43 
and uncertain. As a result, organisations have to manage resources more efficiently and effectively 
(Froelich, 1999). NPOs’ dependence on external funding entails both competition and uncertainty 
(Heimovics, Herman, & Coughlin, 1993). Studies on NSOs tend to agree with general NPO-literature 
in that commercialisation is related to both a sector-wide resource shortage in (government) funding 
(Nagel et al., 2015; O'Brien & Slack, 2004), and strategies of resource diversification employed by 
organisations in response to financial uncertainty (Wicker, Feiler, & Breuer, 2013). I will focus on 
four factors that, according to Robinson (2003), gave rise to the commercialisation of sport: a trend 
towards sport spectating, changing technologies, increasing competition and professionalisation of 
sports management. 
 
3.1. Professionalisation 
3.1.1. Professionalisation in sociology and management literature 
In sociology and management, professionalisation is often equated with the terms 
bureaucratisation or rationalisation. In the word bureaucratisation, bureau indicates the delimitation 
between the private sphere (home) and the working environment (bureau, office). A name that is 
inevitably linked to bureaucratisation is Max Weber (1968), who, with his posthumously published 
treatise “Economy and Society”, laid the cornerstone for the sociology of organisations. He provided 
some of the most influential statements on “the structural rational of contemporary organizations” 
(Child, 1972a, p. 163). Four of the central characteristics of bureaucracies established by Weber are 
(1) the organisation’s hierarchical order of authority, (2) formalisation of processes through written 
documents, (3) specialised training and objective qualifications for office, and (4) a management 
governed by general and impersonal rules. The goal of bureaucracies is to organise human activity in a 
rationale and efficient manner. It is based on a combination of social control (rational-legal supremacy 
defined by published rules) and hierarchical structure (functions). The most common examples of 
bureaucracies are public administrations. Today, the term bureaucratisation is often associated with a 
negative connotation in the sense of overly controlled and heavy administrations, rigid procedures, 
dehumanisation and inefficiency. The impersonal character of bureaucracies has its origin in the 
rational feature of the organisation’s division of labour: everything is subordinated to the ultimate goal 
of organisational efficiency and productivity. The rationale perspective also gave rise to the notion of 
means and ends (goal orientation), which is dominated by rules, techniques and calculations. In light 
of multiple definitions regarding professions and professionalisation, another brief delimitation of 
these terms appears useful. 
  
Professions 
Abbott and Meerabeau (1998) note: “the terms ‘profession’ and ‘professional’ are confusing and are 
used in a number of different and potentially contradictory ways” (p. 1). According to them, the most 
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frequent use of the term profession describes occupational groups practising a recognised profession. 
Recognised professions convey a certain status, the most typical examples being doctors and lawyers. 
The authors resume the key features of professions as being “based on a body of knowledge, that the 
members had specialized skills and competence in the application of this knowledge, and that 
professional conduct was guided by a code of ethics” (p. 3). Early studies therefore generally 
considered professionalisation as a question of status differences between occupations, rather than 
analysing it in the broader context of professional work (Barley & Tolbert, 1991).  
 
Professionalisation 
The strategies employed by occupational groups and the steps on the way to recognition are referred to 
as occupationalisation or occupational professionalisation. According to Barley and Tolbert (1991), 
occupationalisation occurs when, because of external shifts or internal changes, organisations seek or 
need to dispose of specialised expertise which, before, they only called upon occasionally or not at all. 
Two scenarios are possible: either the organisation draws on existing groups of specialized expertise 
(e.g. legal, accounting or marketing experts), especially if the required skills fall into these categories; 
or, in case the tasks and responsibilities cannot be located in any existing occupational group, a new 
occupational group may emerge. However, the occupational process takes time and needs to be 
accompanied by specific educational setting and/or norms. In another study, and referring to 
evolutions in America since 1890, Barley (1992) sketches shifts from one major occupational category 
to another: while at the beginning of the 20th century, agriculture represented the most important 
employment category (38%), it had been replaced by manufacturing (40%) in the 1940s, giving rise to 
the category of blue-collar workers; a third shift quickly progressed in the 1980s and which saw the 
category of white-collar workers grow quickly (56% by 1988), this being workers employed in 
“managerial, sales, clerical, professional, and technical occupations” (p. 3). These examples of 
occupational division of labour in 20th-century America demonstrate a growing need for specialised 
workforce due to increasingly technical tasks.  
Another strand of conceptualising professionalisation is to describe it as an organisational change 
processes that is initiated and shaped by the influx of full-time employees and specialised 
professionals, who introduce a more managerial and business-like perspective and ultimately impact 
on the organisation’s structure. This change process can be labelled as organisational 
professionalisation. Contrary to certain researchers who tried to define what a profession is (traits of a 
profession) and how professions become recognised (occupational professionalisation), thus making 
professionalisation an endpoint, other researchers consider professionalisation as an ongoing process 
that changes with time. These researchers reject a generalised professionalisation concept. As one of 
their representatives, Abbott (1988) perceives professionalisation as processes of heterogeneous and 
multidirectional but interdependent developments that require a focus on the work itself rather than on 
structural characteristics only. For instance, the arrival of professionals into previously volunteer-run 
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organisations or domains using unskilled work forces entails several new managerial dynamics such as 
organisational goals, responsibilities, standards, conduct, and control mechanisms to achieve these 
goals in the most efficient way. Within organisational professionalisation, and combining elements of 
legitimacy and effectiveness in an organisational setting of multiple actors, two recurring areas of 
investigation emerge: governance and organisational structure. Governance refers to the steering and 
coordination of interdependent (usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems 
(Benz, 2004) “in the context of a plurality of views and interests” (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009, p. 6). 
The Institute on Governance, a Canadian NPO founded in 1990, defines governance as “a process 
whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine whom they involve in 
the process and how they render account” (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 1). Organisational 
structure (or design), for its part, most often refers to the three dimensions of 
complexity/specialisation, formalisation and centralisation (Fredrickson, 1986; Hage & Aiken, 1967; 
Van de Ven, 1976). Thompson (1967) describes structure as the organisation’s specific composition of 
internal relationships, authority and communication. The three dimensions listed above are expected to 
impact an organisation’s strategic decision making. Reviewing earlier studies, Child (1972b) notes 
that structural design has predominantly been explained by organisations’ size. He concludes that 
strategic decisions of those who hold the power should also be included in the analysis of structural 
arrangements. Hall (1967) has equally questioned the relevance of size in determining organisational 
structure. One of the most significant works on organisational design is certainly Mintzberg’s (1979) 
organisational configurations framework. He uncovers five ideal structural types: simple structure, 
machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, diversified form and adhocracy.  
 
As the examples and considerations presented above demonstrate, the term professionalisation is 
employed in various contexts that gave rise to the development of different concepts. I acknowledge 
that professionalisation in the general sociology and management literature is only broached 
superficially as the main focus of thesis is on professionalisation in IFs and sport management.  
 
3.1.2. Professionalisation in sport organisations 
Several scholars have analysed professionalisation processes in NFs. The goal was mainly to 
understand NFs’ evolution from loosely structured organisations run by volunteers to increasingly 
rationalised and professional structures. These change processes have sometimes been referred to as 
rationalisation (Slack & Hinings, 1987) or bureaucratisation (Slack, 1985), but more often as 
professionalisation (Amis et al., 2002; Kikulis, 2000; Skinner et al., 1999). Despite several studies, the 
concept of professionalisation in sport management remains fairly vague. In light of insufficient 
definitions and conceptualisation of professionalisation in sport management, Dowling at al. (2014) 
have reviewed extant literature in sport management. On the basis of a literature review and the 
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identification of three broad classifications (occupational, organisational and systemic 
professionalisation), they suggest the following definition: professionalisation in sport management is 
“the process by which sport organisations, systems, and the occupation of sport, transforms from a 
volunteer driven to an increasingly business-like phenomenon” (p. 527). Hence, professionalisation is 
not understood to be merely a process of occupational professionalisation, the increasing creation of 
full-time jobs in hitherto volunteer-run structures (Horch & Schütte, 2009; Seippel, 2002), and 
individual professionalism as some researchers suggest (e.g. Hall, 1968; Wilensky, 1964). Nor is 
professionalisation understood to be a purely normative process as DiMaggio and Powell argue 
(1983). However, the influx of professionals in sport organisations undeniably initiates normative 
processes such as the implementation of new management practices (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Hoye 
& Cuskelly, 2003a).  
 
3.1.2.1.  Occupational professionalisation  
Recalling the literature on occupational professionalisation mentioned earlier, one should look for 
studies in sport management that demonstrate the emergence of transferable skills and the proliferation 
of objective working standards (Wilensky, 1964). Hall (1968) defines several indicators for this 
emergence such as specialised training and education programs (e.g. university degree, diploma), 
professional associations and a code of ethics. Dowling et al. (2014) point out aptly that the concept of 
occupational professionalisation has been widely ignored in sport management. Though the arrival of 
full-time employees and the increasing need for specialised work forces are undeniable facts in IFs 
(see Table 9), and though conflicts between elected volunteers and professional staff have been 
discussed abundantly in studies on NSOs (e.g. Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004b; Chelladurai, 1987; 
Cuskelly, 1999; Auld & Godbey, 1998; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003a; Inglis, 1997b; Seippel, 2002), the 
question of the emergence and recognition of sport management as a profession has hardly been 
touched upon.  
 
Table 9. Examples demonstrating the increase of paid staff in IFs 
IF N° of staff  - past N° of staff (2016/2017) N° of departments (2015) 
FIFA 1975: 13 >450 11 
FIH 2010: 14 35 5 
FISA 1992: 3 19 4 
UCI 1992: 3 79 8 
UWW 2012: 10 24 6 
 
While research on sport management as a profession is not abundant, some examples exist. 
One is the book chapter “The business of sport” by Robinson (2003). Referring to Chelladurai (2001), 
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Robinson states that, in 2001, over 200 universities in North America offered educational programs in 
sport management. Today, more than ten years later, this number is expected to be even higher. 
Likewise, the existence of numerous rankings of sport master programs (e.g. SportBusiness 
Postgraduate Course Rankings) emphasises the growing market for sport management education. This, 
in turn, assumes a growing need for skilled employees in sport organisations. In parallel to the 
development of educational programs in sport, scientific journals in sport management gradually 
emerged. As Shilbury and Rentschler (2007) point out, these journals are often related to scholarly 
associations: The North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM) was established in 1985 
and gave rise to the Journal of Sport Management (since 1987); the European Association of Sport 
Management (EASM) was established in 1992 and gave rise to the European Sport Management 
Quarterly (since 1994, formerly named European Journal for Sport Management); the Sport 
Management Association of Australia and New Zealand (SMAANZ) was established in 1998 and gave 
rise to the Sport Management Review (since 1998); and the Applied Sport Management Association 
(ASMA) gave rise to the Journal of Applied Sport Management (since 2013). An example of a 
recently launched journal is the Journal of Global Sport Management (since 2016). In addition to 
journals that are solely dedicated to sport management, other journals integrate sport management 
studies. Overall, the establishment of numerous journals focusing on or integrating sport management 
“is a measure of the level of interest in the field, the growing number of academics, and the increasing 
need for a body of knowledge to consolidate the field” (Shilbury & Rentschler, 2007). 
As mentioned above, the existence of academic journals, scholarly associations and 
conferences is fundamental for the development of sport management as a professional field and field 
of study. Pitts et al. (2014) underline the steadily growing body of knowledge in sport business and 
sport management as follows: “The body of literature in sport management has grown significantly, 
especially over the past decade. One study reported locating 154 journals that are directly or indirectly 
related to the study of sport business management” (p. 46). However, as a field of study, sport 
management is still in its infancy. Shilbury and Rentschler (2007) noticed for instance that sport 
management journals are still excluded from most rating systems, because “sport management does 
not fit neatly within management, marketing, sociology, economics or law” (p. 31). The authors 
provide several reasons for the difficult fit. The most salient one is the need for a multidisciplinary 
approach, as many sport delivery systems are today composed of both volunteer and professional work 
forces, hence locating sport management as a discipline as much in the leisure as in the management, 
business and other related sectors. Shilbury and Rentschler’s study is also interesting from the 
perspective of recognition and legitimacy of sport management as a profession and academic field. 
Realizing that the lack of rating systems applied to sport management journals is detrimental to the 
development of the entire research field, the authors evaluate 13 sport management journals by 
replicating a rating scheme based on four criteria: prestige, contribution to theory, contribution to 
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practice and contribution to teaching. The authors hence provide a multi-dimensional measure to 
evaluate and compare journal quality.  
Despite the interest in sport management as a professional and academic field, little is known 
about sport managers, their roles and capacities. While board roles and board capacities have been 
largely analysed, those of professional staff remain fairly unexplored. With regard to international 
sport organisations, two questions seem to be of major importance to advance researchers 
understanding of sport management as a professional field: (1) Which jobs exist in sport management? 
(2) How do individuals qualify for these jobs? Despite the lack of research on sport management as a 
profession and academic field, one aspect seems to be particularly entrenched in contemporary sport in 
general: the business approach. Robinson (2003) lists several elements that have led to a commercial 
approach to the management of all types of sports organisations, including increasing customer 
expectations of service quality, value for money, and sport entertainment industry, as well as growing 
competition between sport organisations and technological advances. One can add that the business 
approach also takes effect in sport management as an educational program. Table 10 demonstrates 
examples of tuitions for postgraduate courses in sport management.  
 
Table 10. Examples of tuitions for postgraduate courses in sport management 
Course provider Course Country Tuition 
Ohio University83 Master in Sports Administration USA USD 48’540 
AISTS Master of Advanced Studies in 
Sports Administration and 
Technology 
Switzerland CHF 28’000 
The International Centre for 
Sport Studies - CIES 
FIFA Master Switzerland CHF 25’000 
University of Liverpool MBA Football Industries UK £21’500 
Coventry University84 MSc in Sport Management UK £ 10’121 
 
What is interesting to mention here is that despite numerous references to sport having 
become big business, it appears that this is not necessarily reflected in the salaries of administrators 
working in IFs. While elected volunteers may receive tremendous salaries or “compensations” (e.g. in 
                                                        
83 Ranked 1st postgraduate course worldwide by SportBusiness International in 2017. Retrieved from. 
https://www.sportbusiness.com/sportbusiness-international/sportbusiness-postgraduate-course-rankings-2017-
introduction. Furthermore, Ohio University is the cradle of sport business education. The first postgraduate 
program in sport administration was established there in 1966. From: SportBusiness International, N° 224 
84 Ranked 1st European postgraduate course by SportBusiness International in 2016 (13th in the international 
comparison). From: SportBusiness International, N° 224 
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2015, Sepp Blatter was supposed to receive an annual revenue of CHF 3.63 million85), which are 
being kept secret in many cases, IF administrators seem to receive relatively low salaries compared to 
other sectors. For instance, a starting salary for high school teachers in Switzerland varies between 
CHF 7’600 and CHF 9’800 per month86. In comparison, a starting salary in an IF for someone holding 
a Masters degree amounts rather to CHF 5’000 to CHF 6’00087. If one believes in the reward of skills 
and expertise, the distribution (and perhaps discrepancies) of salaries/compensations between IFs’ 
elected volunteers and paid staff represents another interesting starting point to evaluate sport 
management as a profession. 
 
3.1.2.2.  Organisational professionalisation 
The arrival of professionals inevitably affects the structure and functioning of voluntary nonprofit 
sport organisations. No matter whether these professionals were trained as sport managers or have 
acquired expertise in other domains through educational programs (e.g. finance, legal, economy, 
communication, marketing), they are likely to introduce new modes of operation and new managerial 
practices. As a consequence, specific professional norms are likely to impact on decision-making 
processes and programs/policies (Dowling et al., 2014). From this perspective, Mason (2012) argues 
that changes within sport organisations’ structures and processes are the result of normative pressures 
that are brought into previously amateur structures by professionals, their background, professional 
education and code of conduct. Mason further awards umbrella organisations a particular importance 
in the diffusion of professional values and standards within an organisational field. In the following, I 
refer to the increase of managerial and business-like perspectives through professionals as 
organisational professionalisation. In reviewing extent literature, I divide studies on NSOs’ 
organisational professionalisation into two broad areas of investigation: organisational structure (1) 
and governance (2). After that, I briefly present research on IFs’ organisational professionalisation, 
which mainly focuses on governance (3). 
 
(1) Organisational structure  
Several researchers have analysed how the introduction of professionals influences the 
structural arrangements of NSOs (e.g. Amis & Slack, 2008; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1989; 
Papadimitriou, 2002; Thibault et al., 1991). Amis and Slack (2008), for instance, assess structural 
dimensions of complexity, formalisation and centralisation to provide sport managers with insights 
                                                        
85 The Independent. (2016). Sepp Blatter salary as FIFA president revealed for first time. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/international/sepp-blatter-salary-as-fifa-president-revealed-for-first-
time-a6936946.html  
86 Watson. (2014). Soviel verdienen Lehrer in der Schweiz. Retrieved from 
http://www.watson.ch/Schweiz/Best%20of%20watson/520724380-So-viel-verdienen-Lehrer-in-der-Schweiz  
87 Information based on personal experiences as a former UCI staff member and discussions with former 
colleagues and friends from other IFs. 
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that enable them to design and operate their organisations more effectively. Complexity refers in this 
case to both the horizontal differentiation (i.e. task specialisation, departmentalisation) and the vertical 
differentiation (i.e. hierarchical levels). By formalising policies (e.g. code of ethics and procedures 
such as elections and bidding processes), as well as rules and regulations (e.g. statutes and rules of the 
game), organisations set up mechanisms to co-ordinate internal complexities more efficiently. With 
regard to centralisation, the authors refer to decision-making power and the question of where this 
power is located in an organisation. Academics generally speak of centralisation when the decision-
making power is concentrated at the level of senior executives (e.g. board), rather than being in the 
hands of lower-level staff (decentralisation).  
In a similar approach and analysing six voluntary sport organisations in Canada, Thibault et al. 
(1991) replace the term complexity by specialisation, linking it only to individuals’ professional 
expertise and training/education. The authors conclude that the hiring of professional staff increases 
the organisation’s degree of specialisation (mostly in areas dealing with technical aspects) because 
“professional staff in voluntary organizations are often specifically hired to increase specialisation by 
developing programs” (p. 89). Thibault et al. further provide two arguments for the increase of 
formalisation in consequence of the hiring of professionals: first, the set of standards that professionals 
bring into the organisation and hence the need to clarify their roles accordingly; and second, 
formalisation as a means for volunteer executives to maintain the control of the organisation by 
establishing written rules, procedures and guidelines. A correlation between specialisation and 
formalisation seems likely as specialisation increases organisational complexity and formalisation may 
help to control this complexity. According to Thibault et al. (1991), the dimension of centralisation 
changes the least when professionals entered the organisation. They noticed an initial increase (i.e. 
concentration of decision-making authority at the board level) that is subsequently followed by a 
decentralisation. While professionals are involved in everyday operations and control the information 
flow related to these operations, elected volunteers consider themselves as the legitimate holders of 
decision-making power. By fear of losing this power, they may increase centralisation of decision-
making when professionals are first hired. However, the authors suggest that, over time and with 
increasing trust, elected volunteers may award more autonomy to professionals. Overall, Thibault et 
al. conclude that systems concerned with administrative areas are less subject to increased 
specialisation and formalisation compared to technical areas. 
 
(2) Governance 
Another recurring issue in sport management literature is governance. Through leaders’ 
perception of control and strategy (including its realisation), governance is directly related to the 
process of organisational professionalisation. Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) relate to sport governance 
in terms of “due diligence in monitoring performance and conformance” (p. 109). They argue that the 
growing focus on governance in sport arises from a “culture of increasing accountability” (p. 109). 
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This focus (both at national and international level) is the result of several developments. For one 
thing, the hiring of professionals “has resulted in changing board roles and relationships with paid 
executives” (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005, p. 2015). In the past, board members of voluntary 
sport organisations were involved in basically everything from strategy to operations. The hiring of 
professionals made a redistribution of tasks and redefinition of roles necessary: professionals do not 
necessarily have the sport background and experience that board members have, while board members 
do not necessarily have the training, skills and specialised expertise that professionals have to manage 
and adapt to particular challenges. New and more complex constellations composed of professionals 
and volunteers thus required new role distinctions.  
Parallel to the hiring of professionals, the growing economy of the sport industry and the 
geopolitical importance of sport (e.g. sporting success at major sport events as a vector of national 
power, hosting of major sport events) resulted in a rising influence of new actors (e.g. sponsors, 
government). Both the internal and external evolutions triggered the question of how sport 
organisations should be governed. Dowling et al. (2014) therefore argue that governance “has emerged 
as a specific area of inquiry as a consequence of the ongoing, broader professionalisation process 
evident within sport” (p. 522). In fact, a fair amount of studies exists in sport management that 
examine NSOs’ governance structures and practices of boards. These studies can be divided into 
several subcategories. The following subcategories shall be briefly touched upon: board roles, shared 
leadership, board capability and board performance analysed in NSOs. 
 
Board roles: The works of Inglis (1997a, 1997b) are among the first studies on board roles in sport 
organisations. As a result of a progressive hiring of professional staff in NSOs, Inglis locates the need 
for defining clear board roles in the emerging system of dual leadership (volunteers/professionals). 
Hoye and Doherty (2011) pick up on the four main roles of the board identified by Inglis. These are: 
setting and monitoring the mission, planning and policy development, appointing and monitoring the 
CEO, and managing external relationships. They conclude that the complexity of governance in the 
context of sport organisations is still not fully understood and that poor governance is likely to 
negatively impact organisational performance. In one of his earlier studies, Shilbury (2001) considers 
strategy, developing financial policies and budgeting as the most important board roles. In a later 
study, and focusing only on the strategic role of boards, Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) assign boards the 
role of defining the vision, mission, and strategic planning. As a final example, Yeh and Taylor (2008) 
acknowledge the growing body of literature on sport governance, but emphasise a gap in the 
application of theoretical frameworks. They suggest a multi-theoretic approach to help understand and 
design appropriate board structures.  
 
Shared leadership: Another reoccurring topic in sport management studies is shared leadership 
(Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015; Inglis, 1997b; Schulz & Auld, 2006; Shilbury, 2001; Shilbury & Ferkins, 
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2011; Shilbury et al., 2013). Contrary to vertical leadership, shared leadership shifts leadership powers 
to those with key knowledge, skills and abilities for particular issues. Shared leadership as a concept 
was first mentioned by Gibb (1954): “Leadership is probably best conceived as a group quality, as a 
set of functions which must be carried out by the group. This concept of ‘distributed leadership’ is an 
important one” (p. 884). Carson et al. (2007) point out two main trends for team designs to shift 
towards shared leadership: team and task complexity that are difficult to be managed by one single 
leader, and employees’ high level of expertise and desire to apply their knowledge and skills more 
autonomously. In nonprofit sport organisations, shared leadership has been thematised in relation to 
growing tensions between elected volunteers and paid professionals with regard to decision-making 
power. Devoting their time, knowledge and experience gratuitously, elected volunteers tend to 
consider themselves as the legitimate holders of decision-making power. Meanwhile, the increasingly 
complex environment of sport organisations requires the involvement of skilled professionals, who, in 
turn, seek autonomy in areas that fall under their expertise. Shilbury and Ferkins (2011), for instance, 
claim that “sport organisations in contemporary society are complex entities struggling with the 
delicate balance between volunteer involvement and professional management by paid staff” (p. 110). 
At national level, this generally concerns “the balance and influence of power between the executive 
director and the voluntary board” (p. 118). Other studies have examined leadership dynamics of 
nonprofit sport boards. Investigating board members’ and paid staff’s perceived influence, Shilbury 
(2001) observes a growing influence of paid staff in decision-making while, in the eyes of executive 
directors, board members should be more strongly involved in strategy formulation. Shared leadership 
as a result of task complexification, increasing expectations and expenditure of time is also likely to 
impact strategic decision-making as the traditional role of boards. Ferkins et al. (2005) as well as 
Schulz and Auld (2006) see in this evolution a potential for blurred roles and role ambiguity.  
 
Board capability: The third topic I put forward and that is frequently analysed in relation to 
governance in NSOs is board capability (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010; Ferkins et al., 2005; Shilbury & 
Ferkins, 2011, 2015; Shilbury et al., 2013). Ferkins and Shilbury (2005) define performance (strategic 
role), conformance (monitoring role), policy (primary role of the board) and operations (primary role 
of paid management) as the four generic themes to examine and express governance capabilities in 
sport organisations. Together, these four themes are indicators of the board’s role and influence on the 
organisation’s strategic development. The authors express concerns about ownership and control in 
light of the “growing dominance of management involvement in governance, signalling a potential 
retreat by volunteer board members who have traditionally been elected to protect the interests of the 
membership” (p. 217). The four generic themes investigated by Ferkins and Shilbury (2005) reflect 
elements of corporate governance frameworks such as Tricker’s (2015) model of conformance and 
performance. The model represents one possibility of defining and evaluating boards’ capability: 
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 Compliance roles Performance roles 
 
Outward looking 
 
Provide accountability 
 
 
Strategy formulation 
 
Inward looking 
 
Monitoring & supervising 
 
Policy making 
 
 Past and present-focused Future-focused 
 
Figure 1. Basic board perspectives adapted from Tricker (2015) 
In yet another study, Ferkins and Shilbury (2010) apply the lens of boards’ strategic 
capabilities to the context of the national-regional governing relationship. They conclude that a more 
collaborative partnership between the two entities “by engaging in a power-sharing approach” (p. 252) 
could improve the strategic capability of the board, as “regional relationships are integral to the overall 
governing performance” (p. 253). Through a developmental action research study, Ferkins and 
Shilbury (2015) also investigate collaborative partnerships in a NSO in New Zealand with the goal of 
enhancing the governance capability of the board. They conclude: “understanding collective board 
leadership provides important direction for future research in sport governance settings characterised 
by a federal model, and has the potential to facilitate deeper insights into leadership in governance and 
governance in leadership” (p. 396). 
 
Board performance: The last subcategory of sport organisations’ governance and that I include in this 
brief review is board performance. Governmental funding, nations’ quest for sporting success to 
receive those funds, and governments’ need to evaluate sporting success has resulted in an increasing 
number of studies measuring general organisational performance (Bayle & Madella, 2002; Bayle & 
Robinson, 2007; Madella, Bayle, & Tome, 2005; Winand, Rihoux, Qualizza, & Zintz, 2011; Winand, 
Zintz, Bayle, & Robinson, 2010) and the emergence of managerial practices related to it (O'Boyle, 
2015; O'Boyle & Hassan, 2014). Numerous studies at national level also deal with the particular focus 
on board performance (Ferkins, et al., 2010; Hoye, 2004; Hoye & Auld, 2001; Hoye & Cuskelly, 
2003a; Hoye & Doherty, 2011). This focus can be explained by the two performance roles that boards 
hold and which Tricker (2015) defines as strategy formulation and policy making. Presenting a four-
stage model to develop organisational performance, Ferkins et al. (2010) relate performance directly to 
boards’ strategic capability: “Performance is understood to be the forward-looking, strategic role of 
the board” (p. 605). They notice that the insufficient understanding of boards’ involvement in strategy 
complicates the analysis of board performance. Hoye and Doherty (2011) also highlight the 
relationship between board effectiveness and organisational performance and suggest the use of 
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quantitative, qualitative and/or mixed methods designs “to examine and better understand the various 
correlations of board performance” (p. 282). Taking a slightly different focus, Hoye and Cuskelly 
(2003a) investigate the relationship between board performance and patterns of board power using the 
five types of power pattern developed by Murray et al. (1992): CEO-dominated board, chair-
dominated board, fragmented power board, power-sharing board, powerless board. Their findings 
suggest that when the board power pattern is perceived as powerless or fragmented, perceived board 
performance is lower. Meanwhile, the study sample does not provide sufficient evidence for 
relationships between chair-led, executive-led and power-sharing-boards and does not explain 
variation in power patterns, their emergence or their impact on board performance.  
 
(3) International sport federations’ organisational professionalisation  
The aspect of governance in national nonprofit sport organisations has been an intensively 
discussed topic for several years already. In recent years, and in light of numerous scandals and public 
pressures for improvement, studies on governance issues in international sport organisations have also 
increased significantly (e.g. Alm, 2013; Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 
2013; Forster, 2006; Geeraert, 2015a, 2015b; Geeraert, Alm, & Groll, 2014; MacAloon, 2011; Pielke, 
2013, 2015; Pieth, 2014; Tomlinson, 2014). Studies on international sport organisations even appear to 
be exclusively related to corruption, mismanagement, doping and similar scandals that fill the 
newspaper headlines since the late 1990s. Multiple and repeated scandals in IFs raise questions about 
their efficiency, willingness and capacity to implement contemporary governance practices. While 
NFs are generally accountable to public authorities (e.g. government, ministry of sport) on which they 
depend financially, IFs act more or less like monopolies. I therefore argue that IFs experience less 
pressure to professionalise and to align with practices of good governance than NFs. Some examples 
of governance issues in IFs are given below:  
 
1998: IOC 
• Salt Lake City bribery scandal resulting in the IOC 2000 Reform Commission and the creation of 
the IOC Ethics Commission.  
1990s – today: FIFA 
• The ISL88 scandal (late 1990s) in which commissions were paid to FIFA senior officials.  
• The Qatargate (2011) on alleged bribes in the electing process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups.   
• The FIFAgate (2015) leading to the arrest of several high ranked FIFA officials accused of money 
laundry, fraud, corruption etc.  
 
 
                                                        
88 ISL (International Sport and Leisure) was a Swiss sports marketing company. 
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2008: FIVB 
• Allegations on self-enrichment practices of former FIVB president Ruben Acosta for taking a 10% 
commission on all sponsor and TV contracts signed on behalf of the FIVB, ultimately leading to 
Acosta’s resignation as IOC member in 2004.  
2013: IWF 
• Accusations against IWF officials (first and foremost the president) for financial mismanagement, 
including notably the unaccounted whereabouts of several millions of dollars of Olympic 
revenues. 
2015: UCI 
• Allegations against former UCI president Hein Verbruggen for covering up positive doping tests 
of Lance Armstrong (taken at the Tour de Suisse in 2001) by knowingly providing a backdated 
TUE (therapeutic use exemption). The Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC) report 
finally cleared Hein Verbruggen and his predecessor Pat McQuaid of outright corruption in 2015 
but queries their governance methods and accuses them of preferential treatment in specific cases. 
2016: IAAF 
• Allegations against IAAF senior officials for extorting money from athletes to cover up failed 
doping tests and irregularities in the biological passport, leading to the exclusion of all track and 
field athletes from the 2016 Olympic Games. 
In an attempt to respond to urging calls for good governance in international sport, Chappelet and 
Mrkonjic (2013) suggest an assessment tool which they call Basic Indicators for Better Governance in 
International Sport (BIBGIS). Based on extant literature and discussions with stakeholders, the 
authors put forward seven dimensions for better governance, producing a total of 63 indicators. In a 
similar approach, Geeraert (2015b) presents the Sports Governance Observer, a benchmarking tool for 
good governance in IFs. He argues that IFs’ institutional design does not allow for members of the 
decision-making body to be adequately monitored and sanctioned. Other studies focus more on single 
aspects of governance, notably on accountability. Forster (2006), for instance, relates international 
sport organisations’ “apparent lack of accountability towards member organisations and other 
stakeholders” (p. 79) to a lack of ownership and organisations monopoly position. Investigating 
governance issues in 35 Olympic sports, Geeraert (2014) provides empirical evidence demonstrating a 
general lack of accountability in these IFs. Main findings include opaque criteria for the distribution of 
funding to members, lack of independent ethics commissions and a general lack of term limits for IF-
presidents. He concludes that “the far-stretching autonomy of the sports world has had a negative 
impact on the quality of the self-governance of SGBs [sport governing bodies]” (p. 301) and that 
increased external pressures to reform are needed to make a difference. Pielke (2015) further argues 
that “international sport bodies are particularly fertile settings for corruption to take root in and, 
accordingly, difficult to reform” (p. 35). Similar to Geeraert, Pielke considers external pressures as a 
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necessary means to improve the governance of international sport bodies. He further predicts that if 
these organisations adopt changes insufficiently, change might be forced upon them.  
Though Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) highlight the “complexity, uncertainty and evolving 
nature of the environment” (p. 24) in which international sport organizations operate, past evolutions 
and elements that have shaped the organisations’ characteristics and current functioning have, so far, 
been investigated fairly little. Tomlinson’s (2014) study on FIFA’s governance is one of the rare 
studies examining a federation’s changing leadership styles, structures and values over the years. 
However, the vast majority of studies on governance in international sport organisations place the 
adoption of standards of good governance (rather than board roles, leadership, capability and 
performance) at the centre of the governance debate. The following extract from a chapter of Pielke 
(2015) in the Global Corruption Report: Sport demonstrates this focus:  
 
The rapidly increasing financial interests in sport and associated with sport create a 
fertile setting for corrupt practices to take hold. When they do, the often insular 
bodies have shown little ability to adopt or enforce the standards of good 
governance that are increasingly expected around the world (p. 29). 
 
I argue that despite an overwhelming and growing number of governance scandals in IFs, a 
fundamental and broader analysis of IFs is necessary. Though the prevention of future governance 
issues is undeniably one of the most urgent priorities in international sport, the question of board 
structures, roles and processes and how they evolved through changing environmental contexts should 
also be considered. This might enable researchers to understand the full extent of current governance 
issues by putting it into the overall context of IFs’ transformations. Likewise, governance issues 
should not be equated with inversed professionalisation. On the contrary: the most sophisticated forms 
of organisations (e.g. governments, multinational companies) are not immune to corruption. Wherever 
considerable power and/or money are part of the organisation’s functioning, corruption has to be 
considered as a possible risk.  
Overall, and considering the growing economic impact and outcome of international sport, 
strategic leadership and performance emerge as two central aspects for IFs to take into consideration if 
they want to be/remain competitive. Boards as the key decision-making body, their strategic capability 
and performance play a pivotal role in this process. Growing numbers of scandals seem to have 
diverted research from other essential questions including board selection, evaluation and 
performance. In their study on corporate governance, strategic boards and challenges to traditional 
forms of governance models in New Zealand, Ingley and Van der Walt (2001) aptly summarise the 
dilemma in the general governance debate: “The basic concern is to improve current practice and 
avoid further embarrassing scandals” (p. 176). “Avoid further embarrassing scandals”, this is exactly 
what scandal-ridden sport organisations try to do. With their main focus being on normative pressures, 
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I argue that studies on governance structures and practices tend to ignore sport organisations’ history 
and contextual factors. Haigh (2016) notes in this regard: “One tends to hear about sports governance 
only in the context of its failures. It obscured more general trends of increasing levels of sophistication 
and professionalism in sports administration” (p. 11). Or with the words of Ferkins et al. (2010): “for 
many involved in the sport industry, governance has been an invisible process, something that occurs 
as a matter of course until the organisation runs into difficulty, and only then does the spotlight 
become more focussed on governance practices” (p. 603). But how can one define good governance 
practices for IFs without first determining historical and contextual factors that have shaped their 
current forms of governance (and that have enabled corruption and other forms of mismanagement)? 
As a result of external pressures related to government funding and sporting success, literature on 
board roles, capacity and performance at the level of NSOs is fairly rich. This cannot be said of 
international sport organisations, leaving room for a necessary discussion that should perhaps have 
preceded that of defining good governance practices in international sport organisations.   
 
3.1.2.3.  Systemic professionalisation 
After having outlined occupational and organisational professionalisation in the context of sport 
organisations, I follow Dowling et al.’s (2014) suggestion and circumscribe a third category of 
professionalisation, which is systemic professionalisation. According to the authors, systemic 
professionalisation refers to “ a process by which an external factor causes some form of field-level 
change” (p. 524), hence classifying it as a by-product of environmental shifts. Systemic change can 
thus also be described as a paradigm change: instead of changing only bits and pieces through 
independent actions and to the degree the necessity (or desire) for their change occurs, systemic 
change refers to a fundamental change that impacts the whole system. Considering this large scope, 
Reigeluth (1992) also refers to this approach as radical change. Radical change is difficult to manage 
and risky in terms of outcome. He concludes that systemic change is the result of paradigm shifts in 
society, producing new needs. If that is the case, then organisations need to analyse and understand 
environmental and societal shifts to decide and influence themselves the course of change. Without 
this background of understanding and in case of important environmental changes, societal shifts and 
pressures for adaptation, a self-determined change process is difficult to achieve for organisations. 
Paradigm shifts may occur when there is a change to the dominant logic. A dominant logic is built 
through shared ideas, beliefs and values (one could also say “organisational culture”) of a dominant 
coalition (one could also say “organisational elite”). Prahalad and Bettis (1986) define the dominant 
logic as “the way in which managers conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation 
decisions – be it in technologies, product development, distribution, advertisement, or in human 
resource management” (p. 490). Management processes generally relate to various administrative 
tools such as planning, budgeting and control. The more the activities of an organisation are 
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diversified, the more we are likely to find dominant logics to coexist and influence actors’ conduct 
and, ultimately, the organisation’s goals and decisions.  
Some of the environmental paradigm shifts of the last decades are globalisation, 
commercialisation and digitalisation. These shifts seem to affect organisations of the same field in a 
similar way. O’Brien and Slack (2003) apply this logic to sport organisations, noting that “[All] sport 
organizations are embedded in organizational fields, and are subject to pressures from key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, competitors and regulatory agencies” (p. 419). Picking up on 
O’Brien and Slack’s study, Dowling et al. (2014) therefore consider a “field level examination (hence 
systemic professionalisation)” (p. 525) to be more appropriate than the analysis of single sport 
organisations. Systemic professionalisation in sport organisations therefore means shifting logics in 
the organisational field of sport organisations and which entail fundamental changes to management 
processes. O’Brien and Slack (2003) analysed communities of actors, exchange processes, forms of 
capital, and regulatory structures of the English Rugby Union during the transition from amateur to 
professional status. They conclude that, “as the professional area unfolded, actors shifted their former 
emphasis on intrinsic forms of cultural and social capital to the pursuance of economic capital” (p. 
444). In the case of the English Rugby Union, the success of this transition from amateur to 
professional status was dependent on at least two elements: the adoption of a new dominant logic by 
actors of the dominant coalition (this dominant logic stems from general shifts in the environment and 
society), and the development of clear objectives for the change process. In essence, systemic 
professionalisation is initiated by external influences (e.g. pressure to adapt to paradigm shifts), while 
occupational professionalisation and organisational professionalisation are the result of internal 
change processes (though not exclusively).  
Dowling et al. (2014) provide examples of studies that examine organisational change in NSOs 
with regard to the influence of government-led programs (e.g. Slack & Hinings, 1992). The authors 
refer to this change process as systemic professionalisation. Based on the literature review, further 
examples can be added (e.g. Hoye, 2003; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings, 1995). The sample sizes of the 
three studies demonstrate the authors’ goal to analyse a whole set of organisations (Hoye: 42 
Australian NSOs; Kikulis et al., and Slack and Hinings: both 36 Canadian NSOs). For the level of 
international sport organisations, and in particular IFs, extensive research on organisational 
professionalisation is rare, not to mention systemic change. While external pressure relating to specific 
evolutions (e.g. increasing cases of corruption, mismanagement and doping) is growing in recent 
years, studies that pick up on these evolutions only analyse one or not even a handful of international 
sport organisations at a time. A general investigation of external field-level pressures and which is 
based on empirical findings from a representative sample size is currently lacking. Forster (2006), for 
instance, analyses governance issues in three IFs (other IFs are only briefly touched upon and this in a 
rather unstructured manner). He concludes that the massive commercialisation of IFs increases self-
governance issues. However, the study does not conceptualise commercialisation, nor does it explain 
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the paradigm shift from volunteer-run and service oriented sport organisations to professional 
structures in pursuance of commercial capital. In a sense, the phenomenon is pointed at, but it is 
neither analysed nor conceptualised in a broader context. Another example is the study of Pielke 
(2013) on repeated governance scandals within FIFA and the global football system, based on a 
framework using seven mechanisms for the evaluation of accountability in international politics 
(hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer and public reputational accountability). Though 
findings reveal that reforms are indispensable for FIFA and reference is made to the IOC 2000 Reform 
as an example, it remains unclear who or what should/could establish, implement and overlook a 
reform program that leads to increased accountability. Pielke mentions two starting points: the legal 
environment and public pressure. Both elements are only represented in a descriptive manner but not 
from a theoretical or systemic perspective. Mallon (2000), for his part, details multiple cases of 
bribery in relation to the Salt Lake City bid for the 2002 Winter Games. He points out that external 
pressures (e.g. FBI, media) were needed to initiate change. Still, while the author argues that 
recommendations of the IOC 2000 Commission are a first step, their effectiveness and impact on the 
wider Olympic Movement remain to be proven.  
 
Overall, and as the above examples testify, studies on IFs do broach certain phenomena that occur 
as the result of profound organisational transformations. These phenomena are, in the majority of 
cases, limited to some sort of management scandal (e.g. corruption, bribery, blackmailing, self-
enrichment). The question of field-level changes, their origin and evolution that would explain these 
phenomena in a broader context, are not subject of discussion. This makes it difficult to grasp whether 
there is systemic professionalisation in IFs, and if yes which forms it may take. This category of 
professionalisation is by far the most complex conceptualisation, but also the least investigated in IFs 
to this date. Assembling aspects of the disparate definitions and conceptualisations of 
professionalisation in general and in sport management in particular, I suggest the following 
definition: professionalisation in sport organisations is a dynamic change process (Bayle, 2001) that 
is initiated and characterised by environmental (external) pressures and organisational (internal) 
adaptations, progressively shifting sport organisations from an amateur to a professional logic 
(O'Brien & Slack, 2004), and eventually entailing organisational rationalisation, efficiency and 
project management (Chantelat, 2001).  
 
3.2. Commercialisation 
The massive commercialisation of sport over the last decades, and especially of major sport 
events, is perhaps one of the most impressive evolutions in international sport. In the introduction of 
their Handbook on the economics of sport, Andreff and Szymanski (2006) note: “The principle driving 
force behind the expansion of sport economics has been the rapid growth in the economic significance 
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of sport during the past three decades” (p. 5). Two of the outstanding examples of this evolution are 
the Olympic Games, a multi-sports event, and football with the FIFA World Cup. In both cases, the 
enthusiasm of spectators to consume televised sport laid the foundations for the unprecedented 
explosion of broadcasting rights. The Olympic Games have first been telecasted in 1960 (both winter 
and summer Games). Back then, USA TV (today CBS) paid USD 3.2 million89 for the broadcasting 
rights of the 1960 summer Games. 52 years later, the broadcasting rights for the 2012 London Games 
were sold for nearly USD 1.2 billion to NBC90. This represents a multiplication factor of 375! In the 
following years, the technological advancements of broadcasting (e.g. satellite feeds), as well as the 
creation of heroes and exciting stories reached the living rooms of an ever-growing audience, resulting 
in skyrocketing broadcasting and sponsorship rights. During the Olympic cycle 1973-76, the revenue 
of the IOC amounted to USD 14 million (Andreff & Szymanski, 2006). And though 
commercialisation of the Olympic Games has its origins in the 1960s, it only seriously gathered in 
speed with the 1984 Los Angeles Games, which were the first to be privately organised. As the 1984 
Los Angeles Games immediately generated a surplus of USD 250 million, it is not surprising that, 
since then, the following Games pursued the same strategy. For the Olympic cycle 1997-2000, the 
IOC had increased its revenue to reach USD 346 million (Andreff & Szymanski, 2006). 
The growing value of broadcasting rights for sport events is also at the origin of the success of 
the FIFA World Cup. Back in 1978, the FIFA World Cup already generated incredible revenues of 
EUR 15 million from TV rights. In 2006, revenues from TV amounted to EUR 991 million. And 
between 2012-2015, revenues from the FIFA World Cup broadcasting rights accounted for 43% of 
FIFA’s overall revenue (USD 5.8 billion91). In total, 83% of FIFA’s revenues between 2012-2015 
were generated through the FIFA World Cup alone. Both the Olympic Games and the FIFA World 
Cups hold monopolies of supply. Other events could be listed here such as the Super Bowl organised 
by the NFL (National Football League), or the Rugby World Cup organised by WR (World Rugby). 
The massive demand for their events in terms of TV audience provides these organisations with 
particular power to negotiate rights and contracts. Two steps were important in this evolution and 
concentration of power: first, sport organisations had to understand which of their products and 
services had a commercial value; and second, they had to establish ownership rights on these products 
(e.g. events). Meanwhile, the growing inflow of revenues from broadcasting also has its downsides. 
One of the downsides is that the inflow entails strong dependencies on the buyers (i.e. broadcasters), 
hence limiting sport organisations’ margin of action vis-à-vis buyers’ pressures and expectations. For 
instance, having obtained the TV rights and targeting a specific audience (e.g. geographical region and 
time zone) or play format, a broadcaster might put pressure on an IF to adapt the sporting program to 
its own requirements. Another downside, and which has been emphasised by some researchers in the 
                                                        
89 In today’s dollars 
90 CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) and NBC (National Broadcasting Company) are American commercial 
broadcast television networks. 
91 FIFA financial statements 2012-2015 
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nonprofit sector with regard to commercialisation, is the rise of profit-seeking behaviour at the 
expense of declining nonprofit values and services, as well as mission drift (e.g. Dees & Anderson, 
2003). But before taking a closer look at commercialisation in general NPO-literature and in sport 
organisations in particular, a basic differentiation should be clarified: the differentiation between 
commodification and commercialisation in sport. 
 
3.2.1. Commodification and commercialisation in sport 
The difference between commodification and commercialisation appears somewhat fuzzy in 
sport management literature. Some scholars, when referring to the commodification of sport, mean the 
growing profit from event and broadcasting rights, gate revenues, merchandising etc. (Sewart, 1987; 
Slack, 2004; Walsh & Giulianotti, 2001). But they also refer to it as the commodification of athletes 
and team sports: clubs can exchange athletes against money (Ben-Porat, 2009), and clubs themselves, 
due to increasing revenue streams and financial value, are treated as commodities (Gerrard, 1999). 
What they all have in common and what makes them a commodity is their exchange value. Gerrard 
(1999) sees the beginning of sport commodification in teams’ need to establish entrance fees so they 
could pay players’ wages: “The advent of the turnstile marked the transformation of sport from a 
public good to a private commodity” (p. 274). Enjolras (2002), for his part, analysed to which extent 
sport clubs can transform their activities (e.g. services to members) and properties (e.g. infrastructures) 
into commercial products and whether the commercialisation results in a crowding out of voluntary 
work. Why did Enjolras choose to speak of commercialisation rather than commodification? The line 
between the two concepts is not always obvious in sport management, if not to say confusing. Extant 
literature and dictionaries provide some definitions that may serve as useful starting points to 
distinguish the two terms. 
 
Commodity and commodification  
In the Oxford Dictionary of English, Stevenson (2010) defines commodity as “a raw material or 
primary agricultural product that can be bought and sold, such as copper or coffee” (p. 350). Today, 
not only raw material or primary agricultural products but also ideas, social relationships and 
individuals can be considered as commodities. Mason (1999) describes the commodification of sport 
as a shift through which sport becomes “increasingly bound up in the processes of economic 
production and distribution” (p. 403), notably within the recreation and entertainment industry. From a 
sociological perspective based on Marx’s (1976) theory, commodification means that sport transforms 
from a use value into an exchange value, that is: the value something can be sold or traded for. This 
presupposes that a market to exchange sport as a commodity exists. According to Sewart (1987), 
commodified sport is equivalent to functionalised sport: sport serves the goal of entertainment, 
distraction and diversion; in exchange for  these, consumers have to pay. 
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Commercialism, commercialize and commercialisation  
In the Oxford Dictionary of English, Stevenson (2010) defines commercialism as the “emphasis on 
maximizing profits” (p. 349) and the verb commercialise as the action through which individuals or 
groups “manage or exploit (an organisation, activity, etc.) in a way designed to make a profit” (p. 
349). Shifting the focus again on sport, Alain Tomlinson describes commercialisation in the 
Dictionary of Sports Studies as “[the] process whereby commercialism, and its raison d'être of 
financial profit, becomes the underlying economic basis of sports organization. It can be a gradual 
process, as in the case of established amateur sports in which the athlete might accept commercial 
contracts to advertise goods, or when the organizing body negotiates over time with the forces of 
commercialization” (p. 101). He further notes that commercialism relates to “a system of social and 
economic organization in which financial profit is valued above any other criterion or consideration” 
(p. 101). 
 
Based on the definitions provided above, commodification of sport thus relates to a 
transformation of immaterial, social relationships in sport into economic products, whose value is 
determined by the market. From a capitalist perspective, the process of commodification is directly 
linked to the transformation of society into a gigantic marketplace and serves the goal of 
organisations’ and individuals’ economic survival. Commercialisation, on the other hand, seems more 
related to a mindset (profit-seeking, business-oriented) and a growing number of “strong links to 
commercial enterprises” (Slack, 2004, Prologue xxii). Scholars who have investigated general 
commercialisation trends within sport clubs (Enjolras, 2002; Gammelsæter, 2010; O'Brien & Slack, 
2004; O'Brien & Slack, 2003; Stenling & Fahlén, 2009) indeed tend to focus on the link between sport 
organisations and commercial enterprises, as well as the increasing for-profit mindset that underlies 
their actions. For instance, O’Brien and Slack (2003) revealed that the abolition of the international 
amateur code on rugby clubs not only led to a restructuration of UK rugby clubs into shareholder 
companies, but also to the arrival of business entrepreneurs pursuing for-profit goals. Overall, the 
commercialisation of NPOs has been a recurring topic for many years already (e.g. Child, 2010; Guo, 
2004, 2006; Toepler, 2004; Tuckman, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998; Young, 1998). As the examples above 
testify, the commercialisation of sport clubs also caught some attention, though not comparable to the 
attention it has received in general NPO-literature. Meanwhile, the commercialisation of IFs as the 
governing bodies of international sport is both ill-defined and little studied. To understand IFs’ 
commercialisation, it is useful to place it in the general context of NPOs’ commercialisation.  
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3.2.2. Commercialisation of nonprofit organisations 
Several researchers emphasise that the environment for NPOs has become increasingly 
competitive, complex and uncertain (e.g. Froelich, 1999). In turn, competition, complexity and 
uncertainty entail the urging need to manage resources more efficiently and effectively, and to develop 
new resource strategies. Both competition and uncertainty largely stem from NPOs’ dependence on 
external funding (Heimovics et al., 1993). In light of new resource challenges, Macedo and Carlos 
Pinho (2006) view NPOs’ increasing market orientation as “an adaptive strategy for ensuring that 
organisations receive the necessary resources for accomplishing their mission and carrying out their 
activities” (p. 538). The development of a revenue-seeking behaviour appears somewhat contradictory 
considering the legal form of NPOs. While Froelich (1999) sees revenue-seeking behaviour as a long 
existing reality among NPOs, other researchers fear that NPOs’ increased blending of service-oriented 
and profit-oriented objectives may lead to goal and mission displacement (e.g. Toepler, 2004). 
Clotfelter and Ehrlich (2001), for their part, see in NPOs’ commercialisation an opportunity for 
obtaining additional resources to be used for good purposes. On a more neutral stance, Maier et al. 
(2014) simply define commercialisation as “NPOs’ increasing reliance on revenue from sales of goods 
and services” (p. 71), this being commercial activities. Though commercial activities are not new in 
the nonprofit sector (Salamon, 1989), the undeniable gathering of pace in recent decades is striking. 
Froelich (1999) notes in this regard:  
 
A funding approach gaining popularity as an alternative or supplement to 
traditional sources of nonprofit support involves various forms of commercial 
activity. [...] In essence, clients and customers have become the primary resource 
providers in the nonprofit sector, rather than donors or government entities (p. 
249).  
 
In turn, increasing dependence on commercial activities implies new political, economic and 
technological issues. Two major aspects contribute to this dependence: a general decline of private and 
public contributions (e.g. grants and subsidies, individual and corporate donations) as the traditional 
cornerstone of NPOs’ financial model (Froelich, 1999); and growing competition between nonprofits 
for scarce funding (Smith, 2010) and with for-profits that offer similar services (Tuckman, 1998). In 
response, NPOs increasingly seek to diversify their revenue (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chang & 
Tuckman, 1994). Analysing the effects of NPOs’ various revenue strategies, Froelich (1999) notes that 
commercial activities constitute the largest and fastest growing revenue source. And yet, despite a 
strong interest in NPOs commercialisation, “scholars have not agreed on what specifically constitutes 
commercial revenue, and they variously refer to it as business income, commercial income, 
commercial share, fee income, earned income, profit-motivated income or program service revenue – 
often measured in slightly different ways” (Child, 2010, p. 147).  
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3.2.3. Commercialisation of nonprofit sport organisations 
The few studies that broach the topic of commercialisation in NSOs tend to agree with general 
NPO literature in that commercialisation is related, on the one hand, to a sector-wide resource shortage 
in (government) funding (Nagel et al., 2015; O'Brien & Slack, 2004) and, on the other hand, to 
strategies of resource diversification employed by organisations in response to financial uncertainty 
(Wicker et al., 2013). Referring to both financial uncertainty and new managerial approaches, 
Robinson (2003) describes sport as “a business that competes for scarce consumer resources, requiring 
a business approach to its management, utilising professional management techniques” (p. 308). In her 
study, Robinson notably distinguishes four main factors that gave rise to the commercialisation of 
sport: a trend towards sport spectating, changing technologies, increasing competition and 
professionalisation of sports management.  
Unlike NFs, IFs never faced the challenge of securing alternative revenues because of declining 
public contributions. In general, literature on the commercialisation of IFs is scarce. Existing studies 
rather focus on the consequences of massive commercialisation, such as corruption, bribery and self-
enrichment. Studies on growing commercialisation are primarily related to financial excesses within 
some prominent international sport organisations such as the IOC (Tomlinson, 2005), FIFA 
(Cornelissen, 2010) or IAAF (Krieger, 2016). In light of such scant research on IFs’ 
commercialisation, I will take a closer look at the four main factors that Robinson (2003) has 
distinguished as the triggering causes for the commercialisation of sport.  
 
A trend towards sport spectating  
Robinson (2003) deduces her conclusion of a growing demand for sport spectating from the massive 
rise of broadcasting rights in major events such as the Olympic Games. Besides broadcasting rights, 
she also includes an increase from sponsorship and gate receipts. According to Robinson, the trend 
towards sport spectating has two consequences: first, considering the inflow of commercial revenues, 
sport needs to adopt corporate management practices in a similar way as do business ventures; and 
second, as the principal investors, sponsors’, broadcasters’ and spectators’ expectations increase to the 
degree that the sums they invest increase.  
 
Changing technologies 
Television, one of the ground-breaking developments of entertainment technology, has undeniably 
altered the access to and consumption of sport over the last decades. Buraimo (2006) circumscribes 
the 1980s as a period of important technological advancements in broadcasting, which “contributed to 
the expansion of the market and saw the emergence of new broadcasters who produced and broadcast 
programmes using the new direct-to-home (DTH) satellite platform” (p. 100). This first innovation 
was followed by the emergence of digital technology in the 1990s (e.g. digital television broadcasts 
giving viewers access to several hundreds of television channels, digital computers, mobile 
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telecommunication, wireless, etc.). Before these evolutions, televised sport programs were limited to a 
few big events and sports, marginalising many smaller sports (e.g. sports climbing, surfing). A second 
important innovation is the Internet. Today, most IFs have their own official YouTube channel (e.g. 
FINA, Planet Canoe, FISA, FEI, UCI, UWW, FIFATV and many other). Other technological 
innovations in recent years include the use of drones, spider cameras, goal line technology or “ref 
cam”92. However, some recent technologies such as the use of video assisted referees (VDR) still 
remain controversial (e.g. the time it takes to review a scene). However, examples such as VDR also 
emphasise that “the subjective nature of human decision making is no longer considered appropriate 
for such a profitable and professional business as sport” (Robinson, 2003, p. 312).  
 
Increasing competition  
According to Robinson (2003), competition mainly comes from other sports and leisure providers. 
Modern broadcasting technologies not only brought sport spectacles into people’s living room, it also 
offered them a choice between hundreds of channels at only one click (TV or internet). Sports 
therefore have to compete for visibility at multiple levels. One solution to manage competition is 
strategic planning.  
 
Professionalisation of sports management  
As I already broached this topic under occupational professionalisation (3.1.2.1), I shall only briefly 
summarise some of the main aspects. The professionalisation of sports management as the fourth 
factor described by Robinson (2003) refers to improved organisational functioning thanks to the 
implementation of strategic planning, human resource management and marketing plans. This 
professionalisation is based on two elements: (1) education and training (e.g. degree programs in sport 
management, professional associations such as the European Association for Sport Management), and 
(2) academic research into sport management in terms of exploring and publishing best practice 
regarding organisational design, marketing, sponsorship, human resource management, quality 
management and ethics. Robinson notes that the development of sport management as an educational 
domain and a research field has led to the “emergence of a management culture based on the belief 
that good management practice is the solution to organisational survival” (p. 313). The dominant 
perception of good management practices appears to be the business-like approach, which is brought 
in by professional sports managers.  
 
In the above literature review, I focused on professionalisation and commercialisation as the key 
concepts of this study. The review classifies the concept of professionalisation in sport management 
into three categories: occupational, organisational, and systemic professionalisation. 
                                                        
92 In rugby, the ref cam provides a referee’s eye view of the match. The lightweight camera system worn on the 
side of the referee’s head has been in regular use since 2014. 
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Commercialisation, the second key concept, is probably the most salient evolution in international 
sport in recent years, and yet it has received little academic attention. Based on the review, 
relationship(s) between these two concepts emerge. In the following sections, I will first summarise 
research gaps and then develop the conceptual framework of this study. 
 
3.3. Research gaps  
A first observation that strikes the eye when diving into the topic of IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation is the blatant dearth of studies at the international level compared to studies at the 
national level. Table 11 provides some examples of topics that have been analysed in the context of 
NFs. A possible explanation for this imbalance is the level of independence and autonomy that differs 
greatly between IFs and NFs. NFs generally receive important government funding. The sum of the 
funding is often coupled with the federation’s sporting success (i.e. medals won at international sport 
events such as Olympic Games and World Championships). Using sport as a geopolitical vector, a 
government is interested in seeing its athletes excel on the international stage. Therefore, for the 
money the government injects into NFs a return on investment is expected. As the injected money is 
public money, the pressure is even higher. NFs are therefore subject to strict national scrutiny, 
generally resulting in high demands for accountability. The latter includes annual activity reports, 
external financial audits and other evidences the responsible institution (e.g. government, Ministry of 
Sport) may request. IFs, on the other hand, do not receive government funding (though some 
exceptions for small funding exist, as is the case with the ISSF – International Shooting Sport 
Federation 93 ), but finance themselves through various revenue sources (e.g. event hosting, 
broadcasting and sponsorship rights, membership fees, etc.). They owe a certain level of 
accountability to their members (i.e. continental and national federations). However, in light of 
members’ increasing financial dependency on their IF, the question about members’ scope of free 
action and opinion arises. Would members really question or even criticise their IF’s due diligence if, 
at the same time, this very IF is an important source of financial income? Or if the IF is a source of 
political power for some actors (e.g. board members)? In a nutshell: IFs enjoy large freedom from 
public institutions and their scrutiny because they are financially independent from government 
funding. Furthermore, the legal framework for NPOs as it exists in Switzerland is very liberal and puts 
little pressure of accountability on IFs. And if neither the public authorities nor the members request 
accountability, who should/could?  
Research into government funded NSOs began around the late 1980s. Many studies of the 
empirical strand pursue the aim of understanding particular factors (e.g. board capacity, governance) 
that are relevant for the organisation’s outcome and improvement (e.g. organisational performance, 
                                                        
93 Every year (at least since 2012), the ISSF annually received between EUR 6’000 and EUR 10’000 of subsidies 
from the German Ministry of the Interior (source: ISSF financial statements 2012-2015). 
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medals). Studies from the conceptual strand, for their part, try to further researchers’ understanding of 
sport organisations’ structure and functioning by analysing various concepts within organisational 
theories such as professionalisation (Dowling et al., 2014) and professionalism (Evetts, 2014), 
organisational change (Slack & Hinings, 1987), strategy (Thibault et al., 1993) and effectiveness 
(Papadimitriou & Taylor, 2000). Looking at studies on international sport organisations, it appears that 
they only emerged since the year 2000 and in reaction to several scandals that came to the surface at 
the end of the 1990s. These scandals include notably the Salt Lake City bid scandal involving the IOC 
(1998), the Festina doping affair involving the UCI (1998), and the ISL scandal involving FIFA (late 
1990s).  
 
Table 11. Examples of topics investigated in national sport organisations 
Topic Examples 
Board capacities Ferkins (2005, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2015) 
Board performance Hoye (2001, 2003, 2004, 2011) 
Organisational performance Bayle (1999); Bayle & Robinson (2007); Bayle & Madella (2002); 
De Bosscher (2006); Nowy (2015); O’Boyle (2014, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015c); Papadimitriou (1998, 2002); Winand et al. (2010, 2011); 
Governance Hoye (2003a, 2003b, 2007); Shilbury (2011, 2013) 
Organisational behaviour & HRM Doherty (1998, 1999) 
Institutional change/pressures Edwards et al. (2009); Washington (2004, 2011) 
Typologies Kikulis et al. (1989); Thibault et al. (1993); 
Conceptualisations Dowling et al. (2014); Evetts (2014); Papadimitriou & Taylor 
(2000); Slack & Hinings (1987); Thibault et al. (1993) 
 
Studies that analyse IFs thus mainly focus on governance issues in relation to particular scandals, 
including corruption, bribery, doping, etc. (Table 12). As scandals mainly concern some of the 
prominent (and dominant) international sport organisations (e.g. IOC, FIFA, IAAF, UCI), the sample 
size of these studies is very small. The lack of both empirical and conceptual research in combination 
with a focus on governance issues in a handful of IFs creates a biased picture of the more than 90 IFs 
that do exist. Recent and recurring governance issues and the question of a fair redistribution model of 
IFs’ (gigantic) commercial revenues suggest that both professionalisation and commercialisation are 
of considerable relevance to understand (and steer) IFs in their present form and functioning. At the 
same time, neither professionalisation nor commercialisation processes are limited to these prominent 
IFs. A broader analysis of these two concepts and their interrelationship is expected to reveal new 
insights. 
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All in all, the comparison of studies on national and international sport organisations reveals an 
interesting situation: as a result of government funding and demands for accountability resulting from 
it, research on NSOs, which dates back to the late 1980s, is fairly comprehensive; as a result of 
scandals and governance issues related therewith, research on IFs emerged only since the year 2000, is 
rather partial (main focus on governance issues) and, while focusing on a few prominent IFs, largely 
ignores the majority of the 92 IFs that exist.  
 
Table 12. Examples of topics investigated in international sport organisations 
Topic Examples 
Governance Bayle & Rayner (2016); Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott (2008); Chappelet 
(2011, 2013); Chappelet & Mrkonjic (2013); Forster (2006); Geeraert 
(2014, 2015); Jennings (2011); Pielke (2013, 2015); Tomlinson (2014) 
Performance 
management 
Chappelet & Bayle (2005) 
Doping Hanstad (2008); Maennig (2002); Wagner (2010) 
 
 
3.4. Conceptual framework 
The question of the interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation in IFs is 
also the question of the hen and the egg: what came first? Is IFs’ commercialisation the result of their 
professionalisation? And is commercialisation outside of professional structures even possible? Or is 
IFs’ commercialisation at the origin of a professionalisation process, including for instance the hiring 
of paid staff? So far, professionalisation and commercialisation have been analysed as coexisting yet 
distinct concepts in this thesis. Considering them as two central processes that shape IFs’ structure and 
functioning, a critical reflection on their interrelationship hitherto missing. Analysing general NPO-
literature, Maier et al. (2014) classify both professionalisation and commercialisation under 
“becoming business-like”, though under two different analytical dimensions. By carrying out a 
systematic literature review, the authors relate professionalisation to the dimension of business-like 
organisation, defining it as “the conviction that experts should be in charge” (p. 71). And they relate 
commercialisation to the dimension of business-like goals, which “captures NPOs’ increasing reliance 
on revenue from sales of goods and services” (p. 71). Maier et al. further acknowledge that a clear 
separation between causes and effects of NPOs’ business-like behaviour is difficult to establish.  
To analyse IFs’ professionalisation I refer to a study from Dowling et al. (2014), which proposes a 
conceptualisation of professionalisation in sport management research. In the literature review, I 
presented definitions for three categories of professionalisation (i.e. occupational, organisational and 
systemic professionalisation). A focus on organisational and systemic professionalisation seems 
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reasonable, as occupational professionalisation constitutes a stand-alone topic. The latter describes a 
normative evolution that, in the case of sport management, takes the form of legitimising sport 
management as an academic discipline (Dowling et al., 2014; Robinson, 2003). Within systemic 
professionalisation, one of the field-level changes caused by an external factor is commercialisation. 
Following Dowling et al.’s (2014) approach of field-level changes, I consider commercialisation of 
IFs as a particular form of systemic professionalisation. I further distinguish between two approaches 
to commercialisation: the output-oriented approach and the managerial approach. In the output-
oriented approach, commercialisation implies that organisations increasingly rely on income from 
commercial activities (Enjolras, 2002). This approach to commercialisation is grounded on a 
quantitative analysis. The managerial approach, on the other hand, suggests that organisations’ 
strategy increasingly focuses on commercial activities and that the expertise, knowledge and attitudes 
of managers resemble those of managers in the business world (Dees, 1998). This approach assumes 
that a strong emphasis on commercial activities may affect the organisation’s behaviour. An 
observation from James (1998) supports this assumption: “When faced with large new opportunities 
for commercialism, many nonprofits seem quite willing to shed their altruistic cover and assume the 
values and behavior of for-profits” (p. 285). To uncover commercialisation as a managerial strategy, a 
qualitative analysis is necessary. 
The interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation based on extant research 
studies is summarised in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 provides detailed information, while Figure 3 
summarises them in order to create a more concise framework. The classifications and form that are 
analysed in this thesis with relation to IFs are emphasised through bolt framings. The forms of 
professionalisation can be considered as a continuation of Dowling et al.’s (2014) classification. The 
commercialisation of IFs is considered as a by-product of environmental shifts during the last decades, 
including the general commodification of sport, in the course of which sport participation is gradually 
being replaced by sport consumption. This does not mean that commercialisation is the only form of 
systemic professionalisation. It appears nevertheless to be one of the most salient forms. Different 
organisational theories can be used to analyse and explain IFs’ transformation, including for instance 
institutional theories, contingency theory, social theory of action and resource dependence theory. 
Considering professionalisation as a strategy and a rhetoric/discourse to gain legitimacy and autonomy 
of self-regulation, the focus of this thesis is first and foremost on institutional theory, and particularly 
on new institutionalism. From the perspective of institutional theory, organisations compete for 
resources and institutional legitimacy (Aldrich, 2008). Therefore, resource dependence theory in the 
context of sport organisations will be briefly outlined. 
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PROFESSIONALISATION 
 
Classification  
(Dowling et al., 2014) 
Occupational 
professionalisation  
Hiring of paid experts since the 
end of 1980s/beginning 1990s 
in IFs; emergence of sport 
management as a discipline 
(e.g. Robinson, 2008; Whitson 
& Macintosh, 1989)  
 
Organisational 
professionalisation  
New managerial practices (e.g. 
corporate management), 
rationalisation and 
formalisation of structures and 
processes (e.g. Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2008) 
Systemic professionalisation:  
 
External pressure from 
environmental shifts resulting 
in organisational field 
development (e.g. Skinner et 
al., 1999) 
 
 
 
 
Forms of professionalisation  
Sport management  
• as an academic discipline 
• as a profession 
 
Rationalisation 
 
Structure: Impact of the 
introduction of paid 
professionals on the 
organisation’s structural 
arrangements (Amis & Slack, 
2008; Thibault et al., 1991) 
 
Governance: Rising influence 
of new actors; governance 
structures and practices of the 
board (e.g. Hoye & Doherty, 
2011; Shilbury, 2013) 
COMMERCIALISATION  
• Outcome-oriented 
approach: commercial 
activities constitute the 
largest and fastest growing 
revenue source of NPOs 
(e.g. Froelich, 1999) 
• Managerial approach: 
growing importance of 
commercial strategies (e.g. 
Dees, 1998) 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework – detailed 
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PROFESSIONALISATION 
 
Classification 
 
Occupational 
professionalisation 
 
 
Organisational 
professionalisation 
 
Systemic professionalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forms of professionalisation 
 
Sport management  
Academic discipline 
Profession 
 
 
Rationalisation 
Structure 
Governance 
 
 
COMMERCIALISATION 
Outcome-oriented approach 
Management approach 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual framework - simplified 
 
 
3.4.1. Institutional theory  
“Institutional theory is perhaps the dominant approach to understanding organizations” 
(Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008, p. 2). In their competition for resources and 
legitimacy, institutions strongly influence organisations’ activities. As one of the dominant theories in 
organisational and management literature, institutional theory describes how institutions, their policies 
and laws shape organisational strategies and structures, even if the influence is not always consciously 
experienced. Congruently, Scott (1987) speaks of organisational structures evolving “over time 
through an adaptive, largely unplanned, historically dependent process” (p. 506). Within the 
institutional theories, new institutionalism offers the advantage of analysing organisations’ 
environmental conditions as well as their (institutional) structure. The new-institutionalist axiom 
advocates that organisational change leads to structural similarities among very diverse organisations. 
As fathers of the reformulation of the sociological view on institutions, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
further introduce the notion of organisational fields and isomorphism as organisational field 
characteristics. They were among the first to conceptualise the paradox of rational actors making 
“their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them” (p. 147). To explain this paradox, 
the authors refer to institutional pressures that organisations have to face. They describe the impact of 
authority relations with three adaptive mechanisms of institutional change: coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism.  
Coercive isomorphism occurs in reaction to dependence on other organisations, cultural 
expectations from society and organisations’ quest for legitimacy within a same legal environment. 
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Organisations may perceive these pressures as force, as persuasion or as invitation. Even if changes 
are ceremonial in first place, they may well be consequential. As hybrid organisations (Bayle, 2015) 
with both a social mission (e.g. development) and business objectives (e.g. event bids, broadcasting), 
IFs have to seek legitimacy at two fronts. First, their legal form as NPOs offers IFs the advantages of a 
fairly liberal legal frame as well as tax reductions (or even exemptions), but it also makes them 
accountable towards public authorities and other institutions they depend on (e.g. IOC). Second, a 
growing mingling with business organisations as contractual partners pushes IFs to conform to the 
expectations of their partners (e.g. return on investment). Regarding the first, public authorities of a 
country may formulate specific requirements through which NPOs have to demonstrate their legal 
eligibility. As a form of coercive pressure, political influence from both sides results in increased 
institutional conformity. In periods of crisis (e.g. governance scandal), coercive pressure from public 
authorities is expected to increase (see FIFAgate). In the case of Olympic IFs, the IOC exerts 
additional coercive pressure (e.g. WADA Code, Agenda 2020), especially on IFs that strongly depend 
on the Olympic revenue and therefore seek alignment with IOC expectations.  
Mimetic isomorphism, for its part, is described as an imitation that stems from uncertainty (e.g. 
environment, goals). In situations of uncertainty, organisations may consciously or unconsciously 
adopt solutions modelled by prototypical organisations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further note: 
“Models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or 
explicitly by organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations” (p. 151). In the 
hope of achieving similar results, IFs imitate business organisations and/or other IFs, which they 
perceive as being successful. Examples of mimetic pressure are IFs’ structure (e.g. departments, 
hierarchy) and the profile of top managers (increasingly business-oriented profiles). Especially in 
uncertain and ambiguous situations, less innovative IFs, or those who do not have the necessary 
resources, are expected to comply with mimetic pressure. Mimetic behaviour hence reduces risks and 
minimises research costs (Cyert & March, 1963). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) further note that 
“models may be diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or 
explicitly by organizations such as consulting firms” (p. 151).  
Normative isomorphism, the third mechanism, is associated with professionalisation in the sense 
of legitimisation of professions. Here, isomorphic change primarily stems from formal education (e.g. 
university) and professional networks, creating organisational norms which professional managers and 
their staff internalise. Professionals bring specific organisational norms with them. In order to 
consolidate their position, professionals in IFs need to differentiate themselves from volunteers who 
have run the federation so far. This may entail an increasing divergence of professional and amateur 
logics. The hiring of managers from outside sport and with a business background is likely to further 
trigger this trend. Likewise, leaders’ management style and the filtering of personnel with similar 
education and legitimisation shape organisational behaviour as individuals “undergo anticipatory 
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socialization to common expectations about their personal behaviour” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 
153).  
According to new institutionalism, surviving organisations are believed to adopt techniques, 
policies, services and products that have been institutionalised. The formal incorporation of 
institutionalised elements protects organisations against suspicion and investigations (Rojot, 2005). In 
sport management literature, institutional theory and new institutionalism have received broad 
approval (e.g. Edwards, Mason, & Washington, 2009; Kikulis, 2000; Kikulis et al., 1992; O'Brien & 
Slack, 2004; Slack & Hinings, 1994). In their attempt to circumscribe the development of institutional 
theory and its use in sport management, Washington and Patterson (2011) refer to the five key 
elements of the original institutional theory (late 1970s/early 1980s) suggested by Greenwood et al. 
(2008, p. 6):  
1. Organisations are influenced by their institutional and network contexts [...]; 
2. Institutional pressures affect all organisations but especially those with unclear technologies 
and/or difficult to evaluate outputs [...]; 
3. Organisations become isomorphic with their institutional context in order to secure social 
approval (legitimacy), which provides survival benefits; 
4. Because conformity to institutional pressures may be contrary to the dictates of efficiency, 
conformity may be ceremonial [...]; 
5. Institutionalised practices are typically taken-for granted, widely accepted and resistant to 
change. 
 
With regard to isomorphism in sport organisations, Slack and Hinings (1994) analysed how the 
organisational design of 36 NSOs in Canada changed under governmental pressures that arose from 
the so-called Quadrennial Planning, a four-year plan established by Sport Canada. Under the threat of 
seeing their governmental funds cut back, the 36 sport organisations adopted a more bureaucratic 
professional design. This example of the professionalisation of Canadian NSOs is also an example of 
how organisations can gain legitimacy:  conformity to the bureaucratic professional design as a social 
obligation legitimated Canadian NSOs to receive funding they heavily rely on. Several other scholars 
relate professionalisation to particular external pressures such as government funding (e.g. Edwards et 
al., 2009; Hoye, 2003), legal requirements (Papadimitriou, 2002) or norms inclunding for instance 
recommended board processes (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2004).  
The theory of new institutionalism constitutes a suitable starting point to analyse IFs under the 
perspective of competition for resources, institutional legitimacy (e.g. to acquire these resources) and 
radical change. Due to repeated governance scandals, IFs are under increasing pressure from 
institutional constituencies - regulatory bodies, the general public, media, sponsors, etc. - and the 
social forces they exert, including normative expectations, standards, regulations and laws. These 
pressures are described as social forces. Institutional isomorphism comes as a strategic response to 
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these pressures. A major challenge for organisations lies in their network of multiple institutional 
constituents: “With a variety of institutional constituents, organisations confront pressures from 
multiple and sometimes conflicting source” (O'Brien & Slack, 2004, p. 166). Applying the lens of the 
institutional theory is therefore also a way to gain insights and a better understanding of the specific 
environment in which an organisation is embedded and operates. In order to reduce external pressures 
and control, organisations may, for instance, try to merely generate an aura of trust and good faith. In 
this case, and if management structures (e.g. formal hierarchy, separation of powers) and procedures 
(e.g. election process) are not applied consistently in practice, organisations’ strategic response 
becomes mere window dressing (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). An IF may try to gain legitimacy and 
trustworthiness by formally setting up a control system (regulations, audits, code of conduct, etc.), and 
at the same time fail (or deliberately avoid) to apply control mechanisms effectively (e.g. repeated 
governance scandals at FIFA). Nonconformity with institutional pressures is more likely to occur in a 
context where sanctions are absent or modest. This raises the question of institutions that are presently 
in a position to pronounce sanctions against IFs. The IOC? Public authorities of the country in which 
the organisation/IF has its headquarters? The example of the IOC’s hesitant reaction in conflictual 
issues with members (e.g. state organised doping in Russia) queries its role as guardian of sporting and 
Olympic values. The intervention of the US Justice department in the latest FIFA scandal further 
suggest that Swiss authorities have not been able to effectively hold Switzerland-based IFs to account. 
And yet, pressures on IFs seem to increase, coercing them to show stronger conformity with regard to 
control and evaluation mechanisms (e.g. external financial audits).  
 
 
3.4.2. Resource dependence theory 
According to resource dependence theory, organisations are open systems. As such, they depend 
on their external environment to survive (Buckley, 1967). Their visible and tangible attractiveness (i.e. 
efficacy and potential to achieve future goals) influences the way actors of their external environment 
perceive them and hence their ability to acquire resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) summarise the 
perspective of resource dependence as follows: “The key to organisational survival is the ability to 
acquire and maintain resources” (p. 2). Organisations’ main rational for action is hence to gain control 
of resources. These may be scarce or uncertain. As organisations’ (financial) survival is directly linked 
to their external environment, they must constantly analyse this environment in order to adapt to it 
(Miller & Friesen, 1983). 
The evolution of sport organisations from a volunteer-based structure to a professional structure 
has greatly increased the need for financial resources. Several studies on NSOs have emphasized 
boards’ role in developing financial budgeting (Shilbury, 2001) and raising funds (Inglis, 1997b) 
thanks to the ability of board members (high profile, network) to liaise with potential stakeholders 
(Chelladurai, 1987). Though revenue diversification (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chang & Tuckman, 
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1994; Froelich, 1999) and particularly commercialisation (Guo, 2006; Toepler, 2004; Tuckman, 1998; 
Weisbrod, 1998; Young & Salamon, 2002) are frequently discussed topics in NPO-literature, only few 
studies exist on sport organisations’ revenue diversification (Enjolras, 2002; O'Brien & Slack, 2004; 
Stenling & Fahlén, 2009). So far, the question of how IFs secure financial resources to carry out their 
mission remains unanswered. At the same time, researchers agree and debate about the skyrocketing 
commercial revenues of some IFs. Yet, general questions remain unanswered: what exactly are IFs’ 
the revenue sources? How has the acquisition of these revenues evolved? What is IFs’ strategy to 
acquire financial resources? Do they have a strategy? How do IFs use their revenues? Are they being 
used efficiently? These questions are closely linked to the question of IFs’ commercialisation as one of 
the key concepts analysed in this thesis. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
After briefly explaining the research design (4.1), and though this thesis is built on publications 
and each publication has its very own methodology, I provide a summary of the basic methodological 
techniques that are being used to collect and analyse data (4.2 and 4.3). An exploratory study plus 
seven case studies in IFs of different size form the basis of the data collection. For data analysis I 
mainly use the approaches of qualitative content analysis and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). 
In terms of research gaps, I focus on three major shortcomings: (1) the general lack of both empirical 
and conceptual research on IFs; (2) the primary focus on governance issues in the few studies that 
exist on IFs; and (3) the limited number of cases being analysed, this being in general a few prominent 
IFs (e.g. FIFA, IAAF, UCI). In the following, I will explain why I chose multiple case studies as the 
main approach to collect data, how I analysed the data and how the two articles and two chapters aim 
at answering the research questions formulated earlier.  
 
4.1. Research design 
In consideration of the general lack of empirical evidence on IFs and Nagel et al.’s (2015) 
suggestion of carrying out “a simultaneous consideration of different perspectives of 
professionalisation in a few selected sport organisations (case studies)” (p. 427), I opt for a multiple 
case study design. The multiple case study approach allows researchers to analyse a contemporary 
phenomenon within its actual context and to determine an overall pattern of complexity (Yin, 1984). 
Related to a specific phenomenon (here: professionalisation and commercialisation), case studies 
typically answer the questions of “why” and/or “how”. Data collection is built around multiple sources 
of evidence. The main sources used in this thesis are: interviews (face-to-face, Skype, and via email), 
documents (e.g. reports) and archival records (e.g. organisational chart, financial statements, statutes, 
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rules and regulations). To refine the focus and distinguish relevant aspects of a poorly explored topic, I 
first carried out an exploratory study. The epistemology and underlying ontology of this thesis are 
built on an inductive research approach for the analysis of qualitative data.  
 
4.1.1. Exploratory study 
The exploratory study consisted of interviews with experts from six umbrella organisations (e.g. 
IOC, ASOIF) in international sport. Interviews were conducted between September 2014 and January 
2015. As the umbrella organisations maintain regular contacts with multiple IFs, they are familiar with 
the challenges and opportunities IFs have to face. The exploratory study hence enabled a first 
approach to IFs’ transformations, and notably professionalisation, from an IF-external perspective 
(though several of the interviewees do or have worked in an IF). The purpose was to gather 
information on interviewees’ perception of IFs’ professionalisation, causes for and barriers to it and 
distinctive moments of rupture. In light of scarce research on IFs’ transformations, the exploratory 
study pursued the goal of locating and extracting supporting evidence and tackling “new problems on 
which little or no previous research has been done” (Brown, 2006, p. 43). All in all, nine semi-
structured interviews were carried out with representatives of six umbrella organisations in 
international sport (Table 13). These are: IOC (International Olympic Committee), ASOIF 
(Association of Summer Olympic International Federations), AIOWF (Association of International 
Winter Sports Federations), ARISF (Association of IOC Recognised International Sport Federations), 
SportAccord, and WADA (World Anti-Doping Agency). Three of the interviews were conducted with 
Hein Verbruggen, who substantially shaped international sport in his functions as UCI president 
(1991-2005) and as president of SportAccord (2003-2013). The three interviews further served as 
basis for the book chapter on Hein Verbruggen. 
 
Table 13. Exploratory study: interviews 
IF Interviews Interviewees  Year Duration Pages 
SportAccord 1 Director 2014 89 minutes 18 (transcript) 
3 Former president 2015 95 minutes 19 (transcript) 
2015 60 minutes 2 (summary) 
2015 45 minutes 2 (summary) 
ASOIF 1 Director + Head of 2014 93 minutes 19 (transcript) 
AIOWF 1 Secretary General 2014 68 minutes 10 (transcript) 
ARISF 1 Council Member 2014 146 minutes 18 (transcript) 
IOC 1 Director 2014 43 minutes 10 (transcript) 
WADA 1 Director 2014 82 minutes 18 (transcript) 
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Table 14. Interview guide: exploratory study 
1. Meaning/understanding of the term professionalisation in reference to sport federations 
a) According to you, what are the characteristics of professionalisation regarding sport 
federations? Can you give concrete examples? 
b) In general, what would you describe as “unprofessional” regarding sport federations? Can 
you give concrete examples? 
 Obtain information about the interviewee’s understanding of professionalisation 
 
2. Current situation in international sport federations in terms of professionalisation 
a) From a sporting, administrative and developing point of view, how does a professional 
federation differ from a less professional/unprofessional one?  
b) Which characteristics/factors make the difference? 
 Obtain information about different forms/stages of professionalisation in IF 
 Obtain information on characteristics of (arche)types of professionalisation 
 
3. Factors influencing professionalisation processes 
a) Which factors trigger/initiate professionalisation processes? 
b) Which factors hinder or slow down professionalisation processes? 
c) What role do member organisations (e.g. national federations) play? 
 Obtain information on causes and barriers for professionalization 
 
4. Consequences due to professionalisation processes in the international sport federations 
a) Which changes/evolutions do you consider as positive and beneficial for the federations?  
b) In general, what kind of evolution do you consider as negative and/or restrictive? 
 Obtain information about the consequences of professionalisation 
 (Obtain information on the process/dynamics of professionalisation) 
 
5. Stages in the process of professionalisation (first elite sport, then administrative, then 
development etc.?) 
a) Are there some relevant points in time that should be considered? 
b) Are there steps that are necessary for the follow-up progress? 
 Obtain information on the dynamics of professionalisation process 
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Together with a PhD student from Bern, who investigates the professionalisation of NFs in 
Switzerland, an interview guide was established94. Using the same interview guide (Table 14), all 
seven interviewees were asked identical questions. The questions covered interviewees’ understanding 
of the term “professionalisation”, their perception of the current situation in IFs regarding 
professionalisation, factors that trigger or hinder professionalisation and consequences of the 
professionalisation process. Depending on interviewees’ function and experience further questions 
were added. Seven of the nine interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim, producing 12 
hours of audio recording and 112 pages of single-spaced transcripts. To increase trustworthiness, 
participants were asked to verify the transcribed interview and indicate corrections and/or 
complements. These included mainly informal language and sensitive information. 
 
4.1.2. Case studies and case selection 
In the absence of comprehensive empirical and conceptual studies on IFs, the exploratory study 
served as a useful starting point to better define aspects of relevance with regard to IFs’ 
professionalisation process (e.g. commercialisation, leadership, knowledge sharing). In a second step, 
seven case studies were carried out, including 25 interviews (Table 15). In order to tackle the research 
gap of limited sampling mentioned earlier, the thesis is built on purposive sampling. For this, three 
criteria of selection are being used. Firstly, only Olympic IFs are included. One reason for this choice 
is enhanced comparability, as Olympic IFs experience similar pressures. These pressures include 
competition with other Olympic IFs to defend their position on the Olympic program and for the 
Olympic revenue, or pressure from stakeholders that seek a return on investment (e.g. visibility). 
Secondly, as Switzerland has the highest density of IFs and with the University of Lausanne being 
based in the Olympic capital, I chose only Olympic IFs for case studies that have their headquarters in 
Switzerland. Thirdly, and in order to address the research gap of previous studies focusing primarily 
on a few prominent IFs, I placed great emphasis on selecting IFs of varying organisational size. Table 
16 summarises some structural characteristics of the seven cases: year of creation, on the Olympic 
program since, number of NFs, number of staff members, number of departments, average annual 
revenue and part of the Olympic revenue. 
 
 
  
                                                        
94 The universities of Lausanne and Bern collaborate on a project on the professionalisation sport federations in 
Switzerland. This project is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). 
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Table 15. Case studies - interviews 
IF Interviews Interviewees (position) Year Duration Pages 
FIH 9 Chief Executive Officer  2015 37 minutes 9 (transcript) 
Business Development Director 2015 63 minutes 11 (transcript) 
Executive Office director 2015 58 minutes 12 (transcript) 
Communication Manager 2015 46 minutes 8 (transcript) 
Officials Manager 2015 66 minutes 13 (transcript) 
Sports Services Manager 2015 26 minutes 5 (transcript) 
Sport Coordinator 2015 Skype 3 (summary) 
Media Operations Coordinator 2015 Skype 2 (summary) 
Eurohockey General Secretary 2016 Phone 1 (summary) 
UCI 4 President 2016 53 minutes 11 (transcript) 
Head of Legal Services 2016 Phone 3 (summary) 
Director of Administration 2015 107 minutes 21 (transcript) 
Sport & Technique Director 2015 89 minutes 32 (transcript) 
UWW 4 General Secretary + staff member 2016 55 minutes 14 (transcript) 
Commercial Operations & 
Communications Director 
2015 Email 7  
Consultant 2015 Email 2 
Project Manager 2015 Email 2 
FISA 3 President 2015 60 minutes 14 (transcript) 
Former President 2015 75 minutes 20 (transcript) 
Executive Director 2015 Email 4  
FIS 2 Secretary General 2014 68 minutes 10 (transcript) 
Head of Services 2017 Phone 2 (summary) 
FIFA 2 Former staff member legal department 2016 Skype 3 (summary) 
Former staff member legal department 2016 Skype 2 (summary) 
FIVB 1 General Director + 1 staff member 
(Manager Sports Development) 
2015 63 minutes 13 (transcript) 
 
 
  
  
 
80 
Table 16. Structural elements of the seven federations analysed 
IF Creation Olympic 
since 
NFs Staff  
(2015) 
Departments Revenue 2012-2015 (2010-2013 for FIS) 
Annual average Of which Olympic revenue 
FIFA 1904 1900 209 >450 9 USD 1.337bn95 0.4% 
FIH 1924 1928 132 36 5 CHF 10m96  39% 
FIS 1924 1936 128 60 8 CHF 30m97 34% 
FISA 1892 1896 148 19 4 CHF 7.5m98 51% 
FIVB 1947 1964 220 65-70 10 Not available Not available 
UCI 1900 1896 174 79 7 CHF 36m99 15% 
UWW 1905 1896 174 24 6 CHF 8.4m100 40%  
 
4.2.  Data collection 
Interviews were carried out between July 2015 and June 2017. With the aim of gathering 
information on IFs’ past and current professionalisation and commercialisation, I tried to diversify the 
selection of interviewees with regard to their functional and hierarchical position. Except for FIFA, I 
interviewed at least one person from the IF’s direction (e.g. president, secretary general/general 
director/CEO) and one staff member (e.g. director, manager, coordinator). The disproportionately high 
number of interviews in the FIH is due to the federation’s readiness to provide the amplest 
information. Saturation was clearly reached in this case. This cannot be said of all IFs analysed here, 
but access to interviewees and information was sometimes very difficult (e.g. FIFA, FIVB). Interviews 
were conducted in person (n=14), by phone/Skype (n=7) or, if there was no other option, via email 
(n=4). In-person interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim, producing 193 pages of 
transcript. I acknowledge that email interviews present certain shortcomings. One of the most salient 
shortcomings is that the asynchronous nature of email responses regarding time and place makes 
spontaneous answers impossible. Spontaneous answers may however constitute a rich and valuable 
source of evidence. To mitigate these issues, interviewees who provided answers via email were asked 
for additional information where necessary. 
Besides collecting information through interviews, I analysed documents (e.g. annual reports, 
financial statements, statutes, rules and regulations, organisation chart) and further information (e.g. 
website, newsletters) that are either specific to the respective IF or concern IFs in general (e.g. Swiss 
laws regarding NPOs, IOC Evaluation Criteria 2008 and 2012, Olympic Agenda 2020). Both the IOC 
Evaluation Criteria and the Olympic Agenda 2020 address current and future aspects of the Olympic 
                                                        
95 FIFA annual reports 2012-2015. 
96 FIH financial statements 2014 and 2016. 
97 FIS financial statements 2010-2013. 
98 FISA annual reports 2012-2015. 
99 UCI annual reports 2012-2015. 
100 UWW financial statements 2012-2015. 
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Movement. These aspects are of particular relevance for the 35 Olympic IFs. With regard to the IOC 
Evaluation Criteria: since 2008, the IOC carries out an evaluation after each Olympic Games to 
determine the contribution of summer IFs to the overall success of the Olympic Games. The 2012 
evaluation was composed of 39 criteria covering eight themes. With regard to the Olympic Agenda 
2020: the Olympic Agenda 2020 is ‘the strategic road map for the future of the Olympic Movement’ 
(IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020), built around 40 recommendations. Table 17 summarises how these 
documents and electronic information have been used. 
 
Table 17. Documents and their utilisation 
Source Use 
Annual reports of the IF Strategy, communication 
Financial statements of the IF Income, expenses, level of commercialisation 
Statutes of the IF Mission statement 
Rules and regulations of the IF Term limits, separation of powers, athletes’ participation, ethics 
commission, election procedure, etc. 
Organisation chart of the IF Number of staff members, hierarchical levels, departments 
Website, newsletter etc. of the IF Communication, social media engagement, strategy 
Swiss law Rights and obligations of IFs as nonprofit associations under 
Swiss law 
IOC Evaluation Criteria Pressures and expectations of the IOC that may influence IFs’ 
strategy Olympic Agenda 2020 
 
 
4.3. Data analysis 
To analyse collected data, two analytical methods are primarily used: one is qualitative content 
analysis, and the other is qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The method of qualitative content 
analysis is explained in Publication I (Drivers of and Barriers to Professionalization in International 
Sport Federations), while the method and technique of QCA are detailed in Publication III 
(International Sport Federations’ Commercialisation: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis). What 
follows is a very brief summary of both methods.  
 
Qualitative content analysis 
Qualitative content analysis is a textual analysis based on systematic reading. Krippendorff (2004) 
describes it as “a repertoire of methods of research that promise to yield inferences from all kind of 
verbal, pictorial, symbolic and communication data” (p. 17).  Content analysis allows researchers to 
gain new insights. However, new insights are dependent on the meaning that researchers give the 
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content. As there is not one single meaning to the same message, two analysts may interpret a message 
in two different ways. Hence, content is not naturally contained in messages. It depends on the analyst 
and the context in which the analyst reads and interprets a message. Or, as Graneheim and Lundman 
(2004) put it: “a text always involves multiple meanings and there is always some degree of 
interpretation when approaching a text” (p. 106). By analysing written, verbal or visual 
communication messages, deductive content analysis seeks to enhance the understanding of a specific 
phenomenon (Krippendorff, 2004) by moving from the general to the specific (Burns & Grove, 2005). 
To avoid greater levels of abstraction, I focus on manifest (i.e. obvious components) rather than on 
latent content (i.e. interpretation of the underlying meaning of a text). Written text from transcribed 
interviews, discussion summaries, emails and secondary documents as described above therefore 
constitute the primary dataset.  
 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is both a comparative case-oriented research approach and a 
technique based on set theory and Boolean algebra (Marx, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2014; Ragin, 1987). One 
of the advantages and novelties of QCA is that it integrates “both qualitative (case-oriented) and 
quantitative (variable-oriented) techniques” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008, p. 6). Ragin (1991), who 
developed the method and technique, describes QCA as an iterative process, a dialog of ideas and 
evidence. Considering the small and intermediate N-situation (5-50), QCA is not a statistical 
technique. However, it enables in-depth analysis of cases and cross-case comparison (Legewie, 2013). 
For data processing, I use the crisp-set QCA (csQCA). csQCA translates base variables into two 
possible truth-values: true (or present) or false (or absent), generally denoted as 1 and 0. The main 
strength of QCA as a technique is that it allows the assessment of complex combinations of key 
factors (independent variables called conditions) that are causally relevant to a specific phenomenon 
(dependent variable called outcome). Focusing on causal configurations and context rather than on 
isolated aspects, the method assumes that organisations demonstrate multiple conjunctures of 
independent variables that may still lead to the same outcome (equifinality). 
 
Through the four publications, I seek to address some of the research gaps uncovered earlier. 
Furthermore, I intend to provide first answers to the three research questions formulated at the end of 
the introduction. Research question 1 on drivers for and barriers to professionalisation in IFs is dealt 
with in Publication I. This publication, an article, is based on six case studies. Data collection includes 
20 semi-structured interviews, which are analysed by using the method of qualitative content analysis. 
Constituting a deeper immersion into the question of specific drivers and barriers, Publication II, a 
book chapter on Hein Verbruggen, picks up on the question of leadership and entrepreneurial 
management. The chapter mainly draws its data from three interviews with Hein Verbruggen himself 
and secondary documents on the UCI, SportAccord and Hein Verbruggen. These two publications are 
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grouped under the aspect of causes of professionalisation in IFs. First answers to the research question 
2, which asks for conditions that particularly influence IFs’ commercialisation, are given in the 
Publications III and IV. Publication III, again an article, is innovative in at least two respects: firstly, it 
attempts to analyse all 35 Olympic IFs with regard to their level of commercialisation (even though 
only 22 IFs provide enough information to be included in the final analysis); and secondly, the use of 
the method and technique of QCA represents an innovative approach to analyse and compare causal 
complexity in IFs, rather than looking at isolated aspects. And finally, Publication IV, another book 
chapter, focuses on IFs’ events (e.g. calendar, portfolio) against the background of the federation’s 
financial and commercial strategy. Publications III and IV are grouped under the aspect of forms of 
IFs’ professionalisation. Referring to research question 3, managerial implications of IFs’ 
professionalisation and commercialisation will be debated in the discussion as they are based on the 
findings of the four publications. 
 
5. Summary of publications 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis is built on publications. Sections 1 to 4 served as an 
introduction to the general topic of the interrelationship between professionalisation and 
commercialisation in IFs. The introductory part included a contextualisation of IFs (i.e. their role, 
structure and functioning in the past and present), a literature review on key concepts (i.e. 
professionalisation, commercialisation), a conceptual framework describing the relations between 
these key concepts, and a brief overview of the main methodological approaches applied. Table 18 
now provides a summary of the four publications. The following section is divided into two parts: one 
on causes of IFs’ professionalisation (Publications I and II), and the other on commercialisation as a 
specific form of professionalisation (Publications III and IV). To briefly introduce the publications, I 
will provide separate summaries of each publication’s main goal, the most important findings, the 
methodology used and how the publication fits into the general logic of this thesis.  
 
  
  
 
84 
Table 18. Summary of publications 
Title Type Journal/Book Publication 
Drivers for and barriers to professionalization in 
international sport federations 
(Publication I) 
Article Journal of Global 
Sport Management 
Published 
online 19th 
Dec. 2017 
Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of 
sport 
(Publication II) 
Chapter Leading 
worldwide sport 
Accepted 
International sport federations’ commercialisation: a 
qualitative comparative analysis 
(Publication III) 
Article European Sport 
Management 
Quarterly 
Published 
online 29th 
Jan. 2018 
Major sport events at the centre of international sport 
federations’ resource strategy 
(Publication IV) 
Chapter Handbook of 
International Sport 
Business 
Published 
 
 
5.1. Causes of professionalisation in international sport federations 
The following two publications focus on causes of IFs’ professionalisation. While Publication I 
distinguishes and analyses system-relevant causes of professionalisation on the basis of six case 
studies, the Publication II adds insights into one particular cause of professionalisation, which is 
leadership. I will first contextualise the main topic of the publication before summarising key findings 
and briefly outlining their impact.  
 
5.1.1. Drivers of and barriers to professionalization in international sport federation 
Major sport events and their economic repercussions, as well as sport in general (e.g. leagues, 
salaries) have become increasingly professional over the last decades (Mason, 1999). Surprisingly, IFs 
as the regulatory bodies of international sport have, so far, not been in the focus of comprehensive 
studies. Compared to the blatant dearth of general research on the structure and functioning of IFs, 
NFs have frequently been subject to research, for instance with regard to board composition (Taylor & 
O'Sullivan, 2009), board functioning (Yeh & Taylor, 2008) and organisational performance (Winand 
et al., 2013). As “little attention has been paid to GSO [Global Sport Organisations] as a whole” 
(Croci & Forster, 2004), this article offers a first approach to the topic of IFs’ professionalisation. For 
this purpose, it provides a brief literature review on professionalisation of sport organisations. It 
further uses the conceptual framework proposed by Nagel et al. (2015) to analyse causes and 
dynamics of IFs’ professionalisation. The article focuses on drivers of and barriers to IFs’ 
professionalisation. We were not only interested in causes of IFs’ professionalisation, but also in the 
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question of whether professionalisation processes occur according to specific dynamics and if so what 
triggers these dynamics. Though IFs’ development from mainly volunteer-run and purely regulatory 
organisations towards more and more professional organisations is undeniable, we do expect IFs’ 
change patterns to vary. 
In the context of the evolution in international sport and the increasing number of actors having a 
stake in it (e.g. sponsors), Nagel et al. (2015) assume that sport organisations consciously or 
unconsciously adopt the concept of professionalisation as a useful strategy to adapt to the various 
challenges they have to face. The main objective of this article is therefore to determine factors that 
trigger or hinder IFs’ professionalisation. Due to its density of international sport federations (45), we 
chose Switzerland as our geographical setting. This density has several reasons. On the one hand, IFs 
are attracted by the network and closeness to the Olympic movement (home to the IOC and numerous 
Olympic IFs). On the other hand, the advantageous legal frame, which is characterised by great 
simplicity, easiness and liberalism (Pieth, 2014), as well as the political and economic environment in 
Switzerland promise stability and extensive freedom. In return, Switzerland profits from the economic 
impact these organisations generate and the image they convey (e.g. worldwide visibility through 
events and meetings). Data were collected by means of six case studies (i.e. FIFA, FIH, FISA, FIVB, 
UCI, and UWW). Overall, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Interviews were processed 
and analysed by using the qualitative content analysis. The analysis of IFs’ professionalisation is 
largely based on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who describe the impact of authority 
relations with three adaptive mechanisms of institutional change: coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism. 
The article uncovers eleven causes of professionalisation deemed essential. These are: (1) pressure 
from stakeholders in sport and society, (2) Olympic revenue share (with the exception of FIFA, as the 
Olympic revenue share only constitutes 0.4% of its overall revenue), (3) competition with other IFs, 
(4) management practices, (5) paid experts from within and outside sport, (6) commercialisation, (7) 
board efficiency, (8) leadership, (9) organisational culture, (10) financial support and development of 
members, and (11) knowledge sharing. Three particular findings related to IFs’ current dynamics of 
professionalisation are discussed in more detail: professionalisation as a dynamic process with phases 
of acceleration that vary depending on IFs’ size; IFs’ becoming increasingly business-like through 
isomorphic changes; and five causes of particular relevance to IFs’ current professionalisation process 
(i.e. external pressures, leadership, commercialisation, management practices and organisational 
culture).  
Findings suggest that, depending on the IF’s size, dynamics of professionalisation are more or less 
homogenous. We propose that each IF goes through an individual professionalisation process due to 
the unpredictable nature of changes in the economic, political and institutional environment and their 
varying impact on IFs. Nevertheless, depending on their size, IFs appear to be affected in different 
ways by certain dynamics. In the 1990s, the Olympic revenue mainly triggered professionalisation in 
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the three IFs of our sample that count less than 40 staff members (i.e. FIH, FISA, UWW). Only now 
do these IFs focus on commercialisation, entailing a new dynamic phase of professionalisation. 
Meanwhile the three IFs of our sample with more than 60 staff members (i.e. FIFA, FIVB, UCI) 
already entered a phase of commercialisation in the 1990s. In the aftermath of scandals related to 
various governance issues (e.g. corruption, bribery, fight against doping), phase two is now 
characterised by pressures from stakeholders in sport and society. This phase shows a tendency to 
result in the implementation of increased management practices. Referring to Dees and Anderson’s 
(2003) term of sector-bending, we further argue that IFs’ increasing interaction with and financial 
dependence on business-oriented organisations results in IFs becoming increasingly business-like. 
Explanations to the particular relevance of five of the eleven causes also fall into the category of 
isomorphic change. Both the role of external pressures and leadership in phases of radical change can 
be interpreted as the result of coercive pressures. Compared to this, mimetic pressures, under which 
we list commercialisation (i.e. selling of services and products) and management practices (e.g. 
strategic planning), and normative pressures, to which we count organisational culture, rather seem to 
result in incremental change. 
The main contribution of this article is certainly the unprecedented analysis of several IFs of 
varying size with regard to the evolution of their structure and functioning in the context of 
professionalisation. As the literature review of the article underlines and as we have pointed out 
earlier, studies on IFs are not only scarce, but they are very limited in their focus (i.e. scandals and 
general governance issues in some prominent IFs). Structures of growing complexity (e.g. headcount, 
departments, activities, partnerships, power structure relations) further make it difficult for researchers 
to collect valuable and trustable information. The main contribution for the continuation of this study 
is the uncovering of a set of causes that characterise IFs’ professionalisation and which researchers can 
now analyse in more detail. On the basis of these findings, Publication II picks up on the aspect of 
leadership, while the third publication focuses on commercialisation. As this first publication has 
demonstrated, both leadership and commercialisation have been uncovered as causes of particular 
relevance for the professionalisation process of the six IFs under investigation. 
 
5.1.2. Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of sport 
The second publication, a book chapter on Hein Verbruggen, seeks to further develop one of the 
causes of IFs’ professionalisation that have been identified in the first publication: leadership. The 
career of Hein Verbruggen serves as a rich example regarding important influencers in international 
sport. Over the last two decades, Hein Verbruggen has been among the very influential but also very 
controversial persons in international sports. Coming from the business world rather than having a 
sports background, his career in international sport was all but predictable. His business and marketing 
background considerably influenced his vision and leadership skills, which he invested into the 
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development of international sport: from 1991 to 2005, he was president of the UCI, and from 2004 to 
2013 of SportAccord. He changed the UCI from a nearly bankrupt federation into a prosperous 
organisation. And he transformed SportAccord to become an important service provider to all IFs.  
Hein Verbruggen never concealed his admiration for multinational companies, their structure and 
their pursuit of efficiency. Throughout his presidencies he therefore tried to implement practices from 
the corporate world into international sports, to move them from amateur structures to professionally 
organised service providers and to make them self-sufficient economic actors. Hein Verbruggen died 
on 14 June 2017. For the two years preceding his death, and exemplifying controversies surrounding 
his personality, he led a lonesome battle against allegations of mismanagement in connection with the 
Lance Armstrong doping case. During the 2013 presidential election campaign for the UCI 
presidency, Brian Cookson (UCI president from 2013 to 2017) largely nourished and exploited these 
allegations to discredit his opponent Pat McQuaid (UCI president from 2005-2013) as an extended 
arm of Hein Verbruggen’s reign. An independent report into these allegations, commissioned by 
Cookson himself, could not find evidence for corrupt practices being initiated by either Hein 
Verbruggen or his predecessor Pat McQuaid. However, the damage was done and Hein Verbruggen’s 
multiple achievements for cycling and international sport were overshadowed by the latest events. 
This chapter is not about allegations against Hein Verbruggen, but about how he shaped the UCI and 
SportAccord with his pragmatic marketing and management vision. To grasp Hein Verbruggen’s 
impact on international sport from a leadership perspective, we take a look at his career, his various 
stages as a sports manager, his achievements and legacy, as well as controversies surrounding his 
leadership. 
Hein Verbruggen can be considered a true game changer in international sport. Part of it takes its 
origin in his strong belief in business principles. We try to look behind the scenes and understand how 
the business world has shaped his leadership style and nourished his endeavour to lead international 
sports organisations towards more professionalisation. As Amis et al. (2004b) note, it lies in the nature 
of sport to be “vulnerable to conflict developing among different factions” (p. 183). This is even more 
the case when change is the chosen strategy. By choosing change, Hein Verbruggen had to manage 
strategic goals, the uncertainty of achieving these goals, and individuals’ general reluctance to change. 
He had to navigate between accommodating interests of different groups and being consistent 
regarding the goals set. In order to demonstrate Hein Verbruggen’s efforts to professionalise 
international sports, the focus of this chapter is on his influence on two particular sport organisations: 
firstly, the implementation of business management practices to professionalise the UCI’s structure 
and functioning; and secondly, the transformation of SportAccord to become a service provider to all 
IFs, as well as a multisport games organiser.  
With regard to the first one, an essential step in the professionalisation of the UCI under Hein 
Verbruggen was the dissolution of two additional international cycling federations in 1992: FICP 
(Fédération Internationale de Cyclisme Professionnel) and FIAC (Fédération Internationale Amateur 
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de Cyclisme). Both federations were remnants of the IOC’s amateur code under Avery Brundage. 
After a quasi-total paralysis that lasted for 27 years, the UCI finally became the sole international 
cycling body. A second important step was the creation of the ProTour (today: WorldTour), as it 
shifted the control over the international cycling calendar from the race organisers to the UCI. Today, 
the international cycling calendar and the commercialisation of the UCI Road World Championships 
constitute the main pillars of the UCI’s economic model and its viability. The second sport 
organisation Hein Verbruggen shaped from within is SportAccord. Some of his biggest achievements 
are certainly the creation of the SportAccord Convention (an annual meeting of all IFs with the IOC 
and SportAccord’s most important source of revenue), the development of services offered to all IFs 
(e.g. Doping Free Unit), and the organisation of global multi-sports Games (e.g. Mind Games, Beach 
Games, Martial Art Games) that gave visibility to non-Olympic sports. A last point we put forward in 
this chapter concerns allegations against Hein Verbruggen, notably in relation to doping. Rather than 
taking position, we provide some reflections on the perception of doping over time, ranging from 
scientific miracle (beginning of 20th century), to health-threatening products (since the 1960s) and 
finally to morally illicit practices (today). 
Briefly expanding on the question of leadership, the story of Hein Verbruggen outlined in this 
chapter also reflects a specific “zeitgeist”. Autocratic power, non-existent or poorly developed checks 
and balances, a lack of efficient mechanisms to fight against doping and corruption, and waning 
credibility as a result of scandals mark a period that began in the 1980s. Interestingly, here cited 
deficiencies often went hand in hand with growing financial resources and IFs’ commercialisation. 
And perhaps the massive commercialisation process had never occurred had the zeitgeist been 
different? Many of today’s big IFs were in fact run by powerful (and sometimes autocratic) leaders, 
who led their IF into the era of commercialisation. Besides Hein Verbruggen, other examples are the 
IAAF presidents Primo Nebiolo (1981-1999) and Lamine Diack (1999-2015), FIVB president Ruben 
Acosta (1984-2008), and FIFA president Sepp Blatter (1998-2015). From a pure profit perspective, 
one could say that all of these presidents have achieved their mission: their IFs are today highly visible 
and self-sufficient. During most of their reign, these presidents were praised for their achievements 
(many of them being measured in financial results). However, from today’s perspective, all five 
presidents had or have to face allegations and/or court cases related to governance issues such as 
corruption and self-enrichment. A paradox? Perhaps rather a shift of priorities. With the increase of 
scandals in and around highly commercialised IFs, the priorities began to shift. The same leaders who 
had commercialised their federation were now shoved into a disdained corner, seeing in them the root 
of many current problems in international sports, notably governance issues. Could anyone have 
foreseen the scandals? Perhaps yes. Where a lot of money is at stake and, at the same time, control 
mechanisms are weak or absent, personal interests, and with them greed and unscrupulousness, are not 
far away. Who or what could have prevented these scandals? As long as IFs enjoy nearly unrestricted 
autonomy thanks to their status as nonprofit associations in many countries (e.g. Switzerland, Monaco, 
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Ireland), this is the tricky question that needs to be resolved. So far, no institution or organisation is 
either willing or capable of playing the watchdog. WADA plays this role for one of many aspects, 
which is doping. The IOC, for its part, wants to have great Games (and revenues), but does not seem 
to want to take responsibility for the wrongdoings of IFs or their members (i.e. CC, NFs, athletes). 
This became particularly evident in the forerun of the 2016 Olympic Games: rather than the IOC 
pronouncing the exclusion of Russian athletes in relation to state-sponsored doping revealed by the 
McLaren report, the IOC shuffled off all responsibility to the IFs. Was this decision based on the 
IOC’s political interests or on other motivations? I do not know. But the question that remains to be 
answered is: which institution could be powerful and unbiased enough to take on this role? 
 
5.2.  Forms of professionalisation in international sport federations 
While the first two publications pursued the goal of shedding some light on causes for IFs’ 
professionalisation, the following two publications focus on a specific form of professionalisation, 
which is commercialisation. The distinction between causes and forms of professionalisation draws on 
the multilevel framework of Nagel et al. (2015). In their attempt to conceptualise the 
professionalisation of sport organisations, the authors establish a multilevel framework on the basis of 
international literature within and outside the context of sport. However, I do not strictly follow this 
framework. For instance, the authors do not clarify how to determine broad concepts (or as they call it: 
forms) of professionalisation. Though they suggest different dimensions to be analysed (activities, 
individuals, structures and processes), it is not clear how these dimensions can be related to or produce 
broader concepts (what is exactly meant by broader concept?). Overall, the idea of forms of 
professionalisation remains vague. The study does not advance specific considerations and theoretical 
concepts on forms but only on causes and consequences. I have therefore chosen a slightly different 
approach. My first step was to define professionalisation in sport federations and identify essential 
causes of professionalisation (Publication I). In a second step, I analysed whether specific concepts or 
phenomena emerge and that can be related to IFs’ professionalisation. One of the most salient 
evolutions in international sport is commercialisation. The difficulty is to decide whether 
commercialisation is a cause, a form or rather a consequence of professionalisation. It is the question 
of the hen and the egg. In Publication I, we refer to commercialisation as a cause of 
professionalisation. The reader may now wonder why, in the following publication, we consider 
commercialisation as being a form of professionalisation. The answer is as short as simple: depending 
on the perspective, commercialisation can be considered as a cause (e.g. the influx of money through 
commercialisation enables the hiring of paid staff, and the increase of paid staff requires a more 
formalised structure and functioning), a form (e.g. some IFs can be easily commercialised due to 
various factors, while other IFs have to adopt alternative strategies) or a consequence (e.g. 
commercialisation as a by-product of professionalisation). In the following two publications, we refer 
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to commercialisation as a particular form of systemic professionalisation. With the qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) we use an innovative technique and method. An introduction to the 
method of QCA and the choice of cases analysed seems useful. 
 
 
5.2.1. International sport federations’ commercialisation: a qualitative comparative 
analysis 
5.2.1.1. Qualitative comparative analysis in a nutshell 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a systematic cross-case comparative method. With his 
book The Comparative Method (1987), Charles Ragin can be considered as the founding father of 
QCA. The method and technique of QCA integrates key strength of both the qualitative and the 
quantitative approach (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009). QCA is a particularly 
useful approach if researchers want to analyse complex causal patterns, or if they seek to uncover 
regularities of medium- to large-N designs while doing justice to case specificities. As I already 
briefly indicated in the method section, QCA is both a comparative case-oriented research approach 
and a technique based on set theory and Boolean algebra (Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987). 
Considering each case, a complex and distinct configuration of independent variables (called 
“conditions” in QCA terminology) and one dependent variable (called “outcome” in QCA 
terminology), QCA fulfils the characteristic of being a case-sensitive approach. Research based on 
QCA requires a good knowledge of each case, something that Ragin calls “intimacy” with the cases. 
The variable-oriented approach of QCA, which is based on the idea of multiple conjunctural 
causations, further allows researchers to demonstrate and analyse causal complexity within and across 
cases. Two essential consequences are related to multiple conjunctural causation: the first is 
equifinality, meaning that several configurations (in the sense of combinations of conditions) or causal 
paths can lead to the same phenomenon (in QCA terminology: outcome); the second is that the same 
condition may influence the outcome in various ways, depending on the context of the respective case. 
Context and conjuncture sensitivity hence result in several causal models and researchers have to 
determine the number and character of these models rather than establishing one explanatory model. 
After having briefly summarised the case-sensitive (qualitative) approach, the question of the 
quantitative approach of QCA remains to be explained. With the comparative method that became 
QCA, Ragin sought to fill a gap for small and medium-N research designs (3 to 50 cases). By defining 
a limited number of independent variables to be specifically analysed in each case, the advantage of 
QCA compared to case-oriented studies is that its analytical approach can be replicated for more than 
a handful of cases. Three particular features are at the basis of the analytic-formalised approach of 
QCA: Boolean algebra, set logic and minimisation algebra. Boolean algebra is a branch of algebra 
that uses the truth-values “true” and “false”, which are generally denoted as 1 and 0. Applied to QCA 
  
 
91 
it means that each variable is marked as 1 (true) or 0 (false). The denotation depends on the calibration 
threshold the researcher defines. The basic operations of Boolean algebra are conjunction (and), 
disjunction (or) and negation (not). What is interesting to note here is that the absence of a causal 
condition (negation) may still have a triggering influence on the outcome, rather than being considered 
as inconsequential.  
The set logic or the set-theoretical perspective refers to a formalised analysis of data-set 
observations. Sets are logical constructs and cases can be located in or outside these constructs. Cases 
are analysed with regard to their membership in sets (i.e. conditions and outcome). As we use the 
crisp-set QCA (csQCA), membership is dichotomous (1 = fully in or 0 = fully out). The set relations 
that QCA looks at are sufficiency and necessity of conditions. In order to empirically determine 
whether a condition is sufficient or necessary, QCA uses consistency and coverage as parameters of 
fit. Minimisation algebra in QCA, for its part, uses specific software that calculate the shortest 
possible (parsimonious) expression for those paths (configurations) that are sufficient for the outcome. 
The combination of the three features (Boolean algebra, set logic, minimisation algebra) enables the 
identification of parsimonious causal regularities. These are expressions “with the fewest possible 
conditions within the whole set of conditions that are considered in the analysis” (Rihoux & Marx, 
2013, p. 168). 
While the initial technique of QCA was of purely dichotomous nature (i.e. csQCA), researchers 
now count two other techniques: multivalue QCA (mvQCA) and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). Rather than 
using binary (or dichotomous) data as in csQCA, mvQCA suggests the use of multiple-category 
conditions, which are represented by natural numbers (0, 1, 2, 3 etc.). And finally, measuring the 
degree of a condition, fsQCA introduces scores that can have every possible value on a continuum 
between 0.0 and 1.0, hence allowing a more fine-grained assessment of the data. Despite the 
introduction of varying degrees of membership (fsQCA) and multiple-category conditions (mvQCA), 
the three techniques use the same steps to analyse data. First, the researcher establishes a raw data 
table. Each line of the raw data table indicates the empirical data that corresponds to the respective 
case and variables (conditions and outcome). In a second step, the raw data table is transformed into a 
data table by using the truth-values 1 and 0 of Boolean algebra. Before that, researchers have to 
define the criteria for set membership. This is done by setting up a logical calibration threshold. A 
clearly dichotomous threshold is for instance data that produces only “fully in” or “fully out” 
memberships (e.g.: Does the IF have a strategic plan? Answer: yes/no). The data table hence displays 
case-specific combinations of conditions in relation to an outcome by using Boolean algebra and set 
logic. Several observed cases may correspond to the same combination of conditions and an outcome. 
By grouping these cases together, the software produces a synthesis of the data table. This synthesis is 
called truth table. Once researchers have established the truth table (and solved contradictory 
configurations), they can proceed with the Boolean or logical minimisation. For this purpose, they 
have to choose a software that uses an algorithm to perform minimisation (we use Tosmana). The goal 
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of Boolean/logical minimisation is to find minimal solutions for a given phenomenon (outcome). It 
excludes for instance redundant conditions. The following example includes two observed 
configurations. A is redundant. The shortened expression for both configurations is thus:  
 
Table 19. Example of logical minimisation 
Configuration 1 A[0]*B[1]*C[1|  D[1] 
Configuration 2 A[1]*B[1]*C[1]  D[1] 
Minimisation B[1]*C[1]  D[1] 
 
Based on the minimal formula, researchers are left with the task of interpreting prime implicants 
and the links of causality between them. A last analytical specificity is worth mentioning at this point: 
despite the fact of being an analytical tool and even though we use QCA in its most basic contribution, 
which is to summarise, explore and compare data, QCA relies strongly on theoretical input. Not only 
the selection of variables, but also the definition of calibration thresholds must be theoretically 
justified.  
In a retrospective, Rihoux and Marx (2013) reflect on the development of QCA over 25 years 
since its emergence (1987-2012). Though the aim of the method largely remained the same, the 
technique of QCA has expanded considerably to become more and more sophisticated. The wider 
diffusion of QCA only peaked off in recent years, entering new fields of research such as medical 
sciences and management.  
 
5.2.1.2.  Selection of cases 
The third publication seeks to analyse IFs’ level of commercialisation and factors that contribute 
to this commercialisation. Several criteria were taken into consideration when choosing the cases for 
this study. In general, QCA is suggested for medium- to large-N research designs (≥ 10). With regard 
to sample size, Marx and Dusa (2011) suggest the following formula: N ≥ 2C (C stands for the number 
of conditions). By adding up the IFs from the four umbrella organisations defined by SportAccord (i.e. 
ASOIF, AIOWF, ARISF and AIMS), we count some 92 IFs. Through a review of literature, 
interviews and secondary documents, we have further identified four independent variables 
(conditions) of relevance for IFs’ commercialisation. Our research design should hence be composed 
of minimum 16 IFs (24). Among the 92 IFs, important differences can be observed in terms of 
disclosure of financial statements. For the evaluation of IFs’ commercial revenues, it is essential that 
their financial statements are available to us. As a result of IOC requests (IOC, 2012)101 since at least 
2010, a larger number of published financial statements can be found among Olympic IFs. We hence 
constructed our study population (i.e. IFs) by defining two membership criteria: availability of 
                                                        
101 IOC Code of Ethics and other texts / Good governance / Art. 4.3 
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information and comparability. Since the IOC calls upon Olympic IFs to regularly publish their 
financial statements on their website, we only include Olympic IFs. Another argument to include only 
Olympic IFs in a first study is comparability: Olympic IFs evolve in a similar competitive 
environment, including efforts to ensure/increase Olympic revenue, pressures from the IOC and 
visibility through the Olympic Games. In short, our study population includes IFs that are a) Olympic 
and b) disclose their financial statements. 
Through the focus on Olympic IFs, we could already reduce our research design to 35 cases (28 
summer Olympic IFs and 7 winter Olympic IFs). Taking a closer look at each of the 35 IFs, it turns 
out that only 22 of them published their financial statements for the period of investigation. The period 
of investigation is the last completed Olympic cycle (i.e. 2010-2013 for winter Olympic IFs, 2012-
2015 for summer Olympic IFs). Of the 22 Olympic IFs that published their financial statements for the 
given period, only 10 IFs published them for all four years. The choice of looking at the last 
completed Olympic cycle provides several advantages. For instance, the Olympic revenue share that is 
allocated after each Olympic Games for the following Olympic cycle is, in most cases, not divided 
into four equal parts. Hence, in case of incomplete financial statements, we were faced with the 
problem of a biased picture. In order to reduce data inconsistencies, we applied normalisation rules to 
Olympic IFs for which financial statements were not available for the entire Olympic cycle. We first 
added up the IF’s incomes for the years for which financial statements are available, not including 
Olympic revenue (Sum A). As the 2012-2015 Olympic revenue allocated to the summer Olympic IFs 
is known to us, we multiplied a quarter of this revenue by the number of years for which the IF’s 
financial statements are available (Sum B). Finally, we added up Sum A and Sum B. As the 2010-
2013 Olympic revenue allocated to the Olympic winter IFs is not known to us, we could not apply 
normalisation rules in these cases. A third and final advantage of analysing IFs’ over a four-year 
period is cyclical fluctuation related to IFs’ flagship events. While some IFs organise World 
Championships on an annual basis, others follow a biennial or even quadrennial scheme. With major 
events being an important source of income for many IFs, an analysis of only one or two financial 
years would therefore produce an incomplete picture. 
 
5.2.1.3.  Main findings 
Literature review 
In order to understand nonprofit sport organisations’ revenue streams, we carried out a literature 
review on the commercialisation of NPOs in general (e.g. Froelich, 1999; Maier et al., 2014) and of 
sport organisations in particular (e.g. O'Brien & Slack, 2004; Wicker & Breuer, 2011; Wicker et al., 
2013). Based on the literature review, the study highlights an important difference between NFs and 
IFs: while in the past NFs (and NPOs in general) received important parts of their revenue from 
government funding and donations, this does not hold true for IFs. Contrary to other NPOs, IFs have 
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never been seriously confronted with an important decline of public funding and private donations, 
which would have entailed growing financial uncertainty. In the past, member fees from NFs and 
sponsorship contracts rather than public contributions constituted the main source of IFs’ revenues. 
Therefore, we can say that IFs did not experience a significant income gap as the result of declining 
public contributions and public funding. Against this background, IFs’ commercialisation does not 
constitute a necessary solution to compensate a significant revenue shortage. This raises the question 
of what has triggered IFs’ commercialisation instead. Though existing studies do not provide answers 
to this question, we suggest several possible answers in the literature review including: worldwide 
commodification of sport, growing demand for televised sport spectacles, sport as an advertising space 
for businesses of any kind, and competition between sports regarding broadcasting, sponsorship as 
well as attraction and retention of fans and athletes.  
Two explanatory approaches emerge from these driving forces. For one thing, they increase 
the desire of IFs (especially those governing very popular sports such as football and athletics) to 
capitalise on the massive commodification of sport. On the other hand, expectations from multiple 
stakeholders regarding the activities and services of IFs are increasing and fuel competition between 
IFs. Seen from this angle, commercialisation of IFs’ can be considered as an adaptive strategy (Maier 
et al., 2014; Toepler, 2004; Tuckman, 1998) that pursues the goal of mission accomplishment in an 
increasingly competitive environment (Macedo & Carlos Pinho, 2006). In light of these evolutions, 
especially smaller IFs come under pressure to commercialise in order to keep up with bigger IFs. 
While most studies on commercialisation in NPOs seek to understand why and how NPOs began to 
commercialise, our main goal is first to determine which conditions impact IFs’ commercialisation, 
and second, to empirically uncover configurations (i.e. combinations of conditions) that favour high 
levels of commercialisation. 
 
QCA analysis and findings 
Based on the literature review, various documents (e.g. IF statutes and regulations, reports, IF 
websites, web articles) and interviews in international sport organisations (e.g. ASOIF, FIS, FISA, 
UCI, UWW), nine conditions of potential relevance for IFs’ commercialisation are detected: (1) 
financial independence from the Olympic revenue share, (2) social/digital media, (3) media coverage, 
(4) specialisation, (5) strategy/goal orientation, (6) governance/accountability, (7) popularity of the 
sport, (8) capacity of innovation, and (9) revenue diversification. Sufficient information could only be 
collected for four of the nine conditions. These are: specialisation (indicator: headcount), strategic 
planning (indicator: publicly available strategic plan covering minimum three years), social media 
engagement (indicator: Facebook, Twitter and Instagram followers) and low accountability (indicator: 
levels of transparency, evaluation, representation, complaints and responses). Data collection was 
thwarted by the difficulty to access information from several IFs, especially financial information. 
Overall, from the 35 Olympic IFs we initially wanted to analyse, we could gather sufficient 
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information on 22 of them. By using the QCA technique, we can assess the four conditions in relation 
to the outcome. To evaluate IFs’ level of commercialisation as the outcome, we measured the part of 
revenues from commercial activities in their overall revenue. For this purpose, we studied IFs’ 
financial statements. Based on Enjolra’s (2002) study, an IF is considered to achieve high levels of 
commercialisation if revenues from commercial activities represent 50% or more of its overall 
revenue.  
Using crisp-set QCA (csQCA), we translated base variables (called raw data) into two possible 
truth-values: true (or present) or false (or absent), generally denoted as 1 and 0. As binary conditions 
allow two possible answers, they split “the logical space into two equal parts” (Rihoux & Ragin, 
2008). The number of possible configurations for our study (4 conditions) is thus 16 (24). The QCA 
analysis reveals seven configurations that lead to high levels of commercialisation (including 13 IFs), 
and five configurations that lead to low levels of commercialisation (including the remaining nine 
IFs). This leaves four “logical remainders”, which are logically possible combinations of conditions 
that have not been observed empirically. The necessity analysis reveals only one truly necessary 
condition according to the widely accepted consistency threshold of 0.9 (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 
2013). The necessary condition that we are referring to is the absence of specialisation (~SPEC) in the 
outcome of low commercialisation. If we lower the consistency threshold to 0.75, a threshold that 
Ragin (2006) suggests as the lowest boundary, the presence of specialisation (SPEC) and social media 
engagement (SOCM) in the outcome of high commercialisation can be equally considered as 
necessary conditions.  
Further proceeding to so-called Boolean minimization, we obtain three parsimonious solutions 
leading to high levels of commercialisation and two leading to low levels of commercialisation. 
Supporting findings from the necessity analysis, the condition “specialisation” plays a major role in 
IFs’ level of commercialisation. Its presence accounts for 77% of membership in configurations 
leading to high commercialisation, and all cases resulting in low commercialisation show low 
specialisation. Though not to the same extent as high specialisation, high social media engagement is 
also a strong indicator for IFs’ level of commercialisation, whereas strategic planning and lack of 
accountability are of secondary importance. 
 
Discussion 
While most studies on commercialisation in NPOs try to explain why commercialisation occurred, the 
aim of this study was to collect and analyse data on a maximum of Olympic IFs to approach the 
question of how they commercialise. Which factors are relevant in achieving high levels of 
commercialisation? How do they combine to result in high commercialisation? The QCA analysis of 
22 Olympic IFs provides four starting points:  
(1) Firstly, high specialisation (SPEC) appears to be a key condition in the outcome of high 
commercialisation. We explain the importance of specialisation with growing workload and work 
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requirements in terms of skills and complexity of tasks (Amis et al., 2004b). These evolutions are 
closely related to the importance that sport events occupy in today’s society (in 2015, Tour de France 
attracted up to 15 million spectators along the roads102) and economy (in 2015, the average cost of a 
30-second ad spot during NBA [National Basketball Association] finals amounted to USD 
540’000103).  
(2) Secondly, the analysis of necessity reveals a relatively high importance of the presence of 
social media engagement (SOCM) to achieve high commercialisation. We argue that digital and 
especially social media constitute cost-efficient marketing relationship tools. Through interactions 
with their community, sport organisations can strengthen brand awareness, image and fan loyalty 
(Coulter, Bruhn, Schoenmueller, & Schäfer, 2012). Unlike traditional media, the cost-effective use of 
social media gives IFs with smaller budgets the opportunity to rival with bigger IFs. IFs increasingly 
leverage social media as a marketing tool to create a fan base that, in turn, attracts business partners.  
(3) Thirdly, and contrary to specialisation and social media engagement, strategic planning 
(STRAT) and lack of accountability (LACC) show relatively low overlaps with the outcome of high 
commercialisation (respectively 46% and 31%). We first take a quick look at IFs’ accountability. 
Several studies, such as Geeraert’s (2015b) Sports Governance Observer, showed that good 
governance, including accountability, is quite difficult to measure in IFs. This is partly related to the 
capacity of organisations to demonstrate formal change (e.g. governance reform), even though 
informal practice undermining these changes may remain in place, unnoticed by the external observer. 
The evaluation of IFs’ accountability is based on formal information. In the aftermath of several 
governance scandals, it is possible that IFs only formally adopt practices of good governance. In any 
case, both this study’s findings and researchers’ increasing focus on IFs’ governing issues (e.g. Kihl, 
Skinner, & Engelberg, 2016; Maennig, 2002; Mason, Thibault, & Misener, 2006; Tomlinson, 2014) 
manifest a dire need for a more solid understanding of the relation between IFs’ commercialisation 
and their existing/potential governance issues. With regard to strategic planning, we put forward the 
hypothesis that IFs prefer to maintain goal vagueness (rather than fixing goals) to get a maximum of 
very different stakeholders committed to the federation and its activities. This finding is rather 
surprising as we expected IFs to establish clear goals in order to satisfy business partners who expect a 
return on investment. 
 (4) A final observation concerns the increasingly business-like behaviour of IFs: 13 out of the 
22 IFs analysed in this study achieve high levels of commercialisation. While studies on NPOs 
recognise increasing isomorphism between NPOs and businesses (Maier et al., 2014), studies on sport 
organisations with a similar focus are presently lacking. Only a few studies on IFs refer to isomorphic 
                                                        
102 The National. (2015). Tour de France: Cycle of sporting profitability. Retrieved from 
https://www.thenational.ae/business/tour-de-france-cycle-of-sporting-profitability-1.41883  
103 Statista. (2017). NBA finals: cost of a TV commercial 2013-2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/616373/nba-finals-cost-tv-commercial/  
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changes (Phelps & Kent, 2010; Wagner, 2010) in relation to business-like behaviour. Considering the 
immense revenues some IFs generate through their events, this lack is all the more astonishing.  
 
Implications 
This study proposes several novelties. It represents a first immersion into the multi-facetted 
organisational functioning of IFs with regard to commercialisation, one of the most salient topics. 
Though scholars increasingly turn the magnifying glass on IFs to finger point excesses related to 
commercialisation, the range of international sport organisations analysed remains, so far, very 
limited. Scandals such as corruption within the IOC (Chappelet, 2011; MacAloon, 2011), doping in 
cycling (Wagner, 2010), or repeated governance issues within dominant IFs such as FIFA (Bayle & 
Rayner, 2016; Pielke, 2013) and IAAF (Forster, 2006) are easy prey for those who see the mutation of 
sport organisations to business-like entities with a critical eye. However, the focus on this relatively 
small group of IFs compared to the total number of IFs that are part of the Olympic movement (more 
than 90) produces a biased picture. By looking at 22 Olympic IFs (35 initially), this study provides a 
first analysis and comparison of small, mid-sized and big IFs. 
A second novelty is the use of the method and technique of QCA. The popularity of QCA only 
broadens since 2012. However, Winand (Winand et al., 2011; Winand et al., 2013; Winand & Zintz, 
2013) seems so far to be the only scholar having published studies based on QCA in sport 
management. QCA is both a research approach and a data analysis technique based on set theory and 
Boolean algebra (Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987). To explore, analyse and interpret the complexity of 
IFs’ functioning in terms of revenue generation, QCA constitutes a useful research method and data 
analysis technique.   
And finally, the study draws attention to the potential dangers of IFs’ increasing focus on 
commercial activities. Besides governance issues that appear to ferment hidden from the public eye 
(thanks to the relative freedom IFs enjoy as NPOs), we particularly point out the danger of mission-
drift.  
 
 
5.2.2. Major sport events at the centre of international sport federations’ resource strategy 
The forth publication, another book chapter, focuses only on major sport events as IFs’ fastest 
growing revenue stream during the past two decades. In light of the immense public interest in major 
sport events (e.g. Olympic Games, football, rugby and cricket World Cups) and the possible leverage 
effect this may have on IFs in terms of revenues, the chapter seeks to uncover IFs’ resource 
acquisition patterns. Does the pattern reflect historical conditions? How do changes in the 
environment affect IFs’ resource acquisition? And how do IFs respond to both historical conditions 
and environmental changes? What resource acquisition strategy do they adopt?  
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The chapter begins with outlining three aspects that make sport events an interesting starting 
point to analyse IFs’ financial resource strategy. First, the constantly growing number and 
globalisation of sport events: in 2013, the summer Olympic IFs organised 2162 sport events; a country 
like Qatar that, a couple of years ago, no one related to international sport hosted a total of 85 
international sport events in 2016; and even Mongolia hosted 16. Second, the massive 
commercialisation of sport events, especially thanks to a sprouting economy including broadcasting 
and sponsorship rights. And third, the lack of research on sport events from the perspective of IFs, 
prompting us to raise two central questions: (1) which elements constitute IFs’ main sources of income 
and expenses? And (2), which financial and strategic role do sport events occupy in IFs’ economic 
model? In the course of the chapter, we provide an overview of event types in international sport, a 
general summary of IFs’ main sources of revenue, and observed commonalities across several IFs with 
regard to their resource acquisition strategy. And finally, four cases exemplify different models of 
revenue generation: FIFA for the “One-mega-event-model”, UCI for the “Fee-collector-model”, FIH 
for the “Mixed-model”, and FISA for the “Olympic-dependence-model”.  
 
Main findings 
At the international level, we could distinguish four main types of sport events: World 
Championships, international circuits, promotional sport-for-all events and international multi-sport 
games. IFs generally own the first three event types and are participants in the fourth type. Being the 
owners of the first three types empowers them to decide on the event allocation and to capitalise on 
commercial rights such as TV and sponsor rights. Regarding IFs’ main sources of revenue, some 
important changes can be observed since the early years of IFs: until the 1980s, basically all functions 
within IFs were non-remunerated. Back then, affiliation fees from members (i.e. NFs), small 
sponsorship contracts and, in some cases, donations constituted IFs’ main revenue streams. With the 
sport broadcasting industry quickly picking up speed in the 1980s, the distribution of broadcasting 
revenues from the Games to the IFs, the growing interest of sponsors to showcase their products 
through sport, and fierce competition between IFs for these sources of revenue, two main financial 
pillars emerged: (1) events, and (2) Olympic revenue. A look at the revenues of 18 Olympic IFs shows 
that half of them generated 50% or more through their events. Meanwhile, for some IFs the Olympic 
revenue constitutes the main source of revenue (e.g. ISSF: 85%, WA: 63%). 
 In the attempt to compare the functioning and economic models of IFs, the chapter further 
presents emerging commonalities and suggests an analytical model. Emerging commonalities include 
event ownership and event rights (e.g. property rights on World Championships, sanctioning of events 
that are not the IF’s property), financial cycles around events (i.e. income from and reinvestment into 
events), and dependence on and competition around the Olympic revenue. Our approach to analyse 
IFs economic model is twofold: for one thing, we look at IFs’ economic model (expenditures, sources 
of income); and second, we establish a basic event portfolio of four IFs. For the analysis of IFs’ 
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economic model, we selected six main variables: three on the income side (events, Olympic revenue, 
fees) and three on the expenditure side (events, administration, development). In terms of IFs’ event 
portfolio, we base our analysis on four variables: creation of the IF (year), size (number of paid staff), 
events (number and periodicity), and flagship event(s) and/or discipline(s).  
The four patterns we present are an exploratory approach. As an example of the One-mega-event-
model, FIFA generated 83% of its 2012-2015 overall revenue through the FIFA World Cup. In 2014, 
the selling of broadcasting rights represented the most lucrative source (35.4%), followed by those of 
marketing rights (22.2%). In the case of FIFA, the success of this model is closely tied to the 
popularity of football and an elaborated strategy around FIFA’s commercial rights and limited risk-
taking. The risk of the one-mega-event-model consists in its high dependence on a single event. The 
UCI, as an example of the Fee-collector-model, receives important revenues from calendar and licence 
fees. The UCI tries to counter-balance the fact that it basically holds no commercial rights for 
cycling’s most prestigious races (e.g. Tour de France, Giro d’Italia). From 2015 to 2016, an important 
increase (31%) for UCI WorldTour races could be observed. The challenge of this model lies in the 
necessary balance between the attractiveness of the IF’s main product and buyers’ interest and 
financial capacity to pay the fixed fees. The Mixed-model, exemplified by the FIH, produces a fairly 
stable situation as it spreads IFs’ financial risks across several sources of income. Even though the 
downfall of one source of income might not inevitably cause the collapse of the IF’s economic model, 
it requires a continuous analysis of the federation’s environment, a quick adaptation to changes and a 
drive to explore new market opportunities. And finally, IFs like FISA and that show characteristics of 
the Olympic-dependence-model are probably the most vulnerable IFs. Not only do they have little 
influence on total earnings, but their dependence also forces them to align a maximum with 
requirements and expectations of the IOC as the main funding entity.  
 
Conclusion 
Findings emphasise the pivotal role that IFs’ sport events and event portfolio play today in their 
strategic orientation and revenue streams. Without event revenues, IFs will have difficulties to carry 
out their historical mission (regulate, promote, develop their sport) and the activities they have 
developed over the years (e.g. events, development programs) and to finance the structures necessary 
for their maintenance. A remaining question that goes hand in hand with the growth of IFs’ event 
revenues is the aspect of profit redistribution. Contributing considerably to the IF’s event profit, 
stakeholders (e.g. NFs, teams, clubs, athletes, organisers) might claim their part in the profit 
redistribution. To avoid frictions with main stakeholders, building compromises becomes more and 
more important for IFs. 
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6. Discussion 
 
The four publications of this thesis suggest that, over the last three decades, IFs have undergone 
important transformations towards professionalisation of structures and processes at the administrative 
level and commercialisation of their activities. Through these transformations, IFs have become global 
key actors not only from a sporting, but also from a social, economic and geopolitical point of view. 
As a result of a growing focus on rationalisation, performance-orientation and business-like 
functioning, the original volunteer-structure and logic of many IFs gradually yields new forms. These 
forms are generally modelled after business enterprises. Numerous studies exist that broach the issue 
of change in NSOs, often referred to as professionalisation (Chantelat, 2001; Dowling et al., 2014). 
However, research on IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation is fairly sparse. Studies are 
limited to those discussing governance shortcomings in dominant international sport organisations 
such as the IOC and FIFA (MacAloon, 2011; Pielke, 2013), or those suggesting solutions to these 
shortcomings (Chappelet, 2011; Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). Furthermore, little is known about the 
interrelationship between IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation. The four publications of this 
thesis provide some answers, raise new questions and emphasise persisting ones. 
 
In the following sections, I first come back to the initial research questions 1 and 2 and findings 
from the four publications related herewith (6.1 and 6.2.). Based on these findings and further 
readings, I suggest some reflections on the interrelationship between professionalisation and 
commercialisation in IFs (6.3). Findings further pave the ground for the distinction of specific 
characteristics. From the combination of these characteristics emerge at least four ideal types, which I 
present and describe (6.4). Expanding a little further on findings, it seemed appropriate to take a 
particular focus on managerial implications of IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation (6.5). 
Within section 6.5, some reflections regarding research question 3 are provided (6.5.2). Looking back 
at the research accomplished, I finally present contributions of and limitations to this thesis (6.6). 
Based on the four publications, the following two sections discuss findings related to the research 
questions 1 and 2. The research questions formulated in the introduction are: 
 
Table 20. Overview of research questions 
Research question 1 What are drivers for and barriers to professionalisation in international 
sport federations? 
Research question 2 Which conditions particularly influence international sport federations’ 
commercialisation? 
Research question 3 What are the managerial implications of international sport federations’ 
professionalisation? 
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As a reminder, the order of the publications is: 
 
Table 21. Overview of publications 
Publication I Drivers of and Barriers to Professionalization in International Sport Federations 
 
Publication II Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of sport 
 
Publication III International sport federations’ commercialisation: a qualitative comparative 
analysis 
Publication IV Major Sport Events at the Centre of International Sport Federations’ Resource 
Strategy 
 
 
6.1. Discussing drivers for and barriers to international sport federations’ professionalisation 
 
IFs’ professionalisation process is non-linear. Certain drivers have an accelerating effect. 
 
Research question 1 focused on causes (drivers, barriers) of IFs’ professionalisation. To get to the 
bottom of this first research question, publications I and II provided some useful starting points. The 
article on Drivers for and Barriers to Professionalization in International Sport Federations 
demonstrates that professionalisation is non-linear, evincing moments of acceleration and 
deceleration. To distinguish patterns in the dynamics of IFs’ professionalisation, we conducted six 
case studies in IFs of different sizes and analysed findings by using the institutional theory, in 
particular DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of organisational isomorphism. Findings suggest 
that dynamics of IFs’ professionalisation vary depending on the federation’s size (size refers here to 
the federation’s staff headcount). While for the IFs with less than 40 staff members (i.e. FIH, FISA, 
UWW) the distribution of the first Olympic revenue (1992) constituted an important impetus for their 
professionalisation process, IFs with more than 60 staff members (i.e. FIFA, FIVB, UCI) were, by that 
time, already engaged in commercialising their activities and services. In the following, these two 
starting points entailed different dynamics of professionalisation.  
Overall, three main phases of professionalisation emerged for IFs with less than 40 staff: the first 
one (1990s), and as mentioned above, was mainly triggered by the Olympic revenue; the second 
(roughly between 2000-2010) was strongly marked by competition between IFs (e.g. for Olympic 
revenue) and pressures from stakeholders in sport and society (e.g. IOC, sponsors); and the third phase 
(since 2010) is, above all, organised around management aspects (e.g. leadership, corporate 
management practices, expertise). As a fourth phase, we mention the tendency towards 
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commercialisation, which constitutes a goal in all three IFs analysed. The advent of the Olympic 
revenue, as an external driver, clearly represented a catalyst. Meanwhile, internal drivers that currently 
shape the professionalisation of these IFs rather entail incremental change. 
With regard to the three IFs with more than 60 staff members, two main phases could be 
distinguished. The first one (1990s-2010), and which saw an important growth of these IFs, includes 
four important drivers: commercialisation, paid experts from within and outside sport, leadership and 
development through sport (e.g. Football for Hope). Back then, commercialisation of these IFs 
remained relatively unchallenged even though federations’ functioning increasingly resembled 
business organisations. Over the last years, however, pressures from sport and society have grown. 
These pressures (e.g. calls for more control and ethical leadership) come as a response to growing 
governance issues and repeated scandals of systemic dimension (e.g. FIFAgate, IAAF doping 
scandals, corruption related to Olympic bids and Olympic organising committees). Being under high 
scrutiny because of these scandals, there now seems to be a tendency across bigger IFs to demonstrate 
improved governance and management practices. However, we argue in Publication III and in the 
discussion that caution should be exercised when evaluating IFs’ formal implementation of practices 
of good governance. Formal adoption and accurate application are two different things. 
Even though six case studies do not allow for generalisation, it seems that coercive pressures 
entail radical change in all six cases, while mimetic and normative pressures rather result in 
incremental change. This observation is congruent with findings from Amis et al. (2004a). 
Investigating on the interplay between organisational context and organisational action, Greenwood 
and Hinings (1996) further support the observation that pace of change may vary between 
organisations of the same institutional sector: “both the incidence of and the pace by which such 
change occurs will vary within sectors because organizations vary in their internal organizational 
dynamics” (p. 1023). A current aspect with strong potential for radical change in international sport 
are pressures from public authorities, media and stakeholders in light of a long list of governance 
scandals in some IFs. According to Greenwood and Hinings (1996), radical change involves a 
transformation from “one template-in-use to another” (p. 1026). The question is here: have IFs already 
undergone a transformation regarding practices of good governance? Perhaps some IFs did, though 
probably at varying degrees. But as long as the same IFs continue to be caught in scandals, systemic 
change towards better governance obviously did not happened. Repeated scandals in a federation like 
FIFA raise the question whether formally adopted reforms are not perhaps eroded by embedded norms 
(e.g. lack of checks and balances), which, directly or indirectly, enabled the scandal(s). IFs under 
pressure of legal persecution, withdrawal of sponsors etc. are likely to formally adopt change in order 
to accommodate institutional expectations. And this even if expectations are totally unrelated or 
opposed to the performance accomplishment the organisation seeks. This behaviour is what DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) refer to as the quest for legitimacy. Or as Greenwood and Hinings (1996) put it, it 
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shows “how organizational behaviours are responses not solely to market pressures, but also to 
institutional pressures” (p. 1025).  
Another element that may cause radical change according to findings from the first publication is 
leadership. During the period investigated, several IFs have undergone important or even radical 
change after the arrival of a new key actor. Based on findings, I argue that there is no ideal type of 
leadership as IFs’ organisational context may vary considerably: 
 
• UWW: In 2013, the UWW was under imminent threat of being removed from the Olympic 
programme. According to a UWW staff member, the federation before 2013 lacked credibility, 
transparency and ambition. The task of the newly elected president was therefore to turn the ship 
around and make sure UWW remains an Olympic sport. The importance the president played in 
these changes is emphasised in the following citation: “The UWW President has played a key role 
in the overall success of the reforms for the UWW. His vision has helped to push through the raft 
of changes and kept the momentum high” (UWW, G3).  
• FIH: The arrival of a new CEO in 2010 triggered an important change dynamic, including the 
creation of a ten-year strategic plan (Hockey Revolution 2014-2024), a new sporting format 
(Hockey5, a short form version of hockey), and a considerable growth of the administrative staff 
(from 14 in 2010 to 36 in 2015).  
• UCI: In the case of the UCI, the next months will tell whether the new president (elected in 
September 2017) prepares for a radical change or not. In general, in an election that opposes two 
candidates, one of which being the incumbent president, it is likely that, in case the incumbent 
president loses the election, the new president will make sweeping changes. The changes do not 
need to be radical, but they need to testify a break with the former direction. Everything else 
would make a change in president redundant.  
• FIFA: FIFA still has to prove not only that it has the capacity to undertake radical change (which 
is needed at least in terms of governance principles), but also that those involved in initiating and 
steering change have the willingness to properly put reforms into operation. Capacity means in 
this context leaders’ ability to manage the transformation process. This requires an understanding 
of the new organisational form the organisation is aiming for, skills and competencies that are 
necessary for the functioning of the new form, and a competent management to implement change 
successfully.  
 
Pointing out some drivers that may have an accelerating effect on the process (e.g. external 
pressure, leaders), findings from the six case studies suggest that professionalisation processes are 
non-linear. 
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IFs change isomorphically to resemble organisations on which they depend for resources and to 
increase their legitimacy in the eyes of regulators and the public. 
 
The second finding also leans on neo-institutionalism. Two approaches appear particularly 
relevant: firstly, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) observation of organisations seeking to become 
isomorphic with their contextual environment; and secondly, Deephouse’s (1996) investigation into 
increased organisational legitimacy conferred by regulator (regulatory endorsement) and media 
(public endorsement) as a consequence of strategic isomorphism. Scholars relate the convergence of 
NPOs with business organisations to different concepts. Based on the analysis of a single organisation 
setting, Dart (2004), one of the first scholars who tried to define the phenomenon of NPOs’ business-
like behaviour, suggests for example three meanings: business-like organisation, business-like goals 
and business-like rhetoric. Through a systematic literature review and applying Dart’s distinction, 
Maier et al. (2014) provide evidence for each of the three meanings. Being primarily interested in 
NPOs’ structure and functioning, a brief look at the first two meanings (i.e. business-like behaviour 
and goals) shall suffice here.  
 
Business-like behaviour: One of Maier et al.’s (2014) key findings is that various concepts contribute 
to the perception of NPOs’ core and support processes as being business-like. These include for 
instance managerialisation and corporatisation. In sport management literature, managerialisation is 
often explained as a result of normative pressures, based on the shift from amateur to professional 
structures (Dowling et al., 2014; Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015). Corporatisation, in the sense of changes 
to NPOs’ governance structure, is rather the result of coercive pressures. Revenue generation through 
commercial activities can be considered as an essential activity of IFs to pursue mission-related goals 
(e.g. cross-subsidising non-profitable activities such as development). At the same time, and especially 
as commercial revenues increase, this type of revenue generation requires increased accountability and 
has a critical side to it, which is the risk of corruption. To increase accountability and limit corruption, 
coercive pressures (e.g. from public authorities) may push for the implementation of principles of 
good governance.  
 
Business-like goals: These are summarised by the concepts of commercialisation, meaning an 
“increasing reliance on revenues from sales of goods and services” (Maier et al., 2014, p. 71), and 
conversion (i.e. changing the legal status from non-profit to for-profit). While conversion is irrelevant 
in the case of IFs, commercialisation has been addressed in detail in the Publication III, uncovering 
IFs’ growing focus on commercial activities. The remaining question at this point of time is: is IFs’ 
commercialisation mainly serving mission related goals, or is commercialisation rather entailing a 
mission-drift? This question will be discussed in section 6.5.2.  
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Several interviewees emphasise IFs’ growing resemblance with the structures and functioning of 
business firms (e.g. departments, hierarchical levels, management practices), hence confirming 
findings from general NPO-literature. One interviewee sees the origin of IFs’ business-like behaviour 
in leadership:  
 
We see more and more people arrive in sport that do not necessarily know the sport, but 
that are businessmen. And I think sport today is somewhere between two logics: some 
federations work mainly with people who come from the sport, such as former athletes or 
people having worked for a national federation. Because these people can obviously 
provide new elements and a true knowledge of the sport. And other federations work a lot 
more with a business vision, hiring people with high profiles, well formed, well 
organised, but who know little about the sport. We see the emergence of a group of 
businessmen who are very outcome-oriented (WADA, A4, free translation from French). 
 
Applying DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concepts of institutional isomorphism, the more IFs 
liaise with and depend on business organisations to carry out their activities, the more business those 
organisations “can coerce the weaker party to adopt its practices in order to accommodate the stronger 
party’s needs” (p. 154). A representative of SportAccord confirms this hypothesis saying that the fact 
of “not having or having a choice influences the majority of the working activity and decisions that are 
taking place inside the organisation, inside the executive body of the organisation” (SportAccord, A1). 
Not having a choice refers in this context to a dependence on external revenues. 
Another observation is that IFs do not only become isomorphic with business organisations, but 
also with each other. One explanation for increasing similarities between IFs relates to education and 
training programs in sport management as well as the hiring of experts from established domains (e.g. 
finance, legal, marketing). The educational background of staff members, whether from sport 
management or other domains that IFs increasingly call on, brings shared professional norms and 
values into the organisation (Mason, 2012). In other words: the hiring of professional staff from within 
and outside sport triggers isomorphism between IFs. A good example for this convergence is the 
increase in cross-sectoral expertise: “We’ve got ex-hockey players and then we’ve got people from 
other industries like myself. And this gives a really good balance in terms of skills that we can all 
bring to the table” (FIH, B1). 
Besides changing isomorphically to resemble organisations on which they depend financially, 
findings also suggest that IFs seek strategic isomorphism to increase their legitimacy vis-à-vis 
regulators and the general public. Analysing the link between isomorphism and legitimacy in 
commercial banks, Deephouse (1996) comes to the following conclusion: “Organizations that conform 
to the strategies used by other organizations are recognised by regulators and the general public as 
being more legitimate than those that deviate from normal behaviour” (p. 1033). Deephouse further 
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establishes a correlation between larger and older banks and lower levels of media endorsement. He 
explains this correlation with higher public expectations for larger banks due to their strong influence 
on and visibility in the community. The same seems to hold true for IFs: while scandals with FIFA, 
IAAF or UCI are attracting large media attention and negative press, federations such as BWF and 
IWF nearly go unnoticed by the general public. In another study on US commercial banks, Deephouse 
and Carter (2005) analyse the relationship between legitimacy and reputation. Supported by empirical 
findings, they conclude that “higher financial performance increases reputation, but does not increase 
the legitimacy of high performing banks” (p. 329). It could be interesting to analyse the 
legitimacy/reputation relationship in IFs. 
Overall, findings propose that IFs change isomorphically a) to resemble organisations on which 
they depend financially, and b) to increase their institutional legitimacy. However, a more fine-grained 
analysis is necessary to determine which organisational parts of IFs are most affected. 
 
6.2. Discussing conditions that influence international sport federations’ commercialisation  
 
Due to the increasing demand for sport spectating, IFs commercialise especially through their 
sporting events. 
 
Research question 2 focused on commercialisation as a specific form of IFs’ professionalisation. 
Though the phenomenon of NPOs’ commercialisation has been widely discussed in general NPO 
literature (Guo, 2004, 2006; Toepler, 2004; Tuckman, 1998; Weisbrod, 1998; Young, 1998; Young & 
Salamon, 2002), and to a much smaller degree in NSOs (Enjolras, 2002; O'Brien & Slack, 2004), IFs’ 
commercialisation has, so far, not been subject of comprehensive studies. In light of the spectacular 
revenue growth of some IFs and potentially related governance issues (Forster, 2006), the absence of 
studies on IFs’ commercialisation is all the more surprising. Findings of both Publication III and IV 
suggest that, due to the increasing demand for sport spectating, IFs commercialise particularly through 
their sporting events  (e.g. 13 out of 22 IFs studied generate 50% or more of their revenue through 
their sporting events). This also consolidates Bayle’s (2015) belief that IFs’ events constitute the 
“heart of their economic model” (p. 109).  
Publication III provides several arguments for the importance of sport events in IFs’ economic 
model. These include the increasing demand for sport spectating, the general growth of the 
broadcasting industry and its economic effects on IFs. Solberg (2004) argues that the growth of the 
sport broadcasting industry is the result of particular developments in the market: “It was the 
liberalisation of European Broadcasting in the mid-1980s that paved the way for astronomical price 
rises for the most attractive products” (p. 372). Solberg further argues that IFs, as the “sellers of sports 
rights” (p. 372), have in fact learnt to exploit the demand for televised sport to their advantage: as 
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more and more sport got diffused on TV, IFs’ revenues from broadcasting rights increased. The rivalry 
among global broadcasting companies to acquire television rights for mega-sport events further played 
into the hands of IFs. Sport events have thus become auctioned products of IFs, whose price level 
ultimately depends on the attractiveness and the entertainment potential of the sport itself. Sports with 
highly demanded broadcasting rights also attract sponsors more easily. Beyond the control of IFs, 
certain market dynamics (e.g. liberalisation of European Broadcasting) were hence beneficial for some 
IFs in that it rapidly increased their revenue. 
This brings in a second argument: while sports with a large fan and athlete base facilitate these IFs 
to sell broadcasting rights, other sports are less visible to the public eye and thus less sought after by 
broadcasters and sponsors. This imbalance naturally produces pressure on less marketed IFs to follow 
the example of highly commercialised ones. One can speak here of both coercive pressures (e.g. 
sponsors expecting a return on investment, otherwise they might decide to sponsor another sport) and 
mimetic pressures (e.g. IFs aspiring to the economic model of IFs they perceive as economically 
successful). As pointed out in Publication III, IFs’ activities that are related to member services (e.g. 
affiliation, licence and calendar fees) are not suitable for commercialisation. A cost increase in these 
activities would be against IFs’ principles of non-discrimination and risks to entail a crowding out 
effect of small NFs, athletes and events in the long term. Therefore, the only activities IFs can truly 
commercialise are their events. Publication IV further consolidates the conclusion that major sport 
events and the economy around them have become an important variable in IFs’ financial resource 
strategy. 
 
 
High specialisation and a strong focus on modern communication technologies are 
characteristic of highly commercialised IFs. 
 
Though publication III particularly supports the finding mentioned above, additional research is 
needed for further consolidation. For one thing, “specialisation” is only referred to in terms of staff 
headcount. Even though a high staff headcount is likely to entail an increased need for coordination, 
formalisation of rules and standardisation of procedures, it might be interesting to see whether a more 
complex analysis of “specialisation” leads to the same results. Additional indicators for IFs’ 
specialisation could include number of departments104, hierarchical levels, educational background of 
staff members and officials (e.g. university degrees), number of training programs an IF organises 
internally or enables staff members to attend externally. Due to their increasing complexity, including 
a growing number of stakeholders and growing staff headcount, we argued that specialisation is an 
important factor for IFs to perform effective business operations.  
                                                        
104  Some smaller IFs have many departments. However, some only consist of two persons. Therefore, 
researchers should define a minimum size of departments to consider them as such. 
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The complex and knowledge-based economy IFs operate in today links specialisation closely to 
human resource management (HRM). Taylor and Ho (2005) have analysed the response of both 
Australian amateur and professional sport organisations to governmental and global convergence 
pressures regarding HRM practices. They conclude that “few sport organisations have adopted a 
formal HRM strategy and HR practices are widely variable across organisations” (p. 110). In some 
regards, this still holds true for IFs, even though federations such as FIFA and UEFA employ more 
than 450 staff members. For instance, the election of volunteers on the basis of their political influence 
rather than on their expertise is an indicator for HR processes not being equally applied to both 
professionals and volunteers. In fact, theses volunteers (e.g. board members) are elected and not 
selected. In order to partly remedy this imbalance and also because elected volunteers take the most 
important decisions, the FIH has started what they call a board evaluation and a nomination 
assessment:  
 
There is two things: there is whole board evaluation which is how the board is, how it 
functions, what are we good at, what are we not good at, and where can we make 
improvements? Then there is an individual competencies assessment where we can 
identify the overall strengths and weaknesses. The board evaluation guides our 
nominations process because we will put out a demand for certain competencies. So 
certain competencies will be viewed favourably, let’s put it that way, in order to keep the 
board strong. When we do a call for nominations, we would put out the fact saying that 
anybody with sport law or legal expertise would be regarded favourably. Of course, we 
can’t control that, because ultimately it is a democratic process. But we’d like to think 
that the NAs [national associations], when they put forward a candidate, will take these 
things into consideration (FIH, B5). 
 
Representing a good example of planned HRM, the FIH further establishes job specifications 
(which is by far not the case for all IFs), has a performance evaluation system through which 
professional and personal objectives are fixed annually, and a staff development budget (e.g. to attend 
workshops and seminars, language courses). Compared to this, it is indeed surprising that a highly 
commercialised IF such as FIFA does not establish clear job descriptions, as a staff member indicates. 
This shows that organisational size based on federations’ staff headcount is not sufficiently satisfying 
as an indicator for organisational specialisation. The condition “specialisation” as it is used in 
Publication III should rather have been termed “size”. 
 
Studies further show that the use of modern communication technologies such as social media 
(Twitter, Facebook, Instagram) represents a cost-effective marketing and relationship tool (e.g. Abeza, 
O’Reilly, & Reid, 2013). As such, social media can be used by all IFs equally, whether they have big 
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or small budgets. Some IFs with low levels of commercialisation show indeed high social media 
engagement (e.g. WA - World Archery, UWW - United World Wrestling), while other IFs with high 
levels of commercialisation show low social media engagement (e.g. BWF - Badminton World 
Federation, ITF - International Tennis Federation). One assumption is that, especially for smaller IFs, 
social media is an efficient means to raise brand awareness and evaluate fan engagement and 
satisfaction. The following comment from a FIH staff member supports this assumption:  
 
The feedback we rely on a lot is on social media because of the comments that people 
post. So, every Friday we run a story called ‘Hockey Project’ from around the world. And 
there are loads of great hockey projects going on. And we are getting a lot of good 
feedback from fans who enjoy reading these stories. And then we can see instant 
feedback on Facebook and Twitter. (FIH, B1) 
 
Even though the phenomenon of social media is still a relatively new one, it is already deeply 
entrenched in most societies around the globe. In 2012, 87% of the Fortune 100 Best Companies (i.e. 
the world’s top 100 companies across Europe, USA, Asia-Pacific and Latin America) used at least one 
social media platform with Twitter being the most popular one (Tsimonis & Dimitriadis, 2014). In 
2016, the most popular social media platform was LinkedIn with 97% of the Fortune 500 companies 
using it105. Tsimonis and Dimitridas further observe that, compared to traditional media, social media 
not only generate content, but also “forge relationships with existing as well as new customers and 
form communities that interactively collaborate” (p. 329). From the creation of brand communities 
through social media, at least three opportunities emerge for IFs: first, IFs can attract the interest of 
businesses partners that want to be associated with the brand (marketing through sport); second, IFs 
can reach out more easily to the community, spread information and thus increase fan loyalty 
(marketing the sport); third, and as already mentioned above, IFs can evaluate the satisfaction of fans 
and athletes by analysing their comments (e.g. instant reactions) and shape their communication and 
marketing strategy accordingly (marketing analysis). In sum, social media engagement is not 
sufficient or even necessary for IFs to achieve high commercialisation. However, as an additional 
marketing tool that allows extensive coverage of a sport, social media can facilitate commercialisation. 
Being an inexpensive and efficient marketing tool, particularly smaller IFs can use social media to 
raise brand awareness and create fan loyalty. Based on Narain and Ofrin’s (2012) reflections on the 
role of modern technology in public health and personal reflections on the specific case of IFs, the 
main challenges for IFs regarding today’s social media use seem to be:  
 
1. How to handle the rapid growth of technology and the difficulty of keeping pace with it? 
                                                        
105 Statista. (2016). Most popular social networks used by Fortune 500 companies used in 2016. Retrieved from: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/626872/fortune-500-corporate-social-media-usage/  
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2. How to reach communities in countries where the infrastructure or connectivity is weak or 
does not even exist?  
3. How to optimise the use of social media in order to best serve the federation’s marketing 
objectives and general strategy?  
4. How to avoid excessive commercial influence that might lead to user withdrawal? 
 
With regard to marketing through social media, IFs need to hire professionals that have certain 
skills. These professionals are indeed increasingly sought after and have a very clear profile. As an 
example, a job description of the NFL (National Football League) for a Social Content Coordinator 
posted in 2017 reads as follows:  
 
This individual must have a passion for and comprehensive understanding of the NFL, its 
Clubs and Players, and football as a whole. A thirst for pop-culture, sports, entertainment 
and music and the ability to excite fans through content across all digital formats are 
essential. The successful candidate will have experience at a professional sports or news 
organization, superior news judgment, and be obsessed with figuring out what people are 
sharing, liking, recommending, and talking about online. (NFL Career Site, 3 October 
2017) 
 
 
Highly commercialised IFs do not necessarily adopt long-term strategic planning as a means to 
secure financial resources. 
 
Empirical findings presented in Publication III reveal that, among the 13 IFs with high levels of 
commercialisation, only six have an official strategic plan in place (i.e. BWF, FIFA, FIH, ISU, ITF, 
WR), and only FIFA, FIH and WR have a long-term strategic plan (10-year plan). The first essential 
question is: what are IFs’ motives to develop a strategic plan? Looking first at some of the bigger IFs, 
World Rugby (WR) is one of the rare IFs that have developed a strategic plan already before 2010. 
The federation clearly refers to its strategic plan in terms of growth orientation:  
 
At the very heart of this growth was the ground-breaking 2004 World Rugby Strategic 
Plan. For the first time the game’s governing body had a blueprint for growth that would 
enable the sport to be truly global and reach out to new audiences and participants around 
the world while maintaining the values that bind the sport together. (World Rugby106) 
 
                                                        
106 WR – World Rugby. (2017). Strategic plan. Retrieved from https://www.worldrugby.org/strategic-plan  
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FIFA (FIFA 2.0) and ITF (ITF 2024), on the other hand, only presented their first-ever strategic plan 
in 2016. ITF president David Haggerty provides the following argument for developing a strategic 
plan: “It has been important to create a structure to allow us to become a more efficient and effective 
organisation, and give us more opportunity to realise our primary goal of developing, growing and 
promoting tennis around the world107". In short, the target of ITF is organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness. This brings us to FIFA as the third example of commercially successful IFs with a 
strategic plan. In the foreword of the document that outlines FIFA’s 2016-2026 strategy, Gianni 
Infantino proclaims: “[...] FIFA continues its work to regain trust with its partners and stakeholders. 
These are exciting times for a new FIFA, for a FIFA 2.0 that is energised to build an organisation that 
is truly football-centric”. After the motives of growth (WR) and organisational efficiency (ITF), a 
third motive for developing an official strategic plan emerges: the motive of rebuilding trust, 
credibility and legitimacy, thus coinciding with the observations and conclusions of Deephouse 
(1996). The development of a strategic plan to regain legitimacy can also be found among smaller IFs 
that have come under pressure. Wrestling (UWW), a relatively small IF, employed a similar pattern as 
FIFA: to be reinstated on the Olympic program, UWW had to demonstrate its willingness to lead 
change and make wrestling more attractive for stakeholders (1). Another important aspect in the new 
strategy of UWW is to conclude responsible sponsorship deals (2).  
 
(1) The [World Wrestling] plan began in 2013. It was defined due to the lack of a 
strategic plan from the previous leadership. The threat to be permanently removed 
from the Olympic Programme was incentive enough to put in place many reforms. 
(UWW, G2) 
 
(2) The focus at this stage is the recruitment of sponsors and signing partnerships that 
benefit the federation and the sport. Each sponsor will be assessed biannually to 
compare the benefits the federation receives compared to the return on investment of 
the sponsors. (UWW, G2) 
 
The FIH seems to have given yet another focus to its strategic plan called “Hockey Revolution” 
(2014-2024). As the interview excerpt below reveals, the federation’s main objective is development. 
Therefore, their strategy is built around the aspects of engaging and empowering members: 
 
We have something that underpins our whole strategy which we call engage and 
empower. It’s based around a whole development program, running education in 
particular, providing resources, providing assistance to really get them [national 
                                                        
107 ITF – International Tennis Federation. (2016). News: ITF announces long-term strategic plan. Retrieved 
from http://www.itftennis.com/news/231617.aspx  
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associations] to be more professional and make small steps. And that made a massive 
difference, just by putting a simple plan in place. (FIH, B7) 
 
Seeing only few IFs develop strategic plans, and generally as the result of institutional pressures, 
raises the question of where the apparently still widespread reluctance among IFs to establish and 
communicate a strategic plan comes from. What might be the pitfalls of strategic planning? Many 
factors are relevant for a strategic plan to be a) developed in accordance with the organisation’s needs 
and context, and b) successfully implemented. Regarding the development of a strategic plan, 
Mintzberg (1994) emphasises that “”strategy making needs to function beyond the boxes, to 
encourage the informal learning that produces new perspectives and new combinations” (p. 109). In 
other words: the formal application of techniques may actually impede strategic thinking. Mintzberg 
points out further fallacies related to strategic planning:  
 
1. The fallacy of prediction: the organisational environment is characterised by discontinuity. 
Accurate prediction is hence nearly impossible. It takes visionaries to create intuitive rather 
than calculated strategies. 
2. The fallacy of detachment: strategic planning is often considered to be a set of conscious 
decisions based on hard data (e.g. market research reports). However, a strategy can also 
emerge in form of a convergent pattern, for instance through a process of learning. In other 
words: managers need to integrate both hard and soft data. Therefore, they need to immerse 
themselves into daily details. 
3. The fallacy of formalisation: the adoption of formal planning may prevent the emergence of 
viable patterns, as formal systems cannot process soft data the way human brains can.  
 
Developing a strategic plan is far from being easy. As a FIH staff member said: “We feel we have 
a good strategy. But you know, a strategy is only something written on a piece of paper. It’s the 
execution of that which is difficult” (FIH, B7). This brings us to a final question, one that has also 
been discussed in Publication III: why should IFs actually have a strategic plan? One line of 
argumentation is that a strategic plan is essential for at least two reasons: (1) to keep up with a 
complex, fast-changing external environment and adopt adequate solutions to often unpredictable and 
ill-structured problems; (2) to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of business partners and stakeholders by 
formalising how they seek to accommodate their expectations. Regarding the first argument, one can 
refer to Thibault et al. (1993): “in order to anticipate changes and challenges in their environment, 
sport organizations must formulate strategies” (p. 25). Considering the importance of strategy and its 
centrality in organisational theory, the authors further express their astonishment regarding the lack of 
research into nonprofit sport organisations’ strategy. Today, more than 20 years later, this observation 
still holds true for most IFs. The second argument for IFs to develop a strategic plan is what Bryson 
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(2011) terms as “enhanced organisational legitimacy” (p. 16). Through goal-orientation and by 
satisfying their stakeholders, IFs justify their existence and maintain stakeholders’ interest to be 
committed to the IF.  
A strategic plan must be adapted to the organisation’s context and its success depends on the 
willingness of participants to engage in strategic planning. However, there is no guarantee for success: 
“a strategic plan is simply a deliberative, disciplined approach to helping key decision makers in 
organizations figure out what they should be doing, how, and why” (Bryson, 2011, p. 19). Some 
scholars even go further and claim that any strategic plan an organisation or company develops will be 
insufficient, as it “can’t develop models of the increasingly complex environment in which they 
operate” (Camillus, 2008, p. 98). Camillus further argues that a very formal strategic plan using 
standard techniques may even prevent fresh ideas to be generated. Considering the fact that standard 
responses may not be sufficient in certain situations, the generation of fresh ideas, creativity and 
intuition becomes essential. Especially traditional strategy making is considered to be rigid, not 
enough innovative, creative or original (Mason, 2007). Stone and Brush (1996) further point out the 
conflict between needs for commitment and demands for legitimacy. One explanation for NPOs and 
IFs is ambiguous rationales (non-profit vs. business objectives). To overcome the strategy dilemma, 
Camillus advises companies to use social-planning processes: “Companies must go beyond obtaining 
facts and opinions from stakeholders; they should involve them in finding ways to manage the 
problem. Getting a variety of opinions helps companies develop novel perspectives. It also strengthens 
collective intelligence” (p. 102).  
In IFs, the decision-making power to establish the federation’s strategy lies with the board. Access 
to the board is still widely limited to those who hold an official position in one of the member 
federations (e.g. presidents of NFs) or have a proven track record in the sport and/or its administration. 
Athletes’ representatives are only slowly getting to be involved in the decision-making process. And 
still: some IFs note that they have an athlete representative on the board. However, this does not 
necessarily mean the athlete representative has a voting right. In several big IFs, athlete 
representatives have indeed no voting right (e.g. FIFA, FINA, UCI, WR). Other stakeholders such as 
event organisers, sponsors or partners are totally absent in the strategy-making process. In light of 
increasing pressure from and influence of stakeholders, it might be worth for IFs to consider a broader 
involvement of stakeholders in strategy development. Some IFs even seem to rely on the vision of one 
charismatic leader (president, general director) rather than engaging in a formal and collective process 
of strategy formulation and planning. This may be the case in IFs with very powerful and/or long-
standing leaders (e.g. FIFA under Sepp Blatter). If the leader is intuitive, creative and takes into 
consideration both hard data (e.g. facts and figures) and soft data (e.g. qualitative observations), there 
may actually be no need for a formal strategic plan. However, it is very unlikely that one single person 
can gather and process all information produced in an organisation. Hence, it will be difficult for 
him/her to induce the commitment necessary for effective strategy implementation. I therefore argue 
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that strategic planning is, in any case, beneficial for an IF as it ideally brings together a maximum of 
key actors to discuss and envision the future of the organisation and engages them to participate in the 
implementation of the strategic plan.  
 
6.3. The interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation 
So far, professionalisation and commercialisation of IFs have been dealt with as separate concepts 
in this thesis. However, findings from the four publications and further reflections suggest an 
interrelationship between the two concepts. The dimensions that are affected by a transformation 
process are congruent with Nagel et al.’s (2015) conceptual framework regarding forms of 
professionalisation: individuals, structures and processes, activities. Though IFs’ transformation 
depends on varying organisation-internal as well as external factors, in their general strategic 
orientation all IFs analysed in this thesis seek to hire more professional staff and to increase revenues 
from commercial activities. As commercialisation requires specific expert knowledge and 
considerable time investment, the hiring of professional staff and commercialisation are directly 
related. While the traditional structure of IFs as purely voluntary organisations does not mean that 
volunteers have no expert knowledge, they may neither have the specific expert knowledge nor the 
time that are needed to increase revenues from commercial activities108. Based on this observation, it 
occurs that the professionalisation of individuals at the operational level precedes the process of 
commercialisation, meaning the transformation of activities with the aim of increasing commercial 
revenues. A third transformation refers to structures and processes, which appears to be a coin with 
two sides: for one thing, the federation-internal impetus for better governance, increased credibility 
and greater efficiency may result in a professionalisation of structures and processes; on the other 
hand, external claims from regulators (e.g. governments, ministries, international supervisory 
authorities) and the general public (e.g. media) for increased accountability and control to counteract 
repeated governance scandals in IFs may result in a deprofessionalisation of structures and processes. 
Deprofessionalisation means here a loss of professional autonomy (Boussard et al., 2010). Compared 
to the professionalisation of individuals, the professionalisation of structures and processes is much 
more difficult to determine. In response to general social pressure to demonstrate professionalism, IFs 
may simply adopt rhetoric of professionalism. Whether IFs’ behaviour is actually in line with the 
image this rhetoric conveys is often difficult to tell for the researcher.  
 
Professionalisation of individuals: Contrary to the definition we have provided in Publication I 
(Clausen et al., 2017), overall findings, ongoing reflections and recent discussions suggest that, at this 
point in time, professionalisation in IFs relates, first and foremost, to the professionalisation of 
                                                        
108 A questionnaire sent in 2015 to board and commission members of four IFs and resulting in 37 valid answers 
reveals that 41% invest less than 5h into federation-related work, and another 27% between 5-10h.  
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individuals at the operational level. Thanks to specific educational training (e.g. university degree), 
competences and experience, employees bring particular professional norms into the IFs. As Ferkins 
and Shilbury (2010) as well as Hoye and Cuskelly (2003b) note, the hiring of professionals in sport 
organisations initiates normative processes such as new modes of operation and introduces new 
managerial skills. The hiring of paid experts further leads to a more balanced workload: while the 
professionals carry out managerial and operational tasks they are qualified for, the board can focus on 
strategic aspects. At the same time, tensions around power relations may emerge between the board 
and the staff. Likewise, an increasing headcount, cultural mix and different working norms and 
methods lead to growing organisational complexity and constitute possible management challenges.  
 
Commercialisation (activities): Commercialisation is related to the dimension of activities. In the case 
of bigger IFs, massive commercialisation is directly linked to the rise of broadcasting rights and the 
attractiveness of the sport for sponsors and broadcasters. In the absence of such a natural impetus, 
smaller IFs may seek commercialisation by hiring business experts and adopting a strategic plan. For 
commercialisation to occur, an IF first needs to hire professionals. IFs’ goals in increasing their 
revenues through commercialisation are increased self-sufficiency and having more financial 
resources for the development of the sport. The list of risks includes an increase of governance issues, 
efficient but unethical leadership, mission drift, insufficient legal frame and loss of the IF’s nonprofit 
values and traditions. In light risks and repeated governance scandals in the wake of growing 
commercial revenues, one may question IFs’ capacity of self-regulation and their privilege of 
autonomy. One may also question the role of social values and mission, which are all fundamental 
characteristics of their nonprofit form. Perhaps more regulation and control are necessary in the future 
to control IFs’ acquisition and use of commercial revenues?  
 
Professionalisation of structures and processes: In many cases, both presidential and board elections 
are still a matter of politics rather than of competences in first place. Obviously, one cannot generalise. 
But political ties still appear to be very important, and sometimes more important than actual 
knowledge and the contribution of this knowledge to the federation’s strategy and development. A 
former UCI director said in this context: “How do you want XY to understand what it means to ride in 
a peloton? The riders know, and the sport directors know. [...] This is where you realize that it’s not 
the members of the Management Committee [board] who have that knowledge” (free translation from 
French). The same interviewee further questions whether sport and the development of sport are really 
at the forefront of board members’ concerns:  
 
What they forgot is that we are an international sport federation with sport. There is not 
just politics. [...] The sport is the main value. It’s about developing the calendar, the 
situation of the [national] federations, the development of the clubs. [...] They [members 
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of the Management Committee] have their personal interests. They are all political 
friends. It’s all about business. (Free translation from French) 
 
In a similar vein and with a particular focus on competences and politics, Hein Verbruggen 
commented in 2015: 
 
If I look at these 80 presidents of the international [sporty] federations that I know, and 
you can add all the national Olympic committees and the IOC and so on, then there is not 
one of them who has been elected on the basis of capacity. So, they are all a political 
choice. Now, you might be lucky and say: “I found somebody who is also doing a very 
good job”. I don’t say anything different. There are very many capable people around 
there. 
 
The question of competences is also reflected in the next example. As board members of IFs not 
only have different cultural backgrounds but also speak different languages, it is important to decide 
on one (or several) common language(s). One former IF-president therefore established the rule that 
each board member should at least speak one of the federation’s two official languages, this being 
French and English. This rule is crucial, because all files and reports of the federation are written in 
English and French. In 2015, the reality was somewhat different: “They don’t speak the same 
language. How do you want them to understand each other” (former IF-president)? During the board 
meeting, spoken language was translated into five languages, but not the files and reports. This meant: 
documents sent in advance to board members, so they could prepare the meeting were probably not 
understood by all of them. Speaking the same language is important in many ways: to discuss and 
decide on matters that touch the federation’s strategy and governance; for board members to defend 
their point of view based on the understanding of shared information; and to transmit information 
further down the system (from the presidents of the continental federations that are present at the 
board meeting to the national federations, and from there to the clubs, teams and athletes).  
While structures and processes inherited from the past seem to persist, it does not mean that IFs 
are ignorant or sit around twiddling their thumbs. The FIH provides one such example where a 
federation seeks to adapt to its changing environment by changing its structure. In 2010, the FIH 
carried out an internal governance review. At the 2010 FIH Congress, it was decided that the 
executive board would be reduced from 28 to 16 members and a permanent CEO position was created. 
“They made a very clear decision at that point that they are going to move away from that older 
system into a newer and more efficient one” (FIH, B5). Four years later, during the 2014 Congress, the 
FIH tested a so-called “nomination assessment”, which was carried out by the Nomination Assessment 
Panel composed of three independent members that were appointed by the board. This nomination 
assessment is based on two evaluations: an overall and an individual board evaluation. The first one 
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seeks to answer how the board functions as a whole, which competencies it has, which competencies it 
potentially might lose (e.g. retirement of members), what it is good/not so good at and which 
improvements can be made. The individual board evaluation, for its part, tries to identify the strength 
and weaknesses of each board member. These evaluations guide the federation’s nomination process, 
for example if a board member with legal expertise is needed:  
 
When we do a call for nominations, we would put out the fact saying that anybody with 
sport law or legal expertise would be regarded favourably. Of course, we can’t control 
that because, ultimately, it is a democratic process. But we would like to think that the 
national associations, when they put forward a candidate, will take these things into 
consideration. (FIH, B5) 
 
As forward thinking as this nomination assessment may be, it is also limited by what the 
interviewee refers to as the “democratic process”: elected volunteers (e.g. the presidents of national 
federations) elect the IF-president and board members, who are also volunteers (at least in most IFs). 
Some actually make their choice based on candidates’ competences, others based on friendly 
solidarity with candidates, and others based on strategic alliances (e.g. promised or expected 
favours/advantages). With the structures and processes currently in place in IFs, it is nearly impossible 
to guarantee that competence overrules political interests. Challenges in defining and determining 
individuals’ competences and success reside in the difficulty to a) measure IFs’ and performance and 
b) IFs’ general goal-vagueness109.  
All these observations reinforce the impression that the professionalisation of IFs’ structures and 
processes consists of isolated actions rather than constituting a systemic transformation, as we have 
seen in the cases of professionalisation of individuals and of commercialisation. A major difficulty in 
determining the actual level of professionalism of IFs’ structures and processes resides in possible 
discrepancies between formal information that a researcher can obtain and the reality. It is for instance 
very improbable that a person from within an IF would admit that his/her own department/federation 
is not professional. These persons are part of a collective, they represent a team and they are generally 
bound to their collective by a sense of solidarity. Admitting that the structures and processes of their 
department/federation are not professional would be both a betrayal of the collective they are 
themselves part of and, at the same time, discredit their own work. Simultaneously, the reality of 
governance structures and political powers in IFs may create unease amongst professionals. Having a 
specific perception of their work, which is influenced by their educational background, professional 
ethics and personal convictions, professionals may face a dilemma: they might oppose to certain 
                                                        
109 Hein Verbruggen: “At Nestle, the highest governing body is the general assembly of shareholders. They all 
have the bloody same objective: money, profit, return on investment. So they know that, when they select a 
board and a CEO, they take the guy of which they believe he is the best to give them the profit. Because the 
objective is very clear.” 
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(political) decisions that are in contrast with their professional ethos and/or personal convictions; and 
yet, they may not be in a position to change existing structures and processes, even if these are 
inefficient or even unethical. This dilemma is evident in cases where individuals quit the IF they had 
been working for, no matter if their departure was voluntarily or involuntarily. Three interviews with 
former staff members of two different IFs show that, once the person is no longer bound to the 
collective, he/she speaks openly about the federation’s deficiencies. At the moment of the first 
discussion, one interviewee was very positive about the advancements of his IF regarding 
transparency and accountability. In a second discussion, the same interviewee, who had left the 
federation in the meantime, was very critical about the federation’s actual reluctance to change, 
notably with regard to enhancing transparency and accountability. The person openly denounces 
practices of favouritism at the highest level and sees in the elaboration of the strategic plan only a 
façade, as there is no actual implementation of strategic goals.  
By demonstrating corporate management practices such as enhanced control mechanisms and 
strategic planning, IFs may strengthen their legitimacy, credibility and stakeholders’ trust in them. 
However, the above example shows that a process of professionalisation towards better governance, 
increased transparency and efficiency can also be orchestrated by an IF, serving as an empty rhetoric 
and a mere façade to distract the critical eye of public authorities, media etc. Or as O’Brien (2015) 
puts it in the Law and Financial Markets Review: “Without strong normative foundations there is a 
risk that building an argument for reform through the rhetoric of professionalisation or accountability 
alone will produce a Potemkin façade, privileging the symbolic over the truly transformative” (p. 173). 
The same can be said for IFs.  
 
Deprofessionalisation of structures and processes: Though no coherent regulatory framework exists 
today for IFs, they are undeniably under increasing pressure to demonstrate professionalisation. Due to 
repeated governance scandals, collusion and various allegations, the pressure on IFs to professionalise 
is perhaps stronger than is the case for other types of organisations. Professionalisation becomes in 
fact a vector of legitimacy and credibility, justifying IFs’ autonomous self-regulation. As noted earlier, 
the UN “supports the independence and autonomy of sport as well as the mission of the International 
Olympic Committee in leading the Olympic movement” (p. 5)110. Even if it does not explicitly award 
autonomy to international sport governing bodies, the UN resolution nurtures a belief that actually 
falls into a grey zone: the (responsible) autonomy of international sport governing bodies. But is such 
autonomy really justified? Awarding organisations the autonomy of self-regulation also implies that 
these organisations are believed to have the capacities of governing themselves in a context of limited 
external interference and control. In a recent article, and referring to recurring issues such as doping, 
                                                        
110 United Nations. (2014). UN General Assembly. Resolution 69/6: Sport as a means to promote education, 
health, development and peace. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/6 
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match-fixing, hooliganism and corruption in sport, Chappelet (2017) argues that international sport 
“requires a wider international legal framework, developed through cooperation between government 
authorities and the sports sector” (p. 1). Claims for better governance through increased external 
control on and accountability of IFs constitute possible evolutions in this direction. Chappelet (2017) 
further notes that “setting out principles or guidelines is insufficient without an effective method for 
evaluating the governance of individual sport organizations” (p. 2/3). This raises some basic questions: 
who should carry out these evaluations? Which measures/sanctions can/should be taken in case of 
non-compliance? And who should decide on them? 
No matter whether a supervisory authority for IFs will emerge one day, repeated calls for 
stronger institutional surveillance (e.g. from media, politicians) and isolated external interferences 
(e.g. Lex FIFA) are already about to put greater institutional pressure on IFs. They may in fact entail 
stepwise limitation of IFs’ organisational autonomy. Boussard et al. (2010) refer to this process as the 
“decline of professional autonomy” (p. 168, free translation from French). Using a similar line of 
argumentation, Ritzer and Walczac (1988), when analysing changes to the medical profession, 
described the increase of external control and the prevalence of “formally rational structures” (p. 6) as 
deprofessionalisation. Like other sociologists (e.g. Freidson, 1983; Haug, 1973, 1975), Ritzer and 
Walczac refer to deprofessionalisation as the waning distinctiveness, monopoly of knowledge and 
autonomy of recognised professions. Frequently analysed professions include physicians, lawyers and 
teachers. Applied to sport organisations, the following observations can be made: educational 
programs in sport management (e.g. AISTS, FIFA Master) constantly increase; several sport 
management associations exist across the globe (e.g. EASM, NASSM, SMAANZ); and academic 
journals were created (e.g. European Sport Management Quarterly, Sport Management Review, 
Journal of Global Sport Management). In consideration of these evolutions, it can be said that sport 
management has reached a certain degree of professionalisation in the academic realm. At the same 
time, if professionals from occupations outside sport management (e.g. lawyers, economists, 
marketing and communication experts) can become sport managers, what exactly is the field of 
competence for those who have studied sport management? And has sport management as a 
profession reached the level of credentialism, meaning that practitioners control a) the content and 
standards of sport management as an educational program, b) the knowledge that is necessary for the 
practice as a sport manager and c) how this knowledge should be acquired? Though many 
practitioners seem to intervene as experts in educational programs of sport management, it presently 
remains to be proven whether they actually control content, standards and knowledge. Personally, I 
got the impression that the control of all three is still fairly ill-defined.  
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Figure 4. The interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation in international sport federations 
PROFESSIONALISATION (individuals) 
Goal: 
- More balanced workload  
- Increased expertise 
Risks: 
- Tension between board and staff 
- Management challenges emerging from the increasingly 
complex structure and work relations 
 
COMMERCIALISATION (activities) 
Goal: 
- Increased self-sufficiency 
- More financial resources for and through sport 
Risks: 
- Increase of governance issues 
- Unethical leadership 
- Mission drift  
- Insufficient legal frame 
- Loss of nonprofit values and traditions  
 
DEPROFESSIONALISATION 
(structures and processes) 
Goal: 
- Increased accountability 
- Increased control 
- Better governance 
Risks 
- Reduced autonomy of individuals 
and the organisation as a whole 
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(structures and processes) 
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- Better governance 
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With regard to sport management as a profession, it can be argued whether it has ever reached 
full recognition as a profession and/or whether sport management already experiences a process of 
deprofessionalisation. It is not the aim of this thesis to answer these questions. The term 
deprofessionalisation is rather used in relation to a possible decline and erosion of IFs’ autonomy as 
self-regulating organisations. Through a mix of certified professions that constitute their labour force, 
IFs may increase their image as professional organisations. But it does not mean that overall 
organisational structures and processes have become more professional. Repeated governance 
scandals at the highest decision-making level are compelling reasons against such beliefs. As a 
consequence, calls for increased control become louder. Figure 4 presented above summarises the 
interrelationship between professionalisation of individuals, commercialisation of activities and 
professionalisation/ deprofessionalisation of structures and processes. 
 
6.4. The emergence of ideal types 
Typologies and taxonomies have a long tradition in organisational theories, including the strategic 
typology of Miles & Snow (1978) to examine organisational adaptation, and Mintzberg’s (1979) 
typology on organisational structure. Many scholars have adopted and adapted these typologies. In 
sport management, Kikulis et al. (1992) applied Mintzberg’s (1979) configurational approach to 36 
Canadian NFs and Theodoraki and Henry (1994) to 34 English NFs; Thibault et al. (1993) applied 
Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology to 32 Canadian NFs. Other typologies (and taxonomies111) 
in sport management include Winand et al.’s (2013) analysis of NFs’ level and capacity of innovation, 
Bayle and Madella’s (2002) establishment of a typology of six performance profiles based on 
statistical analyses of 40 French NSOs, and Kikulis et al.’s (1989) organisational taxonomy, which 
measures, scales and compares the specialisation, standardisation and centralisation of Canadian NFs. 
Based on data collected in the context of the four publications of this thesis, several characteristics 
are on offer to analyse structure and strategy patterns of 22 Olympic IFs and to identify ideal types. 
For this purpose, three dimensions serve the analysis of IFs’ structure: (1) size, (2) 
commercialisation, and (3) solidarity/redistribution model. IFs’ headcount in 2016 or 2017 (depending 
on the information available) is used as an indicator for size. The scale used here is based on actually 
observed headcounts rather than on official classifications for enterprises (e.g. EU classification112) or 
extant studies on NSOs (e.g. Bayle & Robinson, 2007). Taken from Publication III and based on the 
analysis of IFs’ financial statements, the percentage of commercial revenues in IFs’ overall revenue 
2012-2015 is used to determine their level of commercialisation. Also based on IFs’ financial 
                                                        
111 Typologies are based on dimensions that represent concepts rather than empirical cases, they are descriptive 
rather than explanatory, they are more general, they are mental constructs and they follow the notion of 
conceptual ideal types. Taxonomies are classifications based on empirically observable and measurable 
characteristics. Despite this distinction, the terms are often used as synonyms.  
112 Medium-sized: headcount <250 & turnover ≤ EUR 50 millions; small: headcount <50 & turnover ≤ EUR 10 
millions; micro: headcount <10 & turnover ≤ EUR 2 millions. European Commission. (2017) 
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statements, their financial support to member organisations (NFs, CCs) and athletes can be calculated. 
This gives an idea of IFs’ solidarity and redistribution model.  
Four dimensions serve the analysis of IFs’ strategy: (1) image/reputation, (2) strategic plan, (3) 
communication, and (4) accountability. Image and reputation refer to IFs’ involvement in scandals 
related to corruption, doping, match-fixing etc. The period investigated covers the years 2005-2017 
and evidence is based on media articles. With regard to strategic planning, two conditions are being 
used: first, the strategic plan has to be publicly available; and second, it needs to be effective at the 
time of investigation (2017) and cover minimum three years. As communication through social media 
has gained in importance as a strategic and efficient marketing tool, IFs’ social media engagement is 
evaluated based on a ranking established by Redtorch113 for the period February 2016 – February 
2017. The ranking includes all 35 Olympic sports. Finally, and in light of growing institutional 
pressures on IFs (e.g. due to scandals, media scrutiny, IOC requirements), accountability is considered 
here as a strategic element to regain or maintain trust, credibility and legitimacy as self-regulating 
bodies. The qualitative evaluation of IFs’ level of accountability is mainly based on four elements 
proposed by Chappelet (2011) and which pick up on the accountability definition proposed by One 
World Trust in their Global Accountability Framework: transparency, participation, evaluation, 
complaints and responses. Term limits is added as a fifth element, notably because the IOC 
encourages IFs to introduce term limits in order to strengthen good governance and transparency. 
Table 22 summarises the dimensions, the indicators and the scales used. 
 
  
                                                        
113 REDTORCH. (2017). Sport on Social 2017. Retrieved from: 
http://www.redtorch.co/download-sport-on-social-2017 
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Table 22. Ideal types: dimensions and indicators used 
 DIMENSIONS INDICATORS SCALE 
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
Size Number of staff members in  • Very small: <10 
• Small: 10-30 
• Medium: 31-50 
• Big: 51-100 
• Very big: >100 
Commercialisation Revenues from commercial activities  
 
• Very weak: <10% 
• Weak: 10-30% 
• Moderate: 31-50% 
• Strong: 51-74% 
• Very strong: 75-100% 
Solidarity/redistribution 
model 
Financial support to members  
 
• Very low: <5% 
• Low: 5-10% 
• Moderate: 10-15% 
• High: 16-24% 
• Very high: ≥25 
S
T
R
A
T
E
G
Y
 
Image/reputation 
 
Scandals  
 
• None: good 
• Rare: tarnished 
• Repeated: bad 
Communication  Social media engagement  
 
• Strong: upper 50% 
• Weak: lower 50% 
Accountability Transparency 
Participation 
Evaluation 
Complaints and responses 
Term limits 
• 0/5: very low 
• 1/5: rather low 
• 2/5: low 
• 3/5: rather high 
• 4/5: high 
• 5/5: very high 
Strategic plan Strategic plan 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Findings of 22 Olympic IFs are presented in a synoptic table (Table 23). As some information 
is either difficult to access (e.g. financial statements) or difficult to evaluate (e.g. image, 
communication), this table should be interpreted as an approximate approach and a qualitative 
investigation. The table emphasises important structural differences between IFs in terms of size 
(between 7 staff members in the case of ISSF and >450 in the case of FIFA), level of 
commercialisation (between 2% in the case of ISSF and 97% in the case of WR) and 
solidarity/redistribution model (between 2% in the cases of FEI and FINA and 41% in the case of 
WR). It further shows that only eight out of 22 Olympic IFs had a publicly available strategic plan in 
place in 2017, of which only three are long-term strategic plans (i.e. 10 years). With the exception of 
the FEI, all IFs with a very strong level of commercialisation (≥75%: BWF, FIFA, ITF, WR) have a 
strategic plan. But they were also repeatedly involved in scandals.   
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Table 23. Ideal types: synopsis of 22 international sport federations 
 STRUCTURE STRATEGY 
Size Commercialisation114 Solidarity115 Image/reputation Communication Accountability Strategic plan 
BWF Medium (30) Very strong (78%) High (20%) Bad116 Weak Rather high  2016-2020 
FEI Big (85) Very strong (78%) Very low (2%) Good Strong Very high - 
FIE Small (14) Weak (3%) Very high (32%) Good Weak Rather low - 
FIFA Huge (>450) Very strong (88%) High (18%) Bad117 Strong High 2016-2026 
FIH Medium (34) Strong (56%) Moderate (15%) Good Weak High 2014-2024 
FINA Medium (33) Strong (70%) Very low (2%) Bad118 Strong Rather low - 
FIS Big (60) Strong (57%) Very high (25%) Good Strong High - 
FISA Small (17) Moderate (37%) Moderate (10%) Good Weak Rather high - 
IIHF Medium (30) Strong (56%) ? Good  Strong Rather high  - 
IJF Small (15) Strong (64%) Moderate (14%) Tarnished Strong Low  - 
ISAF Small (25) Weak (13%) Low (6%) Good Weak  Rather low  - 
ISSF Very small (7) Weak (2%) Very low (4%) Tarnished Weak Rather high - 
ISU Small (17) Strong (63%) High (22%) Good Strong High 2014-2018 
ITF Big (80) Very strong (75%) High (17%) Bad119 Weak High  2016-2024 
ITTF Small (26) Moderate (50%) High (19%) Good Strong Rather low - 
ITU Small (20) Moderate (40%) High (17%) Good Weak Rather low 2014-2017 
IWF Small (<20) Weak (17%) Very high (26%) Tarnished Weak Very low - 
UCI Big (79) Strong (70%) Moderate (13%) Bad120 Strong High - 
UWW Small (24) Weak (29%) High (23%) Tarnished Strong Rather high - 
WA Small (14) Moderate (31%) Low (6%) Good Strong Rather high - 
WCF Small (12) Weak (20%) Moderate (10%) Tarnished Weak High 2015-2018 
WR Big (75) Very strong (97%) Very high (41%) Bad121 Strong Rather low 2010-2020 
                                                        
114 Due to incomplete financial statements between 2012-2015 in the case of some IFs, some numbers are approximate. 
115 Idem  
116 BWF: match-fixing scandal (2012) / allegations of corruption against the Vice-president (2017) 
117 FIFA: Qatargate (2011) / FIFAgate (2015) 
118 FINA: doping scandal (2016) / financial scandal (2017) involving the first Vice-president of FINA 
119 ITF: match-fixing (2005, 2015, 2016) / corruption scandal (2016) 
120 UCI: repeated allegations of doping cover up 
121 WR: repeated scandals on doping, match-fixing, corruption 
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Based on the synoptic table and further case-specific knowledge, at least four ideal types emerge: 
the market dominator, the marginalised, the innovator and the traditionalist. 
 
 
Type 1: the market dominator (e.g. FIBA, FIFA, FIVB, IAAF, ITF, UCI, WR) 
• Size: big to very big  
• Economic model: very strong  
• Solidarity: high/very high  
• Image: often bad 
• Communication and technology: strong social media engagement, strong R&D 
• Accountability: rather high  
• Strategy: long-term strategy 
 
IFs of the type market dominator govern popular and global sports that are easy to practice (e.g. 
football, basketball, cycling, track and field). Federations are big (51-100) to very big (>100) in terms 
of staff headcount and have a complex organisational structure with distinct functional entities 
(departments). High revenues from commercial activities originate from ownership rights on major 
sport events/tournaments (e.g. broadcasting, marketing, ticketing). Thanks to high commercial 
revenues, these IFs can strongly invest into the development of their member federations and thus 
further globalise their sport and create new market opportunities. As the example of FIFA shows, 
important funding to members can, however, also cover up other motives such as vote buying (e.g. for 
presidential elections, event bids). Due to high commercial revenues and individuals’ personal 
interests related herewith, IFs are more prone to scandals. This type of IFs generally governs very 
popular sports that enjoy strong visibility, have a large community and a loyal fan base. Strong social 
media engagement is an important relationship and marketing tool for these IFs, especially if they try 
to revamp a scandal-ridden image by producing positive news feeds. With the goal of constantly 
growing the sports community, of improving fan experience and of being at the cutting edge, market 
dominators are strongly investing into research and development and employ or commission qualified 
experts for this purpose (e.g. market analysis, product development, new technologies). To maintain, 
regain and/or strengthen their legitimacy, credibility and stakeholders’ trust in them, the market 
dominators are eager to demonstrate high accountability and publish long-term strategic plans.  
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Type 2: the marginalised (e.g. FIE, FISA, ISAF) 
• Size: small  
• Economic model: weak/moderate 
• Solidarity: low/moderate 
• Image: rather good  
• Communication and technology: rather weak social media engagement, few R&D 
• Accountability: varies  
• Strategy: vague 
 
Compared to the market dominators, the marginalised are at the far end of the spectrum. Sports of 
this category are often expensive in terms of equipment (e.g. rowing, sailing) and demand very 
specific training facilities. The structure of the IF is rather small with only few functional entities 
(departments). Revenues from commercial activities are low to moderate and IFs are therefore highly 
dependent on external funding such as Olympic revenue or donations. An important part of the 
expenses flows into administrative tasks at the headquarters. Therefore, financial support to members 
is rather small, also because equipment is very expensive, and the sport can only be practiced within 
specific sport facilities. The image of these federations is rather good, and scandals are rare. At the 
same time, and because of restricted practicability (i.e. equipment costs, facilities), sports of this 
category tend to attract less media attention and have comparatively small sporting and fan 
communities122. Social media engagement of these federations through social media is accordingly 
weak. The same applies to research and development: due to a combination of limited staff headcount, 
scarce financial resources and the generally high costs of the sport equipment that is necessary to 
practice the sport, research and development are restricted. The accountability of these federations 
varies. Some show high levels of accountability. A possible explanation is their desire to demonstrate 
alignment with IOC requirements and thus consolidate their position in the Olympic movement. 
Others show low levels of accountability. A possible explanation is that public pressure and media 
scrutiny on these IFs are fairly low. The strategy of the marginalised is generally vague, either because 
of a lack of human and financial resources to establish and implement a strategy, or because of 
reluctance to (radical) change and/or the incapacity of managing it. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
122 Though exceptions clearly exist: e.g. FIA thanks to Formula 1. 
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Type 3: the innovator (e.g. FIH, FIS, UWW) 
• Size: small/medium/big  
• Economic model: moderate/strong  
• Solidarity: high/very high  
• Image: rather good 
• Communication and technology: strong social media engagement, strong R&D 
• Accountability: high 
• Strategy: mid-/long-term strategy 
 
Innovators have medium or big structures and generate moderate to high revenues through 
commercial activities. With the goal of growing their sports community and fan base, these 
federations put strong focus on the support and development of their members. Such development 
offers new market opportunities and increases IFs’ attractiveness for business partners. Few scandals 
can be observed in this category of federations, contributing to a relatively good image. In their efforts 
towards growing their sports community and fan base, innovators are very active on social media and 
use these as a cost-efficient marketing and relationship tool. Social media is employed as an important 
vector to strengthen brand awareness, image, and fan loyalty, but also to improve the federation’s 
services based on instant feedback from the social audience. In addition, by growing their community, 
these IFs may eventually drain visibility from dominant sports. Just as in the case of market 
dominators, continuous analysis of the direct environment through research and development are very 
important in these sports in order to increase fan and spectator experience and identify new trends. 
Innovators demonstrate high levels of accountability. Seeking greater commercialisation, federations 
need to satisfy (potential) sponsors and partners. At the same time, they may still be relatively 
dependent on the Olympic revenue and therefore display alignment with IOC requirements to 
strengthen their legitimacy within the Olympic movement. To emphasise their aspirations, IFs of the 
type innovator develop mid- or even long-term strategies as part of their dynamic change policy. 
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Type 4: the traditionalist (e.g. IWF, ISSF, WCF) 
• Size: small  
• Economic model: weak/moderate 
• Solidarity: low/moderate 
• Image: tarnished 
• Communication and technology: rather weak social media engagement, few R&D 
• Accountability: varies 
• Strategy: vague 
 
IFs of the category of traditionalists are rather small structures with a weak economic model due to 
low revenues from commercial activities and a very high dependency on external funding, notably the 
Olympic revenue. Expenses are mainly used for administrative operations. As a consequence, limited 
financial support is provided to members. The image of these federations is often tarnished due to 
scandals such as financial mismanagement and allegations against elected officials, insufficient 
regulations and improper governance practices. Scandals are often the result of outdated and deficient 
governance structures and processes. Traditionalists tend to have a rather weak social media 
engagement compared to other IFs, which is also related to their relatively small sporting community 
and fan base. They also focus less on research and development than on maintaining a status quo. Just 
as in the case of the marginalised, levels of accountability vary across these federations. To 
demonstrate alignment with IOC requirements and consolidate their position in the Olympic 
movement, some IFs are eager to demonstrate high levels of accountability. But as public pressure and 
media scrutiny on them are fairly low, others show low levels of accountability. In light of their 
reluctance to or incapacity of managing (radical) change, the strategy of this type of IFs is rather 
vague or even inexistent. In turn, they attach particular importance to the preservation of traditions and 
values and are therefore less dynamic. 
 
The four types presented here obviously only present ideal types. Being integrated and dynamic 
entities and by definition, ideal types rarely show a perfect fit with organisations’ reality. IFs that are 
indicated as examples above match at least with five of the seven dimensions. Contrary to the 
typology of Miles and Snow (1978), the here suggested typology does not seek to portray patterns of 
IFs’ adaptive behaviour and adaptive process, nor should types be considered as purely structural 
configurations in the sense of Mintzberg (1979) or be linked to managerial theories. At this stage, the 
types merely constitute an attempt to classify discussed findings and observations along lines of 
similarity. And though this classification does not allow drawing concrete conclusions, certain 
correlations seem to emerge between the types: the market dominators and the marginalised are 
diametrically opposed, and so are the traditionalists and the innovators. The market dominators and 
the traditionalists differ in nearly all dimensions, whereas traditionalists and innovators mainly differ 
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with regard to their strategy and dynamic. While innovators seek rapid and efficient adaptation to 
environmental changes and constraints, traditionalists are reluctant to change. Figure 4 demonstrates 
the correlations just mentioned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rather than linking the typology to managerial theories (also because the current state of research does 
not allow for such conclusions), the next section will focus on some (potential) managerial 
implications that emerge from the findings of this thesis and further reflexions. 
 
 
6.5. Discussing managerial implications of international sport federations’ 
professionalisation and commercialisation 
 
After the discussion of findings related to research questions 1 and 2, the interrelationship between 
professionalisation and commercialisation and the suggestion of a typology, the third and final 
research question remains to be discussed. 
 
Research question 3: What are the managerial implications of international sport federations’ 
professionalisation and commercialisation?  
 
As outlined in the first part of this thesis, IFs have undergone important transformations since their 
creation. Many IFs have evolved from a purely volunteer-run structure to complex organisations run 
by professionals. They are also increasingly interlaced with a multitude of stakeholders with often 
varying interests. As a reminder, IFs’ main activity in the past was to establish, oversee and sanction 
rules of the game and of membership (early years). As a second activity, and with the main goal of 
determining the best athletes, IFs began to organise World Championships. Today, the organisation of 
major sport events such as World Championships is a core business of basically all Olympic IFs. This 
Market dominator 
Marginalised 
Innovator
s 
Traditionalist 
Figure 5. Correlations between the four ideal types 
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activity requires professional and specialised workforces both in technical (sport) and economic 
domains (e.g. marketing, communication, finance). Organisational changes that occurred in NSOs 
over the last decades have been widely analysed and referred to as rationalisation (Slack & Hinings, 
1987) or bureaucratisation (Slack, 1985), but more often as professionalisation (Amis et al., 2002; 
Clausen et al., 2017; Kikulis, 2000; Nagel et al., 2015; Ruoranen et al., 2016; Skinner et al., 1999). 
The thesis further demonstrated that, while the activities and structure of IFs have changed 
considerably, other aspects have remained surprisingly unchanged. This includes notably IFs’ mission 
statement and legal form. 
Despite a growing interest of scholars to analyse transformations in sport organisations and the 
emergence of sport management as a recognised professional field, research on IFs is fairly sparse and 
results in a biased and incomplete picture of their structure and functioning. Considering the 
increasing presence of sport at the social, political and economic levels, it is all the more astonishing 
that IFs as that the international governing bodies of sport have received so little attention in the 
academic field. Even though a growing number of studies on various governance issues within a few 
IFs have emerged, comprehensive studies analysing several IFs of different size are literally non-
existent. Most studies focus indeed on the same international sport organisations (e.g. IOC, FIFA, 
IAAF, FIVB, UCI) and the same problematic (e.g. corruption, doping). While governance issues 
dominate the research agenda on IFs, professionalisation and commercialisation as the driving forces 
behind IFs’ transformations have been insufficiently investigated and comprehensive understanding is 
therefore lacking. Previous studies on IFs further tend to generalise observations from IFs with large 
revenues. If researchers and sport managers want to gain a better understanding IFs’ current structure 
and functioning and the variety that exists between them, they need to understand the driving forces 
that are behind IFs’ actions. For a comprehensive understanding of IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation as well as related managerial implications the incomplete and simplified 
generalisation neither provides sufficient empirical relevance, nor is it doing justice to the majority of 
the 92 IFs. This thesis therefore seeks to remedy some of these research gaps, notably by: 
 
• Adding to the limited scope on governance issues and doping an analysis of the concepts of 
and the relationship between professionalisation and commercialisation in IFs.  
• Analysing 22 Olympic IFs of different size and context with regard to professionalisation and 
commercialisation rather than focusing on a few dominant IFs.  
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Table 24. Overview of main findings and managerial implications 
 Findings Managerial implications 
P
U
B
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
 I
 
• IFs are very heterogeneous in terms of size, 
structure, and budgets 
1. Heterogeneity 
• IFs professionalisation process is non-linear 
and closely linked to IFs’ size 
• IFs become increasingly business-oriented 2. Sector bending and mission drift 
• Five causes of particular influence emerge: 3. Growing number, diversity and expectations 
of stakeholders o External pressures 
o Leadership 4. Need for efficient but also ethical leadership 
o Commercialisation 5. Growing pressure for IFs to commercialise 
o Management practices 6. Corporate management practices 
o Organisational culture 7. Reluctance to change 
P
U
B
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
 
II
 
• Importance of leadership to bring about change Need for efficient but also ethical leadership 
(see point 4) 
• Growing business approach of nonprofit IFs Sector bending and mission drift (see point 2) 
 
• Weighted voting 8. Political governance 
P
U
B
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
 I
II
 
• Important revenues from commercial activities  9. Development of and through sport 
• Size/specialisation is a key success factor in 
achieving high levels of commercialisation 
Growing pressure for IFs to commercialise 
(see point 5) 
• The use of social media shows high overlaps 
with high commercialisation 
10. Social media use 
• IFs prefer goal vagueness to a clearly defined 
strategic plan 
11. Conflicting rationales: goal ambiguity vs. 
business objectives 
• The actual impact of commercialisation on IFs’ 
governance remains unclear 
Sector bending and mission drift (see point 2) 
12. Increase of governance issues 
13. Lack of an appropriate legal frame 
P
U
B
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
 
IV
 
• Main revenue streams of Olympic IFs: events 
and Olympic revenue 
14. Major sport events: the question of saturation 
and consumption 
15. Growing uncertainty of event outcomes: the 
question of attractiveness and the need to 
diversify revenues 
 
In Publications I and II, we have uncovered several relevant drivers of and barriers to IFs’ 
professionalisation. Publications III and IV, for their part, focus on commercialisation as a particular 
form of IFs’ professionalisation. Based on these articles and the immersion in the field that was 
required for the research, a number of managerial implications related to IFs’ professionalisation and 
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commercialisation are being deduced. Table 24 above provides an overview of findings from the four 
publications and 15 related managerial implications. I first discuss various implications before taking a 
closer look at one particular implication, which is the risk of mission drift. To discuss managerial 
implications, I draw on existing literature and on findings from the four publications. Publications are 
listed in the order of their occurrence: 
 
1. Drivers of and barriers to professionalization in international sport federations  
2. Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of sport 
3. International sport federations’ commercialisation: a qualitative comparative analysis 
4. Major sport events at the centre of international sport federations’ resource strategy 
 
 
6.5.1. Various managerial implications 
6.5.1.1.  Heterogeneity 
It should not come as a surprise that IFs analysed in this thesis are of very different size (from <10 
to >450 staff), structure (from 0 to 10 or more departments, from flat hierarchy to multiple hierarchical 
levels) and revenues (from less than CHF 5 million to more than CHF 1 billion of annual revenue, not 
counting non-Olympic IFs). Depending on IFs’ size, the processes of professionalisation and 
commercialisation vary considerably. The differences between IFs as well as variation in their process 
of professionalisation have been discussed in detail in the Publication I. In light of IFs’ diversity, it is 
impossible to pronounce universal recommendations or think of them in terms of “one model fits all”. 
In sport management, several scholars have therefore used the contingency approach to explain the 
two-way interaction between organisations’ structure and performance, or between organisational 
constraints and strategy. Papadimitriou (2002), for example, draws on contingency-oriented theorists 
(e.g. Hage & Aiken, 1967; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968) to 
analyse the effect of structure on the performance of Greek sport organisations: “As organizations 
grow in size and develop resource dependencies on other agencies they tend to develop a certain type 
of internal structure characterized by division of labour, separation of roles and functions and 
formulation of rules and regulations.” (p. 207). Berret and Slack (2001), for their part, apply the 
contingency approach to analyse the strategic nature of sponsorship acquisition in Canadian NSOs: 
“The different environmental constraints and opportunities faced by NSOs dictate that different 
strategic approaches are necessary for the success of their sponsorship programs” (p. 38). In summary, 
due to differences in size, structure and environmental constraints, IFs need to develop different 
strategies that respond to their particular context. The best fit between structure and strategy of one IF 
may be actually impracticable for or even detrimental to another IF. Hence, there is not one best way 
 133 
 
(or one organisational model) that can serve as reference for all IFs. The ideal types suggested in 
section 6.4 constitute an attempt to classify IFs according to specific characteristics. 
 
6.5.1.2.  Growing number, diversity and expectations of stakeholders  
At least two types of stakeholders should be distinguished in the context of IFs: those that have a 
stake in the economic success of the IF (e.g. business partners), and those that have a stake in the sport 
itself (e.g. national and continental federations, athletes, clubs, teams, fans). Over the years, both types 
of stakeholders have continuously grown in terms of numbers. Different explanations exist for these 
evolutions:  
 
• Members: The worldwide development of their sport is part of IFs’ mission, e.g.: “The purposes 
of the UCI are [...] to promote cycling in all the countries of the world and at all levels” (UCI 
Constitution, Article 2b). Furthermore, through its evaluation criteria, the IOC exerts pressure on 
IFs to have a high number of members. “The IOC looks very closely at the number of nations that 
practice rowing. You speak of pressure from the IOC: yes, of course there is pressure from the 
IOC. And not only from the IOC, but from all sports that want to enter the Olympic program” 
(FISA, F2, free translation from French). As a result, the number of NFs constantly grows. 
• Members, fans and business partners: A general globalisation of markets entails the desire and 
possibilities to tap into new markets. Smith and Stewart (2010) call this evolution a “two-edged 
sword” (p. 11): it allows sport organisations to make commercial progress, but it also fractures 
traditions that constitute the core of sport organisations’ initial form and the reason for their appeal 
to fans. 
• Business partners: The growing interest of businesses to partner up with IFs and showcase their 
products is accompanied by IFs’ quest for new sources of revenue:  “The federation has recently 
defined a sponsorship structure that was approved at the 2015 Las Vegas World Championships. 
The focus at this stage is the recruitment of sponsors and signing partnerships that benefit the 
federation and the sport” (UWW, G2). 
 
The growing number and diversity of stakeholders bears several challenges. With regard to those 
having a stake in the sport itself, the challenge revolves mainly around cultural differences. Some IFs 
now have more than 200 members (NFs). This means 200 different cultures. As a consequence, 
cultural differences render it more difficult to reach a common agreement or find a common 
denominator, especially in the case of sensitive topics. Hein Verbruggen used a very visual 
comparison regarding IFs’ members: “It’s like a bucket full of frogs which all go in different 
directions”. With regard to business partners, the challenge IFs have to face is more related to 
dependencies: “As our ambitions grow, our level of dependency will increase as we will need to align 
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with partners that can dedicate resources in order to deliver our objectives” (UWW, G2). Berrett and 
Slack (2001) see a dilemma in the increasing number of alliances with business partners as sport 
organisations have to become more responsive to the needs of business partners and “continue to 
pursue goals in accordance with wishes of members” (p. 23). This raises several questions for future 
research: How can IFs best respond to both members’ expectations (mission-related) and those of 
business partners (contract-related)? What are the risks of business partners’ choice not being 
aligned with the fulfilling of the IF’s mission in first place? 
 
6.5.1.3.  Need for efficient and ethical leadership  
Over the last two decades, various scandals in a handful of IFs have repeatedly occupied the 
headlines of newspapers. Scandals generally include one or several high officials of the IF in question. 
It is therefore only appropriate to speak of “governance scandals”. But how is it possible that so much 
criminality is happening if not under their eyes then at least without leaders being aware of it or 
denouncing it? In the past, the success of an IF-president was measured against his/her efficiency. In 
fact, presidents like Sepp Blatter (FIFA), Hein Verbruggen (UCI), Primo Nebiolo (IAAF) and Ruben 
Acosta (FIVB) were all celebrated for their achievements of commercialising their sport and making 
their IF self-sufficient. After the uncovering of governance scandals, these former presidents showed 
little understanding of why everyone was now criticising them for what they have done in the past, if 
this was what they were celebrated for back then:  
 
I took up a bankrupt federation and when I left there were a cycling centre, all paid for, 
and CHF 14 million capital, reserves. [...] Very often they say: ‘you did a good job and 
you made a federation’. I know that, but it was not that difficult. There was nothing. [...] 
I’ve been 14 years president. And thanks to that I have all these Armstrong problems 
now. Otherwise I wouldn’t have had that. (Hein Verbruggen)  
 
This raises the question if and how past actions can be judged when applying recent standards 
that were not requested back then. Against current standards, and in view of repeated governance 
scandals, today’s leaders not only have to be efficient, but they also have to demonstrate ethical 
leadership. Antonakis (2006) therefore implies that systemic change towards good governance is very 
much a question of leadership: “It is important that leaders understand how they are legitimized 
because [...] leaders must reflect the collective aspirations of their constituencies (follower) [...] in 
order to influence them towards a common goal” (p. 4). According to Antonakis, it is equally 
important that supervisory authorities understand leaders, because “[only] when we understand leaders 
will we be able to control them” (p. 4). Several scholars promote the concept of ethical leadership (e.g. 
Arnaud, 2010; Mayer, 2014; Victor & Cullen, 1988). Arnaud even suggests an Ethical Climate index 
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based on Rest’s (1984, 1986) four-component model of ethical decision-making: “For individuals to 
engage in ethical acts, they must engage in four basic psychological processes: moral sensitivity, 
moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character” (p. 347).  
Applied to IFs, the challenge lies above all in their ability to understand and manage the 
normative system of their organisation in order to guide the ethical behaviour of leaders and 
employees alike. A particular challenge for leaders who take over the presidency of an IF that has 
been discredited through scandals is to restore credibility. In the case of FIFA and Gianni Infantino 
(who succeeded Sepp Blatter at the head of FIFA in 2015), this has not worked out yet after his first 
year as president: “Most fans don’t believe Gianni Infantino’s first year has won back trust in FIFA. 
[...] 98 per cent are concerned about corruption at FIFA123” (Transparency International).  
 
6.5.1.4.  Growing pressure to commercialise 
Some IFs/sports have engaged very early in a commercialisation process and, over the years, 
quasi-monopolised the market. Examples are football/soccer, American football and basketball. The 
reasons for their fast commercialisation may, however, differ considerably. While the appeal of 
football is anchored in its tradition of being a working-class sport and its global spread, the success of 
American football (or rather NFL) is closely related to its campus culture, and basketball easily 
attracts players, fans and sponsors that share or want to be associated to the lifestyle around it (e.g. 
hip-hop culture: music, urban youth culture, clothes). In other words: tradition, education and lifestyle 
have acted as facilitators for these sports to become increasingly commercial. Other sports are less 
fortunate in this regard (e.g. sports needing expensive equipment such as rowing or sports with 
environmental constraints such as winter sports), or their leaders have been less visionary. The 
explosion of broadcasting rights, growing numbers of major sport events and the desire of businesses 
to partner up with highly visible sports has moved IFs from being monopolies to being monopolies 
competing with each other for financial resources. This puts especially smaller and less 
commercialised IFs under pressure. A FIH staff member expresses his concern on the ever-growing 
dominance of football:  
 
A lot of these Olympic sports really are not commercial organisations. And therefore, 
they are problematic to match with commercial companies. [...] The dominance of 
football is a problem. [...] Who stops football? Why does football want to be like that? 
Why do the people that run football want everybody in the world to play football and 
                                                        
123 Transparency International. (2017). Most fans don’t believe Gianni Infantino’s first year has won back trust 
in FIFA. Retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/most_fans_dont_believe_gianni_infantinos_first_year_has_won
_back_trust_in_f  
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nobody would play anything else? [...] Football just keeps taking more and more. This 
means that every other sport gets less and less. (FIH, B2) 
 
At the same time, it seems that growing pressure to commercialise may also trigger creativity in 
terms of sponsor acquisition. The FIH, for instance, has developed a new hockey format (Hockey5), 
which is based on a research asking commercial partners what they want: “You design a product, and 
you design it with the idea of being a commercial product, suiting the needs of what commercial 
partners want on the ground” (FIH, B2). Wrestling pursues yet another strategy: “Looking towards the 
future we are looking at some of the traditional categories such as timepiece, automobile and airline, 
as well as more partners from niches to the wrestling community and fan base” (UWW, G2). 
However, to find solutions and conclude partnerships, smaller IFs may have to invest a large part of 
their annual budget into marketing: “[Sponsor acquisition] is an activity that requires competencies 
and expertise. This explains why communication and marketing are key departments in the 
organisation of FISA from the salary side” (FISA, F2, free translation from French). Regardless of the 
IF’s size and budget, the main product they all try to sell is their World Championships (or World Cup 
as some call it). This leads to another interesting question for future research studies: How can small 
IFs persist against big IFs that take more and more of the global market share? 
 
6.5.1.5.  Corporate management practices 
Around the late 1980s, IFs began to hire professional staff, marking the beginning of a shift from 
amateur to professional structures. Generally, the first paid person in the IF was the secretary general 
(e.g. FISA: 1989, UCI: 1992), whose title was often changed to general director, executive director or, 
more recently, CEO. Before that, IFs’ activities were rather inexpensive as they were carried out by 
volunteers: “UCI didn’t need any more money because what did they have? They had a little office. 
So, what do you need the money for?” (Hein Verbruggen). Until then, tasks and projects were mainly 
divided between commissions. As IFs’ activities and services expanded and the interest in televised 
sport grew, the increasing workload and need for expertise required the hiring of specialised and 
fulltime workforces: 
 
When I became president of the UCI there was absolutely nothing. There was a secretary 
general from Poland. A wonderful man but he was 79 years old. [...] From the very 
moment that we had revenues, I started to professionalise. [...] I had a general manager, a 
legal director, a financial director and under the general manager came all the 
departments.” (Hein Verbruggen) 
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With the hiring of paid staff, the role of commissions changed and became more that of 
advisory groups. At the same time, occupational professionalisation within IFs’ administrative 
structure triggered some important evolutions in terms of management. Some of these changes were 
consciously implemented (Hein Verbruggen: “I simply started to apply the principles of management 
that I learned with M&M/Mars”.), others happened naturally. Contrary to NSOs that have created 
many technical positions (e.g. coaches) in order to increase their chances of winning medals at 
international sport events and receive more money from their government, job positions in IFs show 
considerable differences. IFs’ focus is three-fold: manage its sport (i.e. rules, regulations, sanctions), 
promote its sport (e.g. attract new NFs, athletes, fans, partners) and organise its sport (e.g. World 
Championships). Evolutions such as increasing rule violations (e.g. doping, match fixing), competition 
for athletes and fans and the importance of major sport events to generate revenues (e.g. broadcasting 
and sponsorship rights) required the hiring of specialised workforces from very different domains: 
legal affairs, finances, communication, marketing, business, human resource management etc. As all 
these professionals have different educational backgrounds and bring specific professional norms into 
the organisation, organisational complexity is likely to increase. Several scholars analysing 
organisational change refer to this evolution as workforce diversity (e.g. Boyett & Conn, 1992; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). In sport management, O’Brien and Slack (2003) investigated how 
professionalisation for reasons of efficiency impact institutionalised amateur practices in a rugby club. 
They conclude that “new professional values are being institutionalised” (p. 39-40). 
Another interesting observation in recent years is the tendency towards appointing a General 
Director with a professional background outside sport, notably in domains such as legal affairs (UCI), 
business (FIVB, UCI) and international relations (FIFA). This evolution translates a growing demand 
and need for business competencies at the staff level. It is also not surprising that people with a 
background in corporate organisations implement management practices they are familiar with. 
Corporate management practices that are being implemented in IFs include for instance strategic 
planning, external audits, job descriptions, staff evaluation and staff development. Coming back to the 
study of O’Brien and Slack (2003), one may wonder what impact the institutionalisation of 
professionalisation and the simultaneous deinstitutionalisation of amateur values has on IFs’ core 
values and traditions. Organisational core values and traditions of IFs have only been broached briefly 
(e.g. in Publication I). Deeper immersion into this question is needed. 
 
6.5.1.6.  Reluctance to change 
Traditions and values are part of IFs’ identity. As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, the 
emergence of IFs is the result of strong beliefs and of individuals who devoted their time to sport. At 
the same time, not only the context of IFs has changed, their administrative structure and main 
activities (and one could even argue in some cases: their priorities) have changed too. While IFs’ 
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administrative structure and activities have evolved considerably to accommodate growing 
expectations from stakeholders and capitalise on the worldwide commodification of sport, a reluctance 
to change can be observed among elected volunteers. Contrary to elected volunteers, paid staff may be 
interested in the sport, but they also come for the salary. Volunteers, on the other hand, claim that they 
give their time only for the love of the sport. They hence consider themselves as the legitimate 
decision makers. In the past, these elected volunteers would in fact take all decisions based on their 
own judgement and/or personal interests. However, times have changed. Some IFs have become 
highly commercialised and multiple governance scandals have shaken the world of international sport. 
These scandals reveal that several of the high-ranking officials in international sport have used the 
system in place to pursue self-interested objectives. And even for those who have not infringed any 
rules, the idea of profiting a maximum from the system within the legal limits seems widespread:  
 
I went with him [Cheikh Tamim, today Emir of Qatar] to Salt Lake City to introduce him 
to the people from the IOC that I knew. […] He won the elections [to become IOC 
member] with 76% of the votes. He was quite happy. This is why he said to me: you stay 
with me. Whatever you ask me, I will accept it. So, I asked for an enormous salary, half a 
million per year. I asked for a house, a car, a bodyguard, a driver, two nannies and travels 
all paid for, so my family could visit me. I stayed from 2001 to 2008. (ARISF, A6, free 
translation from French) 
 
The above example reveals how much the individual profit through sport may guide 
individuals’ decisions. This brings me to a paradox: on the one hand, elected officials insist on 
amateur values; on the other hand, several examples show that it is rather the elected officials who 
profit from the pervasive effects of sports’ commercialisation and lack of checks and balances, 
accountability and transparency. Another interesting observation is: while the turnover at staff level is 
rather high, some board members serve for decades. This could be a sign for elected officials being 
more satisfied with their situation then staff members. And if they are satisfied, why should they 
change anything?  
 
 
6.5.1.7.  Political governance 
Here presented assumptions on the emergence of political governance are based on Ian Henry’s 
three features of governance: systemic governance (i.e. mutual adjustment between stakeholders), 
good corporate governance (i.e. adoption of principles to fight corporate governance failure), and 
political governance. Henry (2004) defines political governance as “the process by which governments 
or governing bodies seek to steer the sports system to achieve desired outcomes by moral pressure” (p. 
26). According to Henry, different tools may be used for this purpose: moral persuasion, financial 
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incentives and direct regulation. Several examples of political governance as a steering policy in 
international sport can be found with regard to IFs: 
 
• Switzerland attracts IFs through financial incentives such as tax reduction/exemption and a 
very liberal legal frame (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). 
• The IOC creates competition between IFs through the Olympic revenue share, hence also 
using the tool of financial incentive. Through its Code of Ethics and the Olympic Agenda 
2020, the IOC also uses the tool of moral persuasion. As these are only guidelines and do not 
entail sanctions in case of non-respect, one cannot speak of direct regulations. 
• In December 2014, the Swiss Parliament has approved new legislative provisions to fight 
money laundering in sport. These provisions are often referred to as “Lex FIFA”. Lex FIFA 
includes that high-ranking managers and officials of Olympic IFs will be regarded as 
“politically exposed persons”, a status which allows the Swiss Confederation to control their 
finances. For example, in case of a doubtful transaction on their account, the bank is 
authorised to block the account and alert the federal authorities without informing the account 
holder. A possible shortcoming is that continental confederations (e.g. UEFA) are not 
included in this law. At this point in time, the provisions still have to be transferred into the 
Swiss Penal Code. Once they are transferred into the Swiss Penal Code, this would be an 
example of a direct regulation. 
 
By adopting the notion of “political control centre” (Mayntz, 2003), one can equally adopt the 
term “political governance” to IFs. As the governing bodies of sport, IFs have developed their own 
governance systems. The governance system may vary considerably from one IF to the other. All IFs 
have autonomous NFs as members, but not all IFs have autonomous continental confederations (CC). 
There are at least three possible scenarios:  
 
1. NFs are members of the CC, and the CC is a member of the IF. Properly speaking, the IF does 
not have NFs in this case. NFs are only affiliated through their CC (e.g. IJF before Marius 
Vizer became president). 
2. The NFs are members of both the CC and the IF (e.g. FIFA/UEFA). 
3. The IF has no CCs. The NFs are members of the IF, and the IF appoints a subsidiary board 
(e.g. continental representatives) for the continental management and that serve as liaison 
between the board and the NFs (e.g. FIBA, UWW, FISA). 
 
There are diverging views on the need and use of CCs among sport managers. Two examples 
emphasise this divergence. The first example is the view of Hein Verbruggen, former UCI president. 
His approach to CCs was to limit their power as much as possible: “I’ve been aiming very clearly to 
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reduce the power of the continental confederations. Most of the time they are a burden. [...] You don’t 
need a continental federation. In so far, you can use a continental federation to bring in the continental 
colour”. While Hein Verbruggen seemed to have a strong control over the CCs, the situation looked 
slightly different under Brian Cookson. Several internal staff members and external actors have voiced 
their concerns about Cookson’s weak leadership and the strong influence of the UCI General Director. 
As the presidents of the CCs sit on the UCI board, Cookson needed their backing. Before the 2015 
board meeting, everything looked like the board members (among them all 5 continental presidents) 
wanted to get rid of the general director. According to a former staff member, Cookson could only 
ward off the risk of losing his steersman by giving more money to the CCs. Coming from a former 
UCI staff member, the comment should, however, be taken with care: 
 
Mr Cookson decided to pay the confederations, to give more money to them. To me this 
is active corruption. [...] I heard something like CHF 200’000 per confederation. 1 
million! And this is the UCI we are speaking about. That’s a lot of money. That’s two 
months of salaries. (UCI, C2, free translation from French) 
 
The second example concerns the FIH. Here one rather finds a climate of collaboration and 
empowerment: “The continental federations have a big role. Their main role is to support the national 
federations. Let’s face it like this: the big countries don’t need a lot of support. They are self-
sufficient. You need to get their support” (FIH, B7). In this constellation, the CCs are the FIH’s point 
of contact with their NFs and are “integral to our structure. [...] We have very good relationships with 
them” (FIH, B8). The FIH’s goal is to make each CC their extended arm in that particular region. In 
2015, about 20% of the FIH’s revenues went to their CCs. Part of the annual funding to the CCs is 
destined for a professional position. Considering these two very different positions, it would be 
interesting to analyse how increased political governance could positively influence the functioning of 
IFs (e.g. moral persuasion, financial incentives, direct regulation). 
 
6.5.1.8.  Development of and through sport 
The increase of revenues from commercial activities opens NPOs to the possibility to do more 
social good through philanthropic initiatives (Dees & Anderson, 2003). Under point 2.2, I have 
already discussed that, in recent years, the notion of sport as a social good has been emphasised by 
several intergovernmental organisations, including the UN (e.g. peace, human understanding, 
sustainable development) and the EU (e.g. health, education). Crabbe (2009) further reports that the 
idea of sport “to do social good has increasingly come to prominence on social policy agendas, [...] but 
also within sports management and marketing strategies” (p. 177). In parallel, a growing number of 
studies in sport management now analyse sport organisations from the perspective of corporate social 
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responsibility (Babiak & Wolfe, 2009; Bayle, Chappelet, François, & Maltèse, 2011; Godfrey, 2009) 
and development through sport (Gould & Carson, 2008; Skinner, Zakus, & Cowell, 2008).  
Through their sport events, IFs are at the origin of unprecedented social gatherings. The economic 
success of these events can, in turn, be used to finance worldwide development programs (e.g. IAAF 
Regional Development Centres, FIFA Football for Hope) through which federations transmit social 
values such as fair play, peace, tolerance and gender equity. Examples taken from two IFs demonstrate 
that the redistribution of IFs’ profits varies considerably.  
 
• FIH: With CHF 10.5 million of annual revenues (2012-2015), the FIH has a relatively small 
budget considered to other IFs. One of the federation’s main strategic goals is to engage and 
empower its members. In 2015, the FIH provided about 20% of its budget to various development 
projects, the most important ones being FIH Hockey Academy and the Targeted Assistance 
Programmes (TAP). The FIH Hockey Academy is a series of online educational programs 
developed in partnership with World Academy of Sport (a company that delivers tailored learning 
programs for sports). The education area comprises game topics (technical education) and 
governance topics (management education), but also leadership programs with a post-graduate 
certificate. To reach out globally, the FIH tries to spread its programmes through its CCs. In the 
case of TAPs, it is the responsibility of CCs to identify which of their national associations needs 
support in a specific area. The approval through the FIH is based on criteria that relate to the 
Hockey Revolution Strategy. Once approved, the funding for a specific project comes in addition 
to the annual funding the CC receives. An important aspect of this additional funding is external 
co-funding. From past experience, the FIH has learnt that sustainable projects need to be 
supported by “someone who has an interest in it, who is local and will be there for a long time to 
be involved in it” (FIH, B8).  
• FIFA: The second example is FIFA. As one of the rare (if not the only) IFs that generate average 
annual revenues of more than USD 1 billion, one would imagine that FIFA redistributes an 
important share of its profits to its members and/or development programs. FIFA itself claims to 
have invested more than 71% directly into football. However, if one breaks down the 2012-2015 
expenses, it turns out that only 18% were directly invested into development, while 41% were 
invested into the FIFA World Cup and 12% into other FIFA events and FIFA Club Protection124. 
FIFA would now certainly argue that, without the success of the FIFA World Cup, the federation 
would not be able to provide the money it currently does to its members. Considering IFs as 
service organisations to their members, the question that could be raised here is: What would be a 
fair redistribution model? 
                                                        
124 Based on FIFA’s financial statements 2012-2015. 
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6.5.1.9.  Social media use  
Relating to Publication 3 on IFs’ commercialisation, I have already discussed the cost-efficient use 
of social media as a marketing and relationship tool. The question is now: what implications does the 
rise of social media (or Web 2.0, as it is often termed) have for IFs’ marketing strategy? I refer here to 
Constandinides and Fountain (2008): “Web 2.0 has a substantial effect on consumer behaviour and has 
contributed to an unprecedented customer empowerment. The consequences are far reaching, affecting 
not only the area of technology development but also the domains of business strategy and marketing” 
(p. 231). The challenge for IFs is therefore to seize the potential of social media as a marketing and 
relationship tool. One of the principle innovations of online applications such as social media (and 
contrary to traditional producer-user relations) is that they allow user participation (e.g. content 
contribution, content editing). Several advantages emerge from the aspect of user participation for IFs. 
For instance, IFs can listen to their social audience (e.g. instant feedback) in order to improve their 
services: “The feedback we rely on a lot is on social media because of the comments that people post” 
(FIH, B1). Another advantage is the access to information of niche products. If one considers sport as 
the main product of IFs, then it becomes evident that, through traditional media, smaller and less 
televised sports have difficulties to drain visibility from dominant sports. Now, with Web 2.0 online 
applications such as social media, blogs and forums, sport fans of smaller sports “can create 
substantial aggregated demand for products and services not belonging to the mainstream of ‘hit’ 
categories” (Constantinides & Fountain, 2008). Social media further allow a three-way 
communication in that companies can interact with their customers, but customers can also interact 
with each other.  
The social media buzz an IF or its sport creates can be either positive or negative. Ideally, the 
news feeds and comments consist of positive information provided by both the IF and social media 
users (e.g. events, stories). However, negative headlines and comments can also quickly reach the 
connected community through social media. One advantage for IFs is that, in both cases, they can use 
information received through social media as a yardstick against which they can measure their 
organisational performance and external perception. IFs can also use the collective intelligence and 
creativity that emerge from social media feeds for their own development. Another possibility for IFs 
is to integrate messages from professional athletes on the IF’s social media sites. This strategy may be 
more efficient in attracting the attention of the younger generation than publicities created by 
traditional media agencies. And not only of the younger generation: it also provides journalists with 
free and instant access to topics that a sports community cares about. These examples show that 
multiple ways exist for IFs to make the best use of social media as a cost-efficient marketing and 
relationship tool. However, IFs have varying resources to analyse and adopt new marketing tools. A 
big IF such as FIFA employs about 60 marketing specialists, “covering a wide range of expertise 
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within the sports business industry125”. At the same time, the creation of the positions of Social Media 
Manager and Social Media Coordinator is still rather recent. In 2015, FIFA’s Social Media Manager 
wrote in this regard:  
 
In March 2013, I became FIFA's Social Media Manager. In fact, I was the only member 
of the team! Now I’m looking for our third member. [...] The role of Digital and Social 
Media is becoming ever more core to FIFA's daily business. This person will play a big 
role in driving the organisation forward126. 
 
FIFA’s goal for the future is now to build fan loyalty: “The next stage of our social evolution is 
going to be working out how to engage with those people on a more regular basis. Our goal is to build 
a consistent presence with this content rather than just dipping their toes in every four years for the 
World Cup127” (FIFA Social Media Manager). At the same time, for a scandal shaken IF like FIFA, 
social media are also an opportunity to feed their community with more positive news: “If you read 
the papers there may be times when you see negative representations about FIFA, but the truth is that 
we have people working hard on positive projects all over the globe and we want to get the word out 
about those things too128” (FIFA Social Media Manager). 
On the other hand, a small or mid-sized IF may have less financial resources to employ a large 
number of staff members only dedicated to social media. Nevertheless, the relatively inexpensive use 
of social media offers big and small IFs alike the opportunity to exploit social media as a marketing 
tool. According to a FIS staff member, the federation considered social media very early as a valuable 
communication channel. Especially in new disciplines such as Snowboard, Freestyle and Slopestyle, 
and which attract younger people, social media are very important and widespread. FIS pursues a 
differentiated social media strategy: for each discipline, FIS employs a Media Coordinator. These 
coordinators follow the entire season live on site and therefore know the public. This period is in 
general rather short and social media activity very intense. The Media Coordinators therefore work on 
a freelance basis. In a similar way, FIH contracts media officers for the time of their events: “they 
write the match report and they facilitate what we call the ‘mixed-zone’, so the press can choose their 
quotes. And they do all the social media for our events, pictures for Instagram etc.” (FIH, B1).  
 
                                                        
125 FIFA – International Association Football Federation. (2017). Marketing. Retrieved from 
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/marketing/index.html  
126 LinkedIn.(2015). Social Media Manager. Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/wanted-new-
social-media-manager-alex-stone/  
127 Audiense. (2015). Interview with Alex Stone, FIFA’s Social Media Manager. Retrieved from 
https://audiense.com/interview-case-study-how-fifa-filled-a-global-social-media-world-cup-stadium-with-one-
billion-fans/  
128 Idem 
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6.5.1.10.  Conflicting rationales: goal ambiguity vs. business objectives  
The article on IFs’ commercialisation revealed that relatively few IFs work with an official 
strategic plan. While this seems rather surprising at first sight, we found a reasonable argument in 
what Stone and Brush (1996) call “the dilemma of meeting needs for commitment and demands for 
legitimacy”. Meeting needs for commitment refers to the multiple (and sometimes conflicting) 
constituencies whose expectations NPOs have to accommodate to a level that convinces them to 
commit to the organisation. The risk of satisfying the demands of one constituency might be that other 
constituencies no longer sufficiently identify with the organisation. Meeting demands for legitimacy, 
on the other hand, refers to accommodating expectations from those who provide NPOs with financial 
resources (e.g. business partners, government). These actors/institutions are likely to demand 
structured planning and clear objectives that demonstrate their money is well invested and creates 
some sort of return on investment. As a trade-off between these two poles, many NPOs tend to keep 
their goals vague. In fact, goal vagueness and ambiguity appears to be inherent to NPOs and public 
organisations (Chun & Rainey, 2005), including IFs. Chun and Rainey suggest four dimensions to 
measure goal ambiguity: mission comprehension ambiguity, directive goal ambiguity, evaluative goal 
ambiguity and priority goal ambiguity. The four dimensions are briefly outline below: 
 
• Mission comprehension ambiguity: Mission statements aim at enhancing an organisation’s 
legitimacy and hence increase the chance of members’ commitment. An organisation’s mission 
statement can be considered as being clear if there is little leeway for interpretation. The keywords 
that best sum up IFs’ mission are govern, promote, develop and organise their sport. These terms 
are generally explained in IFs’ statutes. These days, one may wonder to which extent IFs’ 
decisions and actions actually reflect their official mission. How much importance is given to each 
of the four key functions? And how can IFs’ mission alignment be measured? As discussed at the 
beginning of this thesis, IFs’ mission statements have remained fairly unchanged despite 
considerable evolutions regarding their activities. Especially the mission of development bears the 
risk of being alienated. Are the IF’s profits a means to develop the sport, or is the development of 
the sport a means to generate more profits? And if the latter, for whom or what exactly? 
• Directive goal ambiguity: This dimension refers to organisations’ degree of translating their 
mission into directives or guidelines that result in clear actions. Chun and Rainey argue that high 
directive goal ambiguity allows for more organisational autonomy. This is perhaps the dimension 
that is the least ambiguous regarding IFs. The only exception is perhaps directives and guidelines 
for development. What would be a fair redistribution model and how could it be anchored through 
directives and guidelines? 
• Evaluative goal ambiguity: The third dimension seeks to evaluate the progress towards the 
achievement of organisational goals that are in line with the organisation’s mission. The measure 
of this dimension depends very much on the availability of objective performance indicators. The 
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lack of objective and measurable performance indicators demonstrates interpretative leeway and 
hence evaluative goal ambiguity. Objective, tangible and result-oriented performance indicators 
are often used in strategic plans. As most IFs have no strategic plan, I conclude that evaluative 
goal ambiguity is relatively high among IFs. 
• Priority goal ambiguity: The final dimension “refers to the level of leeway in deciding on 
priorities among multiple goals” (Chun & Rainey, p. 535). This means that organisations have to 
decide on a goal hierarchy. The spectrum of multiple and sometimes diverging demands and needs 
among IFs’ members makes it difficult for IFs to fix a goal hierarchy. In light of a continuously 
growing number of linkages with business organisations, I further put forth the assumption that 
IFs’ goal hierarchy is increasingly influenced by business objectives. In smaller IFs, the quest for 
entering or staying on the Olympic program may be a priority, resulting in a strong alignment with 
IOC requirements (e.g. FISA, UWW). In bigger and scandal-shaken IFs, the priority may be to 
rebuild trust and credibility, resulting in a focus on actions that are expected to demonstrate a 
commitment to reform (e.g. FIFA). 
 
Though sponsors and partners do not necessarily pursue the same goals as IFs, some questions 
emerge: to which extent does IFs’ goal ambiguity impede or favour its business objectives? With 
regard to evaluative goal ambiguity, business partners have their own performance indicators, and 
which may be totally unrelated to IFs’ goals. A sponsor may be interested in the number of website 
visits, the size of the TV audience or the number of tickets sold. Business partners use sport for their 
own purposes and regardless of IFs’ mission. This raises the question of “convenience marriage”: does 
the IF use the revenues from business partners to pursue first and foremost mission-related goals? And 
to which extent do IFs fix priorities based on pressures/expectations from business partners (return on 
investment) rather than on members’ needs (priority goal ambiguity)?  
 
6.5.1.11. Increase of governance issues 
As mentioned at numerous occasions in this thesis, media and researchers seem to be particularly 
interested in IFs’ governance issues. But is this an indicator for increasing governance issues in IFs? 
By way of illustration, and using Taylor and Francis Online, I have conducted a comparison on the hit 
ratio for the terms *corruption, *development project and *development program in relation to *sport 
and *international sport (the terms appear anywhere in the article, not specifically in the title): 
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Table 25. Hit ratio comparison of the terms *corruption and *development in sport 
Search terms No filter Filter: Sports and Leisure 
*corruption + *sport 14’273 1’719 
*corruption + *international sport 270 160 
*development project + *sport 739 234 
*development project + *international sport 21 13 
*development program + *sport 1’950 728 
*development program + *international sport 92 55 
Note: Information has been extracted on 8 October 2017. 
 
Table 25 shows that, even combined, the research for studies including the terms *development 
project and *development program in combination with *international sport and which have been 
published in Sports and Leisure journals (n = 88) remains far behind studies including the term 
*corruption in combination with *international sport and which have been published in Sports and 
Leisure journals (n = 160). The hit ratio for *corruption in combination with *sport and without using 
the filter “Sports and Leisure” is even more impressive (n = 14’273). This is only a very plain 
example, but it supports my general observation of research studies strongly focusing on governance 
issues when it comes to IFs. Though corruption in sport can be traced back to ancient times, several 
questions arise from this assessment: first, is there a proven increase in governance issues in IFs? 
Second, if there is a proven increase, is this evolution due to IFs’ growing professionalisation and 
commercialisation? And third, if there is no proven increase, can we expect an increase in the future 
due to IFs’ growing professionalisation and commercialisation?  
I do not have an answer to the above questions. However, I would argue that one of IFs’ biggest 
weaknesses is actors’ tendency to adopt opportunistic behaviours (Mason et al., 2006). In line with the 
principle-agent problem that Mason et al. apply in their study, one could replace “actors” by “agents”. 
In the context of IFs, high-ranking officials taking the main decisions are the agents, and stakeholders 
(e.g. members, athletes) are the principles. Two interrelated conditions contribute to the increase in 
agents’ opportunistic behaviour: IFs’ commercialisation and IFs’ autonomy. Over the last decades, the 
network that IF-officials have developed with business partners has grown considerably. In some IFs, 
the network has grown to a size where both a clear overview and control of these connections have 
become difficult. And yet, information gets leaked or investigators uncover corrupt machinations on 
the basis of overwhelming evidence. A very recent example is the arrest of Carlos Nuzman, former 
president of the Rio 2016 Organising Committee and president of the Brazilian Olympic Committee. 
A lawyer by profession, Nuzman has been arrested “for alleged involvement in a vote-buying scandal 
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connected to Rio's successful bid for the Olympic and Paralympic Games eight years ago 129 ”. 
Numerous other scandals related to governance issues could be listed at this point. However, rather 
than joining the indignation chorus, I would like to point out an often-forgotten fact: scholars 
generally only analyse IFs with large revenues. For example, the 2015 indictment against high-ranking 
FIFA officials “related to an alleged bribery and kickback scheme involving 150 million US dollars” 
(Henne, 2015). Compared to the 92 IFs that do exist, the number of IFs that have been analysed so far 
with regard to governance issues remains, however, relatively small. Scholars such as Forster (Forster, 
2006, 2016; Forster & Pope, 2004) contribute to the creation of a biased picture by drawing general 
conclusions from a very small number of international sport organisations. A main driver in 
channelling scholars’ focus is the influence of mass media. Nevertheless, I argue that it is insubstantial 
to assume that IFs in general tend to be corrupt because FIFA & Co have shown time and time again 
corrupt behaviours.  
At the same time, one should not relate corruption to big money and big IFs only. Transparency 
International lists 32 different forms of corruption. Some of the 32 forms may appear mainly in 
relation to big sums of money (e.g. beneficial ownership secrecy, base erosion and profit shifting, 
money laundering, nominee). Others, however, may appear already when only small sums or even no 
direct money is involved. Here, the list of Transparency International includes forms such as nepotism 
(i.e. “someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or favour 
to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving”130), conflict of 
interests (i.e. individuals “choosing between the duties and demands of their position and their own 
private interests”131) or patronage (i.e. “form of favouritism in which a person is selected, regardless 
of qualifications or entitlement, for a job or government benefit because of affiliations or 
connections”132). In international sport, the question of good (or better) governance is a much-debated 
topic (Chappelet, 2011; Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013; Forster, 
2006, 2016; Geeraert et al., 2015; Maennig, 2002; Pielke, 2013, 2015). However, both the lack of 
research on less commercialised sports and the fact that corruption has multiple facets reinforces my 
view that the question of governance issues still only produces a very fragmented and biased picture. 
In Publication III, we also evoked the Sports Governance Observer Index developed by Play the Game 
(Geeraert, 2015b) and the difficulty to obtain substantial information from IFs on the basis of which an 
evaluation could be conducted. The question I would like to raise at this point is therefore: Should IFs’ 
                                                        
129 Inside the Games. (2017). Corruption charges against Carlos Nuzman. Retrieved from 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1056298/nuzman-resigns-from-rio-2016-and-brazilian-olympic-
committee-positions-to-focus-on-clearing-name  
130 Transparency International. (2017). Corruption: nepotism. Retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/nepotism  
131 Transparency International. (2017). Corruption: conflict of interests. Retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/conflict_of_interests  
132 Transparency International. (2017). Corruption: patronage. Retrieved from 
https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/patronage  
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governance be monitored externally? And if so, who could/should monitor IFs and on the basis of 
which evaluation criteria? 
 
6.5.1.12. Lack of an appropriate legal frame 
Under point 2.3, the questions of the legal frame that applies to IFs based in Switzerland and the 
(few) efforts that have been made to tighten this frame have already been touched upon. To 
supplement what has already been said, recent motions (May 2017)133 that have been discussed at the 
Swiss National Council demonstrate the ambivalent positions regarding IFs’ increasing 
commercialisation. The content of these motions and the decisions that have been taken are briefly 
summarised hereafter: 
 
• In May 2017, the Swiss National Council rejected three motions that challenged and aimed at 
changing the current legal form of IFs based in Switzerland. The main argument for these motions 
was that the mingling of non-profit mission and economic objectives results in increasingly 
opaque activities. 
• One proposal suggested to separate the IF's commercial activities and bundle them in a 
corporation. This should only apply to IFs with high revenue (though it remains unclear what a 
“high revenue” is).  
• A similar motion suggested changing the legal form of IFs with high revenues from nonprofit 
associations to corporations. 
• A third proposal went even further, requiring an effective regulation and supervision of IFs, 
arguing that the limits of self-organisation have long been reached. 
• The majority of the members of the Swiss National Council rejected all three motions. The main 
argument for rejecting the proposals was: audit requirements do already exist for IFs of a certain 
(financial) size.  
 
Those who have followed the FIFAgate know that external audits are certainly already a step into 
the right direction, but that informal practices and mechanisms cannot be captured with them. A lot of 
the details that were revealed by the Swiss public prosecutor and the US Attorney General in 2015 
actually touch on information that the auditor (in this case KPMG) would not have access to:  
 
The auditors would have been reviewing FIFA’s organisational finances, rather than any 
private individual transactions made between FIFA officials such as those that are now 
being investigated. In that sense, it’s not clear to me that they [KPMG] would have seen 
                                                        
133 Swiss Parliament. (2017). Legal form of international sport federations. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/news/Seiten/2017/20170503185827079194158159041_bsd203.aspx 
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the transactions that are now being questioned. Of course: unless these transactions were 
made through the FIFA accounts to these individuals. (FIFA, H1) 
 
Numerous other examples have taught us that a lot of decisions guided by self-interests and 
seeking self-enrichment have happened under the cloak of IFs’ self-regulation and their claim of non-
intervention. As monopolistic organisations (Forster, 2006, 2016), IFs create and apply their own 
laws. Their autonomy is further supported by intergovernmental organisations such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the European Union. In a draft document from 2014 entitled “Arrangement for 
Cooperation between the European Commission and the Union of European Football 
Associations134”, it says under point 2.7: “Financial stability, transparency and better governance 
within sport can be pursued through responsible self-regulation” (p. 3). The term “responsible self-
regulation” relates to the recognition of the autonomy of sport through the UN in November 2014. 
About a year before, IOC president Thomas Bach had advocated the need for sport’s autonomy: 
"Sport [is] truly the only area of human existence which has achieved universal law. But to apply this 
universal law worldwide, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this sporting 
autonomy135". The IOC was very delighted about the UN acknowledgement. Since then, several 
scandals within the Olympic Movement (e.g. FIFAgate, Russian doping affaire) and within the IOC 
itself (e.g. corruption allegations against Carlos Nuzman) came to the surface. A headline from 7 
October 2017 on the news page Inside the Games stated: “IOC members raise concerns over 
reputational damage to Olympic Movement following corruption allegations136”. In light of these 
evolutions, the following questions emerge: What exactly should we understand by “responsible self-
regulation”? Where are the limits of IFs’ responsible self-regulation? Personally, I believe that one of 
the main challenges to IFs’ responsible self-regulation resides in their governance structure, though, 
officially, this structure is democratic in the sense that it gives members a voting right. The problem is 
that member representatives (e.g. NF presidents) are often guided by personal interests, which do not 
necessarily translate the interests of those they are supposed to represent (e.g. athletes). In the worst 
case, they result in corruption (e.g. vote buying, favouritism). 
 
  
                                                        
134 European Commission. (2014). Responsible self-regulation. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2014/EN/3-2014-7378-EN-F1-1-ANNEX-1.Pdf 
135 International Olympic Committee. United Nations recognises autonomy of sport. Retrieved from 
https://www.olympic.org/news/historic-milestone-united-nations-recognises-autonomy-of-sport  
136 Inside the Games. (2017). Reputational damage to Olympic Movement. Retrieved from 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1056254/ioc-members-raise-concerns-over-reputational-damage-to-
olympic-movement-following-corruption-allegations  
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6.5.1.13. Major sport events – the question of saturation and consumption 
A study of ASOIF demonstrates the increase of major sport events over the last four decades: 
while in 1975 the 25 summer Olympic IFs organised 160 international sport events, this number had 
grown to 2162 by 2013. Starting in the 1960s, and particularly gathering speed since the 1980s, the 
economy of and around major sport events has been constantly rising, mainly because of broadcasting 
rights. For the 1960 Olympic Games, the IOC sold the broadcasting rights for USD 3.2 million. 
Representing a multiplying factor of 312 over a period of 48 years, the broadcasting rights for the 
2008 Olympic Games were sold for nearly USD 1 billion! And the American network NBC paid USD 
7.5 billion for the Olympic rights until 2032. Another example is FIFA: over a period of 20 years, 
revenues from broadcasting rights for the FIFA World Cup have multiplied by 22. And “global 
broadcasting rights for the Tour de France probably amount to about EUR 50 million a year” (Andreff, 
2016). Several other major sport events (and with them the event owners) have reached levels of 
profitability that exemplify the exponential growth of revenues, especially through the selling of 
broadcasting rights. It is therefore little surprising that big and small IFs seek to expand their event 
portfolio and reach out to new markets to stage their events. Nowadays, sport events constitute in fact 
the heart of IFs’ economic model (Bayle, 2015).  
However, a recent study of PwC (PwC’s Sports Survey 2017) reveals that the sporting economy 
may have reached its peak and be actually on the decline. The study is based on an online 
questionnaire that was completed by 189 different stakeholders in the sports industry (e.g. IFs, clubs 
and leagues, broadcasters and media companies). It appears that broadcasters in particular were very 
pessimistic regarding the future growth of sport. For them, OTT solutions represent the biggest threat. 
OTT stands for over-the-top content, meaning content (e.g. audio, video) that is transmitted through 
the Internet. IFs therefore have to adapt to possible evolutions of viewer behaviours. Related herewith, 
the bargaining of broadcasting rights may change considerably in the future if the content is accessible 
for free on the Internet. At the same time, OTT solutions also offer a number of possible advantages. 
First, “the traditional model of rights payments to sport might now extend to other possibilities, such 
as revenue sharing approach” (Turner, 2017, p. 53). Second, smaller and so far less mediatised sports 
have the possibility to reach out to a wider audience through OTT (e.g. YouTube channels). On the 
other hand, the latter further increases the number of sport events in media. Additional questions to 
look into in the future should therefore be: Is there a point of market saturation for major sport 
events? Will fans get tired of an overabundance of sport events and turn to other pastimes? 
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6.5.1.14. Growing uncertainty of event outcomes: the question of event attractiveness and the 
need to diversify revenues 
Increasing reluctance of host cities to organise the Olympic Games, previously a highly 
competitive event, is interpreted by several as the looming decline of the Games’ attractiveness. After 
the withdrawals of Boston, Hamburg and Rome, Budapest was the fourth candidate to pull out of the 
2024 summer Olympic Games bidding. The main opposition comes from the population, the 
taxpayers, who fear the gargantuan costs of organising the Games. In the case of Boston, the powerful 
opposition campaign argued that “the economic benefits touted by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) were overstated”137. Withdrawals from the 2022 winter Olympic Games (Oslo, 
Stockholm, Lviv and Krakow) seem to confirm a growing opposition. And the estimated USD 35-40 
million debt of the Rio Olympics organisers and sport venues lying in ruins one year after the Games 
is only nourishing the opposition. Other sports such as cycling seem to struggle as well to find 
organisers. The bid for organising the 2016 UCI Road World Championships, the federation’s cash 
cow event, went to the highest bidder at that time: Qatar. A former UCI sports director sees the risk in 
the event now being over-priced and less attractive (because less affordable) for organisers: “It will be 
very difficult in the future to maintain similar revenue streams” (UCI, C1, free translation from 
French). In times of declining bids and increasing event costs, IFs whose economic model evolves 
around one major event are particularly vulnerable. Declining revenues in this event or lack of bids 
risk to unbalance the IF’s entire economic model. 
Research on financial capacity in NPOs (e.g. Carroll & Stater, 2009; Chang & Tuckman, 1994; 
Froelich, 1999) and NSOs (e.g. Millar & Doherty, 2016; Vos et al., 2011; Wicker et al., 2013) evince 
that environmental uncertainty and uncertainty of outcomes increasingly push these organisations to 
adopt a strategy of revenue diversification. Revenue diversification in NPOs is not new. In nonprofit 
literature, revenue diversification has already been considered for a long time as being essential for 
NPOs to carry out their mission: “Nonprofit organizations must rely on a variety of activities and 
resource providers to support their mission related work” (Froelich, 1999, p. 247). Meanwhile, 
revenues from commercial activities are often considered as controversial (Tuckman, 1998; Weisbrod, 
1998) due to a possible mission dilution and drift. As mentioned before, IFs increasingly rely on 
revenues from the commercialisation of their events. The FIFA World Cup alone represented 83% of 
FIFA’s overall income between 2012-2015. And Publication III demonstrated that out of 22 Olympic 
IFs analysed, 13 generated 50% or more through their events. However, as PwC’s Sports Survey 2017 
emphasises, people involved in the sports industry predict that, in the near future, sport might become 
one of the most disruptive industries.  
To further explore the question of growing uncertainty of event outcomes and revenue 
diversification, the analysis should not be restricted to pressures from external partners only but 
                                                        
137 The Guardian. (2015). Hosting the Olympics. Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/shortcuts/2015/nov/30/hosting-olympics-hamburg-drop-out-2024-games  
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include IFs’ general environmental context instead. For future studies, it would be interesting to 
analyse whether IFs with low levels of event commercialisation are affected in the same way as IFs 
with high levels of commercialisation. I hypothesise that less commercialised IFs naturally tend to 
adopt revenue diversification strategies. However, IFs’ possibilities for revenue diversification remain 
very small. An increase in service fees may, for instance, entail a crowding out effect of members who 
are either unwilling or unable to pay higher fees. So far, the biggest potential for revenue 
diversification still lies in IFs’ sporting events, either by increasing the attractiveness of their flagship 
event or by diversifying their event portfolio in order to have several smaller but profitable events 
(many IF-events are not profitable and cross-subsidised by the IF’s flagship event). Based on above 
reflections, the following question emerges: Which strategies do IFs adopt to diversify their revenues? 
 
6.5.2. Sector bending and mission drift 
In light of numerous governance issues in some IFs and increasing commercialisation across 
IFs, I decided to elaborate a bit more on the question of IFs’ possible sector bending and mission drift. 
Considering mission drift as one of the major challenges IFs have to face, this section mainly 
discusses possible indicators for IFs’ mission drift and suggests some useful starting points to further 
investigate the topic. There is little doubt that sport has reached the status of being a global 
entertainment industry, generating important economic incomes and assembling millions of people. 
Seemingly regardless of this evolution, the way IFs like to present themselves is to emphasise first and 
foremost their importance as carriers of social and educational values, and their role as facilitators of 
peace and development. Since the late 1990s, numerous scandals (see 3.1.2.2) have raised outrage and 
scepticism among regulators and the general public (media, fans, sponsors). IFs’ evolution and their 
growing focus on (sometimes extremely) profitable activities while continuing to enjoy and claim 
nonprofit status are worth taking a closer look. Is there a conflict in IFs generating enormous amounts 
of profits? How should the profits be best invested? And who decides on it? To start with, Table 26 
provides examples of nine IFs of different size and their expenditure characteristics. One of the 
patterns this table enables to uncover is that important parts of IFs’ expenditure seem to be absorbed 
by administrative costs. IFs with very high revenues (here: FIFA and ICC) constitute the only 
exceptions. Conversely, IFs with high revenues invest heavily into events. Based on these 
observations, the questions of IFs’ administrative size and level of event commercialisation are 
expected to play a crucial role in federations’ profit redistribution patterns. Overall, most IFs can be 
classified as small or medium-sized enterprises according to the classification of the EU138. Large IFs 
such as FIFA are exceptions.  
 
 
                                                        
138 Medium-sized: headcount <250 & turnover ≤ EUR 50 millions; small: headcount <50 & turnover ≤ EUR 10 
millions; micro: headcount <10 & turnover ≤ EUR 2 millions. 
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Table 26. Characteristics of in nine IFs 
IF Staff size Development  Administration  Events Revenue (period) 
FIAS139 <10 0% 49% 45% USD 7.5m (2012-2015) 
FIFA >450 18% 18% 53% USD 5.8b (2012-2015) 
FIH about 35 15% 54% 21.5% USD 31m (2013-2015) 
FIS about 60 25% 57% 18% USD 122m (2012-2015) 
ICC140 - 1% 29% 70% USD 935m (2012-2015) 
IFA141 <10 25% 44% 23% USD 0.2m (2011-2014) 
IFMA142 <10 11% 40% 10% USD 3.1m (2013-2015) 
UCI about 80 12.5% 52% 25.5% USD 156m (2012-2015) 
WCF about 12 10% 71% 12% USD 29m (2012-2015) 
Note: numbers are based on the analysis of IFs’ financial statements for the period indicated. The currencies 
originally used (CHF and EUR) have been converted into USD based on the exchange rate of the 31 December 
2014/2015: 1 CHF on 31 December 2015 = 1.006361 USD; 1 EUR on 31 December 2014 = 0.812139 USD. 
Results are rounded up (≥5) or down (<5) to the nearest whole number. 
 
Since the Salt Lake City scandal and the Festina Affair, both emerging in 1998, studies on 
corruption (Jennings, 2011; Maennig, 2002), the IOC’s long-standing culture of bidding improperties 
(Dichter, 2016), doping (Hanstad, 2008; Laser, 2015), IFs’ general governance problems (Forster, 
2006; Geeraert, 2015b; Geeraert et al., 2014; Tomlinson, 2014) and reform strategies to solve these 
problems (Chappelet, 2011; Geeraert et al., 2015; MacAloon, 2011; Mason et al., 2006; Pielke, 2013) 
constitute the main research on IFs. The seemingly ever growing dimension of sport scandals is 
further emphasised through actions taken by public institutions (e.g. European Parliament: Anti-
corruption measures in EU-sports policy), reports established by non-governmental organisations (e.g. 
Transparency International: Global Corruption Report: Sport) and the organisation of international 
conferences on these issues (e.g. Play the Game). In order to give some impressions of the complex 
structures into which IFs have evolved since their creation, both in terms of individual and 
organisational logics, a brief glance at three scandals is provided: (1) the Salt Lake City bid scandal 
and (2) the Festina affair as the dominant sporting scandals in 1998 and which, in a sense, marked the 
beginning of the era of investigations into IFs’ irregularities; and (3) Volleygate, a less mediatised 
scandal about Ruben Acosta’s personal enrichment as FIVB president. 
 
  
                                                        
139 FIAS – Sambo International Federation 
140 ICC – International Cricket Council 
141 IFA – International Fistball Association 
142 IFMA – International Federation of Muaythai Amateur 
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Salt Lake City bid scandal (IOC) 
Allegations around the awarding of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games to Salt Lake City “were 
especially damaging for the IOC when it was publicized that several IOC members had received lavish 
gifts and favors in exchange for votes” (Mason et al., 2006, p. 53). To influence IOC votes for the Salt 
Lake City Candidature to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the Salt Lake City Candidature 
Committee allegedly offered cash payments, free medical care, real estate deals and other gifts that 
were accepted by about 30 IOC members. Though accepting gifts was considered unethical, none of 
the persons involved was actually convicted. However, the scandal plunged the IOC into a deep 
governance and image crisis. By entering the search terms *Olympics and *corruption into the 
database Lexis-Nexis, Mason et al. (2006) found more than 600 newspaper articles published in 2001 
alone. It seems that the public opinion, media and the pressure from sponsors forced the IOC to carry 
out far-reaching governance reforms, notably regarding accountability. Ten years after the IOC’s 
reform, Chappelet (2011) uses the Global Accountability Framework, a four-dimensional model 
including transparency, participation, evaluation and complaints and response, to analyse the actual 
implementation of the accountability concept at the IOC. Even though the IOC’s accountability has 
progressed since 1999, Chappelet points out some persisting shortcomings such as the lack of 
independence of the Ethics Commission143 and of a “fully fledged monitoring organisation” (p. 328). 
In 2008, One World Trust, a British independent think tank, even concluded that the IOC was the least 
transparent organisation among 30 international organisations analysed in the report. 
 
Festina Affair (UCI) 
Corruption scandals such as the Salt Lake City bid scandal reveal a profound agency problem in terms 
of conflicts of interest (Mason et al., 2006), a concern that, in fact, many NPOs encounter. Doping can 
be regarded as a specific type of corruption (Kihl et al., 2016), most often related to high performance 
sports, even though the estimated number of unrecorded cases in amateur sports is expected to be 
fairly high (Kayser, Mauron, & Miah, 2007). In 1998, the credibility of the UCI as cycling’s 
governing body was, for its part, shaken by the Festina doping affair. The affair resulted in an 
atmosphere of general suspicion against the UCI as the recognised author, guardian and executive 
power of international cycling rules. The scandal unfolded thanks to a routine border check of a 
Festina team car at the border of Belgium and France during the 1998 Tour de France. Large amounts 
of performance enhancing drugs were seized. Riders protested against inspections of team cars and 
hotel rooms. The incident led to a number of doping investigations in cycling teams, entailing several 
doping confessions from riders and revealing deeply entrenched doping practices across the peloton. 
Since the Festina Affair and other doping cases, cycling and the UCI suffer from severe and repeated 
                                                        
143 The statutes of the Ethics Commission stipulate that a majority of its 8 members has to be from outside the 
IOC in order to be truly independent. This has not been respected since 1999 (J.-L. Chappelet, 2011). At the 
beginning of 2017, the composition is 4:4 (source: https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission). 
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damages to their image based on a general suspicion of systematic doping among cyclists (Dresen, 
Kläber, & Dietz, 2014), critics of insufficient mechanics of doping prevention (Hill, 2016) and 
questions about the effectiveness of sanctions inflicted by the UCI (2015 CIRC Report).  
 
Volleygate (FIVB) 
The leadership of Ruben Acosta at the FIVB (1984-2008) is perhaps more a story of individual greed 
than of systematic corruption. The Oxford Dictionary defines corruption as “Dishonest or fraudulent 
conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery144” and greed as “Intense and selfish desire for 
something, especially wealth, power, or food145”. His position as autocratic leader eventually allowed 
Acosta to run the FIVB as a family company and to extend his influence at a maximum to his own 
advantage. Between 2000 and 2008, and thanks to a rule passed by the FIVB Congress and “by which 
FIVB representatives could cash in 10 percent of contracts that they signed on behalf of the FIVB146”, 
the personal commissions Acosta took on FIVB contracts amounted to USD 33 million. This 
represents more than USD 4 million per year between 2000 and 2008. The rule was actually all to 
Acosta’s favour as, according to the FIVB statutes back then, only the FIVB president was enacted to 
sign contracts on behalf of the FIVB. As the FIVB never accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) throughout the reign of Acosta, the FIVB president could not be judged 
by it during his presidency.  
 
Many more (and more recent) examples could be cited here such as the FIFAgate or the 
embroilment of IAAF in alleged kickbacks related to bidding processes and bribed governance 
elections. The FIFAgate is probably one of the most emblematic IF-scandals in recent times as it 
uncovered a remarkably engrained reluctance to profound and necessary change despite repeated 
problems of mismanagement. Previous scandals at FIFA include Mohamed Bin Haman’s ban from all 
international and national football activities for having bribed FIFA officials in return for their votes 
for Qatar to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup (2011), as well as the “incomplete and erroneous147” 
publishing of Garcia’s report into FIFA’s corruption allegations (2014). The FIFAgate imploded in 
May 2015 as a result of exposed corruption practices within FIFA such as “racketeering, wire fraud 
and money laundering conspiracies148” (US Department of Justice, 3 December 2015) revealed by 
whistle-blowers, media investigations and police inquiries. It culminated in the arrest of nine high 
                                                        
144 Oxford Dictionaries. (2017). Definition: corruption. Retrieved from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/corruption  
145 Oxford Dictionaries. (2017). Definition: greed. Retrieved from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/greed  
146 Play the Games. (2014). On the FIVB scandal. Retrieved from 
http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/FAV-FIVB-summary_by_Play_the_Game-2014update.pdf 
147 The Guardian. (2014). FIFA ethics report. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/nov/13/farce-fifa-michael-garcia-erroneous-ethics-report  
148 The United States Department of Justice. (2015). FIFAgate. Retrieved from 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption  
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FIFA officials and five affiliated corporate executives during and in the aftermath of the FIFA 
Congress in May 2015.  
The above examples all relate to IFs that have strongly commercialised since the 1980s. It 
would, however, be too simplistic to conclude that commercial IFs are more likely to develop 
governance issues. ASOIF is currently carrying out a governance assessment of the 28 summer 
Olympic IFs (one part as self-assessment, one part as assessment through ASOIF). From this 
governance assessment, two remarkable findings stick out: first, the assessment reveals that FIFA, 
despite repeated governance scandals, achieved the highest score in terms of practices of good 
governance; second, the assessment reveals that, of the 28 IFs, only two have assessed themselves less 
positively than ASOIF (while AIBA largely overrated itself). These two IFs are FIH and FISA. Taking 
first a closer look at the case of FIFA, the essential question, and which has already been raised in 
Publication III is: to what extent can formally adopted practices of good governance capture the 
organisation-internal accuracy with which these practices are being executed? The comment of a 
former FIFA staff member from the legal department, saying that it is impossible for an external 
auditor to uncover improper private individual transactions, shows that formal practices are already 
good but perhaps not sufficient. This may actually hold true for any other nonprofit or for-profit 
organisation. However, two things may complicate the situation in IFs: change of mind-set, for 
example through education, and sanctions. It is very likely that improper mechanisms that are being 
revealed through investigations have existed for decades in IFs and/or are even part of the IF’s culture. 
On the other hand, some smaller IFs scored very low in ASOIF’s governance assessment. What if the 
financial sums involved in these IFs are just too small for anyone to make a scandal of it? And in case 
the IF one day generates large revenues and the mechanisms continue, perhaps there will be a scandal? 
At the moment, IFs also know that a breach of IOC guidelines has barely any consequence. Some 
general challenges emerge:  
 
• Changing the mind-set of long-standing officials to make them apply practices of good 
governance.  
• Form/sensitise future officials through education regarding good governance.  
• Determine to what extent IFs’ autonomy and lack of sanctions impede the efficient application 
of practices of good governance. 
 
The cases of FIH and FISA reveal a particularly interesting behaviour. These two federations 
assessed themselves less positively than ASOIF did. What triggers a federation’s high expectations 
and a (overly) critical approach towards its own standards of good governance? A possible 
explanation can be found in literature: Amis et al. (2002) argue that transition is more easily accepted 
if the organisation is composed of members whose values are consistent with the prescribed changes. 
The authors observed that successful change “will depend on how closely the values held by 
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individuals within an organization coincide with the changes being proposed” (p. 461). According to 
them, a key role in leading change lies with the federation’s most influential members. Based on Amis 
et al.’s findings, one would assume that, if the individuals’ commitment remains the same, FIH and 
FISA are likely to improve their governance practices quickly. On the other hand, in IFs where 
governance issues persist, it is likely that the prescribed changes meet resistance among influential 
members. This resistance either slows down the change process and reform or even results in 
organisational inertia. As a recommendation to managers of these IFs, I refer to Burns (2004): “An 
important managerial task will, therefore, be to identify sources of inertia, assess the skill mix within 
their organisation and, most of all, consider whether their own managerial attitudes and styles are 
appropriate” (p. 304). 
 
The above-described challenges raise the question of mission drift and sector bending as a 
result of IFs’ increasing commercialisation. As mentioned before, several scholars note that revenue 
diversification through commercial activities is all but new in the nonprofit sector (Child, 2010; Dees 
& Anderson, 2003; Froelich, 1999). With growing environmental complexity and financial uncertainty 
due to cutbacks in governmental funding, revenue diversification constitutes in fact a useful strategy 
for NPOs to stabilise financial revenues that are necessary for them to carry out their mission. 
Simultaneously, for-profits also entered the nonprofit sector by providing services that were 
traditionally covered by non-profits. Dees and Anderson (2003) refer to this evolution as boundary-
blurring of traditional sectors or sector-bending: “Sector-bending refers to a wide variety of 
approaches, activities, and relationships that are blurring the distinctions between nonprofit and for-
profit organizations, either because they are behaving more similarly, operating in the same realms, or 
both” (p. 16). If it is the NPO behaving more similarly to for-profits, scholars also speak of business-
like behaviour (Cornforth, 2003; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Maier et al., 2014). As already mentioned in 
Publication III, Dees and Anderson (2003) define sector-bending around four broad dimensions: 
imitation (i.e. growing adoption of strategies, concepts and practices of the business-world), 
interaction (i.e. increasing interaction between nonprofits and for-profits as competitors, contractors 
and collaborators), intermingling (i.e. occurrence of hybrid organisations, meaning with both non-
profit and for-profit components) and industry creation (i.e. new sector-blurring fields of practice). 
Though NPOs’ mingling with commercial activities generally raises many concerns (Anheier, 2000; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Weisbrod, 1998), Dees and Anderson also put forward potential benefits. 
Three of them are explained and challenged hereafter:  
 
• More effective and appropriate resource allocation: for instance, for-profits serving those 
willing and able to pay, and NPOs focusing on those needing philanthropic subsidies; 
commercial revenues enable NPOs to have a greater pool to provide social goods; use of 
appropriate business tools may improve NPOs’ effectiveness.  
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Indeed, IFs generally argue that high commercial revenues benefit their wider system. However, as 
already mentioned earlier, FIFA claims to invest 71% of its expenses into football, 53% of which are, 
however, directly reinvested into the FIFA events and only 18% into development projects. One may 
ask whether more of the revenue could/should be distributed to the members and development 
projects? And if so, why is it currently not the case? Of course, the revenue distribution should not put 
the IF’s economic model at risk. The question is more whether a federation like FIFA really distributes 
a maximum to its members and to the development of its sport.  
 
• More sustainable solutions: for instance, seeking systemic and sustainable solutions; use of 
business tools to achieve goals.  
 
A potential weakness in this argument relates to the risk of social goals being gradually replaced by 
business goals. For instance, the structure and functioning of IFs with highly commercial events 
increasingly resembles business organisations. As a result of IFs’ commercialisation, departments such 
as marketing, communication and events have grown substantially. Compared to this, the department 
of development remains relatively small, if it exists at all, and the concept of corporate social 
responsibility is still fairly unknown to or being ignored by IFs. 
 
• Increased accountability: for instance, increased accountability through market discipline and 
customer relationship.  
 
Voices claiming more transparency and accountability from IFs do indeed get louder. However, 
changes to IFs’ current nonprofit status, which enables them to enjoy considerable legal freedom and 
flexibility, seem to meet more opposition than consent (see the three motions rejected by the Swiss 
National Council in May 2017). Being NPOs, the rules of the market do not fully apply to IFs and 
therefore have no influence on increasing their accountability. 
 
Besides potential benefits of NPOs’ sector-bending, Dees and Anderson (2003) also note that the 
merging of social goals and business activities harbours certain risks. One risk is a decline of social 
values through the use of market mechanisms, including mission drift. The term mission drift echoes 
the concern of NPOs losing sight of their social mission, their existential purpose and values inherent 
to this purpose when giving priority to commercial activities (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Referring to 
Weisbrod (2004), Jones (2007) defines mission drift as “a diversion of time, energy and money away 
from a nonprofit’s mission” (p. 300). While it is legitimate for NPOs to turn towards commercial 
activities in order to generate revenues that allow them to carry out their mission, individuals’ diverse 
and sometimes conflicting personal interests may enforce a mission drift. To avoid mission drift, 
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NPOs’ governance should monitor commercial revenues as well as the relationship between resources 
that are invested into social activities and those that are invested in commercial ones. Taking the 
example of FIFA, one may question whether the proportion of 53% investment into FIFA events 
(2012-2015) against 18% investment into development can be considered as a fair redistribution of 
revenues. The UCI is another example: by charging higher fees for teams and event organisers with 
the purpose of increasing revenues (see Publication IV), the federation negatively contributed to the 
precarious situation of the main sporting actors, namely athletes and event organisers. A final question 
therefore emerges: How can IFs’ alignment with the mission that has been entrusted to them by their 
members be measured?  
 
 
6.6. Contributions and limitations 
This thesis pursues the goal of immersing into IFs as organisations that attract a lot of media 
attention but have, so far, mainly been investigated under the aspects of governance issues. For this 
purpose, the thesis focuses on the concepts of and interrelationship between professionalisation and 
commercialisation in the context of IFs. Investigating concepts of professionalisation and 
commercialisation, the thesis makes useful contributions to the sport management literature. Besides 
having raised three research questions and provided answers to them, the thesis further proposes a 
typology (though undoubtedly a typology in its infancy), develops managerial implications of 
professionalisation and commercialisation in IFs as well as several thought-provoking questions. 
Findings can be organised around three broad contributions: empirical contributions, theoretical 
contributions, and managerial contributions. 
 
6.6.1. Empirical contributions 
While studies on NSOs have analysed and compared fairly large numbers of cases, only a handful 
of IFs have been in the focus of separate scholarly studies. Table 27 exemplifies the striking difference 
in terms of sample size: 
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Table 27. Comparison of cases analysed at national and international level 
National sport organisations International sport organisations 
Author(s) N° Author(s) N° 
Kikulis et al. (1992; 1995) 36 (Canada) Chappelet (2014) 1 (IOC) 
Amis et al. (2004b), 36 (Canada) Krieger (2016) 1 (IAAF) 
Hinings and Slack (1987) 36 (Canada) Tomlinson (2014) 1 (FIFA) 
Inglis (1997a) 41 (Canada) Forster (2006) 3 (FIFA, IOC, IAAF) 
Shilbury (2001) 28 (Australia) Pielke (2013) 1 (FIFA) 
Hoye (2003) 42 (Australia) Wagner (2010) 1 (UCI) 
Bayle and Madella (2002) 40 (France) Hanstad (2008) 1 (FIS) 
Theodoraki and Henry (1994) 34 (England) Phelps (2010) 1 (ITU) 
Winand (2010) 27 (Belgium)   
 
This comparison implies already that empirical evidence on IFs is very scarce (only five different 
international sport organisations figure in Table 27) and therefore does not allow for generalisation. As 
mentioned at several occasions, most of the international sport organisations listed above (with the 
exception of ITU) have been investigated in relation to specific governance scandals. This being said, 
the empirical contribution of this thesis and its publications is to have analysed a total of 22 IFs (six 
IFs in the Publication I, one in the Publication II, 22 in the Publication III, 18 briefly and four in detail 
in the Publication IV). The staff size of the analysed IFs varies greatly (<10 to >450), as do their 
revenues (annual revenues 2012-2015 between <CHF 10 million and USD 1.5 billion). This represents 
an important difference to most studies on IFs that focus mainly on some prominent and dominant IFs. 
By systematically gathering extensive data on several IFs regarding causes and consequences of 
professionalization as well as conditions of commercialisation, this thesis allows to analyse 
commonalities, compare IFs and draw first data-driven conclusions. Furthermore, rather than adding 
another study on mediatised governance issues, this thesis focuses on the concepts of 
professionalisation and commercialisation and provides information on IFs’ structure (e.g. staff size), 
and functioning (e.g. processes, strategy, economic model). 
 
6.6.2. Theoretical contributions 
The main theoretical contributions of this thesis are the conceptualisation of professionalisation 
and commercialisation in the context of IFs, the use of institutional theories to explain IFs’ 
transformation and the attempt to distinguish ideal types based on findings from the four publications.  
 
Conceptualisation: The concepts of professionalisation and commercialisation are central to current 
transformation processes in IFs. Though various aspects of professionalisation have been analysed in 
the context of NSOs, attempts to conceptualise professionalisation are fairly recent (e.g. Dowling et 
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al., 2014; Nagel et al., 2015; Ruoranen et al., 2016). Meanwhile, investigations of IFs’ 
professionalisation have been largely ignored despite evident evolutions in this direction. 
Commercialisation, on the other hand, has received little academic attention in both national and 
international sport organisations. And yet, several scholars (and the media) easily link IFs’ governance 
scandals to their commercialisation. In light of a lack of empirical data and yet an obvious influence of 
professionalisation and commercialisation processes on IFs’ current structure and functioning, 
concepts, empirical findings related to these concepts, as well as further research questions that 
emerged from the inductive research design of this thesis were discussed. The conceptualisation of 
IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation therefore constitutes a first theoretical contribution. 
Both concepts have been discussed extensively in the literature review and in Publications I and III. In 
addition, considerations on the interrelationship between professionalisation and commercialisation in 
IFs have been provided in the discussion (6.3). 
 
Institutional theories: This thesis strongly leans on the application of institutional theories and 
especially on new institutionalism. Findings clearly show that IFs yield to institutional pressures, 
notably when this enables them to improve their (damaged) image and increase their legitimacy in the 
eyes of regulators and the general public. The risk is, however, that reforms/changes are a mere façade 
behind which processes (and governance issues related herewith) remain untackled. Such a façade 
allows IFs to divert the critical eye on them. However, in light of IFs continuing to enjoy “responsible 
self-regulation” (e.g. great legal freedom and relatively little pressure for proper accountability) while 
the list of governance scandals gets longer, the question of the effectiveness of institutional pressures 
remains to be answered. Drawing on the DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of isomorphism, 
Publication I demonstrates that external (and often coercive) pressures from regulators (e.g. public 
authorities) and the general public (e.g. media) are likely to have an accelerating effect, while change 
as a result of internal factors, mimetic and normative pressures (e.g. management practices, 
organisational culture, leadership) follows a slower pace. Leadership appears to have both an 
accelerating and a decelerating effect. For instance, a change in president or general director is often 
accompanied by far-reaching changes, especially if there was external pressure for a change in 
leadership (e.g. FIFA, UCI, UWW). For successful change to occur, a systematic and well-thought out 
approach is required. As Gill (2002) notes, comprehensive change “must be well managed – it must be 
planned, organised, directed and controlled – it also requires effective leadership to introduce change 
successfully: it is leadership that makes the difference” (p. 307). Findings from Publication I further 
suggest that, in the long term, the accelerating effect of a new leader slows down and gives way to a 
slower phase of systematically managed change.  
 
Ideal types: Based on findings from the four publications, three dimensions related to IFs’ structure 
and four related to their strategy were used to see whether particular characteristics can be 
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distinguished and whether combinations of characteristics reveal the emergence of ideal types. The 
dimensions related to structure are: size, commercialisation and solidarity/redistribution model. The 
four dimensions related to strategy are: image/reputation, communication, accountability and strategic 
plan. Constituting only a first attempt of classifying findings, I suggest four ideal types: the market 
dominator, the marginalised, the innovator, and the traditionalist. In line with Kikulis et al. (1992), 
who developed design archetypes for NSOs (Kitchen Table, Boardroom, Executive Office), a unitary 
view on professionalization and commercialisation would level variations between IFs. Referring to 
Miller and Friesen (1984), Kikulis et al. note in this regards: “the incentive for organizational analysis 
and specifically the analysis of change, is to look for patterns of reality in organizations around which 
to develop an understanding of the order that exists within the context of variety and complexity of 
organizations” (p. 344). The design archetypes developed by Kikulis for Olympic NFs could equally 
be applied to IFs. Many NFs receive important funding from their government. Though IFs generally 
do not receive governmental funding, many Olympic IFs depend on the Olympic revenue share. The 
strategic focus of many Olympic NFs is on performance sport as international sporting success in the 
form of medals is directly linked to government funding. Here as well, a parallel can be drawn with 
regard to Olympic IFs: Olympic IFs need success in the sense of popularity (e.g. spectator and viewer 
numbers, tickets sold, sponsorship deals, global spread of the sport) to stay on the Olympic program. 
As mentioned earlier, through a list of evaluation criteria the IOC establishes a ranking on the basis of 
which IFs’ inclusion in the Olympic program is evaluated and their part of the Olympic revenue share 
is determined. The ideal types suggested in this thesis propose a continuation of the design archetypes 
of Kikulis. All Olympic IFs analysed in this thesis do in fact show characteristics of the Executive 
Office. The question is rather: what comes after the Executive Office? And which structure/strategy 
patterns emerge or can be determined? The ideal types presented in section 6.4 are only a first attempt 
of classifying empirical findings. Nevertheless, they might constitute a possible starting point to 
analyse dynamics of change in IFs.  
 
6.6.3. Managerial contributions 
Against the background of a fast changing and complex environment, the thesis provides 
numerous insights into the challenges and opportunities that IFs currently have to face: the uncovering 
of drivers of and barriers to IFs’ professionalisation through the comparison of several IFs may help 
raise sport managers’ awareness about triggering and hindering factors; concrete examples of and a 
deeper immersion into the leadership of several key actors may further enhance sport managers’ 
understanding of how sport organisations transformed from loose structures run by volunteers to 
become complex organisations that increasingly resemble business organizations; and based on 
findings from the four publications, 15 managerial implications are briefly discussed: (1) 
heterogeneity, (2) growing number, diversity and expectations of stakeholders, (3) need for efficient 
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and ethical leadership, (4) growing pressure to commercialise, (5) corporate management practices, (6) 
reluctance to change, (7) political governance, (8) development of and through sport, (9) social media 
use, (10) conflicting rationales (goal ambiguity vs. business objectives), (11) increase of governance 
issues, (12) lack of an appropriate legal frame, (13) major sport events, (14) growing uncertainty of 
event outcomes and (15) sector bending and mission drift. Though findings show overlaps with 
general NPO-literature and studies on NSOs, they only represent a first attempt of data collection and 
data analysis with regard to IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation. Therefore, no 
recommendations have been established.  
A final observation, which perhaps did not receive sufficient attention in this thesis, emerged 
from interviews: in terms of human resource management (HRM), IFs generally do not use specific 
strategies to attract, further and/o maintain employees. There seems in fact to be no need for IFs to 
develop a strategy to attract employees as they receive enough applications (see earlier quote on the 
FIH receiving minimum 250 applications for each open position with applicants being often over-
qualified). Because of the images of sport that are conveyed by the media, sport federations attract 
especially younger persons. However, the staff turnover in IFs appears to be fairly high149. One of the 
reasons might be lacking prospects regarding individuals’ professional development and insufficient 
incentives to maintain employees. Possible explanations are: firstly, IFs are mainly conducting 
administrative tasks and these tasks change only slowly if any, hence allowing little leeway for 
development; secondly, and maybe unlike other professions and organisations, there seems to be no 
real career plan in sport administration and only few IFs support employee training; and thirdly, for 
many IFs human resource management and employees’ development and training is not a priority, 
also because employees are relatively easy to replace. Meanwhile, a tendency towards an increasing 
need for very specialised workforce emerges as the result of two evolutions: IFs’ growing mingling 
with for-profit organisations and their expectations; and the replacement of external consultants 
through the hiring of in-house experts (e.g. social media, business development and strategy). It will 
be interesting to see how the increasing overlaps between IFs, business organisations and business 
practices will impact IFs’ human resource management in the future. The high staff turnover could 
further be used as a useful indicator for staff satisfaction. In terms of HRM, questions of interest for 
future research could be: 
 
 
• What are the characteristics of employees in IFs compared to those working in private or 
public organisations? 
• What attracts IFs’ employees? Is it mainly the sport or is it because of specific values? 
                                                        
149 “They [AIBA] have a turnover as I have never seen it before, not even outside the sports movement. The 
person responsible for anti-doping may change four times in one year with absolutely no knowledge transfer” 
(WADA, A4, free translation from French). 
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• What will be the consequences of educational paths dedicated specifically to sport 
professions on IFs’ future development and change? 
 
 
6.6.4. Limitations 
Throughout the four articles, specific research limitations were addressed. However, before 
turning to the specific limitations, some particular challenges and one general limitation are worth 
mentioning. The first challenge was the general lack of empirical findings on IFs from previous 
studies. While studies on NSOs are abundant, relatively few studies exist on IFs. Of these, most apply 
a very restricted focus on governance issues in a handful of very prominent and dominant IFs (and the 
IOC). The lack of existing studies on IFs made it difficult to compare with and build on findings from 
previous research (e.g. confirm, reject). The second challenge was the difficulty to access IFs and 
information on them. IFs are known to be very closed systems and often do not like to be investigated. 
Taking up contact with IFs and getting through to the right persons is often very difficult, unless 
researchers already have a contact in the IF. A limitation that applies to all four publications is that 
only analysed Olympic IFs were analysed. The choice stems from the fact that information on 
Olympic IFs (especially financial information) is easier to access. For future studies it might be useful 
to extend the scope to non-Olympic IFs. This would allow researcher to control whether first findings 
can be further consolidated and whether new elements that have either not been observed so far or not 
been sufficiently treated emerge. Though non-Olympic IFs may compete with other IFs for inclusion 
on the Olympic program, they do not receive Olympic revenue. They are therefore expected to 
develop different strategies compared to Olympic IFs (e.g. financial resources). Also related to the 
question of accessibility is the choice of IFs for in-depth case studies. All IFs in which interviews were 
conducted are based in Switzerland. The question of concrete impacts of regulatory constraints on IFs 
has only been broached through isolated examples in the general context. It becomes, however, 
evident that IFs enjoy extensive legal freedom and fiscal advantages in Switzerland. The closeness to 
the Olympic movement, synergies between IFs and the stable social, political and economic 
environment are good arguments for settling in Switzerland. A broader analysis including IFs outside 
Switzerland might answer the question of the motives, advantages and disadvantages for IFs to have 
their headquarters in a specific country. In the following, main limitations emphasised in the four 
publications are briefly summarised. 
 
• Publication I: Findings of the article only provide a simplified picture of major drivers. They 
do not reflect the detailed analyses of IF-specific dynamics and intensity of causes. To further 
investigate the intensity of drivers for and barriers to IFs’ professionalisation, a purposive 
selection of IFs for single cases studies might be useful. Criteria for a purposive selection 
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could be, for instance, size (staff headcount), winter/summer sport, team/individual sport, 
commercialisation and popularity. Also, the small sample size (n=6) does not allow for 
generalisation. 
• Publication II: Biographic studies such as this book chapter bear the risk of establishing a 
biased picture. We consciously tried to work with this risk by integrating opinions from 
various contemporaries. However, we cannot exclude that the picture remains biased to some 
degree.  
• Publication III: A first limitation of this article concerns the period of investigation for which 
data were collected. In fact, the periods of investigation for the outcome and the conditions are 
not fully congruent. While the outcome is backward looking (2010-2013 and 2012-2015), the 
conditions are based on recent data (2015-2017). Lacking access to information before the 
year 2015, while at the same needing the last completed Olympic cycle as financial time 
frame, another setup was not possible. A longitudinal study (e.g. annual collection of specific 
information) could remedy this situation. And second, the csQCA approach masks finer 
distinctions because of its dichotomous nature. The application of a fuzzy-set QCA represents 
a possible solution.  
• Publication IV: Finally, as in the case of Publication I, findings from this book chapter do not 
allow for generalisation and only represent a first exploratory approach. For a more solid 
classification, the analytical model should be applied to a larger sample. 
 
Beyond the limitations encountered through the four publications, more general limitations to the 
overall thesis are worth mentioning. Regarding IFs’ professionalisation and commercialisation, the 
thesis focuses only on the perception and experiences of individuals from within the sport movement. 
No interviews were conducted with regulators, business partners (e.g. sponsors), fans or random 
persons unrelated to sport. However, in comparison with other organisations, IFs undeniably reveal 
some very obvious characteristics, which most strike people who have worked outside sport before. 
The example of interviewees from the FIH and WADA, who have both previously worked outside the 
sport movement, reveal that a larger investigation could be of interest.  
 
• “Another thing I’m surprised about is how small they [IFs] are. What small businesses they 
are. You can start a Start-up, and I did a Start-up business, and I have as many people working 
there within two years as there are here. So how comes sport federations are so small?” (FIH, 
B2) 
•  “What surprised me a lot is the small size and small structure that most international 
federations have. […] Some of these very small structures govern huge sports”. (WADA, A4, 
free translation from French) 
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In line with the weak embedding of IFs into a larger organisational and social context, a 
comparison of IFs with organisations from other fields (e.g. health, education, children and youth) 
constitutes an interesting research approach. Such a comparison might uncover the extent to which IFs 
differ from or resemble other public and private organisations. Furthermore, little evidence based on 
observation was gathered for this thesis. The observations that do exist mainly stem from the 
candidates’ past experience in one of the analysed IFs. To mitigate issues of bias, particularly strong 
statements (positive or negative) were double-checked whenever possible (e.g. by consulting further 
documents). Apart from these observations, the study mainly relies on evidence from interviewees and 
documents. For future studies, it might be useful for researchers to seek deeper immersion into IFs 
(e.g. attending meetings) in order to see first-hand the mechanisms that are at work within the 
organisation. And finally, additional variables to look at and that were not in the initial focus of this 
study but emerged as interesting starting points for future studies are: 
 
• Conflict management (e.g. between board members, board members and staff, staff members), 
which is important to enhance organisational learning and effectiveness. 
• Innovation (e.g. creativity, capacity to generate and foster innovative ideas), which enables IFs 
to create and sustain a competitive advantage and to adapt to a continuously changing and 
challenging environment. 
• Socio-educational background of both professional staff and board members across several 
IFs, which allows researchers to identify general trends. 
• Factors of motivation (e.g. employees’ and board members’ work satisfaction, incentives), 
which need to be taken more into consideration by IFs’ human resource management if they 
want to put an end to high turnover and knowledge drain.  
• Performance measurement as a means to analyse whether IFs prioritise mission fulfilment 
(e.g. development of and through sport, profit redistribution to members) rather than making 
financial profits that do not necessarily serve the IF’s mission. 
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7. Conclusion and future research 
 
Focusing on international sport federations (IFs), the aim of this thesis was to define and analyse 
the concepts of professionalization and commercialisation as main drivers in their transformation over 
the past three decades, as well as the interrelationship between these two concepts. Compared to 
national sport organisations (NSOs), relatively little empirical and systematic research exists on IFs. 
This comes a bit as a surprise as international sport and IFs as their governing bodies are extremely 
mediatised. By focusing primarily on governance issues in a handful of dominant and prominent 
international sport organisations (e.g. IOC, FIFA, IAAF, UCI), previous studies do not allow for a 
more comprehensive understanding of IFs’ structure and functioning and their evolution over time. 
Drawing conclusions from a handful of IFs and assuming that these hold true for some 92 IFs is 
neither empirically convincing, nor is it doing justice to the IFs that have not been analysed. In light of 
these research gaps and the complexity of both IFs’ structure and transformations, this thesis and its 
four constituting publications should be considered as an exploratory approach. A lot remains to be 
done if we want to understand IFs’ mechanisms and evolution and provide assistance to the challenges 
they face. Based on the findings of this thesis, I cannot claim to have produced concrete solutions. 
Nevertheless, by addressing some questions and raising new, sometimes critical and thought-
provoking ones, this thesis seeks to encourage further research and discussions on a topic that is far 
from being sufficiently investigated and grasped. Understanding IFs’ functioning and transformations 
against the background of historical, economic, social and political influences is, however, crucial to 
lead change and reforms where they are needed. 
The structure of the thesis, including the arrangement of the four publications, is based on the 
conceptual framework of Nagel et al. (2015). The authors suggest analysing sport federations’ 
professionalisation from three dimensions and at three levels. The three dimensions are causes, forms 
and consequences of sport federations’ professionalisation, and the three levels are external level (e.g. 
government, business partners, media), the federation itself, and the federation’s internal level 
(federations’ members). In the first two publications, we focused on causes. While the first publication 
takes a broad approach to causes by investigating general drivers of and barriers to professionalisation 
based on six case studies, the second publication concentrates on one particular driver, which is 
“leadership”. As a specific form of IFs’ professionalisation, the concept of commercialisation 
constitutes the core of the third publication. Just as in the approach to causes of professionalisation, 
Publication IV elaborates on a specific element of IFs’ commercialisation, which is “sporting events”. 
Rather than speaking of consequences, managerial implications of IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation are broached in the discussion. 
In the introductory part of this thesis, IFs’ evolution from regulatory bodies run by volunteers to 
increasingly complex structures in the hands of paid professionals is briefly outlined. The questions 
that guided the analysis in this phase of research were: Why did IFs emerge in the first place? What 
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were their initial role and characteristics? How are IFs perceived today? What are their current role 
and characteristics? Before assessing IFs’ current structure and functioning, it seemed essential to first 
understand where IFs come from, at least broadly. A brief comparison of their structure and 
functioning in the past and today reveals that IFs have undergone important transformations. 
Surprisingly, and despite far-reaching changes to their structure (e.g. hiring of paid staff), activities 
(e.g. focus on sporting events) and revenue generation (e.g. commercialisation), IFs’ form, mission 
and legal frame have remained fairly unchanged. In line with Nagel et al. (2015), transformations in 
IFs appear to be the result of their adaptation to an increasingly complex environment (e.g. growing 
number of constituencies, legal frame), new and intricate challenges (e.g. growing workload and need 
for expertise) and opportunities (e.g. revenue generation through sporting events) resulting from it. In 
the discussion, the initial research questions and related findings are summarised and further 
discussed, followed by an analysis of the interrelationship between professionalisation and 
commercialisation. Findings could further be classified into strategy/structure patterns, resulting in the 
proposal of four ideal types. Overall, 15 managerial implications of IFs’ professionalisation and 
commercialisation were deduced from the four publications, further readings and reflections. 
Considering it as one of IFs’ major challenges, particular attention was paid to the risk of sector 
bending and mission drift. Overall, this thesis, limitations to it and additional aspects that emerged 
through them offer a rich basis for further research. Some of them are listed hereafter: 
 
• Extend the research scope to non-Olympic IFs 
• Analyse IFs with headquarters outside Switzerland and compare them with existing findings 
• Carry out single case studies of purposive samples based on existing findings 
• Compare IFs with organisations from other organisational fields 
• Analyse IFs’ innovation capacity 
• Analyse employees’ socio-educational background and motivations 
 
Besides aspects listed above, some additional and thought-provoking questions can be raised. 
These questions might equally serve as starting points for future research studies, and, in addition, 
challenge sport managers in their approach to certain topics. The questions can be classified into three 
broad areas: (1) mission, values and identity, (2) commercialisation and (3) control and regulation.  
 
Mission, values and identity: At several occasions, it was pointed out that, since their creation, the role 
and also the focus of IFs have changed considerably. Starting out as purely regulatory bodies (e.g. 
rules of the game, statutes), IFs gradually became event organisers (e.g. World Championships) with a 
social mission (e.g. development). Findings suggest that an increasing risk resides in the role and 
mission of IFs being undermined by profit-orientation and commercial activities. IFs tend to defend 
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commercial activities with the argument of reinvesting profits into services to their members. 
However, no study has yet analysed whether the redistributions model that IFs adopt are fair or not. 
Likewise, the hiring of businessmen from outside sport into key positions bears another risk, which is 
that IFs’ core values and traditions are being marginalised (Amis et al., 2002; D. O'Brien & T. Slack, 
2004). With regard to IFs’ mission, values and identity, a first set of research questions for future 
studies could therefore be:  
 
• What impacts have professionalisation and commercialisation on IFs’ core values and 
traditions? How does it affect IFs’ identity? 
• Does increasing commercialisation influence IFs’ mission fulfilment?  
• How can IFs best respond to both members’ expectations (mission-related) and those of 
business partners (contract-related)? 
• How can IFs’ mission alignment be measured? 
 
Research studies into these questions could include interviews with elected volunteers and staff 
members, asking for their perception of what constitutes the IF’s identity and mission as well as 
traditions and values related to them. Are individuals’ perceptions of the federation’s mission 
congruent with the mission stipulated in the IF’s statutes? In a second step, the IF’s mission could be 
measured against the actions the federation takes. Are the federation’s actions congruent with its 
mission? 
 
Commercialisation: Commercialisation is another much discussed topic of this thesis. Even though 
commercialisation is frequently regarded as beneficial in general NPO-literature (Carroll & Stater, 
2009) for reasons of self-sufficiency and the financing of mission-related activities, it is eyed rather 
critically in the context of IFs (e.g. Forster, 2006). Especially in the case of IFs with highly profitable 
events, commercialisation is considered as the root of the evil, entailing corruption, bribery and self-
interested decisions. Commercialisation of IFs has therefore become an ambivalent topic: while it is 
necessary and useful, it is also regarded as highly suspicious. Rather than focusing on specific 
governance scandals as several scholars have done before and based on the insights gained through 
this thesis, a stronger focus on the question of IFs’ commercialisation seems appropriate. Three 
different approaches lend themselves for future investigations: profit sharing, market capacity and 
organisational survival. 
 
• Profit sharing: What would be a fair profit redistribution model?  
• Market capacity: With all sports seeking to grow their sport events, is there a point of 
market saturation? Will fans get tired of an overabundance of sport events and turn to 
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other pastimes? 
• Organisational survival: Which strategies do IFs adopt to diversify their revenues? How 
can small IFs persist against big IFs that take more and more of the global market share? 
 
The question of a fair redistribution model could be approached through an investigation among 
member federations. The question of market capacity, on the other hand, requires the analysis of fan 
and spectator behaviours over the last years as well as interviews among these groups. And to answer 
the question of organisational survival, a study with smaller IFs as the focus group could be 
conducted. 
 
Control and regulation: Commercialisation is closely related to the questions of control and 
regulation. As discussed earlier, the autonomy of the IOC and the Olympic movement has been 
recognised by both the UN and the EU. In addition, and thanks to their nonprofit status in most 
countries, IFs enjoy extensive legal freedom (Chappelet & Mrkonjic, 2013). The combination of IFs’ 
increasing profit-orientation and generation, the recognition of their autonomy at intergovernmental 
level, and extensive legal freedom seems to have opened the door for all sorts of governance issues 
(e.g. corruption, bribery, blackmailing, nepotism, money laundry, etc.). Another triggering factor are 
historically insufficient internal control mechanisms (e.g. checks and balances). One could 
hypothesise that these insufficiencies are partly the result of a deeply entrenched amateur culture 
among longstanding officials (e.g. board members) and their desire to keep a maximum of control 
over the IF. Their reluctance to change therefore reflects a lack of personal interests in adopting 
change. Several interviewees voice in fact their concern that being on the board (or a commission) is 
often considered as a privilege and maintaining this position becomes more important than conducting 
necessary changes, denouncing breaches to the rules or flawed mechanisms of self-regulation. In a 
recent newspaper article, Bayle (2017) argues that the IOC president, in collaboration with public 
authorities, is currently best positioned to impose governance and regulation reforms on international 
sport. In light of these reflexions, the following research questions could initiate future investigations: 
 
• What exactly should we understand by “responsible self-regulation”? Where are the limits of 
IFs’ responsible self-regulation? 
• Should IFs’ governance be monitored externally? If so, who could/should monitor IFs and on 
the basis of which evaluation criteria? 
• To which extent can formally adopted practices of good governance capture the organisation-
internal accuracy with which these practices are executed? 
 
Though the strong focus of extant studies on IFs’ governance, and particularly on governance issues, 
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has been criticised at several occasions in this theses, I have to acknowledge that, like in a circular 
motion, many research questions into IFs’ structure and functioning lead back to the question of 
governance. This is partly due to the fact that governance issues have been and remain a salient topic 
in international sport, perhaps even the most urgent one at the moment. It is also due to the fact that 
information on as well as from IFs frequently revolves around the question of governance. As 
researchers depend on the information they can gather, the strong attention of regulators and the 
general public on governance issues pressures IFs to seek legitimisation in this regard. Information 
from IFs is therefore often related to governance. In any case, it is both impossible and would have 
been naïve to pretend that the governance aspect could be excluded from this thesis to only focus on 
professionalisation and commercialisation. Professionalisation (or lack of professionalisation) and 
commercialisation are in fact integral elements of IFs’ governance. However, as mentioned earlier, a 
focus on governance issues without understanding the driving forces behind them, including notably 
professionalisation and commercialisation, creates a biased and incomplete picture of IFs. 
 
A final evolution is worth mentioning here, an evolution that might well be an isolated case or, on 
the contrary, a herald of a general trend that, sooner or later, might trickle down through the entire 
international sport system. This evolution is the decreasing public interest in hosting the Olympic 
Games. It seems that, over past decades, some sport events, and notably the Olympic Games, have 
been blown up to a size that weighs heavy on both organising committees and taxpayers. Local 
organising committees have to correct initial cost estimations and face the problem of massive cost 
overruns and unpaid creditors (e.g. 2016 Rio Organising Committee150). Fewer tickets are being sold 
ahead of the Games (Pyeongchang151), raising concerns about empty seats and loss of earnings. And 
venues remain vacant and gradually fall into ruins right after the event (e.g. Athens, Rio152). In 
countries where citizens are given the choice, Olympic bids are increasingly being turned down 
through public referendums and lack of local support (summer Games: e.g. Boston, Hamburg, 
Budapest; winter Games: e.g. Munich, St. Moritz-Davos, Innsbruck). Nowadays, citizens mainly 
perceive the Games as a cost factor that outweighs an eventual collective well-being through the 
Games. In fact, while hosting the Games provides many lucrative deals for construction companies 
and new transport infrastructures certainly benefit the entire population, it crowds out direct (and 
perhaps more efficient) public investments into social welfare. Referring to previous studies, Pinson 
(2016) points out the growing viewpoint “that non-mega sports events have a higher potential than 
mega sports events to grow the social capital of people within the host community” (p. 836). Cities 
                                                        
150 ESPN. (2017). The debts of the 2016 Rio Games. Retrieved from 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/20292414/the-reality-post-olympic-rio  
151 Inside the Games. (2017). 2018 Winter Olympics: ticket sales. Retrieved from 
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1056413/pyeongchang-2018-still-sold-only-303-per-cent-of-tickets-for-
winter-olympics-and-less-than-five-per-cent-for-paralympics  
152 ESPN. (2017). The debts of the 2016 Rio Games. Retrieved from 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/20292414/the-reality-post-olympic-rio  
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and regions that maintain their bids increasingly come from countries known for human rights 
violations and dictatorship (Beijing/China, Almaty/Kazakhstan). For the moment, the image problem 
mainly concerns mega sport events such as the Olympic Games. But other sports might well become 
victims of a globally deteriorating image of international sport (e.g. corruption, doping) and major 
sport events (e.g. Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup). This image, it seems, is strongly linked to the 
commercialisation of international sport and IFs and the question of mission, values and goals. The 
privatisation of benefits and the shifting of costs to taxpayers lead give rise to a final question that 
future studies might want to take into consideration: Who benefits the most from current trends in 
international sport and IFs and who is losing? 
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ABSTRACT
In a changing and complex environment, international sport
federations (IFs) have to face new challenges. These challenges can
trigger or hinder IFs’ professionalization processes. While
researchers have examined organizational change and
professionalization of national sport federations (NFs) and clubs,
studies on IFs are rare. Considering professionalization as an
important element of IFs’ change processes in recent years, the
study attempts to ﬁll this gap. The conceptual framework is based
on the concepts and dynamics of organizational change, the
inﬂuence of isomorphic pressures and the operationalization of a
multi-level framework. Data from six case studies was analyzed by
means of qualitative content analysis. Findings reveal multiple
causes of IFs’ professionalization. Three particular ﬁndings are
discussed: professionalization as a dynamic process with phases of
acceleration that vary depending on IFs’ size; IFs’ becoming
increasingly business-like through isomorphic changes; and ﬁve
causes of particular relevance to IFs’ current professionalization
process.
国际单项体育联合会专业化进程的驱动和阻碍因素
随着发展环境的迅速变化和日益复杂化, 国际单项体育联合会(IFs)
正面新的复杂挑战。这些挑战可能对IFs的专业化进程起到促进或
阻碍作用。尽管已有研究者对组织变革与国家单项体育协会 (NFs)
以及俱乐部的专业化进程进行了研究, 但很少有针对IFs的类似研
究。此外, 对体育组织专业化的定义与认识尚不明确。本研究将
专业化作为IFs近几年来变革过程中的一个重要因素, 以填补这方
面研究的空白。本研究的概念框架主要基于组织变革的概念和动
态变化、同构压力的影响以及多层次框架的可操作化, 旨在对IFs
专业化的影响因素进行分析。采用定性内容分析的方法, 对6家IFs
的案例研究数据进行处理和分析, 研究结果发现IFs专业化的11个
基本影响因素。本文对3项研究结果进行了详细阐述:专业化是一
个动态过程, 该过程包含若干加速阶段, 而具体的加速阶段取决于
IFs的规模;通过同构变革, IFs的运作已日趋商业化;与IFs当前专业化
进程最为相关的5个因素是外部压力、领导力、商业化、管理实
践和组织文化。
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1. Introduction
In the course of the commercialization of international sport (e.g. broadcasting, sponsor-
ship, branding, growth of major sport events) and due to increasing expectations and
pressures from various interest groups, international sport federations (IF) have under-
gone important organizational changes in recent years. Scholars have analyzed and
emphasized different elements and processes of organizational change in sport organiza-
tions. At the national level (national sport federations, clubs), existing studies have
enhanced scholars’ understanding of aspects such as occupational professionalization
(Dowling, Edwards, & Washington, 2014; Horch & Sch€utte, 2009; Seippel, 2002), board
composition (Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009), functioning (Yeh & Taylor, 2008) and organiza-
tional performance (Bayle & Madella, 2002; Winand, Rihoux, Robinson, & Zintz, 2013).
With regard to IFs, isolated phenomena such as governance deﬁciencies (Chappelet,
2011; Forster, 2006), major sport events (Parent & Seguin, 2008), globalization and com-
mercialization of sport (Forster & Pope, 2004), and scandals on doping (Hanstad, 2008)
and corruption (Chappelet & K€ubler-Mabbott, 2008; Mason, Thibault, & Misener, 2006)
form the main body of literature. Considering professionalization as a process towards
increased rationalization and organizational efﬁciency (Chantelat, 2001), little is actually
known about the factors and dynamics that inﬂuence this change process in IFs because
‘little attention has been paid to GSO [Global Sport Organizations] as a whole’ (Croci &
Forster, 2004). This lack results in an incomplete understanding of IFs, often reduced to
governance issues following the revelation of scandals (Jennings, 2011; MacAloon, 2011;
Pielke, 2013). Dowling et al.’s (2014) and Nagel, Schlesinger, Bayle, and Giauque’s (2015)
calls for a systemic approach to sport federations’ professionalization emphasize this
gap. An enhanced understanding of IFs’ professionalization as a dynamic process and
interaction of triggering and hindering factors might help sport managers to understand
and predict change processes more efﬁciently. The central questions addressed in this
study are therefore: What are essential drivers of and barriers to IFs’ professionalization?
Can we distinguish particular dynamics of professionalization?
The study addresses these questions by ﬁrst reviewing literature on professionalization
and organizational changes in sport organizations. Following this, we develop a conceptual
framework to analyze causes (drivers, barriers) and dynamics of professionalization in
sport organizations. Data was collected through a multiple-case study design including six
IFs. For data processing and analysis we used the qualitative content analysis. In the results
section we present drivers and barriers as well as dynamics of professionalization. These
are further explained and linked to the conceptual framework in the discussion. We con-
clude with a summary of main ﬁndings and suggestions of future research questions.
2. Previous Research on Professionalization and Organizational Changes in
Sport Organizations
Based on existing studies, we deﬁne professionalization of non-proﬁt sport organizations
as a dynamic process towards a more rationalized functioning, driven by the objectives
of enhancing the organization’s performance and ensuring its service role towards its
members. Being increasingly inﬂuenced by for-proﬁt organizations, we argue that this
process entails a transformation of sport organizations from volunteer-driven to more
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business-oriented logics. Studies and deﬁnitions of professionalization that we base this
deﬁnition on pursue different foci and lines of argumentation, three of which are pre-
sented here for their relevance in the context of sport management (Dowling et al., 2014):
occupational, organizational and systemic professionalization.
Occupational professionalization (also referred to as professionalism) is a process desig-
nating a transformation through which occupations and professions are progressively mea-
sured against normative values (Abbott, 1991; Evetts, 2011; Hall, 1968). Brint (1996)
speaks of a ‘shift from social trustee professionalism to expert professionalism’ (p. 11). In
non-proﬁt sport organizations, this process is characterized by an increased hiring of paid
staff (Seippel, 2002; Thibault, Slack, & Hinings, 1991; Thiel, Meier, & Cachay, 2006). For
Evetts (2014), modern professionalism does not only signify normative values such as
occupational procedures, controlling, education and training, but also a discourse applied
by managers to describe procedures of accountability and good governance. Using Evetts’
deﬁnition of professionalism, we may question IFs’ current level of professionalism as both
their accountability and good governance repeatedly gave rise to critical studies (Alm,
2013; Chappelet, 2011; Forster, 2006; Geeraert, Alm, & Groll, 2014; MacAloon, 2011).
Another strand of research in sport management investigates professionalization as an
organizational transformation, which results in more bureaucratization (Bayle, 2010;
Slack, 1985; Slack & Hinings, 1994), rationalization (Kikulis, 2000; Skinner, Stewart, &
Edwards, 1999), efﬁciency (Chantelat, 2001; Dowling et al., 2014) and effectiveness (Papa-
dimitriou & Taylor, 2000). A general decrease in funding to non-proﬁt organizations
(Alexander, 2000; Levine & Zahradnik, 2012) in combination with an increasing demand
for sport as a social good and entertainment (Borland & MacDonald, 2003) has signiﬁ-
cantly triggered competition between sport organizations for additional ﬁnancial resour-
ces (Nagel et al., 2015). In their quest for efﬁciency and effectiveness, IFs increasingly
adopt for-proﬁt business methods and structures (Dowling et al., 2014; Ferkins &
Shilbury, 2015; Shilbury & Ferkins, 2011).
Besides looking at occupational and organizational professionalization, Dowling et al.
(2014) suggest systemic professionalization as a third classiﬁcation. The authors describe
systemic professionalization as ‘a by-product of environmental shifts’ (p. 525). In view of
researchers’ understanding of current and future developments in sport management,
they attribute a particular signiﬁcance to this approach. Following Dowling et al.’ (2014)
call for a systemic approach, Nagel et al. (2015) developed a multi-level framework to ana-
lyze the inﬂuence of internal and external factors on causes, forms and consequences of
professionalization in sport federations. The perspective of systemic professionalization
appears to be of particular interest for our study as it allows us to determine whether pro-
fessionalization processes are rather the result of internal or of external causes.
In the absence of substantial research on causes of professionalization in IFs, we drew
on change literature on national sport organizations (NSO) that cover various organiza-
tion-internal and external topics. Examples at the internal level include for instance the
hiring of paid managers and staff and their inﬂuence on the structure and dynamics of
formerly voluntary organizations (Horch & Sch€utte, 2009), rationalization processes
(Chantelat, 2001; Slack & Hinings, 1987) and decision-making structures (Kikulis, Slack,
& Hinings, 1992; Thibault et al., 1991). Based on extensive data collection from multiple
NSOs, several scholars put forth typologies to describe and predict their structure-strategy
patterns: Kikulis et al.’s (1992), Kikulis, Slack, and Hinings (1995) analyses of the impact
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL SPORT MANAGEMENT 3
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of paid managers on decision-making structures resulted in the deduction of three design
archetypes (kitchen-table, board room, executive ofﬁce); and Thibault et al.’s (1991) inves-
tigation on NSOs’ long-term strategic planning brought forward four strategic types
(enhancers, innovators, reﬁners, explorers).
At the same time, organizations’ survival and development also depend on their capac-
ity to respond to external changes and pressures (Miller & Friesen, 1983). The adaptation
of NSOs to environmental pressures from stakeholders (e.g. sponsors) and demands for
organizational performance has been researched mainly with respect to changing gover-
nance designs. Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) saw in NSOs’ adoption of established gover-
nance functions (e.g. performance, conformance) an indicator for their degree of
professionalization. Acknowledging the complexity of NSOs’ governance, Hoye and Doh-
erty (2011), for their part, warned against the negative impact of poor governance struc-
tures on organizational performance.
Though some studies applied a conﬁgurational approach to analyze NSOs’ organiza-
tional performance (Bayle & Madella, 2002;Winand et al., 2013) and organizational
change (Kikulis et al., 1992; Theodoraki & Henry, 1994), the predominant research focus
is on internal actors, especially boards. Boards have received a particular attention as they
are regarded as the driving force of NSOs’ performance (Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald,
2005; Hoye & Auld, 2001; Inglis, 1997; Papadimitriou & Taylor, 2000; Shilbury, 2001). In
accordance with Cornforth (2011), we argue that the narrow focus on boards hampers a
comprehensive understanding of sport organizations’ functioning.
In sum, the lack of general research on and a systemic approach to IFs’ professionaliza-
tion not only creates an incomplete picture dominated by few IFs (e.g. FIFA, IAAF, UCI).
It also impedes the development of concrete solutions to current issues. Solutions to cur-
rent issues in IFs cannot be reduced to governance and some related aspects observed in a
few federations only. On the contrary, they require an analysis of professionalization pro-
cesses in IFs of different size and the knowledge production of underlying causes. The fol-
lowing conceptual and methodological procedures attempt to remedy the lack of a
systemic approach to IFs’ professionalization and the dominance of a few IFs.
3. Conceptual Framework
IFs’ professionalization is the result of general organizational changes in non-proﬁt sport
organizations. In this study, we are particularly interested in causes that trigger or hinder
the transformation of sport organizations from primarily volunteer-run and loosely struc-
tured organizations into increasingly complex and rationalized organizations managed by
professionals. We are further interested in the dynamics of this process and seek an
answer to whether professionalization is the result of radical or incremental changes or
both. Institutional theories provide a useful ground to analyze dynamics of IFs’ organiza-
tional change.
Institutional perspectives are not only interested in processes of power, but especially in
authority and power relations between an organization and a superordinate unit. Author-
ity relations may imply imposition of rules and requirements based on coercion or volun-
tarily induced structural changes. According to new institutionalism, institutional signs
from policies, laws, and professions inﬂuence how organizations behave, even if the inﬂu-
ence is not consciously experienced. Congruently, Scott (1987) speaks of organizational
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structures evolving ‘over time through an adaptive, largely unplanned, historically depen-
dent process’ (p. 506). We base our analysis of IFs’ dynamics of professionalization on the
work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who describe the impact of authority relations with
three adaptive mechanisms of institutional change: coercive, mimetic and normative iso-
morphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs in reaction to political inﬂuence and organiza-
tions’ quest for legitimacy within a same legal environment. This external pressure may
be perceived by organizations as ‘force, persuasion of invitation to join in collusion’ (p.
150). Mimetic isomorphism, for its part, is described as an imitation that stems from
uncertainty (e.g. environment, goals). In situations of uncertainty, organizations may con-
sciously or unconsciously adopt solutions modelled by prototypical organizations. These
prototypical organizations are generally ‘similar organizations in their ﬁeld that they per-
ceive to be more legitimate or successful’ (p. 152). Homogeneity is often the result of lim-
ited solution and model variety. Normative isomorphism, the third mechanism, is
associated with professionalization in the sense of legitimization of professions. Here, iso-
morphic change primarily stems from formal education (e.g. university) and professional
networks, creating organizational norms which professional managers and their staff
internalize. The hiring of individuals from similar organizations, training/education insti-
tutions and certain skill-requirements are expected to encourage normative isomorphism.
This ‘ﬁltering of personnel’ (p. 152) results in common expectations regarding personnel
behavior. The authors emphasize that none of the three mechanisms is a guarantor for
increased organizational efﬁciency. However, they constitute helpful tools to establish and
predict typologies of homogenous structure, process and behavior.
Within change literature, some scholars argue that radical change creates a positive
momentum (Miller & Chen, 1994), some that evolutionary change is more effective
(Quinn, 1980) and others observed a mix of both radical and incremental change (Child
& Smith, 1987). Amis, Slack, and Hinings (2004) analyzed 36 Olympic NFs in Canada
over a 12-year period with regard to pace, sequence and linearity of change. The authors
come to the conclusion that initial bursts of change should ideally be followed by
restrained progress in order to be more substantive and enduring. Furthermore, the
authors observe that changing the decision-making system proved to be most difﬁcult
and that NFs differ in pace, sequence and linearity of change. Following Amis et al.’s
(2004) observation, we suppose that dynamics of change vary across IFs and that certain
organizational change processes require incremental change (e.g. mimetic and normative
changes), while others are best achieved through radical change (e.g. coercive pressures).
Applied to our initial research questions of drivers, barriers and dynamics of IFs’ profes-
sionalization, we put forward two research propositions (RP):
RP1: IFs’ professionalization process has elements of both radical and incremental
change. At speciﬁc moments in time, certain drivers may have a particularly accel-
erating effect.
RP2: The more an IF depends on resources from business partners, the greater the
extent to which it will change isomorphically to resemble the organizations on
which it depends for resources.
To ﬁnd answers to our research propositions, we apply the multi-level framework of
Nagel et al. (2015) (Figure 1). The framework is based on a review of current international
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literature and concepts of professionalization in sport federations. Suggesting a systemic
approach, the framework applies the social theory of action to focus on three levels of
organizational relations: the external environment, that is, stakeholders in sport and soci-
ety; the sport federation, that is, the federation itself; and the internal environment, that
is, the federation’s member organizations. Though the framework suggests the investiga-
tion of causes, forms and consequences of sport organizations’ professionalization, we
only focus on causes in this study.
4. Method
4.1. Case Study Design
Lacking empirical evidence on causes of IFs’ professionalization and in order to allow ele-
ments to emerge and investigate their respective importance, the nature of this study is qual-
itative and exploratory. To gather empirical data, we carried out a qualitative content
analysis based on multiple case studies. By means of 20 semi-structured interviews for which
the replication logic was used, we collected evidence of six IFs based in Switzerland. Inter-
views were conducted with staff members and persons from the IF’s direction. Of the inter-
viewees, 17 were male and four female (two interviews were conducted with two persons at
the same time). Important moments of change reported by interviewees date back into the
1990s. Some of the interviewees have been with the IF for many years (up to 35 years) and
were thus able to provide longitudinal information. However, and with the goal to uncover
current causes of professionalization, the main focus is limited to the period between 2008,
marking the ﬁrst ranking of IFs based on the IOC Evaluation criteria, and 2016. A review of
secondary sources of information complements data obtained from interviews.
4.2. Selection of Cases
In an approach of purposive sampling, three criteria were used to select the six cases: envi-
ronmental context, geographical concentration of IFs and size. Regarding the ﬁrst
Figure 1. Causes of professionalisation in sport federations according to Nagel et al.’s (2015) multi-level
framework.
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criterion and with the objective of enhancing comparability, we focused on Olympic IFs
with headquarters in the same country, hence encountering a similar legal, political and
economic context. Secondly, we chose IFs with headquarters in Switzerland, as Switzer-
land is the country with the highest concentration of IFs (about 45 at the time of investi-
gation). Selecting IFs with headquarters in different countries would have made face-to-
face interviews much more difﬁcult and costly. The choice of a country with high concen-
tration of IFs further allows a purposive sampling in terms of selecting IFs of varying
organizational size. The following six IFs were chosen for case studies (we use the IOC-
terminology in English): International Association Football Federation (FIFA), Interna-
tional Hockey Federation (FIH), International Rowing Federation (FISA), International
Volleyball Federation (FIVB), International Cycling Federation (UCI) and United World
Wrestling (UWW). All six federations represent summer Olympic sports and are non-
proﬁt associations under the Swiss Civil Code (Articles 60–79).
4.3. Data Collection
Data collection began in September 2014 and ended in July 2016. A total of 20 semi-struc-
tured interviews with staff members (current and former), persons from the IFs’ direction,
a representative of ASOIF (Association of Summer Olympic International Federations)
were conducted in-person (n = 14), by telephone (n = 3) or by email (n = 3). The ASOIF
representative was included because of his overall view and in-depth knowledge of the
evolution and current situation of the 28 summer Olympic IFs. With the aim of gathering
information on IFs’ past and current causes of professionalization, we tried to diversify
the selection of interviewees with regard to their functional and hierarchical position.
With the exception of FIFA, we interviewed minimum one person from the direction hav-
ing strategic inﬂuence and insights, and one staff member at the operational level
(Table 1).
To ensure trustworthiness, the same interview guide was used for these interviews
(Annex 1). In the case of UWW, the selection was extended to an external consultant and
an IOC staff member. Having identiﬁed the temporary exclusion of UWW from the
Table 1. Interviews carried out between 2015 and 2016.
IF
Interview
# of
Interviews
Association of Summer Olympic
International Federations (ASOIF)
1 person from the ASOIF direction and 1 staff member 1
International Association Football
Federation (FIFA)
2 former FIFA staff members 2
International Hockey Federation (FIH) 1 person from the FIH direction, 1 person from the direction of
the European Hockey Federation and 3 FIH staff members
5
International Rowing Federation
(FISA)
1 person from the FISA direction, 1 person from the past FISA
direction and 1 FISA staff member
3
International Volleyball Federation
(FIVB)
1 person from the FIVB direction and 1 FIVB staff member 1
International Cycling Federation (UCI) 1 person from the UCI direction, 1 UCI staff member and 2
former UCI staff members
4
United World Wrestling (UWW) 1 person from the UWW direction together with 1 UWW staff
member, 1 UWW staff member, 1 UWW consultant and 1 IOC
member
4
Total 20
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Olympic Program (February-September 2013) as the most important driver of the federa-
tion’s recent professionalization dynamic, we deemed it useful to integrate these
interviews.
Though interview questions were closely tied to Nagel et al.’s (2015) framework, we
opted for semi-structured interviews to allow a broadening of the information spectrum.
In-person interviews lasted between 30 and 120 min, were recorded, transcribed verbatim
and resulted in 185 single-spaced pages of data. Interviews conducted by telephone were
summarized producing nine single-spaced pages. In order to increase trustworthiness,
participants were invited to check the transcription/summary. Changes made to the tran-
scripts/summaries by participants primarily concerned sensitive information and infor-
mal language. Responses by email produced 11 single-spaced pages. We acknowledge that
email interviews present certain shortcomings. For instance, the asynchronous nature of
email responses regarding time and place makes spontaneous answers impossible, though
they are a rich and valuable source of evidence.
Secondary documents from the IFs comprise annual reports, ﬁnancial statements, stat-
utes, regulations, organization charts and selected external documents. While statutes and
regulations for all six IFs are accessible on the IFs’ website, annual reports, ﬁnancial state-
ments and organization charts are only partially available and very heterogeneous in form
and length. For instance, both FIFA and UCI publish extensive annual reports (around
130 pages) including ﬁnancial statements, while the FIVB publishes neither annual
reports nor ﬁnancial statements. None of the IFs publishes organization charts of the
administrative staff and we only received two upon request (UCI, UWW). External docu-
ments on IFs primarily focus on the IOC Evaluation Criteria (2008, 2012) and the Olym-
pic Agenda 2020 published in 2014. Both documents address current and future
expectations within the Olympic Movement and which the 28 summer Olympic IFs have
to face. The 2012 IOC Evaluation Criteria is composed of 39 criteria covering eight
themes to determine the contribution of summer IFs to the overall success of the Olympic
Games. Since 2008, the IOC carries out this evaluation after each Olympic Games. The
Olympic Agenda 2020, for its part, is ‘the strategic road map for the future of the Olympic
Movement’ (IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020), built around 40 recommendations.
4.4. Data Analysis
In view of the narrow framework of Nagel et al. (2015), we chose a deductive approach
based on qualitative content analysis. As a method of analyzing written, verbal or visual
communication messages (Cole, 1988), deductive content analysis seeks to enhance the
understanding of a speciﬁc phenomenon (Krippendorff, 1980) by moving from the gen-
eral to the speciﬁc (Burns & Grove, 1993). Our unit of analysis primarily consists of writ-
ten material from transcribed interviews, telephone summaries and emails on IFs’
professionalization. Using the terminology of Graneheim and Lundman (2004), we identi-
ﬁed themes, categories, subcategories, meaning units and codes. Themes and categories
are deduced from Nagel et al.’s (2015) framework. To deﬁne subcategories, our ﬁrst ana-
lytical step was therefore to condense the written material by establishing meaning units,
that is, textual units such as words, sentences or paragraphs (Krippendorff, 2004). Grane-
heim and Lundman (2004) describe condensation as ‘a process of shortening while still
preserving the core’ (p. 106). To achieve condensation, several reading cycles were carried
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out and written material progressively classiﬁed into meaning units. These meaning units
were further condensed (condensed meaning units) before abstracting them into codes
(Baxter, 1991). The grouping of substantively similar codes enabled us to deﬁne subcate-
gories. Table 2 exempliﬁes this process.
A complete presentation of processed data would be too space consuming. As a com-
promise, Table 3 shows an example of condensed meaning units, codes, subcategories and
level of inﬂuence. Units are sorted according to whether they were referred to and/or
interpreted as having a triggering (Drivers) or hindering (Barriers) inﬂuence on the IF’s
professionalization and with regard to their temporal occurrence (Period).
We extended our data collection and analysis by integrating aforementioned secondary
documents. Data from secondary documents was used ﬁrst and foremost to consolidate
Table 2. Example of the content analysis process.
Meaning units Condensed meaning units Codes
With hockey we probably have to improve that
commercial value.
Improve commercial value Commercial
value
Most sports struggle to attract commercial partners. Attract commercial partners Commercial
partners
The event creates an economy around it. Event creates an economy Event economy
We are much more commercially focused than we were
in the past.
Commercially focused Commercial
strategy
We have adapted our strategy to the emerging and fast
growing economies around the world.
Adapted our strategy to emerging and
growing economies
Subcategory Commercialization
Category Financial resources
Theme IF-speciﬁc structure and culture
Table 3. Example of the FIH: condensed meaning units, codes, subcategories and level.
- Period Condensed meaning units Codes Subcategories Level
Drivers Before
2010
Value an IF is bringing to the
Olympic Games
Olympic value Competition with other IFs External
55% from the Olympic revenue
share in 2004
Revenue Olympic revenue share External
Since
2010
New and dynamic CEO CEO, leader Leadership Internal
Benchmarking across sports and
Olympic organizations
Benchmarking Competition with other IFs External
34% from the Olympic revenue
share (2012–2015)
Revenue Olympic revenue share External
First long term strategic plan
(2014–2024)
Strategic plan,
strategy
Management practices Internal
First long term strategic plan
(2014–2024)
Experts, hiring Paid experts from within and
outside sport
Internal
Development of Hockey5 as a
commercial product
Commercial
product
Commercialization Internal
Barriers Before
2010
Few sponsor and event incomes Sponsors, income (Difﬁcult) Commercialization External
Board muddled with operational
decisions
Board roles (Insufﬁcient) Board efﬁciency Internal
No strategic vision and strategic
plan
Strategic plan,
strategy
(Insufﬁcient) Management
practices
Internal
Since
2010
No critical mass of strong national
federations
National
federations
(Low) Financial support and
development
Internal
Not having what commercial
partners are looking for
Commercial
partners
(Difﬁcult) Commercialization Internal
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and contextualize written evidence extracted from interviews, phone calls and emails. In
the event of relevant meaning units (e.g. conﬁrmation, afﬁrmation, mitigation of inter-
viewees’ statements), we proceeded in the same way as we did with written interview
material. We acknowledge that the internal environment as proposed by Nagel et al.
(2015) was not speciﬁcally analyzed with regard to members’ expectations. Considering
the high number and global spread of IF-members (up to 222 NFs in the case of ITTF),
such analysis proved to be very complicated from a logistical point of view. On the other
hand, we uncovered additional causes: competitive environment (competition with other
IFs), and empowerment of member organizations (ﬁnancial support and development,
knowledge transfer).
5. Findings
A ﬁrst observation we can deduce from data is the heterogeneity of the six IFs with regard
to size (number of staff, NFs and Continental Confederations, henceforth: CC), opera-
tional structure (departments) and ﬁnancial resources (revenue). Differences are summa-
rized in Table 4.
Moreover, qualitative content analysis enabled us to identify causes and dynamics of
IFs’ professionalization. Eleven subcategories of causes were uncovered for having an
essential inﬂuence on the professionalization of the six IFs analyzed in this study. Subcate-
gories could further be divided into drivers (n = 11) and barriers (n = 5) at the three levels
of analysis (Table 5), this being external environment, sport federations and internal envi-
ronment. The approach of semi-structured interviews and integration of secondary infor-
mation further revealed two additional themes (competitive environment and
empowerment of member organizations), corresponding categories and subcategories.
Table 5 also shows that we have found no solid subcategories for two categories. In the
case of decision-making structure, a shift of decision-making power towards professional
staff emerged from interviews. However, the aspect of formal versus actual decision-mak-
ing power appears to be a sensitive topic and information is difﬁcult to access. In the
absence of substantial information, we decided to omit this aspect. The second category
concerns expectations from member organizations. Both regional federations and clubs
may inﬂuence NFs, but they revealed insufﬁcient relevance in the context of IFs.
Table 4. Structural elements of the six federations analyzed.
Revenue and part of Olympic revenue share
2012–2015
IF Creation Olympic Sport
NF/CC
Staff Departments
Annual average Olympic revenue share
FIFA 1904 Since 1900 209/6 >450 (2015) 9 USD 1.337bna 0.4%
FIH 1924 Since 1928 132/5 36 (2015) 5 CHF 10mb 39%
FISA 1892 Since 1896 148/0 19 (2015) 4 CHF 7.5mc 51%
FIVB 1947 Since 1964 220/6 65–70 (2015) 10 Not available Not available
UCI 1900 Since 1896 174/5 79 (2014) 7 CHF 36md 15%
UWW 1905 Since 1896 174/0 24 (2015) 6 CHF 8.4me 40%
aFIFA annual reports 2012–2015, bFIH ﬁnancial statements 2014 and 2016, cFISA annual reports 2012–2015, dUCI
annual reports 2012–2015, eUWW ﬁnancial statements 2012–2015; Revenues are referred to in the currency in which
ﬁnancial statements are published and for the years available between 2012 and 2015. The period has been chosen
as it represents the latest completed Olympic cycle on the basis of which IFs’ dependence on the Olympic revenue
share could be established.
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5.1. External Environment
At the external environment, three subcategories emerge that can all be classiﬁed as driv-
ers: pressures from stakeholders in sport and society, Olympic revenue share and compe-
tition with other IFs.
5.1.1. Pressure from Stakeholders in Sport and Society
Since the late 1990s, IFs have to face a signiﬁcant increase in regulatory requirements. In
1998, the Salt Lake City bidding scandal, which involved bribery, fraud and racketeering
committed by members of the IOC, plunged the IOC into a deep governance crisis. Hav-
ing regained its legitimacy by profoundly reforming its governance in 2000, and having
developed a highly successful economic model, the IOC exerts today important pressures
on IFs. Those that do not meet the IOC’s expectations risk being downgraded in the
Olympic ranking (ﬁrst carried out in 2008) or even excluded from the Olympic Pro-
gramme. Both could result in a major loss of earnings and visibility for the federation.
UWW and FISA are particularly concerned by this threat: ‘[If FISA] doesn’t move today,
we are at risk. Because not being an Olympic sport destroys all the rest’ (FISA president);
‘We [UWW] rely on it [IOC revenue share] a 100%!’ (UWW Secretary General). Apart
from this, especially scandal-shaken IFs experience increasing media pressure, which is
also ‘stressful for the staff’ (former FIFA staff member). The same interviewee emphasizes
the growing pressure of public authorities on IFs, considering this new element as ‘proba-
bly the most effective element of brining change’.
Table 5. Subcategories, drivers and barriers identiﬁed through content analysis.
Level Themes Categories Subcategories Driver Barrier
External
environment
Expectations and resources of
stakeholders in sport and
society
Umbrella
federations
Government and
sport policy
Business partners
and media
1. Pressure from stakeholders
in sport and society
@
2. Olympic revenue share @
Competitive environment International
federations
3. Competition with other IFs @
Sport
federations
IF-speciﬁc structure and
culture
Growing
requirements
4. Management practices @ @
Size, sports 5. Paid experts from within
and outside sport
@ @
Financial resources 6. Commercialization @ @
Strategic capability
of the board
7. Board efﬁciency @
Decision-making
structure
Individual key actors 8. Leadership @ @
Role of paid
managing director
Organizational
values
9. Organizational culture @ @
Internal
environment
Expectations of member
organizations
Regional
federations, clubs
10.
Empowerment of member
organizations
Continental
Confederations
11. Financial support and
development of members
@
National Federations 12. Knowledge sharing @
Total 11 5
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5.1.2. Olympic Revenue Share
The Olympic revenue share (ORS), which is a reward for an IF’s contribution to the over-
all economic success of the Olympic Games, is a vital ﬁnancial resource for many Olympic
federations. In the ﬁrst revenue share (1992), USD 37.6 million (Olympic Marketing Fact
File 2014, p. 9), mostly earned from broadcasting rights, were equally divided between the
25 Olympic summer federations (USD 1.5 million/IF) to cover a four-year period. Since
then, the skyrocketing revenues from broadcasting rights have ensured constant growth
in the ORS. They reached a record ﬁgure of USD 519 million (Olympic Marketing Fact
File 2014, p. 9) after the 2012 London Games. Overall, ﬁnancial resources obtained from
the ORS help federations pursue and develop their sporting, administrative and social
activities. According to a person from the ASOIF direction, some IFs even decide that
‘any money coming from the Olympic Games must be only used for development and dis-
tributed to the continents’. Despite the generally beneﬁcial effect of the ORS, some IFs are
more dependent on it than others. While the ORS represented only 0.4% of FIFA’s overall
revenue during the period 2012–2015, it amounts to 51% in the case of FISA. A decrease
in the ORS is likely to affect a federation like FISA more than a federation with lower
dependency. An interviewee from the FISA direction recognizes the need to diversify
sources of revenue: ‘As an Olympic sport we proﬁt from the Olympic Games’ broadcast-
ing rights. But we cannot function solely on these ﬁnancial resources’. Overall, the ﬁnan-
cial support through the ORS positively inﬂuences IFs’ capacities for organizational
development, while their ambition to reduce dependencies on the ORS by diversifying
income sources triggers federations’ quest for increased efﬁciency.
5.1.3. Competition with Other IFs
Besides being an important source of revenue for many IFs, the ORS also entails a growing
competition between sport federations. This competition is reﬂected in a ranking estab-
lished by the IOC: based on a set of evaluation criteria, the IOC assigns Olympic summer
IFs to one of ﬁve groups (A-E) and deﬁnes a sum that is awarded to members according
to their group membership. In the case of the 2012 IOC Evaluation Criteria, promotion
from group B to group A would more than double an IF’s revenue share (from USD
22 million to USD 47 million according to Reuters). It is therefore little surprising that
moving ‘volleyball from category 2 [B] to category 1 [A] in the ranking of the IOC’ (FIVB
staff member) is a pivotal element in the FIVB’s strategy 2016–2020. At the same time,
IFs compete for other ﬁnancial resources (sponsors, broadcasters) as well as fans and ath-
letes: ‘we all do benchmarking across sports and across Olympic organizations’ (person
from the FIH direction). Like the Olympic Games, televised sport is an important market-
ing opportunity for IFs as the visibility facilitates the linkage with commercial partners,
fans and athletes. To convince stakeholders, more and more IFs therefore increasingly
analyze their environments and try to adapt to changes and demands.
5.2. Sport Federations
Six subcategories with a triggering and/or hindering inﬂuence on IFs’ professionalization
could be distinguished at the sport federation level: management practices, paid experts
from within and outside sport, commercialization, board efﬁciency, leadership, and orga-
nizational culture.
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5.2.1. Management Practices
All six IFs progressively introduced management practices, several of them adapted
from the corporate world. Many of these practices are designed to facilitate, optimize
and evaluate the IF’s performance (e.g. strategic planning, job description, staff evalua-
tion). Strategic planning is used as a tool to envision, implement and achieve future
goals: ‘we have a clear vision of the future. So our vision is to be the number one fam-
ily sport entertaining the world. So we are moving the entire organization to look for
that vision’ (person from the FIVB direction). Other practices such as ethics commis-
sions and ﬁnancial audits are rather following the logic of demonstrating the IFs’ com-
mitment to transparency and conformity. However, in case of deﬁcient accountability
mechanisms the actual effectiveness of an ethics commission and ﬁnancial audits may
be questioned and an abuse of deﬁcient structures and procedures constitutes a barrier
to IFs’ professionalization. For instance, in some cases external audits may not be suf-
ﬁcient to uncover corruption as the following example shows: ‘The auditors would
have been reviewing FIFA’s organizational ﬁnances rather than any private individual
transactions made between FIFA ofﬁcials such as those that are now being investi-
gated’ (former FIFA staff member).
5.2.2. Paid Experts from Within and Outside Sport
Despite large variations with regard to revenues, all six IFs have expanded their organiza-
tional structure in terms of workforce, though at varying speed and with varying results.
The hiring of paid staff to carry out tasks that demand special know-how (e.g. legal, com-
munication, ﬁnances, marketing) has in turn increased the need for well-deﬁned hierar-
chical structures and processes. On a long-term basis, a growing staff entails the need for
multiple adaptations: ‘we went from four persons [in 1992] to 79 persons [in 2015]. We
had to professionalise many things: human resources, formation, logistics’ (former UCI
staff member). Thanks to their special know-how, experts are an important element in
the IF’s continuous adaptation to a changing environment. IFs with little ﬁnancial resour-
ces risk having difﬁculties to keep up with IFs that are capable of employing highly spe-
cialized experts.
5.2.3. Commercialization
Since the 1980s, IFs realized that ‘some of the things they had, their events, had some
commercial value’ (person of the ASOIF direction). Ever since, IFs have increasingly
commercialized their activities, though with various degrees of success. For IFs as
non-proﬁts, proﬁt orientation is not a contradiction per se. On the contrary, IFs
need to generate revenues in order to ﬁnance their activities such as administration,
development or organization of World Championships. For many IFs, revenues from
membership fees and donations, their main sources of income in the past, are no
longer sufﬁcient. Competition between Olympic IFs and their quest to consolidate
their position on the Olympic program increase this tendency. And as long as IFs
use proﬁts to ﬁnance their activities and reinvest into their system (e.g. development
of members), commercialization constitutes a powerful driver. Or as a person from
the FIH direction puts it: ‘the more we grow, the more resources we can start push-
ing down’.
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5.2.4. Board Efﬁciency
Boards, a topic largely analyzed in the context of NFs (e.g. boards’ power, strategic capa-
bility, effectiveness and performance, roles of the board), represent an obvious research
gap in IFs. This is even more surprising as an emerging shift in decision-making struc-
tures seems to inﬂuence the role of the board. IFs’ strategic decisions are generally taken
during board meetings, which take place two or three times a year. Over time, the six IFs
have introduced solutions to overcome the challenge of such slow decision-making pro-
cesses. One solution is a shift of decision-making power from the board, as the highest
decision-making authority, to the president (or general director in some IFs) in speciﬁc
circumstances to accelerate the decision-making process when necessary. Another exam-
ple of increasing or ensuring board efﬁciency is what the FIH calls ‘board evaluation’. Rec-
ognizing the need to evaluate and eventually readjust the role of the board in order to
ensure its efﬁciency, the FIH carries out a two-fold board evaluation since 2014. As an
FIH staff member explains, the board is ﬁrst assessed as a whole asking ‘how the board is,
how it functions, what are we good at, what not and where can we make improvements’.
This overall assessment is followed by ‘an individual competencies assessment where we
can identify the strengths and weaknesses’. Overall and individual board evaluations then
‘guide our nominations process because we will put out a demand for certain competen-
cies […] when we do a call for nominations’.
5.2.5. Leadership
In light of increasing external pressures and growing public scrutiny, IFs have to make
proof of sound governance practices that legitimize their autonomy on the one hand, and
their funding and other ﬁnancial sources on the other hand. In the cases of UCI, FIVB,
UWW and FIFA, recent changes in leadership were made to correct previous leadership
issues. In all four cases, external pressures were at the origin, including allegations of cor-
ruption (FIFA, FIVB), insufﬁcient ﬁght against doping (UCI), and the risk of being
excluded from the Olympic Games for not fulﬁlling IOC requirements (UWW). The
arrival of a new president represents a moment of rupture, bringing along a belief in new
dynamic and positive changes. Even though the FIH has been free of serious leadership
issues, the federation demonstrated its willingness to embrace change. The FIH’s current
stability is above all the result of an anticipated internal governance review in 2010, reveal-
ing that the FIH Executive Board members ‘were not playing the role they should be play-
ing in modern days’ (person of the FIH direction). As a consequence, important
adjustments were made such as reducing the board size and hiring an experienced and
dynamic CEO.
As well as being a driver of professionalization, leadership can also be a barrier. This is
especially the case if key actors (individuals or groups) are motivated by personal rather
than organizational interests. Some IF-presidents have been negatively associated with
long-term presidencies resulting for instance in self-enrichment (FIVB) and systemic cor-
ruption (FIFA). And despite the IOC recommendation of a maximum term for president
(12 years) to avoid leader monopolies, three of the six IFs examined still had not intro-
duced term limits in 2016 (i.e. FISA, UCI, UWW). In 2015, the IOC tried to make term
limits mandatory for all Olympic IFs. The attempt failed as a majority of IFs voted against
it during the IF Forum organized by SportAccord Convention (informal discussion with
an IOC staff member).
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5.2.6. Organizational Culture
Organizational culture can be both a strong barrier and a powerful driver to IFs’ profes-
sionalization. The amateur culture carried by passionate individuals signiﬁcantly shaped
IFs’ structure. With IFs’ turning increasingly towards business logics, the amateur culture
is frequently considered as being out-dated and hindering to the federation’s business
objectives. Growing business objectives and commercialization bear the risk of deviating
the IF from its actual mission, which is to serve its members by developing, promoting
and organizing its sport. Or as an FIH staff member puts it: ‘should they [IFs] even be
about money? Is it strange for sports to connect with a brand that may not be related’.
Repeated scandals including corruption, self-enrichment and bribery in recent years
account for this risk of direction change. On the other hand, these scandals also raise lead-
ers’ awareness with regard to new expectations that the organization and individuals have
to internalize: ‘in the modern world, greatest standards of transparency are expected,
highest standards of integrity and a greater level of clarity in terms of decision-making
processes’ (person from the UCI direction). Therefore, organizational culture also appears
to play a decisive role in making adaptive change happen. Especially as a new generation
of sport managers is emerging, trained through new education programs (‘we have FIFA
Master and AISTS graduates here’, FIH staff member) and aware of previous scandals.
5.3. Internal Environment
Our analysis revealed two subcategories in the internal environment, both classiﬁed as
drivers of IFs’ professionalization: (1) ﬁnancial support and development of members,
and (2) knowledge sharing.
5.3.1. Financial Support and Development
Financial support to member federations and for development projects varies greatly
depending on IFs’ ﬁnancial situation. In 2015, the FIH invested 20% of its budget in devel-
opment projects, whereas FIFA claims to have injected more than USD 3.869 billion
directly into football between 2011-2014, meaning 72% of its revenues during this period.
Some IFs even anchor development programmes into their strategic plans. One of the
FIH’s strategic priorities, for instance, is to engage and empower its member federations
to become more self-sufﬁcient: ‘we want sustainable programmes. And the only way you
get sustainable programmes is to get someone who has an interest in it, who is local and
will be there for a long time to be involved in it’ (FIH staff member). The UWW, for its
part, has appointed a Development Ofﬁcer for each of its continental confederations in
order to help them develop and implement the UWW’s strategic plan.
5.3.2. Knowledge Sharing
Some IFs have created platforms to help their members share knowledge and experiences.
For example, since 2013, the UCI runs the Sharing Platform seminars. Through these
seminars, NFs can learn from each other and strengthen networks with NFs from neigh-
boring parts of the world. In the case of hockey, the FIH provides members with technical
and management courses through the FIH Hockey Academy, a series of online educa-
tional programs. The FIH further beneﬁts from the experience of its strongest NFs: ‘The
way we work with the larger ones is that we try to utilise their resources as much as we
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can. I mean in a lot of cases much has already been developed by these top nations’ (FIH
staff member).
5.3.3. Dynamic Phases of Professionalization
Taking a closer look at the temporal occurrence of drivers, ﬁndings suggest that the six IFs
go through different dynamic phases of professionalization. Table 6 indicates these
dynamic phases, drivers and their level of inﬂuence.
In the three IFs with less than 40 paid staff members (FIH, FISA, UWW) we can
roughly distinguish three phases since the 1990s. The ﬁrst phase (1990s) is marked by the
advent of the Olympic revenue share, which was distributed for the ﬁrst time in 1992, giv-
ing especially smaller IFs a considerable ﬁnancial thrust. In the second phase (around
2000–2010), two main drivers stand out: competition with other IFs (notably for the
Olympic revenue share and commercial revenues) and pressures from stakeholders in
sport and society (notably through the IOC evaluation criteria and expectations of busi-
ness partners in terms of return on investment). Since 2010, and in reaction to external
pressures, IFs increasingly adjust their structures, processes and activities at the internal
level (e.g. leadership, management practices, paid staff). A tendency with regard to the
current focus of the three IFs emerges from interviews. This tendency evolves around IFs’
goal to increase revenues through the commercialization of their activities (notably of
events).
In the three IFs with more than 60 paid staff members (FIFA, FIVB, UCI) we can
roughly distinguish two main phases of professionalization since the 1990s. The ﬁrst
phase (1990s–2010) is marked by strong commercialization, hiring of paid staff and long-
standing presidencies: Hein Verbruggen at the UCI (1991–2005, but whose inﬂuence con-
tinued until 2008), Ruben Acosta at FIVB (1984–2008) and Sepp Blatter at FIFA (1998–
2015). Though a clear-cut delimitation is not possible, a second phase can be located
around 2010 and onwards. In this phase, pressures from stakeholders in sport and society
represent the main driver, notably following scandals. Here as well, a tendency with
Table 6. Dynamic phases of six IFs, drivers and their level of inﬂuence.
FIH, FISA, UWW (<40 staff members)
Phase Phase 1: 1990s Phase 2: 2000–2010 Phase 3: since 2010 Phase 4: tendency
Drivers Olympic revenue share Competition with other Ifs Leadership Commercialization
Pressure from stakeholders
in sport and society
Management practices
Paid experts from within
and outside sport
Level External Internal Internal
FIFA, FIVB, UCI (>60 staff members)
Phase Phase 1 (1990s–2010) Phase 2 (since 2010) Phase 3: tendency
Drivers Commercialization Pressure from stakeholders
in sport and society
Management
practices
Paid experts from within
and outside sport
Leadership
Leadership
Financial support and
development
Level Internal External Internal
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regard to the current focus of the three IFs emerges from interviews. External pressures
seem to push the three IFs to consider and/or implement large-scale and more transparent
management practices.
6. Discussion
Findings support the relevance of themes and categories proposed in Nagel et al.’s (2015)
conceptual framework. However, to operationalize the framework for IFs, a more differ-
entiated approach seemed preferable. As outlined in the conceptual framework, IFs’ pro-
fessionalization is understood in this study as a dynamic process (Amis et al., 2004; Bayle,
2000). In accordance with Amis at al. (2004), we notice that this process is non-linear due
to the unpredictable nature of changes in the political-economic and/or institutional envi-
ronment and their varying inﬂuence on federations. For the time being, we draw three
main conclusions from dynamic phases observed in six IFs and illustrated in Table 6: (1)
dynamic phases of professionalization vary according to IFs’ size; (2) professionalization
inﬂuenced by external pressures is likely to be followed by a slower phase of internally-
driven professionalization; and (3) IFs become increasingly business-oriented and
commercialized.
Conclusions (1) and (2) underpin our ﬁrst research proposition on professionalization
processes being accelerated at speciﬁc moments in time. As Nagel et al. (2015) expected,
competition between sports for scarce ﬁnancial resources (e.g. Olympic revenue share)
and external pressures (e.g. scandals, sponsors’ expected return on investment) trigger
professionalization. In both examples, ﬁnancial resources and the question of means and
ends (Anheier, 2000) play an essential role. As a means, ﬁnancial resources produce com-
petition. As an end, especially in case of massive commercialization, they may raise exter-
nal pressures and question IFs’ legitimacy as autonomous non-proﬁt organizations.
Geeraert, Mrkonjic, and Chappelet (2015) see in IFs’ quest for legitimacy a ‘counterstrat-
egy’ against threats such as losing their autonomy. In accordance with DiMaggio and
Powell (1983), we notice that IFs enter a phase of slower pace when implementing sub-
stantive and enduring incremental changes at the internal level (e.g. management practi-
ces) in reaction to radical change (e.g. external pressures).
Conclusion (3) supports our second research proposition on IFs changing isomorphi-
cally (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to resemble business-oriented organizations on which
they depend in terms of ﬁnancial resources. In their pursuit of ﬁnancial resources to
maintain and/or grow their activities, all six IFs experience what Dees and Anderson
(2003) call ‘sector-bending’. Dees and Anderson deﬁne four types of behavior that are typ-
ical for this process: imitation, interaction, intermingling and industry creation. Imitation
includes the adoption of ‘strategies, concepts and practices of the business world’ (p. 17).
Interaction refers to a blurring that originates from collaboration, competition and part-
nerships between the for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt sectors. Intermingling sees the emergence
of hybrid organizations, with both non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt components. The for-proﬁt
component usually serves the goal of revenue generation. And ﬁnally, industry creation
constitutes a new sector-blurring ﬁeld, ‘populated by for-proﬁt, nonproﬁt and hybrid
organizations looking to harness market forces for social goods’ (p. 18). All four types of
behavior can be found in the IFs analyzed.
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Overall, ﬁve causes (subcategories) appear to be of particular relevance to IFs’ current
professionalization process. These are external pressures, leadership, commercialization,
management practices and organizational culture. Referring to the work of DiMaggio and
Powell (1983), we argue that explanations can be found in isomorphic pressures. It
appears that phases of radical change in IFs are often the result of coercive pressures
resulting from an ever-growing number of actors of sometimes diverging interests. In her
multiple constituency approach to organizational effectiveness of Hellenic NFs, one of
Papadimitriou’s (2000) conclusions is that sport organizations have to ‘identify and recon-
cile the multiple demands of their interest groups’ (p. 43) to be effective. This supports the
hypothesis of Nagel et al. (2015) suggesting that sport organizations’ professionalization is
a response to ‘pressure from the sport system, their competitors, sponsors, media, etc.’ (p.
424). A change in leadership can also be source of radical change, especially in relation to
and following governance issues (e.g. corruption). As Antonakis (2006) points out, the
uncovering of system inefﬁciencies increases the need for ‘effective but also ethical leader-
ship’. New IF-presidents are increasingly being measured against capacities such as
domain relevant expertise, values, moral conviction and trustability. ‘Through their
actions on subordinate leaders and followers and on organizational systems’ (p. 7), Anto-
nakis considers leaders as essential for organizational adaptation to take place.
On the other hand, mimetic and normative isomorphism in IFs rather seems to result
in incremental change. In our study, mimetic pressures and isomorphism can be found in
the subcategories of commercialization and management practices. While scholars tend
to criticize IFs’ trend towards commercialization and business objectives (Croci & Forster,
2004; Forster, 2006; Katwala, 2000), two interrelated aspects are important in order to
understand IFs’ commercialization from a more comprehensive perspective. First, IFs
need ﬁnancial resources in order to carry out their mission. In the past, their main sources
of income were membership fees and donations. Second, IFs’ response to a general
decrease in the funding of non-proﬁts and the simultaneously growing demand for sport
spectating (Robinson, 2003) is to organize more sport events. From an operational per-
spective, IFs’ organization becomes difﬁcult with only membership fees and donations,
especially in the case of fast-growing sports. Using for-proﬁts as models, commercializa-
tion and management practices are closely related to organizational effectiveness and per-
formance, concepts that several scholars have studied in NFs (Bayle & Madella, 2002;
Winand et al., 2013). In their study on pressures on the UK voluntary sport sector, Nich-
ols et al. (2005) emphasize the need to analyze whether the introduction of new manage-
ment practices, as a response to external pressures, enhances organizations’ effectiveness.
These concepts are fairly unexplored in IFs. Findings suggest that the implementation of
management practices such as strategic planning, job descriptions and staff evaluation
help IFs improve their organizational performance. However, the challenge seems to lie in
the alignment of performance objectives the IF aims at and the IF’s mission. Bayle (2000)
identiﬁes six types of performance for NFs (sporting, economic and ﬁnancial, organiza-
tional, internal social, media and societal). In the advent of IFs’ focus on commercializa-
tion, they risk to emphasize the organization’s economic and ﬁnancial performance to the
detriment of other performances.
Organizational culture, for its part, can be classiﬁed under normative isomorphism. As
a new generation of sport managers emerges, we are likely to see a progressive change in
terms of individuals’ behavior for two interrelated reasons. First, a growing program of
18 J. CLAUSEN ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
ire
 D
e L
au
sa
nn
e] 
at 
12
:52
 19
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
education and training in sport management (Chelladurai, 2005; Robinson, 2003) brings
forth individuals with targeted know-how. In addition, an increase of experts from outside
sport can be observed as IFs become more specialized (e.g. lawyers, accountants, market-
ing and communication experts). Second, repeated scandals in IFs entail external pres-
sures to replace discredited leaders by ethical leadership. In the future, a generation of
new sport managers may bring along a more ethical mind-set, marked by previous scan-
dals and formed through education and training programs.
7. Conclusion and Perspectives
Research on IFs is still scarcely developed and existing studies mainly focus on governance
issues in a few prominent sport organizations such as IOC and FIFA (Chappelet &
K€ubler-Mabbott, 2008; Forster, 2006). By looking at six summer Olympic IFs of different
size, this study suggests a systemic approach to the question of causes and dynamics of
IFs’ professionalization processes. Based on Nagel et al.’s multi-level framework (2015)
and themes and categories suggested in it, we identiﬁed eleven subcategories by carrying
out a qualitative content analysis. We further classiﬁed these subcategories into eleven
drivers of and ﬁve barriers to professionalization. Drivers and barriers uncovered in this
study come as a proposal to researchers and sport managers to analyze, understand and
predict IFs’ professionalization as a systemic change process. Three particular ﬁndings
stand out: ﬁrst, professionalization is a dynamic process with phases of acceleration that
vary depending on IFs’ size; second, professionalization triggered by external pressures
entails phases of slower and internally-driven professionalization; and third, IFs become
increasingly business-oriented and commercialized.
At this state, our research makes three main contributions to the study of professionali-
zation within sport organizations and raises a number of new research questions. First,
our review of literature and applicable theories revealed abundant studies on national fed-
erations and clubs, but little research on IFs’ systemic professionalization. Hence, answers
remain to be found to the question: How does the professionalization of an IF affect its
member federations and vice-versa?
Our second contribution is empirical, as the qualitative content analysis allows a ﬁrst
direct comparison of several IFs of different size regarding drivers of and barriers to pro-
fessionalization. A detailed assessment of respective impacts of drivers and barriers on the
professionalization process could help sport managers develop adaptive strategies: How
can researchers measure and assess the intensity and impact of drivers of and barriers to
professionalization on IFs?
Third, our ﬁndings support the research proposition that IFs’ activities and manage-
ment practices tend to become more business oriented. In addition, the hiring of profes-
sionals by IFs results in existing managerial practices being modiﬁed or replaced by new
practices (Dowling et al., 2014). These new practices enable IFs to move away from a sys-
tem based on trust to a system based on expertise in which much greater importance is
given to accountability and strategic planning (Evetts, 2011). Given this context: How do
increasing business logics affect IFs’ mission and functioning in the long term?
Besides above research questions, the following limitations of this study emphasize the
lack of systemic research on IFs’ professionalization. First, we did not discuss the intensity
at which drivers and barriers may trigger or hinder an IF’s individual dynamic of
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professionalization. Findings represented in Table 6 provide a simpliﬁed picture of major
drivers. They do not reﬂect the detailed analysis of IF-speciﬁc dynamics and intensity of
causes. Meanwhile, Table 4 exempliﬁes the underlying and more ﬁne-grained analysis on
which Table 6 is based upon. However, to further investigate the intensity of drivers and
barriers and their impact on IFs’ professionalization processes we recommend studies of
single cases. Second, all six IFs of this study are summer Olympic federations. Though
causes found in the empirical cases correspond largely with those of NFs and the multi-
level framework, the relatively small sample and speciﬁc context do not allow for generali-
zation. Future studies should examine a greater number of both non-Olympic and winter/
summer Olympic federations, as these may face different problems and hence adopt dif-
ferent solutions. Also, the impact of different geographical settings on IFs’ professionaliza-
tion should be considered. And third, we did not analyze decision-making structures as
access to topics such as actual power relations within IFs turned out to be very difﬁcult.
Isolated examples give rise to the assumption that formal decision-making structures (e.g.
statutes) may differ considerably from actual decision-making power. Shifts in the deci-
sion-making power bear the risk of blurring the roles and of professionals getting mud-
dled in politics. Ideally, future studies should ﬁnd ways to analyze if decision-making
powers differ from formal structures and if so, whether discrepancies are anchored in the
past or the result of recent changes, and how these effect the organization’s functioning.
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Bringing a corporate mentality to the governance of sport 
Clausen, J. & Bayle, E. 
 
“C’est un vrai politique, patient quand il le faut, presque brutal quand il le faut 
aussi.” (Jean-Marie Leblanc, former Tour de France Director, 2005)1  
 
“There are very good and professional people in the international sport 
federations. But if you look at the structure and organisation of them it simply 
cannot be good.” (Hein Verbruggen, November 2014) 
 
The link between international sport federations (IFs) and business is still a recent phenomenon, a 
tandem of mutual benefit that has evolved over the last three decades. Before this, by their very nature, 
IFs with their social mission and business as an economic activity constituted two completely distinct 
worlds. The former promoting, above all, pastimes and a forum for social encounters; the latter being 
profit- and outcome-oriented, optimised by strategic planning, performance management and quality 
controls. With increasing public interest in sport spectating (Robinson, 2003) and the explosion of 
broadcasting rights in the 1990s, the worlds of sport and business began to converge under the 
doctrine of performance and effectiveness (Barbusse, 2002). Through the merging of the traditionally 
diverging logics of non-profit sport organisations and business corporations, IFs have become hybrid 
constructs (Bayle, Chappelet, François, & Maltèse, 2011). These transformations have introduced a 
new group of actors: sport managers. For these actors, the business world, with its rules, constraints 
and expectations, has become the point of reference (Barbusse, 2002). For transformations to take 
place, it is indispensable to have people who envisage, introduce and lead change (Amis, Slack, & 
Hinings, 2004). Hein Verbruggen was such a person.  
 
A businessman at heart and by conviction, Hein Verbruggen brought new perspectives into the world 
of cycling and international sport. His leadership, pragmatic marketing and management approach, 
which have profoundly shaped international cycling and the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) as its 
international governing body, were not without controversy. Some describe Hein Verbruggen as a 
person with “opportunistic behaviour and decisions driven by money” (former president of a national 
cycling federation) having an “oversized ego” (former UCI staff member), and allegations from riders 
(e.g. Floyd Landis, Paul Kimmage), the media (e.g. BBC) and a report commissioned by the UCI, 
publicly accused Hein Verbruggen of wrongdoings. 
  
A chapter about Hein Verbruggen could tell many different stories: the story of the visionary UCI 
President; the story of an IOC member and President of SportAccord; or the story of Hein Verbruggen 
as a highly controversial figure in cycling who was confronted by allegations of complicity and laxity 
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in the fight against doping. Rather than sketching a complete picture of Hein Verbruggen as a person, 
this chapter seeks to outline his main influences on the international sporting world through interviews 
with him and by impartially gathering impressions from former employees, contemporary witnesses 
and relevant documents (e.g. newspaper articles, reports). In particular it focuses on two developments 
on which Hein Verbruggen had a significant influence: the professionalisation of structures and 
processes at the UCI by applying corporate management knowledge and practices; and the 
transformation of GAISF (General Association of International Sports Federations, renamed 
SportAccord between March 2009 and April 2017) to become a service provider to IFs and a multi-
sport games organiser. This chapter is the story of Hein Verbruggen’s strong belief in, and reliance on, 
corporate management principles. It is the story of how he introduced these principles to sport, 
adapted them to its reality and how these principles have left a legacy in the world of international 
sport. It is also the story of the ambivalent spirit of IFs since the 1990s: on the one hand, there are all-
powerful presidents, a lack of transparency, doping and corruption scandals and waning credibility; on 
the other hand, major sport events bring together thousands of people from all over the world and 
event revenues allow IFs to finance development projects.  
 
The chapter will focus on Hein Verbruggen the marketing expert and his entry into the world of 
sports, his managerial vision as a businessman and its implementation at the UCI and his reform of 
GAISF to become a service provider to IFs and a multi-sport games organiser. As a person who 
strongly divides opinion, a short overview of some of the allegations against him is also given. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of Hein Verbruggen’s main achievements. Information is based on 
ten interviews – three of which were with Hein Verbruggen and seven with former employees and 
contemporary witnesses – as well as newspaper articles and a data analysis of IOC, UCI and GAISF 
documents.  
 
 
1. The marketing expert who became a key leader in international sport 
Born on 21 June 1941 in Helmond, a city in the province of North Brabant (Netherlands), Hein 
Verbruggen grew up in a region where cycling and enthusiasm for cycling have a long tradition. 
However, he had very little to do with cycling in his younger years, besides perhaps occasions on 
which his father took him to watch a local cycling race. Education was highly valued in the 
Verbruggen family. Hein Verbruggen completed his studies at the Nijenrode Business School in 1964 
and started his first job as Regional Sales Manager for Carnation Belgium the same year, where he 
“received a very good training in sales” (HV, April 2015). Following this first professional experience 
at Carnation (1964-1968), Verbruggen’s move to M&M/Mars was, above all, motivated by his desire 
to enter the marketing sector. He was hired as a Product Manager (1969), a job that had a significant 
impact on his later philosophy and vision. From the age of 28, his understanding of business, 
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marketing, management and strategic planning was largely formed during his years with M&M/Mars, 
a company he described as “one of the best companies in the world” (HV, November 2014). Many of 
the skills he acquired during this time served him well when occupying pivotal positions in the world 
of sports. His strong identification with the Mars principles of “quality, responsibility, ethics and 
efficiency” (HV, April 2015) became his point of reference. But how did Hein Verbruggen get into the 
world of cycling, a world that, at that time, was still the reserve of individuals closely involved with 
cycling and/or who had an emotional attachment to the sport?  
 
1.1. The Mars-Flandria sponsorship deal 
At first sight, Hein Verbruggen’s entry into the world of sport could be considered as a mere 
coincidence: looking for new possibilities to advertise M&M/Mars’ products in a fast-growing 
international food market, the young sales manager convinced his employer to sponsor a cycling team, 
proving a subtle instinct for business, strategic alliances and marketing opportunities. Firstly, sport 
creates emotional links and can improve the image of a product by simple association with the 
emotional experience of the sport, an event, athletes, etc. Secondly, in the 1970s and 1980s, sport was 
discovered to be an ideal platform to promote products. It became a new advertising tool, marking the 
beginnings of sport sponsorship. And thirdly, the particular circumstances of the law in Belgium made 
sport events and teams/athletes ideal partners for the advertising industry: in the 1970s, Belgium was 
one of few countries (along with Scandinavia) where commercial advertising was banned on radio and 
television. Verbruggen opened a new door for M&M/Mars to promote their products by signing a two-
year sponsorship contract with a Belgium cycling team in 1970 (Mars-Flandria). Sponsorship from 
outside the world of cycling was still relatively new at this time. Until the mid-1950s, sponsorship and 
the organisation of cycle races were strictly limited to cycling manufacturers and newspapers. 
However, with the increasing popularity of cycling events and the professionalisation of athletes, 
bicycle manufacturers were unable to finance the sport alone. In 1954, Italian cyclist Fiorenzo Magni 
became an emblem of this change in cycling: his bike company, Ganna, was unable to continue 
financing his team. Magni turned to the German cosmetic company Nivea and signed a contract with 
them as team title sponsor. For the first time in cycling history, a brand outside the world of cycling 
became the sponsor of a cycling team2.  
  
In 1975, persuaded by one of the Mars-Flandria riders, Hein Verbruggen became actively involved in 
cycling as a member of the professional cycling committee of the Royal Dutch Cycling Union 
(KNWU). From this time on, he began to shape the sport from the inside. Just four years later, in 
1979, he became a board member of the Fédération Internationale du Cyclisme Professionnel (FICP), 
then Vice-President of FICP in 1982 and President in 1984. In 1991 he was elected President of the 
UCI. Verbruggen’s career path illustrates how rapidly he grew into the role of a major actor in 
international cycling and in sport in general. This chapter studies the following contributions of 
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Verbruggen: his pragmatic management approach triggering the professionalisation of the UCI and the 
creation of a support base for all IFs in the Olympic movement through the services provided by 
GAISF. 
 
 
2. A pragmatic management approach: the example of the UCI 
 
“If you look around in the world, for me the best management system you can find 
is in the multi-nationals” (HV, November 2014).  
 
Hein Verbruggen was at the head of the UCI for 14 years. When elected President in 1991, the 
Geneva-based UCI headquarters (transferred from Paris to Geneva in 1969) consisted of two people: a 
Polish Secretary General aged 79 and his assistant. When Hein Verbruggen left the UCI in 2005, the 
federation employed 55 staff members, had its headquarters in a new velodrome in Aigle and enjoyed 
a stable financial and patrimonial situation: “I took up a bankrupt federation and when I left there 
were a cycling centre, all paid for, and 14 millions [CHF] of reserves,” (HV, November 2014).  Hein 
Verbruggen has shaped international cycling in many ways. The focus will, however, be limited to 
two particular achievements that reflect his management style, his fine sense of policy and his 
relentless pursuit of improved organisational performance. The first of these achievements was the 
dissolution of the Fédération Internationale de Cyclisme Professionnel (FICP) and the Fédération 
Internationale Amateur de Cyclisme (FIAC), finally conferring the UCI with the role of the sole 
international representative for the governance, promotion and development of cycling worldwide. 
The second achievement was the creation of the UCI ProTour, now known as the UCI WorldTour.  
 
 
2.1. Reversing the effects of the amateur code 
As a member of the Dutch national cycling federation since 1975, Hein Verbruggen first participated 
in a FICP/FIAC Congress in 1978 (Munich). He immediately presented himself as candidate for one 
of three vacant FICP posts and was elected at the following FICP Congress held in Maastricht on 20 
August 1979. His election allowed him to attend the UCI Congress (Geneva, 30 November 1979). 
When Verbruggen was elected to the board of the Luxembourg-based FICP in 1979, there was still a 
long way to go before the FICP and the FIAC would be dissolved. Both federations were formally 
under the direction of the UCI but in reality the UCI had no influence. A closer look at the historical 
evolution of the Olympic Games is required to understand why the UCI, as the international governing 
body of cycling, was flanked by two additional international federations – FICP and FIAC – of which 
only the FIAC was recognised by the IOC 
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The 1964 amateur code excluded from the Olympic Games those athletes:  
 
“who have participated for money, or who have converted prizes into money or, 
without permission of the National Federation within the Rules of the International 
Federation concerned, have received prizes exceeding 50 Dollars in value, and 
those who have received presents which can be converted into money or other 
material advantages”3.  
 
In 1965, the IOC under the presidency of Avery Brundage obliged both the UCI and FIFA to split into 
amateur and professional branches, a separation that other IFs had already undertaken. As stated in the 
minutes of the 63rd meeting of the IOC (1965), “the I.O.C. decided to eliminate the sports whose 
federations govern professional sport and amateur sport at the same time4”. As a result, the UCI 
established the amateur association FIAC and the professional association FICP. It was not until 1981 
that the re-admission of professional athletes to the Olympic Games was accepted by the IOC 
Congress (Baden-Baden, Germany). By 1984, the Olympic Games were effectively open to 
professional athletes.  
 
However, having conceded to the pressure of the IOC, the UCI was caught in the crossfire of the two 
rival federations for the next 27 years. The UCI Management Committee comprised 50% FIAC 
members and 50% FICP members. The two-bloc arrangement was symbolic of the time: while 
communist countries from the Eastern bloc dominated the FIAC, the FICP was characterised by a 
capitalist mindset. “Everything they [FIAC] said, we [FICP] said no. And everything we said, they 
said no,” (HV, November 2014). In this 50/50 deadlock, the UCI President could steer a vote in one or 
other direction by his casting vote. It also meant that decisions supported by the majority were rare. 
This situation virtually paralysed the development of the UCI for 27 years. And it was only with the 
UCI’s official recognition by the IOC in 1993 that professional cyclists could finally participate again 
in the Olympic Games, the first being the 1996 Games in Atlanta. Verbruggen’s efforts were key to 
the reintegration of the UCI into the Olympic Movement and the concentration of decision-making 
powers within the UCI as the sole governing body.  
 
How did the situation unfold? In 1984, the FICP sought a new president to complete the mandate of 
the deceased Josy Esch. Two candidates stood for election: Hein Verbruggen and Germain Simon 
(France). Verbruggen was elected FICP President on 28 November 1984. Six years later (July 1990), 
the UCI found itself without a president after the death of Louis Puig (Spain). Verbruggen stood for 
the post and was elected on 29 November 1991 at the UCI Congress in Berlin. With the division into 
three international federations (FIAC, FICP, UCI) of which only the FIAC was recognised by the IOC, 
the UCI was clearly not in a position to promote the sport it represented as the international governing 
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body. The dissolution of the FIAC and the FICP therefore became Hein Verbruggen’s first objective 
as the newly elected UCI President.  
 
Two events facilitated the unification. On the one hand, the separation of amateurs and professionals 
became superfluous from a sporting point of view due to the abolition of the amateur code (1981). On 
the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) in 1989 simplified the destruction of the “iron curtain” in cycling. The path was clear for the 
rapprochement of the FIAC and FICP blocs. With the support of Juan Antonio Samaranch (IOC 
President from 1980 to 2001), Hein Verbruggen succeeded in his first mission: in 1992, the decision to 
dissolve the FIAC and FICP was passed by the UCI Congress (Orlando, USA). The decision was 
finalised in August 1993, leading to the reintegration of the UCI into the Olympic Movement in the 
same year. Instead of FIAC and FICP, two new councils were created – the Amateur and Professional 
Councils – but these only existed for a short time. During the 1996 UCI Congress (Lugano, 11 
August), the two councils were abolished. The Professional Council was subsequently replaced by two 
commissions: the Road Elite Commission and the Road Commission. Four years later, in order to 
better respond to the growing popularity and success of professional cycling, the UCI announced the 
creation of the Professional Cycling Council (PCC) at the 2000 UCI Congress (Sint Michielsgestel, 28 
January). This Council still exists today and is, among other things, responsible for carrying out the 
technical and administrative organisation of the UCI WorldTour, drawing up the WorldTour calendar 
and drafting regulations specific to UCI WorldTour Teams. The events leading to the creation of the 
PCC demonstrate the UCI’s strong focus on road cycling.  
 
 
2.2. The creation of the ProTour: a means to control the international cycling calendar
  
Cycling lives on the myths of seemingly insurmountable challenges such as the first cycling race in 
1891, from Paris to Brest and back over a total of 1300km, mostly on rough cobbled roads. Since then, 
and because of its potential to attract and fascinate people, cycling has always been exploited by 
different pressure groups: “Historically, sport has always been organised in function of something 
else. This makes sport in general very vulnerable, and cycling in particular as cycling teams have no 
political backing and very little regional embedding” (HV, May 2015). The creation of the Tour de 
France is a perfect example of the instrumentalisation of cycling by press groups:  
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Historical flashback: the creation of the Tour de France and its success 
At the end of the 19th century, Le Vélo was the only daily sports magazine. Its Chief Editor, Pierre 
Giffard, supported Dreyfus5 to the extreme discontent of the cycling and car industries. Nevertheless, 
the cycling and car industries had gained visibility through advertising in the magazine. In 1900, 
when the industrialists created their own daily sports magazine, L’Auto-Vélo, printed on yellow 
paper, a dispute broke out about naming rights. As Le Vélo had reserved the rights for “vélo”, L’Auto-
Vélo finally had to accept legal defeat three years later and rename its magazine L’Auto. In the same 
year, in response to the prospect of losing considerable marketing opportunities, L’Auto launched a 
new strategy to increase its readership: organising the biggest cycling race ever seen – the Tour de 
France. The success of the first Tour de France (1903) afforded L’Auto	   a	   considerable	  advantage	  over	  its	  competitor	  and Le Vélo withdrew its magazine the following year. The yellow paper upon 
which L’Auto was printed became the distinctive colour of the Tour de France leader’s jersey.  
 
Today, the mythical Tour de France is organised by ASO (Amaury Sport Organisation). The Tour not 
only has a long tradition, it also generates significant revenues. Tour de France net earnings in 2014 
totalled approximately EUR 35 million (Aubel, 2015). In 2013, 12 million spectators lined the roads 
for the stages of the Tour de France, a total of EUR 2.2 million prize money was distributed, 4,500 
people were involved in the daily organisation of the event, 35,000 beds were booked by the 
organisation during the Tour’s three weeks, 1,700 journalists were accredited and the Tour was 
broadcast to 195 countries, representing a total of 3.5 billion spectators worldwide6. It is beyond 
doubt that an organisation like ASO does not need the UCI to make its economic model work. On the 
contrary, the UCI has often been an unwanted presence, imposing rules on an event that was created 
just three years after the UCI itself (1900), an event that has given rise to myths and stories of glory 
and defeat, and that has an economic impact like no other cycle race in the world. So far, neither Hein 
Verbruggen nor his successors have managed to control ASO as much as they would have liked. In 
2014, 56 out of 154 race days on the WorldTour calendar were organised by ASO (Aubel, 2015), 
giving the organiser considerable visibility and power. 
 
In the years following the dissolution of the FICP and the FIAC, Hein Verbruggen concentrated his 
efforts on strengthening the UCI’s influence on cycling events which, up until then, had been under 
the control of private commercial organisers, professional teams, broadcasters, sponsors, etc. This lack 
of control not only weakened the UCI’s decision-making role, but also its financial capacities. 
Verbruggen was convinced that an IF has to control its international event calendar in order to govern 
its sport. During his time as a member of the FICP, he recognised the overwhelming power of some 
race organisers, notably the “Société du Tour de France” (now known as ASO), the organiser of the 
Tour de France. The international cycling calendar in this era was literally in the hands of Félix 
Lévitan, Director of the Tour de France from 1962-1987: “ASO, or rather the Sport Director Felix 
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Lévitan, took the decisions, the UCI merely approved them without opposition, reducing its own rights 
and power to an all-time low” (HV, November 2014).  
 
Very quickly, Verbruggen realised that race owners were rather opposed to his vision for developing 
cycling. “The cycling calendar was to 70% France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. And these federations 
didn’t want to change. Every new race that came in was a big fight,” (HV, November 2014). By 
introducing the ProTour as a UCI-owned circuit, he initiated a dynamic offensive against the all-
powerful race organisers. Launched in 2005 during his last year as UCI President, the ProTour brought 
together the 18 strongest cycling teams at the most popular cycle races. Participation was no longer a 
question of good contacts with the organiser (as was previously common practice), but was instead 
based on a team ranking that had its origin in the French classification system. Baulking against the 
curtailment of their so far unlimited rights to choose teams and dates, a power battle arose between 
ASO and the UCI. This struggle continued even after the UCI ProTour had been launched in 2005, 
culminating in 2008 when ASO declared that it would quit the UCI calendar and organise its races 
independently. Having joined forces with other major organisers such as RCS (Giro d’Italia) and 
Unipublic (Vuelta a España), ASO once again demonstrated its powerful position. In the end, the IOC 
had to intervene as a mediator to break the deadlock.  
 
According to Verbruggen, the ProTour was pursuing a strategy of stabilising teams’ financial 
situations by guaranteeing top-level participation. “The weak situation of teams was at the basis of the 
ProTour creation because teams are very vulnerable. We wanted to open new sources of revenues for 
the teams and bind sponsors via participation guarantees,” (HV, April 2015). A process of the 
professionalisation and globalisation of cycle races and teams followed the creation of the ProTour. 
Nowadays, race organisers have to follow a precise, very strict organisation guide, the implementation 
of which is controlled by professional UCI technical delegates. In addition, commissaires officiating at 
WorldTour races are specifically trained and WorldTeams, in order to receive their licence, have to 
prove their compliance with financial, ethical and sporting criteria defined by the UCI. Nevertheless, 
the economy of the system continues to be very fragile. Teams still rely entirely on their main 
sponsors, there is no redistribution of TV rights to the teams and athletes receive poor prize money 
compared to other top professional sports such as tennis (in 2015, number one player Novak Djokovic 
earned USD 21.6 million7 in prize money alone) and golf (for the 2015 PGA8 Championship, a total of 
USD 10 million was distributed to the top 21 players, the winner getting USD 1.8 million9). Even for 
the UCI, the UCI WorldTour has not been very profitable, sometimes even returning a deficit: in 2013, 
high legal costs (CHF 718,000) and expenses for meetings (CHF 812,000) led to a WorldTour loss of 
CHF 96,000 (UCI Annual Report 2013). In 2014, the UCI WorldTour generated modest revenue of 
CHF 240,000 (UCI Annual Report 2014). Furthermore, cycling fans, potential sponsors and partners 
do not display much recognition of the “UCI WorldTour” brand whereas they are highly aware of the 
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three biggest races of the WorldTour: the Tour de France, Giro d’Italia and Vuelta a España10. The 
continuing reform of men’s professional road cycling, with implementation planned for 2017-2019, in 
conjunction with the opposition of key stakeholders (e.g. race organisers, teams), emphasises the 
ongoing struggle between the UCI as the governing body of international cycling and stakeholders’ 
individual needs and interests. 
 
 
2.3. Hein Verbruggen’s achievements as UCI President   
Hein Verbruggen’s legacy to cycling and the UCI results from a well-thought out and well-conducted 
transformation of a traditional, volunteer-run and slightly dusty sport federation into a dynamic, 
professional and trendsetting federation. According to Verbruggen, one of his most important 
achievements is hardly mentioned: the reform of professional riders’ working conditions by 
introducing social protection measures through an agreement between the UCI and economic partners 
(in particular social insurance guarantees and minimum salaries for road cyclists), signed in Lisbon on 
12 October 2001. Before this, “riders were slaves, often paid in kind, not in cash. And the UCI 
Rulebook of a meagre seven to eight pages didn’t contain any social protection for riders,” (HV, April 
2015). Today, the major challenges of guaranteeing viable working conditions for professional cyclists 
are still considerable as significant (budgetary) differences exist amongst teams and short-term 
sponsor agreements undeniably introduce uncertainty.  
 
Another important change of paradigm under Hein Verbruggen was the creation of the ProTour (now 
known as the WorldTour). Even though the ProTour didn’t entirely wrest the overwhelming power 
from race organisers such as ASO, it is today a solid component of the international road cycling 
calendar, bringing together the world’s best road cycling teams and delighting millions of fans on the 
roadside and in front of the television. Critics claimed that the new series format embodies several 
disadvantages:  teams are mainly racing for points (as these allow them to participate in major races) 
and riders have to accumulate a questionable amount of race days; the stars and figureheads have 
disappeared behind the “team” product while, at the same time, this product is extremely fragile and 
dependent on short-term sponsorship contracts. Twelve years after launching the ProTour (2005), race 
organisers and cycling teams are voicing significant dissent to the ongoing Reform of Men’s 
Professional Cycling, which was supposed to be finalised by 2017. The criticisms come from several 
sides. WorldTour teams, for example, do not see their sporting needs reflected in the reform as race 
days are set to increase, contrary to an initial agreement.  
 
Hein Verbruggen also promoted the commercialisation of the UCI World Championships and UCI 
World Cups. Cycling World Championships and World Cups now guarantee the UCI a major source 
of income, mainly through the sale of sponsorship and TV rights. Verbruggen marketed these rights at 
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“a time where it was still rare to buy and/or sell TV rights” (former UCI staff member, March 2015). 
When contracting TV rights with the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in the early nineties, the 
UCI immediately harvested some ten million Swiss francs. The contract with EBU included the 
commercialisation of all UCI World Championships with broadcasting guarantees, as well as penalties 
should the contract not be respected. A beneficial side effect of this TV deal was that it allowed the 
UCI to attract new international sponsors such as Tissot and Shimano, generating considerable 
additional income. 
 
From an administrative perspective, staff numbers at the UCI gradually increased in line with the 
changes initiated by Verbruggen: three paid staff members in 1991, five in 1993, 20 in 1997 and 55 in 
2005 (not including the staff of the World Cycling Centre). As a consequence of this increase, the UCI 
headquarters moved to its new home, the World Cycling Centre (WCC) in Aigle, Switzerland, 
inaugurated on 14 April 2002. Since this time, the WCC has been a driving force in the worldwide 
development of cycling (e.g. coaching and mechanics’ courses, athletes’ training).   
 
As UCI President, Hein Verbruggen was a strong, forward-thinking leader who was calculating and 
tireless in the pursuit of his objectives. The evolution of the UCI, its professionalisation and the 
globalisation of cycling are in many ways the result of his vision and the implementation of this 
vision. However, Hein Verbruggen admitted, with a note of self-criticism, that his last term as UCI 
President lacked the motivation with which, hitherto, he had restructured and developed the UCI to 
become one of the biggest international sport federations: “I was fed up after 10 years and I had to 
stay another 4 years because Samaranch told me: ‘You should not only build it [World Cycling 
Centre], but you should also run it.’ And that was just 4 years too much. I didn’t do the job at the level 
as I did before because my motivation was gone,” (HV, November 2014).  
 
Hein Verbruggen retired as UCI President in 2005, becoming a UCI Honorary President and co-opted 
member of the UCI Management Committee until 2008. The move to become a co-opted member was 
unusual for an honorary president as the latter role typically means quitting all executive functions. 
Some interpreted this situation as Verbruggen’s desire to cling on to power. But it was also a tactical 
move undertaken in light of his ambitions regarding the IOC: only individuals occupying an executive 
function in an IF can be elected as IOC representatives. Hein Verbruggen became an IOC member in 
1996. To remain an IOC member and continue his work on the Coordination Commission for the 
Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing in 2008 (2001-2008), to which he had been elected as 
Chairman in November 2001, he had to occupy an executive function within an IF. And the UCI 
Constitution offered a solution: according to Article 47, the UCI Management Committee, comprising 
15 members at this time, could co-opt two additional members. Verbruggen was co-opted as a member 
of the UCI Management Committee in 2005, immediately after the election of his successor Pat 
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McQuaid. He was also named UCI Vice-President of International Relations due to his numerous 
contacts with, and functions within, the IOC (President, Chairman and active member of various 
commissions), SportAccord (President from 2004-2013) and ASOIF, the Association of Summer 
Olympic International Federations (Vice-President from 2000-2003).  
 
 
3. GAISF/SportAccord 
“Under the Presidency of Verbruggen the organisation has been able to move forward in a 
way that perhaps would not have been possible under any other President” (former 
SportAccord staff member, March 2013). 
 
Though Hein Verbruggen relinquished his function as UCI President in 2005, it was clearly not to take 
a break or retire from international sports. In 2004, as GAISF Vice-President, he replaced Un-Yong 
Kim to become acting President. Kim was forced to resign over allegations of bribery and illegally 
acquiring public money intended for the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) over which he 
presided. After three years as acting President, Verbruggen was officially elected GAISF President in 
2007. Established in 1967, GAISF represents all IFs. However, its role as a link between IFs and the 
IOC and as a platform for exchange and the defence of IFs’ common interests dates back to the 1920s.  
 
The collective representation of International Sport Federations 
Through the Conseil National des Sports (CNS), which brought together the leaders of the principal 
sport federations, France actively organised a counter-power to the IOC by promoting initiatives to 
organise collective world championships. In 1918, the CNS established the conditions for the creation 
of international groups, the equivalent of today’s IFs. This project could have resulted in France 
assuming a hegemonic position within each IF and in a Comité International des Sport (CIS). Aware 
of the threat to the Olympic movement, Pierre de Coubertin, with the help of some international 
leaders and IOC members, interrupted this attempt. As an alternative he established a Permanent 
Office of International Sports Federations in 1921, with headquarters in Paris (Grosset & Attali, 
2009). The office organised regular meetings between Olympic federations and the IOC, facilitating 
dialogue. However, non-Olympic federations were excluded. Having no representation vis-à-vis the 
IOC and no platform for exchange between federations to defend their common interests, 26 
federations came together in Lausanne in 1967 to create the General Assembly of International Sports 
Federations, replacing the Permanent Office of International Sports Federations. The Assembly was 
rebranded the General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) in 1976 and became 
SportAccord in 2009. In April 2017, it was renamed the Global Association of International Sports 
Federations, hence adopting its former acronym GAISF. 
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Hein Verbruggen became a leading figure in international sport through his position at GAISF. 
However, he came close to turning his back on GAISF in 2004: “GAISF didn’t do anything. Nothing. 
We had two meetings per year that never lasted longer than 59 minutes. I was wondering what I was 
doing there!” (HV, November 2014). The inactivity of GAISF does not come as much of a surprise if 
one takes a closer look at the power structures of international sport in the late 1980s and through the 
1990s. Under Juan Antonio Samaranch, Avery Brundage’s concerns about the Olympic Games’ losing 
Coubertin’s values of amateurism were quickly thrown overboard and an accelerating 
commercialisation of the Games and international sports in general began. Before 1984, organising the 
Olympic Games was regarded as a financial risk that consumed considerable public funds. This 
changed with the 1984 Los Angeles Games. A private group under the direction of Peter Ueberroth 
(President and General Manager of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Organising Committee) organised 
the Games through a combination of corporate sponsorships, private fundraising and television deals. 
For the first time, the Games were not sponsored by a government, yet they generated a considerable 
profit of USD 250 million11. Nowadays, this strategy is common practice.  
 
The huge success of the Los Angeles Games opened up new financial opportunities for the 
IOC. However, athletes remained the main element in attracting spectators, sponsors and broadcasters 
to invest in the Games. The IOC itself does not have direct control of athletes; athletes are registered 
with their national sport federations who, in turn, are affiliated to their IF or continental federation. In 
other words: to organise the Games and monetise its increasing popularity by selling broadcasting and 
sponsorship rights, the IOC depends on the IFs and their athletes. Though Samaranch knew this, he 
did not want to afford the IFs too much power and freedom of action. What Samaranch needed was an 
organisation to control the IFs. Supporting a person such as Un-Yong Kim to head the GAISF, with 
his dreams of becoming IOC President one day, was an astute move by Samaranch. Kim’s efforts to 
consolidate his position as a future candidate for the IOC presidency made him easily influenced; it 
seems clear that he followed Samaranch’s instructions. To Hein Verbruggen, in turn, the inactivity of 
GAISF was a thorn in his side: “We were trying to put some life in this organisation and he [Kim] just 
wanted to keep us down and low,” (HV, November 2014). Kim’s and Verbruggen’s presidency 
strongly contrasted with each other. 
 
 
3.1. SportAccord: a service provider to international sport federations 
”The [international sport] federations are poorly organised. It’s not always a matter of 
competences. It’s often the lack of resources, financial but also human resources. So I 
thought that we should have an organisation, SportAccord, to help the international sport 
federations” (HV, November 2014). 
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Once he became GAISF President, Hein Verbruggen quickly set up various departments. From his 
time as UCI President he knew the problems and challenges that IFs have to face only too well. One 
major challenge was the lack of consensus. With between 150 and 200 member federations (i.e. 
national sport federations) and each member being primarily interested in improving its own situation, 
Verbruggen commented: “it’s like a bucket full of frogs which all go in different directions” 
(November 2014). According to Verbruggen, the almost impossible mission of gathering members’ 
objectives into shared goals is at the root of organisational and structural problems in international 
sport. In addition, rising expectations from stakeholders and spectators, the commercialisation of sport 
events and competition between top-level sports to be accepted (or remain) on the Olympic 
Programme exposes IFs to severe pressure. Considering the growing need for specific competencies 
and expertise (e.g. anti-doping), the old structure of a volunteer-run association had reached its limits. 
At the same time, many IFs were not in a financial position to hire experts. Against this background, 
GAISF gradually assumed the role of a service provider for IFs. Verbruggen set up different 
departments to encourage and facilitate knowledge sharing among members and provide resources and 
expertise in relevant areas such as anti-doping, integrity, good governance, social responsibility and 
digital media. 
  
In 2009, GAISF became SportAccord. By this time, its services no longer solely supported IFs, but 
also the IOC. The IOC divides IFs into four categories: summer Olympic IFs (ASOIF - Association of 
Summer Olympic International Federations), winter Olympic IFs (AIOWF - Association of 
International Olympic Winter Sports Federations), IOC-recognised IFs (ARISF - Association of 
Recognised International Sport Federations) and non-recognised IFs (AIMS - Alliance of Independent 
Recognised Members of Sport). All are members of SportAccord. For a non-recognised IF to be 
recognised, the federation has to fulfil a number of criteria. Officially, the power to recognise an IF 
lies with the IOC. But as the federation first has to be a member of SportAccord, the initial due 
diligence of verifying whether the IF is in compliance with IOC criteria falls to SportAccord. This 
makes SportAccord an important pillar of the IOC’s recognition policy. 
 
Over the years, IFs’ efforts to become recognised posed a new but basic question: what is a sport? 
Under Verbruggen, SportAccord established a set of criteria to define what a sport is, a task that not 
even the IOC has ever undertaken. The full list of criteria is given below: 
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List of criteria to define what is a sport 
• “The sport proposed should include an element of competition” (thus excluding e.g. yoga or 
Pilates).  
• “The sport should not rely on any element of ‘luck’ specifically integrated into the sport” 
(such as e.g. horse racing).  
• “The sport should not be judged to pose an undue risk to the health and safety of its athletes 
or participants” (such as e.g. base-jumping).  
• “The sport proposed should in no way be harmful to any living creature” (thus excluding e.g. 
fishing).  
• The sport should not rely on equipment that is provided by a single supplier. 
 
To be recognised by the IOC, IFs further need to prove the existence of an anti-doping policy 
compliant with the WADA Code, regularly stage World and Continental Championships, exhibit 
independent governance structures and “the sport it governs must be practised and organised in more 
than 50 countries worldwide”12. Even though IFs’ recognition by the IOC is officially governed by the 
Olympic Charter (Rules 26 and 27), the actual evaluation is conducted by SportAccord. The IOC, on 
the other hand, through its “Evaluation criteria for sports and disciplines”, carries out an assessment 
of the contributions of Olympic IFs to the overall success of the Olympic Games (number of tickets 
sold, number of spectators, TV audience, etc.).  
 
 
3.2. SportAccord Convention 
In an environment where Samaranch was pursuing maximum control over the IFs and where GAISF 
President Kim sought to increase his own influence within the IOC, even if this meant thwarting 
suggestions and initiatives from IFs, new and innovative ideas were not a priority for GAISF. But this 
did not stop Verbruggen trying. As the IOC has to meet its four associations (i.e. ASOIF, AIOWF, 
ARISF, AIMS) at least once a year, he suggested organising an annual meeting over several days, 
bringing together all IFs. Thus the idea of the SportAccord Convention was born. Despite the 
successful first organisation of the SportAccord Convention in 2003, Kim continued to vehemently 
reject Verbruggen’s initiative, almost causing him to give up. But with Kim’s forced departure in 
2004, the SportAccord Convention lost its harshest critic and Verbruggen became acting GAISF 
President in the same year. Emphasising the significance he assigned the SportAccord Convention, 
Verbruggen rapidly created a separate structure for the convention, owned 50% by GAISF, 30% by 
ASOIF and 20% by AIOWF. Since 2003, the SportAccord Convention has been an annual must for 
IFs. Over several days, it brings together about 2,000 delegates, key decision-makers from sport 
governing bodies and the sports industry. It constitutes a platform for connecting, exchanging 
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knowledge and participating in shaping the world of international sport. Today, revenues from the 
SportAccord Convention represent the most important source of GAISF income.  
 
Hein Verbruggen stepped down as SportAccord President in 2013. Under Marius Vizer, Hein 
Verbruggen’s successor at the head of SportAccord, the convention was rebranded as SportAccord 
Convention World Sport & Business Summit, thus accentuating Vizer’s goal of further converging the 
world of sport and the world of business. However, his idea of organising joint World Championships 
every four years did not receive a favourable response from the IOC. Joint World Championships 
would strongly resemble the Olympic Games, with the difference that all IFs, Olympic or non-
Olympic, IOC-recognised or not, could participate. For the first time since 2003, and as the result of 
growing discrepancies between Vizer’s objectives and the IOC, the IOC did not hold an Executive 
Board meeting at the 2015 SportAccord Convention (Sochi). The subliminal conflict between the IOC 
and SportAccord exploded into a crisis when, in his opening speech and in the presence of IOC 
President Thomas Bach, Marius Vizer openly decried the IOC as being “expired, outdated, wrong, 
unfair and not at all transparent13”. Lacking the support of its members (20 SportAccord members cut 
ties or suspended membership in the aftermath of the 2015 Convention), Vizer ultimately stepped 
down from his position as SportAccord President in May 2015. Since this time, SportAccord’s 
structure has been considerably reduced and the organisation of multi-sport games entirely.  
 
 
3.3. SportAccord: organiser of global multi-sport games 
Supporting IFs to professionalise against a background of growing external expectation and financial 
pressures was Hein Verbruggen’s first objective upon becoming GAISF President. Affording IFs, in 
particular small IFs, a certain visibility was another. The Olympic Games are one of the world’s most 
important international sport events. At the time of writing this chapter, 35 of the 92 IFs that are full 
members of GAISF are on the Olympic programme (28 summer + 7 winter). Recognising the potential 
of the 57 sports that are not, and perhaps never will be, on the Olympic programme, Verbruggen had 
the idea of grouping sports together to organise multi-sport games: “Amongst the 92 federations I had 
14 or 15 martial arts. So I had Martial Arts Games. I had 4 or 5 federations that were mind games, 
bridge, chess and so on. So I created the Mind Games,” (HV, November 2014). Thanks to 
Verbruggen’s close relationship with Jacques Rogge (IOC President 2001-2013), the IOC supported 
the idea at the time. The economic model of the multi-sport games was similar to the Olympic Games: 
SportAccord owned the rights and appointed a local organiser who paid an organising fee 
(approximately CHF 3 million for the Martial Art Games and CHF 1.2 million for the Mind Games). 
SportAccord coordinated the development of the games together with its member IFs. Under the 
auspices of SportAccord, the SportAccord multi-sport games gave non-Olympic sports and disciplines 
worldwide exposure. Since 2010, two World Combat Games (2010 in Beijing, 2013 in St. Petersburg) 
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and four World Mind Games (2011-2014 in Beijing) have taken place. The first edition of the World 
Urban Games were scheduled for 2016 and the World Beach Games for 2017. However, not everyone 
welcomed this evolution: “Some people in the IOC wondered if it was the role of international sport 
federations to organise games,” (HV, November 2014). The concept of SportAccord multi-sports 
games ground to a sudden halt with Marius Vizer’s opening speech at the 2015 SportAccord 
Convention and his replacement as SportAccord President shortly after. 
  
Verbruggen insisted that, under his presidency, SportAccord was not seeking to rival the Olympic 
Games, nor was it meant to be a counter-power to the IOC. He considered SportAccord primarily as a 
service provider to the IFs and the multi-sport games as a means of affording visibility to IFs that will 
perhaps never be included on the Olympic Programme. While his goal for SportAccord was to be 
financially independent of the IOC through the organisation of the SportAccord Convention and the 
multi-sport games, he recognised the need to work closely with the IOC for the benefit of the 
federations: “If you want to be a service operator to the federations, if you want to do something for 
them, you can’t do it without the IOC, without a close cooperation between SportAccord and the 
IOC,” (HV, May 2015). The immediate dropping of multi-sport games and other services (except anti-
doping) and the return to its former acronym (GAISF) in 2017 under the new president demonstrate 
the current priorities of GAISF: maximum alignment with IOC requirements and minimum conflict, 
even if this means diminishing services to IFs. 
 
 
4. Allegations against Hein Verbruggen 
While his time as UCI President passed generally uncontested and was rather evaluated in relation to 
the UCI’s growing prosperity and structure, rumours and allegations came to the surface after Hein 
Verbruggen relinquished the UCI presidency in 2005. In 2008, a BBC investigation into UCI finances 
pointed a finger at payments made to the UCI nearly two decades earlier. The investigation focused on 
payments of USD 3 million to the UCI in the 1990s by a Japanese cycling event organiser. These 
payments coincided with the admission of the keirin into the Olympic programme. Keirin racing is 
one of the most popular disciplines for betting in Japan, “commanding tens of millions of dollars in 
gambling revenue every year”14. The disclosure of the payment fed rumours that keirin racing had 
bought its way into the Olympic Games and spawned allegations against the UCI for having accepted 
money in exchange for their support. Voted onto the Olympic Programme in 1996, keirin made its 
first appearance at the 2000 Olympic Games. However, although rumours persisted for some time, the 
BBC could not offer definitive proof of bribery. According to Verbruggen, “the whole thing was an 
idea of the IOC, who suggested the UCI to arrange a deal with the keirin organiser, including a 
payment to support UCI projects,” (HV, March 2015). 
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After the keirin accusations, other allegations against Hein Verbruggen followed. In 2010, Floyd 
Landis claimed that cycling’s governing body, and Hein Verbruggen and his successor Pat McQuaid 
respectively, had helped cover up a positive test by Lance Armstrong at the 2001 Tour de Suisse. The 
UCI brought a case against Landis who was found guilty of defamation by a Swiss court in 2012. And 
in 2011, both Hein Verbruggen and Pat McQuaid launched suits against Paul Kimmage, a journalist 
and former rider, for defamation. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) gave its verdict in May 
2016, ruling that Kimmage should pay CHF 12,000 in defamation damages to Verbruggen and barred 
him from claiming that the latter “knowingly tolerated doping, concealed test results, is dishonest, 
does not behave responsibly, did not apply the same rules to everyone, did not pursue Lance 
Armstrong after he had been provided with a backdated certificate”15.  
 
Finally, the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC) report, published in March 2015 after a 
year-long investigation by an independent UCI Commission, cleared Pat McQuaid and Hein 
Verbruggen of outright corruption, but queried their governance methods and accused them of 
preferential treatment in specific cases. The CIRC Report states that Verbruggen ran the UCI “in an 
autocratic manner without appropriate checks and balances”16. Verbruggen undeniably governed the 
UCI with a strong executive power, himself overseeing internal, external and political issues and 
taking decisions “almost unchallenged”17. And he knew how to deploy his charm and use arguments 
to get people to act as he desired. 
  
All these allegations underline the picture of Hein Verbruggen as a highly controversial figure. A lot 
of people who worked with him describe him as a charismatic, professional and tireless visionary who 
transformed the UCI, international cycling and sport in general: “Not many had the capacities of Hein 
Verbruggen to manage politics and business. He has an exceptional capacity to approach people and 
always find support” (former UCI employee, March 2015). Meanwhile, his opponents, including 
former cyclists and leading administrators in cycling (e.g. former UCI President Brian Cookson) and 
anti-doping (e.g. Richard Pound), criticised him repeatedly for his management style and alleged 
wrongdoings related to doping practices in cycling. This chapter has no intention of taking a position 
regarding the above allegations. Meanwhile, with doping allegations being a dominant and recurring 
topic in the last years of Verbruggen’s life, the following section suggests an alternative view of 
doping based on the general perception and evolution of, and motives for, the fight against doping in 
sport. While the issues of the perception and evolution of the fight against doping are perhaps less 
publicly discussed, they strongly influence the current discourse on doping in cycling. 
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4.1. An alternative perspective on doping 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the use of performance-enhancing drugs was more often 
considered a scientific miracle than an immoral, fraudulent or even health-threatening practice. It was 
only in the 1960s that a number of interrelated rumours and events began to change the perception of 
doping. A first rumour theorised that, during World War II, German soldiers were given steroids to 
create “hyper-masculinised, ultra-aggressive combat soldiers” (Beamish & Ritchie, 2005). The second 
rumour was that athletes from communist countries had been consciously given steroids during the 
Cold War to boost performance in international sporting competitions and hence symbolically 
emphasise the power of the Eastern Bloc. The spectacular success of Eastern Bloc athletes together 
with a growing awareness of the health risks of using performance-enhancing drugs led to a change in 
the perception of doping. And with the death of Tom Simpson on Mont Ventoux in front of spectators 
and the TV audience, doping suddenly also had a face in cycling. Simpson died on 13 July 1967 from 
a combination of amphetamines (found in his jersey pocket), immense physical effort and heat. He has 
since become the emblematic figure of doping in cycling.  
 
In the following years, doping bans were, above all, dominated by considerations about the riders’ 
health. However, it wasn’t until the 1990s with the rise of EPO and the Festina Affair that doping was 
considered morally unacceptable. While for decades conventional doping and its relatively predictable 
impact on performance seemed to be widely accepted among cyclists, the emergence of EPO unhinged 
the entire system. The performance increase through EPO was without precedent. Cyclists were 
alarmed as an equality of opportunity was no longer a question of chemical substances but of 
sophisticated, expensive medical procedures. In 1995, the UCI, under the presidency of Hein 
Verbruggen, commissioned a Lausanne-based laboratory to develop a procedure to detect EPO. But 
even this could not prevent the negative effects that the Festina Affair would have on the perception of 
cycling. The image of a sport engrained with doping persists to this day as much as the question of 
who is to blame. 
 
As described above, the perception of doping has changed over the decades: from first being 
considered as a scientific achievement, then as a health-threatening product and finally as a morally 
illicit practice. Today, and more than in any other sport, the fight against doping in cycling seems to be 
exploited not only for moral arguments but also as a political tool under the guise of which individuals 
or groups of individuals pursue personal interests. With the general commercialisation of sport since 
the 1980s (Robinson, 2003), there is more than just the practice of sport and the athletes themselves at 
stake. As the market value of sport has grown, so have the interests and investments of various actors 
including the media, sponsors and sport officials. In this context, doping represents an economic threat 
to sports in general and a detriment to the image of international sport federations in particular. 
Perhaps the important question is not “Whose fault is doping in cycling?” but “What dimensions other 
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than moral principles should/could be taken into consideration in the fight against doping?” How 
about actors’ economic motives (e.g. threat of losing sponsorship money because of doping scandals) 
and key individuals’ political objectives (e.g. election campaigns in which the fight against doping 
sells well)? To this we can also add Aubel’s (2013) sociological perspective, which focuses on 
cyclists’ working environments (e.g. team structure, functional and economic model, physical 
preparation conditions and the employment framework offered to riders) and the question of elements 
that trigger doping practices and how the working environment should be modelled to prevent them. 
 
A recent paper by Kayser and Tolleneer (2017) in the Journal of Medical Ethics discusses yet another 
interesting perspective. It picks up on the debate of two diametrically opposed discourses on ethics 
and doping. The first discourse “defends strict prohibition enforced by surveillance and punitive 
repression” (p.1), but is practically impossible to meet in terms of technology and surveillance; the 
second “finds anti-doping illogical and calls for the liberalisation of doping” (p.1), but is likely to 
encourage excessive drug use by some athletes. Thus considering both discourses as non-realisable 
idealistic goals and raising the question of the possible aggravating effects of anti-doping policies, the 
authors adopt a systemic analysis to debate ethical aspects of relaxed anti-doping rules accompanied 
by harm-reduction measures. Kayser and Tolleneer acknowledge the incompleteness of their analysis 
(e.g. not taking athletes’ decision-making capacities into account). However, their critical questions on 
the ethics of doping, situated at the interface of two extreme discourses, put forward the experimental 
dimension of their idea, rather than moralising a topic with an immensely complex and ambivalent 
past (scientific miracle, superhuman strength, humans as war machines) and the current problem of 
assessing often intangible parameters including “limits to testing technology and surveillance density” 
(p. 1).  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hein Verbruggen undeniably divides opinions; he has as many supporters as opponents. Verbruggen 
has been celebrated as the person who made the UCI a successful, professional IF. Yet he has been 
attacked with serious allegations regarding his leadership style and approach to the fight against 
doping. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a complete picture of Hein Verbruggen as a person or 
comment on the different allegations, but rather to identify his impact on the organisational and 
functional structure of sport organisations during his time at the UCI and GAISF as well as his ability 
to implement corporate principles in sport organisations and to explore new ideas. His legacy is 
twofold: with regard to his time as UCI President, Verbruggen professionalised the administrative 
structure. He also triggered globalisation and the worldwide marketing of cycling by concentrating 
regulatory power in the UCI. “He came from business and it is his achievement that cycling 
professionalised” (former UCI employee, March 2015). Hein Verbruggen had a vision and his 
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pragmatic, charismatic management became the guarantor of this vision. At the same time, critics 
reproach him for a failure to effectively combat cycling’s internal ethical problems, such as 
widespread, organised doping practices and the associated dangers (athletes’ health, fair-play, sporting 
ethics, etc.), in order to favour the sporting spectacle and financial profits and to create mythical 
champions such as Lance Armstrong. The image of Hein Verbruggen as a powerful, almost invincible 
president evokes other strong leaders from the same period such as Primo Nebiolo (IAAF President 
from 1981 until his death in 1999), Ruben Acosta (FIVB President from 1984 to 2008) or Sepp Blatter 
(FIFA President from 1998 to 2015). These federations (UCI, IAAF, FIVB, FIFA) have in common 
that they were all coordinated by strong executive presidents who were committed to capitalising on 
sporting events, hence laying the foundation for the commercialisation of their federations. Hein 
Verbruggen was a guiding hand as President of the UCI and GAISF, surrounded by capable helpers 
thanks to his “fine sense for people, their motivation and their competencies” (former UCI staff 
member, 2005). Many who worked closely with him over the years described him as a tirelessly 
dedicated visionary, a good listener, always available, a perfectionist. His opponents accuse him of 
corruption and autocratic management. Hein Verbruggen died on 14 June 2017 at the age of 75.  
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ABSTRACT
Research question: This study examines the conditions and
configurations that particularly influence International Federations’
(IFs) commercialisation.
Research method: Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis
(csQCA) is used to determine the conditions that are related to an
IFs’ commercialisation. Sixteen interviews were conducted in six
Olympic IFs and one international sport umbrella organisation.
Results and findings: The findings reveal a variety of high and low
commercialisation configurations. Specialisation is a key condition
in both high and low commercialisation, and social media
engagement is central in high commercialisation. Strategic
planning and low accountability have low degrees of overlap with
high commercialisation outcomes. With 13 out of 22 IFs achieving
high levels of commercialisation, the findings demonstrate that IFs
are increasingly developing business-like behaviours.
Implications: The findings highlight the importance of
specialisation and social media engagement to achieve high
commercialisation. However, when IFs assume a monetisation
agenda, there are associated risks such as stakeholder legitimacy,
mission drift, goal vagueness and adherence to good governance
principles.
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Introduction
Contemporary International Sport Federations (IFs) are not only custodians of their
sport’s policies, rules and regulations, but they also manage business activities such as
major international sport events (Clausen & Bayle, 2017) and commercial contracts (Cor-
nelissen, 2010). The changing nature of sport can be seen in national sport federations
(NFs) through to sport clubs (Girginov & Sandanski, 2008; Skinner, Stewart, &
Edwards, 1999). Research on IFs has examined athletes’ involvement in policy-making
(Thibault, Kihl, & Babiak, 2010), stakeholder engagement in major events (Parent &
Séguin, 2007) and, more recently, social media communication (Belot, Winand, &
© 2018 European Association for Sport Management
CONTACT Josephine Clausen josephine.clausen@unil.ch Institute of Sports Studies, University of Lausanne,
Géopolis, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
EUROPEAN SPORT MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/16184742.2017.1406970
Kolyperas, 2016). Corruption within the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Chap-
pelet, 2011; MacAloon, 2011), doping in cycling (Wagner, 2010) and governance issues
within wealthy IFs such as the International football federation (FIFA) (Bayle &
Rayner, 2016; Pielke, 2013) create global headlines and have dominated the IF research
agenda.
General trends in nonprofit organisations (NPOs) such as marketisation, commercia-
lisation and commodification of services and activities (Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner,
2016) have been linked to a process of professionalisation in sport (Nagel, Schlesinger,
Bayle, & Giauque, 2015; O’Brien & Slack, 2004) that is evidenced in rationalisation (e.g.
rules, workflow) and the adoption of corporate management practices (e.g. strategic plan-
ning) to enhance organisational effectiveness and efficiency (Chantelat, 2001; Dowling,
Edwards, & Washington, 2014).
This study seeks to explore the commercialisation of IF’s sporting events by analysing
various factors of influence (conditions) and their underlying configurations (combination
of conditions). The research question is: which conditions and configurations influence
IFs’ commercialisation? Through identifying, analysing and discussing conditions and
configurations, an explanatory model for IFs’ pathways towards high commercialisation
is proposed. As commercialisation in international sport has focused on cash rich organ-
isations such as FIFA and the IOC, we are particularly interested to see if and how smaller
IFs achieve commercialisation. In examining if commercialisation is a viable strategy to
diversify revenue, we assess IFs’ capacity to achieve self-sufficiency in times of increasing
competition for scarce resources. The study draws on research on commercialisation in
NPOs (Abeza, O’Reilly, & Reid, 2013; Bryson, 1988) and sport organisations in particular
(Bayle & Robinson, 2007; Forster, 2006); internal documents (e.g. IF statutes and regu-
lations) and interviews with IF employees.
Commercialisation of nonprofit organisations
The environment for NPOs has become increasingly competitive, complex and uncertain,
thus entailing the need to manage resources more efficiently and effectively (Froelich,
1999; Maier et al., 2016; Young, 1998). NPOs’ increasing market orientation can be
seen as ‘an adaptive strategy for ensuring that organisations receive the necessary
resources for accomplishing their mission and carrying out their activities’ (Macedo &
Carlos Pinho, 2006, p. 538). Others fear that NPOs’ increased blending of service-oriented
and profit-oriented objectives may lead to goal and mission displacement (Dees & Ander-
son, 2003; Toepler, 2004; Weisbrod, 1998). On one hand, there is a risk of mission displa-
cement and loss of values; on the other hand is the prospect of self-sufficiency, reduced
uncertainty and greater efficiency and effectiveness in an increasingly complex, challen-
ging environment (Toepler, 2004) with commercialisation as an opportunity for obtaining
additional resources to be used for good purposes (Clotfelter & Ehrlich, 2001).
While commercial ventures are not new in the NPO sector, the dramatic acceleration in
recent decades is striking and sits within a context of political, economic and technological
issues. Two major aspects contribute to this evolution: declining private and public grants
and subsidies, as well as individual and corporate donations (Smith, 2016), the traditional
cornerstones of NPOs’ financial model (Froelich, 1999); and, as a result of the first,
growing competition between nonprofits for scarce funding (Smith, 2010) and with for-
2 J. CLAUSEN ET AL.
profits that offer similar services (Coghlan & Noakes, 2012). In response, over the past 20+
years, NPOs have increasingly sought to diversify their revenue (Carroll & Stater, 2009;
Chang & Tuckman, 1994). In sport management literature, several studies conclude
that decreasing private donations and public funding trigger national sport organisations’
commercialisation (Berrett & Slack, 2001; Houlihan, 1997; Nagel et al., 2015).
Commercialisation of nonprofit sport organisations
In sync with the NPO literature, studies of national sport organisations note that commer-
cialisation is related to a sector-wide resource shortage in (government) funding (Nagel
et al., 2015; O’Brien & Slack, 2004) and strategies of resource diversification employed
in response to financial uncertainty (Wicker, Feiler, & Breuer, 2013). Considering the con-
sequences of both financial uncertainty and new managerial approaches, Robinson (2003)
described sport as ‘a business that competes for scarce consumer resources, requiring a
business approach to its management, utilising professional management techniques’
(p. 308). Robinson distinguishes four factors that have given rise to the commercialisation
of sport: a trend towards sport spectating, changing technologies, increasing competition
and professionalisation of sport management.
Amis, Slack and Hinings’ (2004) research provided evidence that sport organisations
are compelled to professionalise and commercialise in order to adapt to an increasingly
complex and competitive environment. Professionalisation has led to increases in the
level of specialisation and the hiring of paid staff (Kikulis, 2000; Thibault, Slack, &
Hinings, 1991). It is assumed that sport organisations with more paid staff, greater func-
tional division of labour and formalised procedures can commercialise more easily as the
expert knowledge of paid staff allows them to adapt more readily to environmental
changes. Analysing the performance of French national sport organisations, Bayle and
Robinson (2007) relate the staff headcount to four phases of professionalisation: first
restructuring (5–10 staff), functional specialisation (15–40 staff), coordination (>40
staff) and professionalisation of the network (>100 staff).
While NPO’s and national/state sport organisations have had to respond to environ-
mental financial uncertainty, and notably a decline of public contributions, IFs have not
experienced a significant income gap. On the contrary, the initial member contribution-
based funding model was augmented by commercial activities. The concept of IFs’ com-
mercialisation can be linked to their professionalisation and internationalisation (Forster
& Pope, 2004), while revenues through commercial activities are mainly related to sport
events, including broadcasting and sponsorship rights (Li, MacIntosh, & Bravo, 2012;
Slack, 2004). The sport event has become an exchange currency that offers businesses
‘increased awareness, image enhancement, product trial or sales opportunities’ (Cromp-
ton, 2004, p. 268).
Bayle (2015) describes IFs’ events as ‘the heart of their economic model’ (p. 109).
Revenue from hosting fees, broadcasting and sponsorship rights allow IFs to finance
their operational activities (e.g. administration), build up reserves and increase their
self-sufficiency. While the initial arguments behind commercialising IFs’ events were to
ensure a federation’s economic stability and to increase its development activities,
Krieger (2016) claims that, in the case of the International Association of Athletics Federa-
tion (IAAF), as early as 1977 ‘the technical development initiatives served as a tool to
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justify the commercialisation of the IAAF and athletic sport’ (p. 1345). Forty years later,
the development argument is still being used to justify commercialisation, especially by
rich IFs. Though FIFA emphasises that it aims to ‘share the success of the FIFA World
Cup with our member associations’ (FIFA, 2016), IFs’ commercialisation has been
linked to excessive and negative effects such as corruption, fraud and bribery (Geeraert,
2015; Pielke, 2013). The lack of accountability mechanisms is particularly related to com-
mercially successful sport organisations (Forster, 2006; Pielke, 2013) such as the IOC
(Tomlinson, 2005) and FIFA (Cornelissen, 2010).
Based on previous research, we classify the commercialisation of IFs’ sporting events as
an adaptive strategy (Maier et al., 2016; Toepler, 2004; Tuckman, 1998) that both pursues
the goal of mission accomplishment in an increasingly competitive environment (Macedo
& Carlos Pinho, 2006), and seeks to capitalise on the constantly growing commodification
of sport worldwide (Hargreaves, 2002; Slack, 2014). Our main goal is to determine how IFs
commercialise and which conditions impact their commercialisation. Moreover, by using
the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) we seek to empirically uncover con-
figurations (i.e. combinations of conditions) that favour high levels of commercialisation.
Our approach is informed by literature on commercialisation in the NPO sector (e.g. stra-
tegic planning) and in nonprofit sport organisations in particular (e.g. professionalisation,
broadcasting, social media), as well as data sources described below.
The method and technique of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
QCA is particularly deployed in sociology and political science (Thiem & Dusa, 2013).
Management scholars used QCA to determine the performance of various organisational
aspects such as strategy (Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008), high-tech consider-
ations (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010) and innovation (Ganter & Hecker,
2014). Winand, Rihoux, Qualizza, and Zintz (2011), Winand, Rihoux, Robinson, and
Zintz (2013), and Winand and Zintz (2013) used QCA in analysing the performance of
Belgian NFs, and Pinson (2017) in heritage sporting events. Dichotomous crisp-set
QCA, as we use in this study, is particularly suitable for the analysis of causal complexity
in small N-samples, that is, for less than 30–40 cases (Rihoux, 2006). Our study includes 35
cases.
QCA is both a comparative case-oriented research approach and a technique based on
set theory and Boolean algebra (Marx, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2014; Ragin, 1987). As a research
approach, it integrates ‘the best features of the case-oriented approach with the best fea-
tures of the variable-oriented approach’ (Ragin, 1987). Instead of being limited to a small
number of hermeneutic in-depth case studies as in the traditional case-study approach,
QCA allows researchers to explore and summarise the data of several cases and test
hypotheses (Berg-Schlosser, De Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2008; Ragin & Rihoux, 2004).
The main strength of QCA as a research technique is that it enables the assessment of
complex combinations of key factors (independent variables, called conditions) that are
causally relevant to a specific phenomenon (dependent variable, called outcome). Focusing
on causal configurations and context rather than on isolated aspects, the method assumes
that organisations demonstrate multiple conjunctures of independent variables that may
still lead to the same outcome (equifinality). Based on the idea that a complex phenom-
enon cannot be fully understood by examining isolated causal conditions but calls
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instead for a systemic and holistic approach (Fiss, 2007), QCA allows for causal complex-
ity. Due to the context-specific notion of causality and the use of relatively small samples,
QCA findings cannot be statistically generalised.
To assess the influence of several conditions on the phenomenon of IFs’ commerciali-
sation, we used the technique of crisp-set QCA (csQCA). csQCA translates base variables
(called raw data) into two possible truth-values: true (or present) or false (or absent), gen-
erally denoted as 1 and 0. We used two software programmes to analyse conditions and
configurations. Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2011) transforms the raw data into a dichotomous
data table called truth table. The truth table may produce five types of outcome: configur-
ations with the outcome value [1], configurations with the outcome value [0], contradic-
tory configurations (‘C’), logical remainders (‘R’) and cases for which the outcome is
unknown. Contradictory configurations are those that lead ‘to a [0] outcome in some
observed cases, but to a [1] outcome for other observed cases’, while logical remainders
are ‘logically possible combinations of conditions that have not been observed among
the empirical cases’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008).
The second software fs/QCA (Ragin & Davey, 2009) enables us to further analyse the
truth table and carry out a necessity analysis for conditions, which is similar to the idea
of significance in statistical models (Legewie, 2013). A condition is deemed necessary if it
must be present for a certain outcome to occur. Two empirical measures of fit should be
reported here: consistency and coverage. Consistency assesses the degree of necessity of a
causal condition for a specific outcome to occur. Ranging from 0 to 1, a score of 1 indicates
perfect consistency, a score of 0, no consistency (Ragin, 2006). While Ragin (2008) sets the
cut-off point for consistency at 0.75, Schneider andWagemann (2010) note that ‘in the case
of necessary conditions, the consistency value should be set much higher’ (p. 10). Maggetti
and Levi-Faur (2013) suggest a consistency score should be above 0.90 or 0.95. However,
they also advise against applying thresholds in a mechanical way, pointing out that hypoth-
esis testing calls for higher consistency compared to exploratory analysis. Consistency
should also be evaluated for the solution term(s), indicating the degree to which a solution
term represents a subset of an outcome (Marx et al., 2014).
Looking at the second measure of fit, coverage determines the empirical relevance of
consistency values (Ragin, 2006). Coverage values need to be large enough to exclude tri-
viality. Legewie (2013) sets the lowest boundary for coverage at >0.5. For both consistency
and coverage measures, choices are research specific and hence need to be substantiated
with arguments (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).
We used Tosmana for so-called Boolean minimisation, an operation that produces par-
simonious solutions (called minimal formula) of identified causal regularities. In the
process of Boolean minimisation, causal conditions that are redundant for an outcome
to occur are removed, hence transforming long, complex expressions into shorter ones.
Let us take two cases that both lead to the same outcome and differ in only one causal
condition: A*B*C→D and A*C→D. In this example, B can be removed, as it is irrelevant
for the outcome. As perfect causal symmetry is unlikely to occur in social phenomena
(Rihoux & De Meur, 2009), the Boolean minimisation has to be carried out for both con-
figurations leading to a [1] and a [0] outcome.
Before assessing conditions, researchers must first assess the outcome. In what follows,
we describe how the commercialisation of Olympic IFs is measured, explain how con-
ditions are selected and assessed and, finally, set forth how we collected data. The analysis
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focuses on Olympic IFs for two reasons: firstly, for QCA studies it is advisable to compare
‘cases that share a sufficient number of features and that operate within sufficiently com-
parable contexts’ (Rihoux, 2006); secondly, the IOC requires Olympic IFs to publish
annual financial statements which are essential for our evaluation of their commercial
revenues.
Measurement of the commercialisation of Olympic IFs
IFs’ commercialisation is evaluated by analysing the contribution of event revenue (i.e.
hosting fees, broadcasting and sponsorship rights) to the federation’s overall income.
Membership and licence fees are not considered as commercial revenues in this study.
Fees are generally kept low to allow the membership base to grow rather than maximising
profits through it. Although exceptions may exist, an increase in revenues from these fees
is more likely to be related to the growing community of a sport than to commercialisation
of the fees. We examined financial statements from 2012–2015 (summer Olympic IFs),
and 2010–2013 (winter Olympic IFs). These periods correspond to the last completed
summer and winter Olympic cycles. Notably, this period afforded good data as the IOC
Code of Ethics set out since 2010 that Olympic IFs should audit and disclose financial
statements on an annual basis. The aim of this requirement is to increase pressure on
IFs to use their Olympic revenue only for Olympic purposes.
Furthermore, and as most IFs do not divide Olympic revenue into four equal annual
years, incomplete financial statements during an Olympic cycle could result in a biased
picture of IFs’ financial situation. In order to reduce data inconsistencies, we apply nor-
malisation rules1 to IFs for which financial statements are not available for the entire
Olympic cycle. In addition, as IFs organise their flagship events (e.g. World Champion-
ships) on an annual, biennial or quadrennial basis, commercial revenue from events
may be subject to cyclical fluctuations and a focus on one or two financial years is
likely to produce an incomplete picture.
As we are particularly interested in configurations that lead to high levels of commercia-
lisation, defining and justifying a threshold for high commercialisation based on theoretical
considerations is required. Studies that distinguish levels of commercialisation forNPOs are
limited. Enjolras (2002) analysed Norwegian voluntary sport clubs to see whether commer-
cialisation through competitions, renting of infrastructure facilities, ancillary activities and
sponsors was≥50%. In the case of IFs, commercialisation mainly relates to sport event rev-
enues (i.e. competitions and sponsors). Infrastructure facilities income and ancillary activi-
ties (e.g. lotteries, cafeteria) are irrelevant for Olympic IFs. Besides commercial revenues, all
Olympic IFs receive revenue from the IOC and annual affiliation fees frommembers. Sup-
ported by the example of Enjolras, we set the threshold for high commercialisation at≥50%
income from commercial revenues.
Defining and assessing conditions for commercialisation
After having determined the outcome, we need to define and assess causal conditions of
potential empirical and theoretical relevance to IFs’ commercialisation. We should note
that the periods of investigation for the outcome and the conditions are not fully congru-
ent. While the outcome is historical (2010–2013 and 2012–2015), the conditions are based
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on recent data (2015–2017). Most IFs only publish their financial statements one to two
years after the end of the fiscal year as these are approved by the IF’s congress, which, in
several cases, only meets every two years (e.g. FIH – International Hockey Federation, FIS
– International Ski Federation). The levels of commercialisation we could calculate for the
22 IFs that publish financial statements represent averages. We selected a period where
data were available for the maximum possible number of the 35 Olympic IFs, accessing
information from the IFs’ websites and in public documents. We assumed that IFs’
average level of commercialisation is representative of the period of analyses. Securing a
large contract or losing an important sponsor cannot be fully captured due to the time
lag. Nevertheless, we are confident that this limit does not undermine our research results.
Conditions were deduced from multiple sources such as scholarly articles (literature
review), documents (e.g. IF statutes, IOC Evaluation Criteria, web articles) and interviews
with representatives from an umbrella organisation in international sport (Association of
Summer Olympic International Federations – ASOIF) and IFs. Nine conditions emerged
(Table 1) and due to the objections we rejected certain conditions.
The remaining four conditions emerged from the literature – strategic planning (Stone
& Brush, 1996), specialisation (Bayle & Robinson, 2007), use of social media (Abeza et al.,
2013; Belot et al., 2016) and low accountability (Chappelet, 2011; Forster, 2006) – and were
reinforced through interviews and further readings of documents (e.g. IOC Evaluation
Criteria, Olympic Agenda 2020, reports, web articles). Considering the lack of models
capable of explaining NPOs’ levels of commercialisation, these conditions suggest a start-
ing point for future research rather than claiming to be exhaustive.
Strategic planning (STRAT)
Strategic planning is considered a tool to envision, implement and achieve future goals,
and is designed to provide structured processes that facilitate important decisions and
actions (Bryson, 1988). An effective strategy formulation depends on ‘the consistency
across rhetoric (what people say), choices (what people decide and are willing to pay
for) and actions (what people do)’ (Bryson, 1988, p. 77). A key objective of NPOs’ strategic
plan is resource acquisition (Stone & Brush, 1996). Business partners may have various
motivations to tie up with an IF (e.g. visibility, image, culture). However, they all presum-
ably seek return on investment. We, therefore, assume that IFs establish a clear strategic
plan with which profit-oriented stakeholders can identify and to which they want to affili-
ate. A strategic plan is considered here as a tool for IFs both to attract and maintain
business partners and manage their expectations, but also to promote and develop the
sport. We, therefore, investigate whether the IFs have a strategic plan in 2016 that
covers a minimum of three years. If a strategic plan ends in 2016, we examine whether
the IF has a subsequent plan for 2017 and a minimum of three subsequent years. As
the threshold, we use the presence [1] or absence [0] of such a strategic plan.
Specialisation (SPEC)
IFs’ specialisation is evaluated using Bayle and Robinson’s (2007) classification of profes-
sionalisation: first restructuring (5–10 staff), functional specialisation (15–40 staff), coordi-
nation (>40 staff) and professionalisation of the network (>100 staff). Coordination is
characterised by ‘an increase in the level of support staff, and the hiring of marketing
experts and management and coordination staff’ (p. 262). Using the coordination phase
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as a threshold allows us to differentiate IFs into high (≥40 staff, [1]) and low (<40, [0])
specialisation based on headcounts from 2016. This condition is termed ‘specialisation’
in reference to Bayle and Robinson’s classification stage of ‘coordination’. We assume
that increased delegation of operational tasks to experts facilitates IFs’ commercialisation.
Social media engagement (SOCM)
Capable of creating high levels of social interaction (Smith & Stewart, 2010), sport organ-
isations focus increasingly on relationship marketing (Abeza et al., 2013) to attract and
retain fans, business partners, media and customers/consumers. Social media represent
a cost-effective relationship tool to engage sport fans (Abeza et al., 2013; Belot et al.,
2016). IFs’ social media engagement is evaluated on the basis of the report Sport on
Social 2017 published by REDTORCH (2017), a data-driven communications agency.
The report provides an analysis of Olympic IFs official account followers and the
number of interactions each account (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube)
had from February 2016 to February 2017. We split IFs into those with a higher social
media engagement ([1]) being ranked in the top 50%, and those with a lower social
Table 1. Initial list of conditions for IFs’ commercialisation.
Conditions Source Indicators Applicability
Financial
independence from
the Olympic
revenue share
(ORS)
Interview (ASOIF) Part of the ORS in the overall
revenue (average
dependence of summer
Olympic IFs on the ORS
according to ASOIF: about
40%)
Findings of a first analysis
showed that the condition was
sufficient to achieve high
commercialisation. As in the
case of decreasing private
donations and public funding
in general NPO literature, we
believe this view is too
simplistic.
Social/digital media Literature (Abeza et al.,
2013; Belot et al., 2016) +
IOC Evaluation Criteria +
interview (e.g. UWW)
Social media engagement (i.e.
Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram)
Yes
Media coverage IOC Evaluation Criteria No. of media accreditations at
the World Championships
Numbers are only available for
2012 and before.
Specialisation Literature (Bayle &
Robinson, 2007)
Headcount, departments,
hierarchical levels
Yes
Strategy/goal
orientation
Literature (Stone & Brush,
1996) + IOC Evaluation
Criteria + interviews (e.g.
FIH, FIS)
Strategic plan Yes
Governance/
accountability
Literature (Chappelet,
2011) + reports + web
articles + IOC Evaluation
Criteria + Olympic
Agenda 2020
Transparency, evaluation,
representation, complaints
and responses
Yes
Popularity of the
sport
Interviews (e.g. FIH, FISA) No. of licence holders Most IFs do not know the number
of licence holders as these are
registered with their NFs.
Capacity of
innovation
Literature (e.g. Ratten,
2016; Wemmer &
Koenigstorfer, 2016;
Winand, Qualizza, Vos,
Scheerder, & Zintz, 2013)
Introduction of new activities
and services and their
benefits
Very time-intensive research. The
general lack of research on this
topic requires a study of its
own.
Revenue
diversification
Literature (Carroll & Stater,
2009)
No. of cash sponsors and their
part in the overall revenue
Information is not available.
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media engagement ([0]) being ranked in the lower 50%. The International Triathlon
Union (ITU) was 18/35 and could be classified either with the top 50% or the lower
50%. As the ITU did not achieve a top 10 position in any of the four social media channels,
it is classified with the lower 50%. Other thresholds such as a minimum of two top 10 pos-
itions were also tested. However, these were rejected as they led to contradictory
configurations.
Low accountability (LACC)
Five accountability dimensions were determined. Transparency, participation, evaluation
and complaints and responses were based on the accountability definition of the One
World Trust and its Global Accountability Framework (Chappelet, 2011). Transparency,
is ‘reliable financial information’ (Chappelet, 2011, p. 321), thus we use annual financial
statements for at least the last three years of the respective Olympic cycle. Participation
is defined as ‘stakeholders participation in its [IOC’s] decisions’ (p. 322). Our proxy
measure is whether athletes have a voting right in the decision-making body (i.e.
board), and whether this right is anchored in the IF’s statutes/constitution. The dimension
of evaluation encompasses ‘official and public reports’ (p. 325) and is measured by regu-
larly published reports or detailed meeting documents. Finally, complaints and responses
and the question of whether IFs have an ethics commission or equivalent body is referred
to under ‘ethics commission’ (p. 325). We added the dimension of presidential term limits
in statutes/constitution as the IOC has encouraged IFs to introduce term limits to
strengthen good governance and transparency.
We use a six-point scale with the categories being ‘very low’ for 0/5 dimensions, ‘low’
for 1/5 dimensions, ‘rather low’ for 2/5 dimensions, ‘rather high’ for 3/5 dimensions, ‘high’
for 4/5 dimensions and ‘very high’ for 5/5. A score of [1] signals the presence of low
accountability (very low, low, rather low) and a score of [0] indicates the opposite
(rather high, high, very high accountability). Detailed research findings are available
from the corresponding author upon request.
Data collection
Measuring IFs’ level of commercialisation is exclusively based on financial statements and
reports published by the 35 Olympic IFs (winter Olympic IFs: 2010–2013, summer
Olympic IFs: 2012–2015). The selection and assessment of conditions is premised on
scholarly articles, documents and interviews. Secondary literature includes IOC docu-
ments (e.g. IOC Evaluation Criteria, Olympic Agenda 2020), IFs’ statutes and regulations
(e.g. to determine IFs’ accountability in terms of participation, complaints and term limits)
and other public documents from IFs (e.g. minutes from board and congress meetings,
annual reports, strategic plans), reports (e.g. Action for good governance in international
sport organisations/Play the Game, Sports governance observer/Play the Game), websites
(e.g. to determine number of staff) and web articles (e.g. from Inside the Games).
A total of 16 interviews were conductedwith 6 IFs (i.e. FIFA, FIH, FIS, FISA,UCI, UWW)
and 1 umbrella organisation (i.e. ASOIF). We used existing contacts to approach several IFs
of varying size, all based in Switzerland. The interviews were essential in the selection of con-
ditions and provided examples of individuals’ actual experiences and opinions. With the
exception of FIFA, at least one interview was with a strategic level and an operational level
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employee. The women (4) and men (12) interviewed had served 3 to 35 years in their IF.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face (10), by phone (3) and by email (3), the latter partici-
pants were asked for additional and explanatory information where necessary. Face-to-face
interviews lasted between 30 and 105 minutes, were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim
(13 in English, three in French) and anonymised (A1-F1). To increase trustworthiness, inter-
viewees were asked to confirm the transcribed interview. The changes requested concerned
informal language and sensitive information.
Findings
Thirteen of the 35 Olympic IFs did not publish any financial statements for the period
investigated (indicated as ‘no public financial statement’ in Table 2), while 10 IFs pub-
lished all financial statements for the respective period. IFs for which the outcome
could not be measured due to lack of available financial statements are excluded from
the analyses. Among the 22 cases, 13 achieved high commercialisation (COMM),
meaning commercial activities (≥50%) outweigh revenues from the Olympic revenue
and member affiliation fees and nine cases show lower levels of commercialisation. In
one exceptional case (i.e. FIE), private donations represent the main source of income.
The raw data table integrates the four conditions associated with the given outcome of
high or low event commercialisation.
Using Boolean algorithms, the dichotomous data of csQCA and by transforming the raw
data from the 22 IFs into dichotomousdata, the truth table reveals five configurations result-
ing in high commercialisation ([1]), three resulting in low commercialisation ([0]) and two
contradictory configurations ([C]). Contradictory configurations are quite frequent in
csQCA, and require deeper immersion into the cases (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). By chan-
ging the threshold for specialisation to ≥30 staff instead of ≥40, the contradictions can be
resolved. A possible explanation is that IFsmainly employ administrative staff with the goal
of increasing organisational efficiency and efficacy, while NFs employ many coaches to
further the nation’s sporting success. Therefore, a smaller headcount in IFs can still be
indicative of the phase of coordination. The adaptation of the initial threshold is supported
as the new threshold,which affects four IFs (i.e. BWF, FIH, FINA, IIHF), does not entail new
contradictory configurations. Based on these arguments and using the new threshold, the
truth table is now void of contradictions (Table 3).
Binary conditions allow two possible answers, hence splitting ‘the logical space into two
equal parts’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008): 1 or 0. The number of possible configurations for our
study (4 conditions) is thus 16 (24). The truth table only indicates observed configurations
(n = 11), excluding logical remainders (n = 5). At the extremes are two IFs (FISA, ISSF) with
low commercialisation ([0]) and a [0] value in all four conditions, and one IF (WR) with
high commercialisation ([1]) and a [1] value in all four conditions. The tilde (∼) signifies
logical negation. As the necessity analysis demonstrates (Table 4), only ∼SPEC can be con-
sidered as a necessary condition according to Maggetti and Levi-Faur (2013) and Legewie
(2013): referring to cases that achieve low levels of commercialisation (∼COMM),
∼SPEC shows perfect consistency (1) and a coverage large enough to exclude triviality
(0.75). Using Ragin’s (2006, 2008) consistency threshold of 0.75, even though this is
below the recommended 0.90, one can argue that two other conditions are necessary to
10 J. CLAUSEN ET AL.
Table 2. Raw data table (35 IFs).
International sport federation (IOC terminology) STRAT SPEC SOCM LACC COMM
AIBA – International Boxing Association – – – – No public financial statement
BWF – Badminton World Federation Yes (2016–2020) 30 Low No 78% (2012–2015)
FEI – International Equestrian Federation No 85 High No 78% (2012–2015)
FIBA – International Basketball Federation – – – – No public financial statement
FIE – International Fencing Federation No 14 Low Yes 3% (2013–2014)
FIFA – International Association Football Federation Yes (2016–2026) 450 High No 88% (2012–2015)
FIG – International Gymnastics Federation – – – – No public financial statement
FIH – International Hockey Federation Yes (2014–2024) 34 Low No 56% (2013–2015)
FIL – International Luge Federations – – – – No public financial statement
FINA – International Swimming Federation No 33 High Yes 70% (2014–2015)
FIS – International Ski Federation No 60 High No 57% (2010–2013)
FISA – World Rowing No 17 Low No 37% (2012–2015)
FIVB – International Volleyball Federation – – – – No public financial statement
IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federation – – – – No public financial statement
IBU – International Biathlon Union – – – – No public financial statement
IBSF – International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation – – – – No public financial statement
ICF – International Canoe Federation – – – – No public financial statement
IGF – International Golf Federation – – – – No public financial statement
IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation No 30 High No 56%
IHF – International Handball Federation – – – – No public financial statement
IJF – International Judo Federation No 15 High Yes 64% (2012–2014)
ISAF – World Sailing No 25 Low Yes 13% (2012–2013)
ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation No 7 Low No 2% (2012–2015)
ISU – International Skating Union Yes (2014–2018) 17 High No 63% (2013–2015)
ITF – International Tennis Federation Yes (2016–2024) >80 Low Yes 75% (2012–2015)
ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation No 26 High Yes 50% (2012–2014)
ITU – International Triathlon Union Yes (2014–2017) 20 Low Yes 40% (2013–2015)
IWF – International Weightlifting Federation No 13–19 Low Yes 17% (2013–2014)
UCI – International Cycling Union No 79 High No 70% (2012–2015)
UIPM – International Modern Pentathlon Union – – – – No public financial statement
UWW – United World Wrestling No 24 High No 29% (2014–2015)
WA – World Archery Federation No 14 High No 31% (2012–2014)
WCF – World Curling Federation Yes (2015–2018) 12 Low No 20% (2012–2015)
WR – World Rugby Yes (2010–2020) 75 High Yes 97% (2012–2015)
WTF – World Taekwondo Federation – – – – No public financial statement
Notes: STRAT, strategic planning; SPEC, specialisation; SOCM, social media engagement; LACC, low accountability; COMM, commercialisation.
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achieve high levels of commercialisation: SPEC with a consistency score of 0.77, especially
considering its coverage (1.00), and SOCM, likewise with a consistency score of 0.77 but
lower coverage (0.83).
In this study, the Boolean minimisation for high commercialisation produces three
terms that together build the descriptive formula. The minimisation formula for low com-
mercialisation produces two terms (Table 5). The first formula reads as follows: configur-
ations of the present sample that demonstrate high specialisation, or high social media
engagement in combination with either low accountability or a strategic planning,
achieve high levels of commercialisation (COMM). The second formula reads: configur-
ations of the present sample that demonstrate either low specialisation in combination
with low social media engagement, or low specialisation in combination with high
accountability and absence of a strategic planning, result in low levels of commercialisa-
tion (∼COMM).With fs/QCA software we can further assess the raw and unique coverage
of the solutions, as well as combined solution coverage and consistency. Raw coverage
assesses the empirical relevance of cases that cover a given path (Marx et al., 2014),
while unique coverage ‘indicates how much a path uniquely covers’ (Thomann, 2015).
Finally, solution coverage indicates how much (percentage) the configurations combined
account for the membership in a given outcome (Fiss, 2011). Table 5 underlines the
importance of SPEC (77%) to achieve high levels of commercialisation. It also reveals
that the combination of ∼SPEC and ∼SOCM accounts for 78% of membership in the
low commercialisation outcome.
Table 3. Truth table without contradictions.
Federation STRAT SPEC SOCM LACC COMM
FISA, ISSF 0 0 0 0 0
WCF 1 0 0 0 0
FIE, ISAF, IWF 0 0 0 1 0
UWW, WA 0 0 1 0 0
ITU 1 0 0 1 0
BWF, FIH, ITF 1 1 0 0 1
ISU 1 0 1 0 1
IJF, ITTF 0 0 1 1 1
FEI, FIS, IIHF, UCI 0 1 1 0 1
FIFA 1 1 1 0 1
FINA 0 1 1 1 1
WR 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: STRAT, strategic planning; SPEC, specialisation; SOCM, social media engagement; LACC, low accountability; COMM,
commercialisation.
Table 4. Necessity analysis.
COMM ∼COMM
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
STRAT 0.46 0.75 0.22 0.25
∼STRAT 0.54 0.50 0.78 0.50
SPEC 0.77 1.00 0.00 0.00
∼SPEC 0.23 0.25 1.00 0.75
SOCM 0.77 0.83 0.22 0.17
∼SOCM 0.23 0.30 0.78 0.70
LACC 0.31 0.50 0.44 0.50
∼LACC 0.69 0.64 0.56 0.36
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Discussion
Findings from 22 Olympic IFs provide a useful starting point in terms of pathways to high
commercialisation. At least three observations can be made from the QCA analysis: firstly,
high specialisation (SPEC) is a key condition for the outcome of high commercialisation;
secondly, social media engagement (SOCM) correlates with high commercialisation;
thirdly, strategic planning (46%) and lack of accountability (31%) show relatively minor
overlaps with the outcome of high commercialisation.
Specialisation in national sport organisations has been related to increasing workloads
and growing work requirements in terms of skills and complexity of tasks (Amis, Slack, &
Hinings, 2004; Thibault et al., 1991). At the international level, the increasing demand for,
and revenues from, major sporting events are evidenced by a progressive hiring of paid
staff. However, the cases of ISU, IJF and ITTF show that high event commercialisation
is not just related to the number of paid staff. ISU, IJF and ITTF still achieve high
event commercialisation through high social media engagement in combination with
either a strategic plan (ISU) or low accountability (IJF, ITTF). Specialisation of roles
and specialisation due to growing organisational size both contribute to an IFs’ levels of
commercialisation.
An IF conducting commercial activities through social media states that ‘the digital
communication gives federations the ability to create a value proposition. We have
millions of people that like [our sport]. If we can connect them somehow through
social media tools, then this [community] becomes a valuable commercial product’
(A1). Through interactions with their community, sport organisations can strengthen
brand awareness, image and fan loyalty (Coulter, Bruhn, Schoenmueller, & Schäfer, 2012).
With respect to the third observation, the relatively small degree of overlap of strategic
planning and lack of accountability with the outcome of high event commercialisation
calls for further investigation. Forster’s (2006) contention that commercialisation has
increased IFs’ governance issues could be linked to the finding that some of the highly
commercialised IFs show low accountability (i.e. FINA, WR, IJF, ITTF), but many do
not. Meanwhile, recurring external pressures related to scandals may well have given
rise to an increased implementation of accountability measures. As FIFA displays a
Table 5. Analysis of intermediate solutions.
High commercialisation (COMM)
SPEC + SOCM*LACC + SOCM*STRAT → COMM
Single case coverage BWF, FIH, ITF, FEI, FIFA, FIS, IIHF, UCI, FINA, WR FINA, IJF, ITTF, WR ISU, FIFA, WR
Consistency 1 1 1
Raw coverage 0.769 0.308 0.231
Unique coverage 0.538 0.154 0.077
Solution consistency: 1
Solution coverage: 1
Low commercialisation (∼COMM)
∼SPEC*∼SOCM + ∼STRAT*∼SPEC*∼LACC → ∼COMM
Single case coverage FIE, ISAF, IWF, FISA, ISSF, ITU, WCF FISA, ISSF, UWW, WA
Consistency 1 1
Raw coverage 0.778 0.444
Unique coverage 0.556 0.222
Solution consistency: 1
Solution coverage: 1
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high level of accountability in our findings, doubts may be raised about the accuracy of this
conclusion. A report published by Play the Game (2015) attributed a high governance
index to FIFA, even though several high-ranking FIFA officials had just been arrested
for corruption. This example emphasises the difficulty of distinguishing between formally
implemented measures of good governance (facade), and truly effective measures
(reform). Future research could examine the relation between IFs’ commercialisation
and their existing/potential governance issues.
The low relevance of strategic planning (only six out of 13 IFs have a strategic plan) is
rather surprising. Allison and Kaye (2011) refer to nonprofits’ strategic planning as a
means to confront business issues such as revenue generation, risk management and
cost control, all aspects which IFs face. Talking to a member of the FIH management,
this rationale seems to hold true for their case:
How do you future-proof your business? What is the business model going to be in 10, 15
years’ time? Marketing and sponsorship are changing. It used to be focussed on television.
Now it’s moving towards digital. The model will change and you have to be aware of that
and adapt. (A3)
Analysing planning practices of nonproﬁt and entrepreneurial organisations, Stone and
Brush (1996) provide a possible explanation for the current situation: the dilemma of
meeting needs for commitment and demands for legitimacy. The former refers to the
need for informal interaction to develop shared perceptions in a context of multiple con-
stituencies and diverging interests. The latter refers to demands for goal-oriented action
and the use of formal systems that accompany acquired legitimacy. Clearly deﬁned
goals might prevent certain constituencies from committing themselves to participate in
the organisation. The example of FIS, which is in the process of developing a strategic
plan, exempliﬁes this dilemma: ‘The biggest challenge concerns differences between
national federations regarding needs and expectations. Sport, and perhaps the desire for
more money, is the only common denominator’ (C2). At the same time, to satisfy legiti-
macy demands from resource suppliers, IFs must demonstrate managerial practices such
as formalisation and clear goal setting. Caught between the two pressures, many IFs see-
mingly prefer to keep their goals vague and adaptable to the individual expectations of
various constituencies.
A final finding is IFs’ apparent business-like behaviour (13 out of 22 IFs analysed
demonstrate high event commercialisation). Businesses seek profit maximisation, distri-
bution of profits is based on exchange, goals are specific and clear, and actors’ motiv-
ation is material; member-serving NPOs, on the other hand, seek member benefit
maximisation, distribution of profits is based on solidarity, goals are complex and
diffuse and actors’ motivation is solidaristic (Toepler & Anheier, 2004)). Maier et al.
(2016) observe increasing isomorphism between NPOs and businesses through the
arrival of new actors who pursue their own goals and interests rather than collective
goals (Toepler & Anheier, 2004), competition for scarce resources (Maier et al., 2016)
or new strategic management approaches (Tuckman, 1998). A few recent studies
(Phelps & Kent, 2010; Wagner, 2010) have provided research on isomorphism
between IFs and businesses.
We argue that IFs’ increasing business-like behaviour has several origins, notably the
professionalisation and internationalisation of sport, as well as growing commodification
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and financial uncertainty. The desire and capacity of some IFs to capitalise on commodi-
fication has resulted in growing competition. Responses to financial uncertainty due to
growing competition can create additional complexity. In turn, growing complexity
requires multi-faceted managerial approaches including management of (resource) depen-
dencies (Toepler & Anheier, 2004) and the capacity to interact with those that control
resources (Froelich, 1999). Despite growing complexity and the growth of commercial rev-
enues, the mission and goals of IFs are unchanged (i.e. to regulate, develop, promote and
organise their sport). At the same time, IFs’ profit redistribution models and the benefits to
stakeholders remain opaque or undisclosed.
Implications and limitations
In terms of commercialisation, this study on 22 Olympic IFs found that a headcount of 30
staff or more presents a critical mass to achieve high event commercialisation. Impli-
cations for organisational complexity (e.g. standardisation, formalisation, centralisation)
and other related aspects (e.g. strategic capability, leadership) require further research
and elaboration. IFs with fewer than 30 staff but with high event commercialisation
have witnessed high social media engagement. This suggests that a strong social media
presence could help IFs with smaller budgets to grow their sport’s community, create
brand awareness and attract business partners.
The research indicates that NPOs may face a dilemma in meeting needs for commit-
ment and demands for legitimacy in a context of multiple constituencies. With increasing
resources from business partners who seek a return on investment, IFs need to demon-
strate goal orientation to satisfy their business partners. At the same time, IFs are beholden
first and foremost to their members (NFs), who may have diverging goals and expec-
tations. Only one-third of the analysed IFs had published a strategic plan, suggesting
goal vagueness, at least within the public domain. The phenomenon of goal vagueness
leads to a fundamental question: to what extent does IFs’ use of market mechanisms
serve mission-related purposes for the largest possible number of members, and to
what extent do a few actors exploit it to satisfy self-interests? Recurring scandals in
some IFs reveal two challenges in this regard: the need for improved governance and poss-
ible mission drift or sector bending.
With regard to mission drift, Olympic IFs increasingly have to demonstrate
improved control, transparency and accountability mechanisms in order to maintain
or regain their legitimacy and autonomy as governing bodies. Governance issues and
corruption together with growing commercialisation require good governance pro-
cedures. To avoid a mission drift, IFs need to consider whether market pressures,
business operations and a commercial culture are pulling their organisation ‘away
from their original social mission’ (Dees & Anderson, 2003). Future studies could,
therefore, develop a more comprehensive understanding of IFs’ commercialisation,
investigating both negative (e.g. mission drift, increased governance issues) and positive
impacts (e.g. increased rationalisation, professionalisation, self-sufficiency).
Limitations to this study include only analysing Olympic IFs for which financial
statements were available. To obtain more information from IFs in the future, use
could be made of the umbrella organisations ASOIF, AIOWF (Association of Inter-
national Olympic Winter Sports Federations), ARISF (Association of IOC Recognised
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International Sport Federations), AIMS (Alliance of Independent Recognised Members
of Sport), SportAccord or even the IOC. This could eventually increase pressure on IFs
to be more responsive. Future studies could also extend the scope to non-Olympic IFs.
This should enable improved comparisons across IFs and would potentially consolidate
and extend the findings of this study. The use of differing periods of investigation
regarding the outcome and conditions was mentioned earlier, and is a limitation of
the research.
The sample size did not allow for an in-depth analysis of IFs’ revenues and expenses. A
general difficulty here is that many IFs do not provide detailed information. For instance,
the IJF spent 41%of its 2012–2014 expenses (about € 15.2 million2) on ‘travelling
expenses’. Despite this significant expenditure, there is no detailed information. The
csQCA method further masks finer distinctions because of its dichotomous nature. For
future studies, the application of a fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) represents a possible solution.
By using scores on a continuum between 0.0 and 1.0, fsQCA produces more nuanced
results. Another constraint related to the QCA method is the static time perspective.
Rihoux (2003) notes that the QCA method ‘does not allow one to include the time dimen-
sion and hence does not deal with process’ (p. 340). As Rihoux and Ragin (2008) empha-
sise, the QCA method ‘is a tool to enhance our comparative knowledge about cases in
small- and intermediate-N research design’ (p. 65). Furthermore, the strategy of using
logical remainders in conjunction with Boolean minimisation algorithms has raised
some criticism (Markoff, 1990; Romme, 1995) as it introduces cases that have not been
observed only because they are logically possible. Although our study clearly has some
shortcomings, to our knowledge, no study to date has compared IFs’ on commercialisa-
tion. IFs’ commercialisation is an ill-defined and often stigmatised concept. By using
QCA as an innovative research method to analyse 22 Olympic IFs, this study enhances
our comparative knowledge regarding the impact of conditions facilitating high commer-
cialisation. The study further points out the need to investigate both the positive and nega-
tive impacts of IFs’ commercialisation.
Notes
1. We first added up the IF’s incomes for the years for which financial statements are available,
not including Olympic revenue (Sum A). As the 2012–2015 Olympic revenue allocated to the
summer Olympic IFs is known to us, we multiplied a quarter of this by the number of years
for which the IF’s financial statements are available (Sum B). Finally, we added up Sum A and
Sum B. As the 2010–2013 Olympic revenue allocated to the Olympic winter IFs is not known
to us, we cannot apply normalisation rules in these cases.
2. We converted the currency used in the IJF’s financial reports (i.e. Swiss francs) into Euros
based on the exchange rate of 31 July 2014 (CHF 1 = EUR 0.82195).
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Introduction 
- 
From regulating to commercializing sport events
The stakes have moved up considerably, customers expe ct events to be international, to
be bigger and better than previously and everything is geared towards achieving the
bottom line.
Emery 2010,p,166
One hundred years ago, International Sport Federations (ISF$ carne into existence for a practi-
cal reason 
- 
to organize and regulate international sports. The first nodern Olyrnpic Games
(OG) in 1896 (Athens) made international rules indispensable and the growing success of the
Games made major sport events more and more attractive. The historical function of ISFs can
be compared to that of a government (Hoehn ,2006): they exert a legislative role by establish-
in¡; rules, a judicial role by monitoring and enforcing these rules, and an executive role by
organizing major sport events such as World Championships. Since their creation, ISFs have
undergone important structural and functional evolution. Starting out as volunteer-rLrn asso-
ciations, IFs employ today up to 450 ormore staffmembers at their headquarters (i.e. FIFA,
UEFA). In literature, these evolutions are often categorized as organizational change. On one
hand, they stern from internal needs for rationalization and efficiency (Chantelat,2001;
Dowling, Eclwards & Washington,2014) such as the hiring of paid managers, whose special-
ized background and expertise entails internal formalization and standardization procedures.
On che other hand, they are the result of an adaption to external changes. ISFs have to adapt
co an increasingly complex and competitive environlnent, including growing numbers of
interest groups with varying and sometimes diverging expectations. In response to these pres-
sures, ISFs invent different solutions. Looking at major sport events is one possible approach
to investigating ISFs' strategic resource acquisition patterns. The fìndings reveal that observed
patterns are either historically funcied or emerge/have emerged as the resr-rlt of changing
environrnental circurnstances and organizations' inlernal response strategies to then.
For the analysis of ISFs' resource strâtegies, three aspects make international sport events
an interesting starting point: (1) their constantly growing number and globalization, (2) their
4
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continuous colrrmercializatíon, and (3) the lack of research on sport events from the
¡rers¡re ctive of ISFs. All threc points are briefly outline cl below:
7. The growing number and globalization of s1'rort evencs: ln 7975, the ISFs of the 25 sports
represented at the OG countecl 160 intcrnational'events, these being'World Chanpionships,
World Cups, Grand Prix, World Tours and so or1. Within 38 years, this number rose [o
2,162 events in 2013 (source: the Association of Summer Olympic International
Federations (ASOIF)). Inicially, the 'World Championships representecl the sole and most
important event of ISFs, crowning the best athletes of the sport. With the abolition of
the Olympic amateur code in 1981,'V7orld Championships and theirlike became more
attractive for top athletes (seeking prize money) which, in tr-rrn, lured spectators (seeking
entertainment), broadcasters and sponsors (seeking a return on investment). Progressively,
ISFs recognizecl cheir cornmercial value, began to define which rights had value (e.g.
event hosting, event bidding, Iogo/naming rights, broadcascing and so on) ancl established
ownership of these rights. Once event forrnats and rights had been established, rnany ISFs
turned towards new countries in search of additional market opportunities ancl the global
spread and development of their sport. Countries previously unknown for sport events
entered the stage: in 2016, Qatar, a peninsula primarily covered with sand, hosted
85 major internacional sport events, and even Mongolia hosted 16 (e.g. Motocross'World
Championships, Surno World Charnpionships, international biathlon competition). Sport
is no longerjust a physical activiry and social meetiÍr€f point. It has become an econonric
product and an increasing number of actors from various levels try to levcrage its financial
potential.
2. The comnrercialization of sport events: Since the 1980s, the galloping commercialization
of broadcasting and sponsorship rights linke d to the sprouting economy around major
sport events (e.g. Olympic Games), and increasing competition between top-level sports,
have pushed ISFs to ernbrace strategic thinking and planning. For some ISFs, being on
the Olympic Programme has becorne a financial comfort zone, but also a highly com-
petitive affair. Through the fìrst Olympic revenne distribution in 1992, totalling US$
37.6 million, each of the 25 ISFs on the Olympic sulnmer progranme at that time
received US$ 1.5 million. Over che years, the revenue share did not scop increasing,
reaching a record high of US$ 526 rnillion after the London 2012 Games (source :
,ASOIF). Although the financial windfall of the OG is uncontestably a blessing for ISFs,
it c¿n also result in a quandary. On che one hand, ISFs need to attract sponsors, investors
and partners in order to finance a growing number of activities (strategic and operational)
and defend their Olympic statr-rs (IOC evaluation criteria) . Hence, ISFs have to be
responsive to stakeholders' needs, wishes and expectations. On the other hand, ISFs need
to stay true to their core values and rnissions and aclvocate their members' needs, wishes
and expectations (Berrett & Slack, 2001). Navigating between these two poles, ISFs
adopt different approaches to satisfi/ one side or the other. Strategic planning, including
the setting of p;oals, an action plan to achieve these goals, ancl the mobilization and
allocacion of resources to execute the action plan, has become a valuable tool for sport
federations, be it at the national (Shilbury & Ferkins, 201,1,) or international level (Nagel
et a1.,2015). Events appear to play a pivotal role in ISFs'strategry in terms of resource
acquisition. Today, the surccess of an ISF's economic moclel largely depends on its capacity
to commercialize its major events (e.g. broadcasting and sponsor rights, organizing fees).
3. Lack of research: I)espite the exponential growth of international major sport cvents, litllc
research exists on major sport events fi-om the perspective of ISFs. Taking the perspective
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of the organizing cornmittee (e.g. Parent, 2008), previous stLrdies primarily focus on event
n1ânagement (e.g. Leopkey & Parenc,2016; Parent & Smith-Swan 2013) ancl organization
as well as comrnercialization (Lee & Taylor, 2005; Szymanski, 2003; Malfas, Theocloraki
& Houlihan , 2004). In light of these evolutions, c\Mo central and so far unexplored ques-
tions emergt: which elements constitute ISFs' main sources of income and expenses?
Which financial and strategic role do sport evencs occupy in ISFs' econornic model?
This chapter starts with an overview of event rypes in internacional sport, followed by a
general sllmmary of ISFs'main sources of revenue. The main question of major sport events
as a central element of ISFs' resollrce strategy is examined by applying a two-fold approach:
first, observed commonalities across several ISFs are outlined; second, four cases exernplify-
ing four different models of revenue generation are presented: FIFA as the international foot-
ball federation, the FIH as the international hockey federation, FISA as rhe international
rowing federation and the UCI as the international cycling federation. The evaluation of the
four feder-ations is based on an analytical rnodel presented beforehand.
Federations' resource strategies through major sport events
Today, two major actofs govern sport at a global level: the International Olympic Cornmittee
(IOC) organizing the OG every four years (Chappelet 2008) ancl ISFs regulating international
sport and organízing'World Championships and World Cups (Arcioni & Bayle, 201.2). 'While
tlre regulation, promotion and organizatton of their sport used to be ISFs' core rnission and
the rcason for their emer€lence, sport events have taken centre stage, especially with regard to
resource acquisition. This evolution results in a seenringly contradictory hybridity: established
as associative non-profit structures, ISFs have developed a strong commercial orientation.
Although these two rationales appear to be diametrically opposed, they are also complementary,
as generating financial income is vital for the development and continuity of ISFs' activities
(Bayle,2000). ISFs partially or encirely delegate the organization of their events to an event
organizer (for example, national federation, re¡¡ion, governmelrt). The delegation of organizing
responsibilities, financial charges and profits depends on the type and appeal of the event. It is
therefore important to first distinguish different types of events and event ownership.
Event types
Consiclering events as the central element of feclerations' sporting, economic, societal and
organizational performance, Bayle distinguishes (2015) different types of sport events owned
and/or organized by sport federations (international ancl national) . Adapted to ISFs, four
event types can be emphasized: 'World Championships, international circuits, promotional
sport-for-all events and international nrr-rlti-sport games. ISFs generally own the first chree
event types and are participants in the fourth type. I3eing the owners of the first three rypes
elnpowers them to decide on the event allocation and to capitalize on conûrercial rights such
as TV and sponsorship rights. ISFs usually concede ticketing ancl domestic sponsorship rights
to the organizer, this beinga national sport federation (NSF), region orprivate organizer. In
this constellation, che ISF is in a position of power, espccially if the event is very successful
ând attracts a number of potential organizers competing for the allocation.
1. Woild Champíonships: C)ften the flagship event of an ISF, these qrajor one-off events mây
be held at cliffering periodicity clepending on the ISF (e.g. che UCI and FISA every year,
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FIFA and the FIH every four years) . The ISF decides on the event allocation, often
through a bidding process. Dividecl into men, women and, for sorre sports, mixed
competitions (e.g. tennis, baclrninton), World Chanrpionships ar:e organizecl for different
age categories (e.g. Junior, lJnder 23, Elite, Masters).
2. Intentational círcuíts: hrternational circuits is a collective term for 'Worlcl Cups, World
Tours, 'World Series, Grand Prix events and their like. ISFs generally own the circuit
but not the events composing the circr-ril. Depending on the various aspects (e.g. the
balance of power between the ISF and event organizers, historical reasons), events may
be registered on the ISF calendar (e.g.Diamond League in athletics), constitute private
professional circuits outside the full control of the ISF (e.g. ATP Worlcl Tour in tennis
or PGA Cham¡rionship in golf) or belong to a national sport federation (e.g. Australian
Open, US Open) or a private organizer (e.g. Tour de France). In sotne sports, the
international circuit, or even single events of it, are more powerful than the ISF's major
event (e.g. tennis with Grand Slan, Tour de France in cycling) .
3. Promotional sport-Jrtr-all euaxtsi Less focusing on competition, nuss-partici¡ration events or
international sport festivals are an opportunity for an ISF to promote its sport and reach
out towards unexploited markets.
4. In.temational ruult'i-sport gctilresi Although ISFs are only participants in these events (e.g.
the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games, the Asian Games, r-rniversity games,
etc.), international mr-rlti-sport galnes can be of high sporting, strategic and economic
importance as they coltvey visibility which, in turn, increases the attractiveness of a sport
for sponsors, athletes and fans.
Although clifferent event types may co-exist, ISFs' deliberate creation of an eve nt portfolio
that is tailored to their needs and strategy is a rather recent evolution. Event portfolio
means in this case a deliberate patcern of events owned, organized and/or controlled by the
ISF. The event portfblio has an impact not only on the federation's image, but also on its
sporting, econorric, societal and organizational perfortnance. It is therefore hardly surprising
that events occupy today a pivotal role in ISFs' strategy and resource acquisition. 'Within the
event portfolio, events rnay be of diflerent importance, creating a certain hierarchy. We
assllme that the econornic value of events is deterrnined by their importance.
Møin sources of revenue
Unlike NSFs, ISFs are not dependent on government funcling. Until the 1980s, ISFs func-
tioned mainly thanks to the time and knowledge investment of a few passionate vohrnteers.
At that time, ISFs'boards were almost entirely composecl of individuals with a background
in the respective sport (e.g. former athletes or presidents of a NSF) . Especially in the early
years of a federation, this prerequisite was inevitable as rules had to be established, requiring
an extensive unclerstanding of the sport. All functions within the ISF were then non-
remlrneratecl. Affiliation fees from NSFs and small sponsorship contrâcts were therefore
sufficient to fund and maintain the ISFs' activities. This changecl rapidly with the commer-
cialization of major sport events and most of all the OG. Sponsors be¡¡an to use sport
events to showcase their products and ISFs began to compete for their financial resources.
Two mailr solrrçes of financial income aroqe frorn this situation for ISFs: (1) revenue from
federations' own evcnts and (2) the Olympic revcnue.
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Looking at the last completed surrrmer Olynepic cycle (2012-2015), nine ouc of 1B surnmer
Olympic ISFs for which information is available generatecl 50 per cent or rnore of their
revenue thrqugh their events
To a large extent, this situation is the result of a growing interest in televised sport and the
rise of an international broadcasting industry. Television brought sport frorn the restricted reach
of fields and stadiuns into the living; roorns of thousands of people. 'While the firsc FIFA'World
Cup (Uruguay, 1930) was attended by sorne 430,000 spectators in the stadiums, the 2014 FIFA
'World Cup (Brazil) counted 3.4 million spectators and another 26.3 billion TV viewers! The
demand ftrr televised sport has attracted not only media and sponsors, it has also increased the
need for expert knowledge within federations in order to respond to stakeholders' expectations
and produce attractive events. Profound organizational changes were needed to aclapt to this
new situation. The growth in size and number of events, a question of both the populariry of
the sport and the ISFs' ability to capitalize on this popularity, is generally accornpanied by a
diversification and complexification of ISFs' activities. As a consequence , voluntary positions
are 11o longer suffìcient to carry out ISFs' adrninistrative tasks and organize major sport events
ineplying multiple stakeholders. Since the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s,
ISFs have progressively hired paid Secretary Generals (e.g. FISA in 1989, the UCI in 1992),
followed by a steadily increasing nurnber of paid staff (especially in the ISFs with fast-growinp¡
events). FIFA has increased its stafffrom about 250 in 2003 to more than 450 in 201.4, the
UCI fron three in 7991, to 79 in 201,4 and even a smaller federation such as the FIH has more
than doubled its staffwithin a relatively short time (2010-2015) from 1.4 to 35.
Tàble 4.I Revenues frorn ISF events and Olyrnpic revenue
F e de. rati on ( I O C tenn i n ol og1, ) Period analyscd Revenues from Olyxlp¡,
ISF euents (%t oJ rcvenue ('%' of
ouarall rcueruc) oucrall reuauc)
BWF 
- 
Badrninton'Word Federation
FEI 
- 
International Equestrian Federation
FIE 
- 
International Fencing Federation
FIFA 
- 
International Association Football Federation
FIH 
- 
International Hockey Federation
FINA 
- 
lnternational Swinlning Federation
FISA 
- 
International Rowing Federation
UF - International Judo Fecleration
ISAF 
-World Sailing
ISSF 
- 
International Shooting Sport Federation
ITF 
- 
International Tþnnis Federarion
ITTF 
- 
International Table Tennis Federation
ITU 
- 
International Triathlon Union
I'WF 
- 
International'W'eightlifÌing Federation
UCI 
- 
International Cycling Union
UWW 
- 
United'World Wrestling
'WA 
-'World Archery
WR 
-'World Rugby
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Olympic revenue
The Olympic revenne share is closely relared to the general evohrtion of broadcasting rights.
For the 1960 Olyrnpic Games (Rome), USA TV (toclay CBS) paid US$3.2 núllion (in today's
dollars) for the broaclcasting rights. Forty-eight years later, the broadcasting nghts for the 2012
London Games were sold for nearly US$1.2 billion to NBC, a multiplication factor of tnore
than 300! In a sense , the commercialization of and profìt generated by the OG began with the
1984 Los Angeles Garnes. (Jnder the clirection of Peter Ueberroth (president and general
manager of the Los Angeles Olyrnpic Organizing Comrnittee), the 1984 Games were the first
to be privately organized and immediately generated a surplus of US$250 million. The following
Games pr,rrsued the same strategy and wich sLrccess. In 1.992, the IOC distributed for the first
time a part of the Games'proceeds to the ISFs: a total of US$37.6 million was equally divided
between the 25ISFs that figured on the Olynepic Pro¡¡ramme (US$1.5 million/ISF). Twenty
years later, a total of US$526 million was divided becween the 28 ISFs that were involved in
the Olyrnpic Programme of the 201.2 London Games, this being US$19 million on average per
ISF. Meanwhile, the IOC had introduced the Eualuatiou Crítería-for Sports and Disciplines in2004:
based on the evaluation criteria, 30 per cent of the adclitional surplus of the OG cledicated to
the ISFs is subsequently allocated, depending on the ISFs' contribution to the overall ecouomic
success of the Games (e,g. tickets sold, TV audience). After the 2012London Ga¡nes, the IAAF
(athletic$ was awarded the highest share 
- 
about US$47 million for a four-year period. The
prospect of a higher share if outperformrng other sports has entailed strong competition between
Olympic ISFs as well as non-Olyrnpic ISFs who seek to enter the Olympic Progranme. The
benefit of being an Olympic sport inpects at both the international and the national level: on
the one hand, it contributes to the financing of ISFs'activities; on the other hand, governments
tend to support NSFs of Olympic sports ll1ore generously with funds to increase their chances
of beating other countries at OG, making sport a geopolitical tool.
In summary, ISFs' resource acqr"risition has char-rgecl drastically due to the explosion of
broadcasting rights, the interest of sponsors in showcasing their products through televised
sport events and the skyrocketing profitability of the Olympic Games. While affiliation from
member fees and smaller sponsor contracts constituted the main sollrce of income for many
decades, the demand for televised sport spectacles has bror"rght forth a new and more business-
oriented rationality. Nevertheless, the spreacl between ISFs with high revenues ancl ISFs with
low revenues is immense: while FIFA generated a cornfortable US$2.096 billion in 2014,
half of the non-Olympic, but recognized, ISFs function with less than €200,000 per year
(sotrrce: Association of IOC-recognized Incernational Sport Federations (ARISF)). The
mission-basecl goal of ISFs is to fìnance the development of their sport, for example by cross-
sr-rbsidizing unprofìtable events (as is the case with 11 out of the 12 FIFA events), sllpporting
national clevelopment prograrnmes (e.g. FIH Targeted Assistance Programtne) or helping to
improve members'fr"rnctioning (e.g. UCI Sharing Platform) . In this context, feclerations'
events and economic rnodels should be a means to develop their sport. In order to understand
and predict why some ISFs have nrore successful econornic moclels than others, four Olympic
ISFs of clifltrent sizes are analysed nore closely. The nrain focus is on ISFs' eve nts and cheir
role in the ftderations' econornic rnoclcl.
International Sport Federations' economic model
and the role of major sport events
It is very diffìcult to conrpare the functioning and economic mqdels of ISFs for various
reasolls, such as accessibility to, as well as transparency aud exhaustiveness of documenls.
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ISFs' organizational strLlcturc (e.g. bodies, departments, organizational cornplexiry), functioning
(e.g. organizational perftrrrnance, behaviour and learning) and culture (traditions, values) play
a significant role here. Initially, everlts such as Worlcl Championships were not creaced for
financial reâsons, but to determine the best athletes. This chapter does not clailrr to produce
a cornpréhensive understanding of the development of ISFs' evênts over time. However, it
tries to identify emerging comrnonalities regarding ISFs' econornic models and the role of
rnajor sport events in it. Following this, the chapter proposes an analytical model and four
exemplary cases to which this rnodel has been applied.
Emerging commo nølities
Despite limited comparability, a few emerging commonalities could be noticed between the
federations in terms of event-related resource acquisition.
Event ownership and event rights
ISFs generally claim ownership over a minimurn of one, often two, event types. These are
Worlcl Championships (in some sports called 'World Cup) and international circuits (e.g.
'W'orld Tour, 'World Cup, Grand Prix), both being neajor one-off cornpetitiorls. ISFs also
tend to sanction international events that are not their property. The ISF may register these
evellcs free of charge or against a calendar or organizer fee. [n the case of the UCI, the
calendar, licence and affìliation fees constitute 17 ¡rer cent of the federation's overall fìnancial
inconre (2012-2015: 40 per cent if the organizing fees are added). However, the clairning
of property rights is only profitable if there are enough buyers. Then again, the tnore buyers
that compete for the rights acquisition, the rnore the federation can raise the price. llisks
inherent co this situation are excessive prices that stakeholclers are not willing or able to pay,
and unsatisfactory returns on investment for stakeholders.
Financiøl cycles around events
If one or several major events form the ISF's principal source of income, the fedetation has
an interest in ensuring chey function well. Financial cycles around ISFs' major events can be
observed, meaning that important parts of the revenue from federations' flagship events are
reinvested in the events. In the case of FIFA, the flagship event (the FIFA World Cup) is
organized every four years. In 2014, FIFA generatecl 91 per cent of its overall income from
the 2014 FIFA 'World Cup (e.g. 35 per cent from broadcasting rights, 23 per cent
from ticketing and 22 per cent from rnarketing rights) . In the salne year, FIFA invesced
42 per cent of all its expenses in the sanre event including, for instance, TV production (19
per cent) andpríze money (18 per cent). On averaÍle, FIFA invested 53 per cent in events
during 201,2-201,5,41 per cent in the FIFA'World Cup alone. In the case of the UCI,25.5
per cent was invested in events during the same period.
Olympic revenue dependence
'While the Olympic revenue share may be irrelevant in the budget of a very big federation
such as FIFr\ (0.4 per cenc), it is vital for many srnall federations such as ISSF (shooting)
(85 per cent) . Federations with high Olympic revenue dependence rr-tn the risk of not being
selÊsuscainable without that money. For the last snmner Olympic cycle (2012-2015), the
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average dependence of the 18 summer Olympic federations for which financial scatenents
are available was about 33.5 per cent. Ic is of no surprise that Olympic sporcs, and especially
those that are highly dependent on the Olynepic revenue share, are making every effôr:t to
defend their place on the Olympic Programme.
Although the focus of this section is'on ISFs' econolrric models, its in-rpact on che wider
syscenr including continental and national federations is worth mentioning: ISFs generating
important revenlle through their own events are expected to invesl lar¡;er parts of their expenses
externally (i.e. primarily on events and development) and ISFs with average or low event
profitability invest internally (i.e. pr:imarily on operations, adm,inistration and governance).
The following examples support this assumption: FIFA invested 71 per cent externally and
18 per cent internally (2012-2015), contrary to the FIH, which investcd 37 per cent externally
and 61 per cent internally (201,3-2015) and FISA, which investecl31.5 per cent externally and
68 per cent internally (2012-2015).
Analytical model
For the purpose of illustration, clata on evellt revenue were collected from 1B summer
Olympic federations. In addition, four exernplary ISFs were selected for a more fìne-grained
analysis: FIFA, the UCI, the FIH and FISA. Data stem from externally audited financial
statements and fìnancial reports, event regulations, bidding docunrents, organizer guides,
face-to-face interviews (n:15) with ISF offìcials and staff members from FIFA, the FIH,
FISA and the UCI, as well as representatives of urnbrella organizations, i.e. the Association
of Summer Olyrnpic International Federations (ASOIF), the,tssociation of IOC Recognized
International Sport Federations (ARISF), and SportAccord. We adrnit that data collection
was complicatecl by the lack of available documents as well as by the varying exhaustiveness
of documents (e.g. financial reports varied between seven and 156 pages). This uncleniably
impeded the data analysis and made clirect comparability of ISFs more diffìcult. Findings
should therefore be considered as approxirnate values rather than definite numbers.
Besides the described commonalities, ISFs' resource acquisitions through events are very
difficult to classify for reasons already mentioned. A closer look at four Olyrnpic surnmer
federations of cliflering size illustrates the variety of income solutions adopted by thern and
the role that events play in these solutions. In an attempt to establish a replicable model of
analysis, the authors selected several key variables. Some of these key variables are based on
Chantelat's (2001) typology, which distinguishes between three kinds of expenditure in
arnateur sport clubs 
- 
sporting, social and economic expenditures. Chantelat calls the
cornbination of the three kinds of expenditure the "production of sport clubs". Concluding
from the analysis of 238 French amateur sport clubs, he determines six socio-economic
patterns. These patcerns emphasize the diversity of economic logics that characterizes amateur
sport clubs. Ädapted to ISFs, and'in order to furcher our understanding of their financial
flows and the part of their major sport events in them, a two-fold approach was adopted:
first, bylookingat ISFs'economic model (expenditures, sources of incorne) and, second, by
establishing a basic event portfblio for each of the four ISFs analysed.
For the analysis of ISFs' economic moclel, six main variables were selected, three on
the income side ancl three on the expenditure side. In the four moclels cletailed on the
following pa€Jes, the ISFs' main sonrce of income and main expencliture are emphasized in
bold letters.
'\)Øhile studies at club level mainly use the fìnancial flow analysis to provide a tool capable
of clefining political subsidies to clubs (Chantelat, 2007), this chapter places ISFs' events at
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Talilc 4.2 Main variables for analysing ISFs'econornic model
htcourc Expcnditure
Events (e.g.TV and sponsor rights)
Olyn-rpic revenue share
Fees (e.g. membership, licences, calendar)
Events
Adnúnistration (including governance and operations)
Developnrent
the centre of investigation. Following Bayle's (2015) pcrspective, which sees ISFs' major
sport events at "the heart of their economic model", events are classifìed here as economic
products. The rnain elements of event incolnes are orgauizing rights, TV rights and sponsor-
ship rights. A second variable is that of Olympic revenlre share. The greater proportion of
income is constitr.rted by Olyrnpic revenue share, the less the ISFs are selÊsufficient. ,4. fìnal
variable on the income side analyses fees of various natllres (e.g. membership, licences,
calendar). Historically, fees constitutecl ISFs'main source of income.'With the increase and
complexity of ISFs' activities and the hiring of paid staff to ensLrre and devclop these activities,
ISFs have needed to turn towarcls l1ew sources of incolrre. Today, the external fìnancing of
ISFs is common practice. However, in some feclerations the share of income from fees seems
to remain relatively important.
On the expenditure sicle, expenses dedicated to events, administration and development
are examined. Event expenses allow us to analyse whether the event balance sheet is even,
whether events are profìtable or whether they represent a costly activity for the ISF. A look
ac fèderations' administration expenses allows us to deterrnine che remaining funds the ISF
has at its disposal to finance activities other than administration. To cornplete che analysis of
their economic model, their development expenses are exarnined. Development expenses
should represent an important part. Using Chantelat's tenrrs, the fìnality of ISFs as non-profìt
associations is, above all, supposed to be "extra-econornic", meaning that the ISF is a corporate
actor that shor-rld not seek financial gains for its headquarters as a prioriry, but redistribute a
maximum of its gains to its members and the development of its sport.-We expect ISFs with
high income to redistribute larger parts into development than ISFs with lower income. 'We
further assume that ISFs with high income from events, but low investment in development,
follow an entrepreneurial logic rather than associative goals. Horch (2001) calls this process
"auto-destruction", a process through which non-profit sport organizations lose their core
values ancl identity.
'With regard to ISFs' event portfolio, we base our analysis on four variables:
Creation of the ISF (year)
Size (number of paid staff)
ISF events (number, periodicity)
Flagship (event, discipline)
'We assume that the age of an ISF neight play a role in the presence of traditional (and
sometilnes rnythical) events. Historically established events are not necessarily owned by the
ISFs (e.g. the Tour de France in cycling,'Wimbledon in tennis). To capitalize ou these
events, federations neecl to establish ownership rights. Depending on the power struccLrres
between the ISF and event organizers, strong negotiation skills are required. The second
variablc is that of size in tcnns of paid staff. l{ikulis (2000), as well as Thibault, Slack and
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Hinings (1,991), equate the increasecl presence of paid staff with an increase in specialization
as the workloacl can bc clividecl more effìciently. The central variablc hcre looks at ISF
evetlts, and notably the nulrrber of ISF events and thcir periodicity. These two elenrents are
useful inclicators for analysing whethel an ISF is focusing rather on one or two events or
whether'it seeks to diversify its event portfolio even further. Tfre focus o11 one event rnight
signify that this event is particr-rlarly successful and therefore absorbs an important part of
the federation's resources. At the same tine, reliance orì one evcnt bears a major risk: the
implosion of the fìn:rncial system if the event does not attain the expecte d objectives (e.g.
event cancellation, lack oflwaning public interest). On chc other hand, an event portfolio
with rnany evellts bears the risk of image delusion which, in lurn, is likely to impact the
events' âttrâctiveness for sponsors, TV broadcasters and fans. The fourth and fìnal variable
of the event portfolio examines the ISF's flagship, this being an event or a discipline.
Inclicators for this variable are the federations' own assessnent, generally to be for-rnd on the
ISF's website, and the income through this flagship.
Classificøtìon of economic models 
- 
ø first attempt
The presentation of the following four cases conscitutes an exploratory approach to the
question of ISFs' economic rnodel and the role of major sport events in it. This approach
can be classified as a socio-economic rather than a rnanagerial approach. In light of this
relatively small sample, the validity of the analytical model and its variables discussed above,
as well as findings presented hereafter, could be tested in the futr-rre by using a larger sample.
FIFA 
- 
One-megø-event model
The economic model of FIFA revolves around a single competition: the FIFA World Cup,
a high profìt rnega-event generating 83 per cent of FIFA's overall revenLre during the period
2012-2015. Compared to this, the remaining 1I FIFA World Cups are of insisnificant
econonric impact. If we take a closer look at FIFTA.'s income from2014, about 91 per cent was
generated through eve11ts, this being about US$1.9 billion. Of this 9l per cent, 90.4 per cent
was generated through the FIFA 'World Cup alone. The detailed sources of incotne are as
follows: broadcasting rights (35.4 per cent), ticketing (23 pet cent), mârketing úghts (22.2
per cent), hospitality rights (5.3 per cent),licensing rights (2.5 per cent), other (2.6 per cent).
The success of FIFA's economic model is grounded on two rnain elemencs. One is football's
popularity. Football is probably one of the world's most popular sports. A large-scale FIFA
survey from 2007 concluded that football counts 265 million players and 5 million referees
worldwide, this being 4 per cent of the rvorld's population at that tirne (source: Big Count,
FIFA Magazine, July 2007). The other element is a close-knit strategy aronnd the FIFA
'Woild Cup inch,rding commercial rights and limited risk-taking, as the following exaìnples
fì'om the FIFA World Cup Regulations 2014 demonstrate:
Comruercial riglrrs: FIFA has established rights to the event's most profìtable elements -
"fìnancial rights, aucliovisual and radio recording, reproduccion and broadcasting rights,
mr"rltirnedia rights, rnarketing ancl promotional rights" (Art. 15).
Litnited rkk-takíug: FIFA takes no responsibility regarcling damages relating to the organization
and course of the FIFA World Cup, for either the preliminary or the fìnal competition
(Art.2.3 and27). Even though "[all] revenlle fron the exploitation of the commercial rights
for che preliminary competition nratches belongs to the host association" (Arts24.1 and2.4.4),
the latter also has to cover expenses for insufTìcient financial outcomes of these matches.
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Thblc 4.3 FIFA as an exarnple of the one-mega-event model
Crcation 1 904
Size
FIIA eucnls
' Very big federation (>450 staffmembers in 2015)
1 nrajor sport event format
11 FIFAWorld Cups
1 Confederations Cup
FIFA'World Cup (since 1930; quadrennial)
fJ3% of FIFA's overa]l] 2012-2015 revc'nue
US$5,826 billion of which
Events:88% of which
FIFAWorld Cup:83%
TV and rnarketing rights: 6tì% (incl. FIFAWorld Cup)
Otlrer: 72o/u of which
Financial income :6.5%
Olympic revenue: 0.4%
Other: operating incorne: 5.1%
US$5,757 billion of which
Events: 537o of which
FIFAWorld Cup 47%o
Development: 1fì%
Adnúnistration, opelations and governan ce: Tflu/o of which
Administration: 7%
Financial expenses: 6%
Governance: 5%
Otber:1Io/¡
Flagship euent / di scipli ne
Reuuue (2012-201 5)
Expenscs (201 2-201 5)
The risk of the one-mega-event model consists of its high dependence on a single mega-
event. FIFA's economic model around the FIFA'World Cup functions as long as the federation
finds buyers for its colnmercial rights, notably broadcasting and marketing rights, which
represented together 68 per cent of FIFA's 201.2-201.5 income. Based on the FIFA exarnple,
we establish the hypothesis that ISFs with the characteristics of the one-me€la-event rnodel
tend to be large in size, have a very profitable flagship event, high expenditure on their
flagship events and moderate internal expenditure. Low administration costs in the case of
FIFA (7 per cent) are notably related to a transfer of responsibility to the organizer.
UU 
- 
The fee-collector model
The UCI model is built on two main pillars: (1) the UCI Roacl World Championships as
the UCI's flagship event, and (2) calendar, licence and affìliation fees.
1. During the period 201.2-2015, the IJCI generated zbout29 per cent through the UCI
Road'World Championships alone.The UCI establishes a contract with each 'World
Championship ancl 'World Cup organizer individually. Depending on the organizer's
capacity to commercialize marketing rights locally, the organizer buys between 30 ancl
60 per cent of the marketing rights from the UCI. Generally, these rights are nego[iated
in conjunction with the hosting fee of the event. Flowever, the UCI WorldTor-rr, with
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Tàblc 4.4 UCI as an example of the fee-collector model
Creatiou 1 900
Sizc '
UCI evettts
Big federation (79 staffmembers in 2015)
2 major sport event formats
7 W'orld Championships (annua-l)
l4 World Cups (annual)
Flagship discipline: Road cycling
Flagship event: (JCI RoadWorld Chanpionships þince 1921)
42% of UCI's over¿L1.2072-2015 revenue
CFIFI11.74 million of which
Events:54% of wlich
UCI Road W'orld Charnpionships: approx. 29%
Organizing fees:23Vu
Fees (calendar, licences, affiliation): 17o/o
Olympic revenue: 14%
Other: 15%
CHFI32.427 rnillion of which
Administration, operations & governance;52o/o of which
Personnel expenses: 26%
Governance: 20.5%
Fees & Consultancy: 5.5%
Events: 25.5%
Developnrent & traintng: 12.5(%
Other: 10%
Fl agú i p eucnÍ / di sci pl i rrc
Reucnue (2012-2015)
Expcnses (2012-201 5)
cycling's most prestigions races (e.g. the Tour de France, the Giro d'Italia), escapes this
rule. Besides communication rights, the UCI holds no commercial rights for lhese races.
This explains the meagre income of CHF 240,000 for the UCI from the 2014 UCI
WorldTour.
2. To counterbalance the hiscorical arrangement of cycling's most prestigious races, the IJCI,
under the presidency of Hein Verbruggen (1,991-2005), claimed control over the inter-
national cycling calendar, which used to be in the hands of the biggest cycling organizers.
Today, calendar fees vary depending on the discipline and the race classification. The
yearly registration of about 1,500 races on the IJCI international calendar (all disciplines
confouncled) constitutes an important pillar in the UCI's econotnic model. They con-
. tributed 1.1o/u to the UGI's overall income in 201,4,'What is more, the official document
labelled "Road 
- 
Calendar Fees" indicates that the UCI has increased the 2076 calendar
fee by 31 per cent for UCI WorldTour races, fron€24,369 for one-day races in 2015
to €31 ,923 tn 201,6). A sirnilar strategy has been applied to tearns with an increase of
teanr licence fees in 2016.Team licence fees depend on the discipline ancl the tier thac
teams are in. The fee of €85,500 for the registration of a UCI'WorldTour team ín201.6
constitutes an increase of 11 per cent frorn 2015 to 2016. During the period fron2072
to 2015, organizer, affiliation, calenclar and licence fees together represenced 40 per cent
, of the UCI's overall revenlle (23 per cent fron organizer fees, 17 per cent from calendar,
licence and affiliation fees).
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The risk of this model lies in the need to keep the balance between the attractiveness of
thc ISF's main procluct and buyers' interest and fìnancial capacity to pay the fìxed fees. In
the case of the UCI, the e conollic rnodel is two-fold. On the one hand, it is based on the
UCI Roacl'VØorlcl Championships as its flagship event. A sr"rccessful fìnancial retlrrn through
this event reqr-rires a product suffìciently attractive for an orsanizer to pây the hosting fees
in adclition to the mar:keting rights owned by the UCI. On the other hand, the UCI's
econornic model is based on income from calendar and team licence fees. This sllpposes two
things: fìrst, that a stable nnmberof cyclingrace organizers are able to produce profìcable (or
at least break-even) evencs; and, second, that sponsors behind cycling tearns see a value big
enough for them to financially support these, which, in turn, allows the team to register on
the UCI calendar and participate in the races with a competitive set of riders. Currently,
cycling teams suffer from the lack of sponsors willing to finance them on a long-term basis
and at an amolrllt that allows the team to cover increasing costs including UCI licence fees,
travel costs or the team's entourage (e.g. sport director, medical and performance staff, etc.).
The main risks of the fee-collector model hence consist of a rnismatch becwcen the price
level fixed by the ISF and the eflective appeal of its product(s). Excessive pricing may entail
precarious situations atrrong thc rnain fee payers. The strategy of the federation therefore
needs to take into consideration noc only its own financial needs, br-lt also the capacity of its
main actors co absorb higher fees while maintaining their activities. Based on the example
of the IJCI, we establish the hypothesis that the fee-collector lnoclel occurs perhaps tnore
often in federations with very old evenr traditions. These traditional and historical events are
sometimes more poplllar than the federation's events and financially independent of the
latter. This rnakes it particularly difficult and delicate for che ISF to establish and impose
ownership rights that allow them to capitalize on these prestigious events, which are outside
the fecleration's property. Due to the important part of fees in the economic model and the
need to administer these fees, administratioll expenses are assulned to be relatively higli (e.g.
the UCI: 52 per cent).
FIH 
-Themixedmodel
In the period ftom 201,3 to 201,4, the FIH's income was based on a resolrrce mix including
32 per cent frorn Olympic revenue, 30 per cent from sponsors and26 per cent from events,
including TV rights and hoscing fces. A rnajority of the FIH's expenses were spent internally
(54 per cent),22 per cent on events and 15 per cent on development. Although the FIH
was previously "the sole owner of the media ancl marketing rights and all other commercial
rights relating to the events that it organises" (FIH General Regulations, Art. 8.3.1), hosting
fees were only introduced for the first time in 2015. Currently, the FIH splits commercial
rights equally with the host organizations. According to the FIH business development
director, this rnodel "works if you have big events and big televisiort", which is noc the case
for the FIH. In combination with a relatively high percentage of Olympic revenne, similarly
structured ISFs, if they warrt to nraintain and develop their activities, have lo be creative and
proactive. After the arrival of a new CEO in 2010, the FIH brought forward a nurnber of
potential solutions towards a lnore clynamic ancl sustainable model. The new action plan
reposes on sevcral pillars: a youn€J and highly educaced staff (in 2015,74 per cent of the staff
members held a university degree); the hiring of experts frorr inside and outsicle hockey/
sport (markcting, communication, busincss); a long-term strate€ic plan (Hockey lìevolution
201,4-2024); and the.creation of a new sporting,forrnat (Hockey5, a shorc-version forrn of
hockey) capable of attracting llew sponsors, spectators and athletes by showcasing fìelcl
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Tàl¡la 4.5 FIH as an exaruple of the nrixed rnodel
Crcatiott 1 927
Sizc
FIH euutts
lìl agsh ip euan t / di scipl ir rc
Reuuuc (2013-2015)
Middle-sized federation (35 staffrnembers in 2015)
3 rlajor sport event formats
FIH'World Cups (Junior, Indoor, Men/'W'ornen)
Hockey'!Øorld League
Charnpions tophy
FIH'World Cup (since 1 971 ; quaclrennial)
CHF30.4 nrillion of which
Olyrnpic revenue share: 32o/o
Sponsors: 3070
Events: 26Yo of wbich
TY nghts:240/o
Hosting fees (since 2015):2%
Fees (licences, afIìliations): 10%
Ocher:2Vo
CHF30.1 rnillion of which
Adrninistration, operations and governance: 610lo of which
Adnrinistration & operations: 44%
Marketing & conlnunication: 10%
Governance:7%
Events: 22Vo of which
TV costs: 1tì%
Development: 15%
Other20/¡
Expenses (2013-2015)
hockey as al1 entertaining, young and urban sport while rem.aining trlle to its values of being
a farnily and gender-equal sport.
The rnixe<l rnodel produces a fairly stable situation as it spreads ISFs' fìnancial risks across
several sources of income. However, in the specifìc case of the FIH, the relatively important
Olyrnpic revenue represents a risk as the federation has little influence on future redistribution
rnodalities. An increase in TV rights (currently at 24 per ccnt) and the advent of hosting fees
(currently at 2 per cent) might mitigate fluctuations in Olympic revenlre. Based on the
example of the FIH, we establish the hypothesis that ISFs with mixed-model characteristics
tend to be dynamic organizational structures with a strong focus on strategic thinking and
anricipation. A.lthough the downfall of one source of income might not inevitably cause the
collapse of the ISF's economic model, it requires a continuous analysis of the federation's
environment, quick adaþtacion to change and a drive to explore new market opportunities
as these diminish the risk of potential future shortcomin¡¡s. Even in case of moderate ittcotnes,
we expect ISFs of the rnixed model to invest a relatively significant share in cleveloprnent as
successful member federations extend the ISFs' radius of action (e.g. events, athletes) and
appeal (e.g. sponsors, broadcasting).
FISÁ 
- 
The Olympic-dependence ffiodel
l)uring tlre period 2012-2075, FISA obtained 52 per cent of its funding from its Olyrnpic
revenue. For the ûlost part, revenLle was nsed to finance the federation's administration costs
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Tàblc 4.6 FISÂ as an example of the Olyrnpic-depemlence model
CraaÍ.ion 1 892
Sizc
FISA cucnts
Flagslip eucn t / discipli trc
Reuenue (2012-2015)
Srnall fedemrion (about 19 staffrnembers in 2015)
5 major sport event formats
'World Rowing Championships (annual)
European l\owing Championships (since 1t193; annual)
'World Rowirg Cups (annual)
'W'orld Rowing Tour (annual)
'\X/orld Rorving Masters Regacta (annual)
'W'orld Rowing Champiornhips þince 1962)
CHF30.2 nrillion of which
Olyrnpic revenue share: 52o/o
Events: 37%
Other: 11%
CHF30.1 million of which
Administration, operations and governance: 68%o of which
Marketing & cornrnunic atíon: L9o/t¡
Events:22Yo
Development: 9.5%
Other: 0.5%
Expcrrscs (2012-2015)
(68 per cent). There may be different reasons for this depenclence, such as hur¡an resources
(I7 staff members in 201,5) and low visibility. The higher an ISF's headcount, the more the
organizational strncture and functioning are likely to be specializecl and coordinated, hence
triggering higher performance. In the specific case of FISA, the promotion of rowing is
difficult as it is an expensive sport in terms of equiprnent ancl facilities. In view of FISA's
dependence, staying on the Olympic Programme is the federation's top priority: "[The]
Olympic Games are a big rnachine. A lot of people, a lot of sports want to enter. Uf FISA]
doesn't rnove today, we are at risk. Because not being an Olympic sport destroys all the rest"
(FISA President). The constantly growing prestige of the OG adds another pressure as desire
to enter the Olyrnpic Prograrnme has increased competition between sports. In light of
lirnited athlete capacity at the Games (around 10,500), the high number of rowing athletes
raises some critics. With 550 athletes, rowing has the third highest number of athletes at the
Games. Compared to this, triathlon only counts 96 athletes. Reducing the number of rowing
athletes might aÌlow other sports to enter the Games, but would weaken the position of FISA..
ISFs that function according to the Olympic-dependence model are under continuous
presslrre to defend their position on the Olympic Programme. The dependence makes them'
particularly vr-rlnerable, as the slightest decrease in the attribution of the Olympic revenue share
jeopardizes their economic model. Furthermore, clependence limits their scope of action.
Aligning with IOC requirements and expectations ultirnately becomes the safest pathway for
them to ward off the discontent of the IOC and potential revenue reductions relatecl herewith.
However, IOC evaluation criteria and expectations can also be considered as a precious guide
for federations in establishing a strategic plan that, ideally, resulls in rnore professionaltzation
and organizational perfornr.ance. Based on the exernple of FISA, we establish the hypothesis
that ISFs with the charactedstics of the Olyrrepic-dependence model invest less in clevelopment
as large pârts of their revenue are consun'Led by aclministrative costs.
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Conclusion and persp ectives
In light of the small sample size, findings obviously cannot bc generalize<l. The analysis is
therefore limited to specifìc risks and challenges encountered by the four ISFs as well âs some
hypotheses. Nevercheless, it becomes evident that.events are a neccssa¡:y prerequisite for
fcderations to attract sponsors and potential buyers of broadcasting and commercial ripçhts.
'Wichout them, federations can no longer carry ollc either their historical mission or the
activities they have developed over the years and the structures necessary for their nâintenance
(e.g. prornotion and development of a sport at the grassroots level) . This necessity is
emphasized by the increase in major sport events and the evolution ftoln volunteer-run
structures towards more professionalized enticies with an increasing business focus. The
organization of attractive events reqr-rires sound expertise at varions levels including sport,
r-narketing, communication, administration (which can be sutnmarized under the concept
of specialization), written rules, policies and procedures (which cau be sumrrarized under
the concept of formalization), strategic planning and perforrnance evaluations (which can be
sumrnarized under the concept of rationalization), and an adapted decision-making structure
(which can be centralized or decentralized) .
In summary, the event portfolio has become a central part of ISFs' strategic and functional
model. 'Whether this model follows a clearly defìned strategy or whether it is the result of
historical evolution and environmental circnrnstances depencls on the fcderation itself. ,\t
the same tirne, each model can change rapi<1ly and for various reasons. The arrival of a new
key decision-maker (e.g. president, generàl director, etc.) may fbr instance influence the
fecleration's strategy. Overall, federations have to face a number of new and complex challenges
related to the growing importance of, and demand for, major sport events. One of them is
the qtrestion of profit redistribution. Contributing considerably to the event profit, stakeholders
(i.e. NSF, teams, clubs, athleces, organizers) might clairn their part in profìt redistribution. To
avoid fi-iction with main stakeholders, building compromises becomes indispensable for ISFs.
Another challenge is that ISFs have to manage their dependence on events. (Jnforeseen
elenents such as event cancellation, security matters, the decreasing appeal of the event/sport,
the concurrence of other sports, new events, and so on, may put their economic model at
risk. Based on these observations, a couple of starting points for future research on the
importance of major sport everlts in ISFs' strategic planning are proposed:
1. The question of ISFs' event portfolio as a strategic tooJ.
2. The question of ISFs' event ownership rights and organizing mo<1e
3. The question of ISFs'redistribution mociel of event profits.
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